Conference Program International Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
International Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory
June 17-19, 2021 | Virtual Event via Zoom | Register Here
Conference Program
Day 1 | Thursday, June 17
8:10 AM - 8:25 AM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
(i) Welcome address by Eric Bahel and Michael Moehler
8:30 - 9:45 AM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Elections and Voting Systems I Session B - Cooperative Games Session C - Contests and Social Choice
(i) Mamageishvili Akaki (i) Haoyu Wang (i) Stefano Barbieri
Elections and Interim Turnout Essentiality of Degree r in TU games Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the
(ii) Tim Schmitz (ii) Kevin Techer New Hampshire Effect
Assessing Alternative Voting Methods in Stable Agreements Through Liability Rules (ii) Subhasish Chowdhury
a Politically Polarized Environment (iii) Mikel Alvarez-Mozos The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests
(iii) Dariusz Stolicki On Convexities in TU Games With Externalities with Endogenous Coalition Formation
Spoiler Effect in Multiparty Systems (iii) Dan Kovenock
A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimen-
sional Private Information
10:00 -11:00 AM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
(i) Keynote address by Franz Dietrich: Jury Theorems
11:15 - 12:30 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Political Economy Session B - Experiments: Voting Session C - Scheduling and Rationing I
(i) Vessela Daskalova (i) Boris Ginzburg (i)Marieke Musegaas
Discrimination in Collective Decision Expressive Voting in Committees Core Allocations for Cooperation Problems in Vaccination
(ii) Marcelo de C Griebeler (ii) Ehsan Asghari-Ghara (ii) Ata Atay
Fear of Communism: A Political Theory of Land Reform in The Effect of a Natural Catastrophe on Election’s Out- Open Shop Scheduling Games
Democracies comes: A Psychic Named Twitter (iii) Herbert Hamers
(iii) Jean-Baptiste Tondji (iii) Antoinette Baujard Weighted Minimum Coloring Games
A Free and Fair Economy: A Game of Justice and Inclusion Not So Strategic Voters. Evidences from an In Situ Experi-
ment During the French Presidential ElectionInternational Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory
June 17-19, 2021 | Virtual Event via Zoom
Conference Program
1:30 - 3:10 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Bargaining, Consensus and Compromise Session B - Fair Division I
(i) Ying Chen (i) Emin Karagozoglu
Sequential Vote Buying Kantian Equilibria of a Class of Nash Bargaining Games
(ii) Ryan Doody (ii) David Lowing
Consensus and Compromise in Collective Choice Allocation Rules for Multi-choice Games with a Permission Tree Structure
(iii) Volker Britz (iii) William Thomson
Open rule legislative bargaining Claims Problems with Restricted Claims
(iv) Juan Moreno-Ternero
On the Axiomatic Approach to Sharing Revenue from Broadcasting Sports Leagues
Day 2 | Friday, June 18
9:30 - 10:30 AM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
(i) Keynote address by Bhaskar Dutta: Voting in Committees
10:45 - 12:25 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Fair Division II Session B - Candidate Selection Session C - Inventives I
(i) Riccardo Saulle: (i) Margarita Kirneva (i) Ashley Piggins
An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs Voting with Simultaneous Vetoes Pure Strategy NE in Spatial Models With Valence
(ii) Shreoshi Banerjee (ii) Car Schroedl (ii) Lars Moen
Lorenz Optimality For Sequencing Problems with Welfare Can Public Officials Understand and Accept The Ranked Eliminating Group Agency
Bounds Pairs Rules (iii) Jingyi Xue
(iii) Marco Dall’Aglio (iii) Nic Tideman Local Dominance
Fair Division of Goods in the Shadow of Market Prices A Rational Way to Shrink the Field Of Candidates to Any (iv) Benjamin Ogden
(iv) Gustavo Bergantinos Specified Size Endogenous Electoral Factions: A Foundation for Ethical
Monotonicity in Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Voting
Sports LeaguesInternational Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory
June 17-19, 2021 | Virtual Event via Zoom
Conference Program
1:30 - 3:10 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Decision Theory: Beliefs and Information Session B - Indices of Power and Inequality
(i) Evan Piermont (i) Mostapha Diss
Hypothetical Expected Utility Inconsistent Weighting
(ii) Andrew Ellis (ii) Laszlo Koczy
Subjective Causality in Choice Power and Preferences
(iii) Rui Tang (iii) Justin Leroux
A Theory of Updating Ambiguous Information Assessing Inequality Assessments: A General Representation of Inequality Indice
(iv) Surajit Borkotokey
A New Ranking Procedure based on the Generalized Shapley: Value of Cooperative Games
with Transferable Utilities
3:30 - 4:30 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
(i) Keynote address by Maggie Penn: Information, Incentives, and Algorithmic Fairness
6:00 - 7:15 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Scheduling and Rationing II Session B - Scoring Rules Session C - Non-Dictatorial Domains
(i)Christian Trudeau (i) Anne-Marie George (i) Joseph Root
Core Constraints When Scheduling With Deadlines The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Proce- Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mech-
(ii) Zhixin Liu dure to Allocate Wasted Votes anisms
Choosing Opponents in Tournaments (ii) Yuta Nakamura (ii) Huaxia Zeng
(iii) Haris Aziz Accountable Voting A Taxonomy of Non-Dictatorial Domains
Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare (iii) Chang Woo Park (iii) Gopakumar Achuthankutty
Rationing Characterization of Ranking by Rating Strategy-proof Rules on Partially Single-Peaked DomainsInternational Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory
June 17-19, 2021 | Virtual Event via Zoom
Conference Program
Day 3 | Saturday, June 19
8:00 - 9:40 AM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Incentives II Session B - Matching
(i) Siwen Pan (i) Vikram Manjunath
The Quasi-Strictly Proper Max Rule Interview Hoarding
(ii) Jorge Alcade-Unzu (ii) Yuki Tamura
Common Structure of All Strategy-Proof Rules The Crawler: Three Equivalence Results for Object (Re)allocation Problems when Prefer-
(iii) Abhinaba Lahiri ences are Single-Peaked
Bounded Stochastic Response in the Random Voting Model (iii) Edwin Muñoz-Rodriguez
(iv) Manvir Schneider Incentive-Compatible Triaging in Deceased-Donor Organ Transplantation
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior (iv) Szilvia Papai
Fairness Comparisons of Strategyproof and Efficient Matching Rules
10:00 - 11:00 AM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
(i) Keynote address by Salvador Barberà: Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices
11:15 - 12:30 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Elections and Voting Systems II Session B - Experiments: Rights
(i) Marek Kaminski (i) Nicola Maaser
Primacy Effects in Proportional Representation Moral Cost in Weighted Committee Decisions
(ii) Frank Steffen (ii) Efrat Dressler
Proportional Representation and Voter Preference Rankings in German Federal Parliamen- Doing the Right Thing? Voting Power Effect and Institutional Shareholder Voting
tary Elections, 2005–2017 (iii) Chetan Dave
(iii) Markus Brill Enumerating Rights: More is Not Always Better
Approval-based ApportionmentInternational Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory
June 17-19, 2021 | Virtual Event via Zoom
Conference Program
1:30 - 2:45 PM EDT
Please add Time Zone, City or Town for additional time zone information
Session A - Experiments: Democracy, Power and Session B - Democracy, Voting and Juries Session C - Decision Theory: Behavioral Choice
the Common Good (i) Huihui Ding (i) Gerelt Tserenjigmid
(i) Philipp Otto Deliberation and Epistemic Democracy Minimum Distance Belief Updating with General Informa-
The Flip Side of Power (ii) Tom Mulligan tion
(ii) Sakshi Upadhyay Optimizing Poltical Influence: A Jury Theorem with Dynamic (ii) Francesco Cerigioni
Coalition Formation in Public Goods Games: Experimental Competence and Dependence Choice by Associations to Concepts
Evidence (iii) Thomas Choate (iii) Giorgia Romagnoli
(iii) Catherine Eckel Optimal Voting Rules for Separated-Dimension Nonsepara- Morals in multi-unit markets
The Democratic Peace: An Experimental Test of a Causal ble Preferences
Relation and of Underlying MechanismsYou can also read
