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The Idea of an Economic Constitution
(Wirtschaftsverfassung) in German Law
Peter-Christian Müller-Graff
Introduction
The legal idea of an ‘economic constitution’ (Wirtschaftsverfassung) is an irides-
cent mind provoking thought in German law and legal scholarship since more
than a century. It goes back as far as to the Weimar Constitution (1.), unfolded
in the early scholarly debates on the content of the Federal Republic’s Basic
Law (2.), but was not recognized as a constitutional principle by the jurispru-
dence of the Federal Constitutional Court, however in its substance linked to
the Basic Law’s fundamental rights by it and by legal doctrine (3.) and revived
in its conceptual relevance by the emergence of the common market law of the
European Communities and its practical implications for the legal order of the
economy as well as by today’s explicit Union law provisions on the principles
of this order (4.) and leaves scholarly legal doctrine with its permanent intrin-
sic task of clarifying the substantive systematic coherence of the economically
relevant legal provisions with a view to their consistent interpretation and to
counseling legislation and policy (5.).
1 The Roots of the Topic of an ‘Economic Constitution’ in the Weimar
Constitution
Since it often proves difficult to trace back and identify the true inventor
of a specific normative thought or idea, one can at least reach solid ground
in naming a remarkable novelty in positive law texts. While the concept
of ‘economic constitution’ can be traced back to the French physiocrats
of the 18th century and the German economists of the historical-ethical
school of the 19th century1 –more or less appearing like a “will-o’-the
1 See supra in this volume, P. Steiner, « Les Physiocrates, l’économie politique, l’Europe ». See
also: R. Piepenbrock, Der Gedanke eines Wirtschaftsrechts in der neuzeitlichen Literatur bis
zum Ersten Wektkrieg, Cologne, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1964; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der
Wirtschaft, Vol. I.: Von der Besatzungszeit bis zur Großen Koalition, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck,
© Peter-C hristian Müller-G raff, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004519350_021
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wisp”2 –, it was first given a legal outline in Germany by the decision of
the Weimar Constitution of 14 August 1919 (wrv) as compared with the
Constitution of the German Empire of 16 April 1871 to treat “the economic life”
(Wirtschaftsleben) as a specific constitutional topic.3 The wrv devoted a whole
division of 15 articles to this subject (Articles 151 to 165). Although they appear
as a conglomerate of rules for different issues related to the economy, they
were connected by a normative programmatic orientation point directed to
the state’s task in the economy. Article 151, par. 1 s. 1 wrv provided that “the
ordering of the economic life must conform to the principles of justice, with
the assurance to all of an existence worthy of a human being as the goal”.4 With
this wording the idea of the public responsibility for the “economic life” was
born in positive constitutional law. The text of Article 151 wrv went on stat-
ing that “within these limits the economic freedom of the individual is to be
secured”5 and “the freedom of trade and industry is guaranteed in accordance
with Imperial statutes”.6
The following articles of this part of the wrv provided for a broad array
of economy-related constitutional guidelines, principles and rights, among
them: the principle of freedom of contract in economic intercourse in accord-
ance with the statutes (Article 152, par. 1 wrv); the right to own property and
the protection against expropriation except for the common welfare and upon
statutory grounds in exchange of adequate compensation (Article 153 wrv);
the guarantee of the right of inheritance (Article 154 wrv); the state supervi-
sion of the distribution and use of the land (Article 155 wrv); the competence
of the state to transfer into public ownership private economic enterprises
1999, p. 12; K. W. Nörr, « “Economic Constitution”: On the Roots of a Legal Concept », Journal
of Law and Religion, 1994, vol. 11, n°1, pp. 343–354.
2 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 12 (« Irrlicht »).
3 K. W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1988, pp. 166,173 ff. Ed.: see
also supra in this volume, Section 1 – The Emergence of the Concept. From the Physiocrats to
the Weimar Republic, and esp. the contributions of G. Grégoire (« The Economic Constitution
under Weimar : Doctrinal Controversies and Ideological Struggles »), and the discussions by
H. Rabault (« Le Concept de Constitution économique : émergence et fonctions ») and P.C.
Caldwell (« The Concept and Politics of the Economic Constitution »).
4 English translation source for the wrv available at: https://constituteproject.org (last con-
sulted on 12 February 2022); for an English version of the Constitution of the German Empire
of 16 April 1871 see: « Constitution of the German Empire (April 16, 1871) » in J. Retallack (ed.),
Forging an Empire: Bismarckian Germany (1866–1890), German History in Documents and
Images (gdhi), Documents, available at: https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?docu
ment_id=1826 (last consulted on 12 February 2022).
5 Article 1, par. 1 s. 2 wrv.
6 In the sense of “Reichsgesetze”; Article 151, par. 3 wrv.
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suitable for socialization, to secure a controlling influence in the administra-
tion of economic enterprises and, in case of urgent need for the purpose of
common-economics (Gemeinwirtschaft)7, to combine economic enterprises
and associations upon the basis of self-administration to engage employers
and employees in the administration, and to regulate production, manufac-
ture, distribution, utilization, price-fixing, and importation and exportation of
economic products according to common-economics principles (Article 156
wrv); the protection of physical and intellectual labour (Article 157–158 wrv);
the right to form associations for the maintenance and advancement of the
conditions of labour and economics (Article 159 wrv); the establishment of a
social security system (Article 161 wrv); the moral duty to work and the public
promotion of job opportunities (Article 163 wrv); the public task to foster and
protect the independent middle class in agriculture, crafts, industry, trade and
commerce (Article 164 wrv); and the promotion of workers’ and employees’
participation, with equal rights in cooperation with the employers, in the reg-
ulation of the conditions of wages, salaries and work and also in the whole
economic development of the productive forces (Article 165 wrv).8
The normative scheme of the Weimar Constitution gave rise to scientific
reflection on the normative overall order of the economy and the role of the
state.9 The discussion about the basic constitutional orientation of the eco-
nomic order was conducted primarily on the basis of the fundamental rights
of the constitution.10 They received different interpretations: as a safeguard
for the trade unions’ conception of economic democracy (Franz Leopold
Neumann)11, as a socially modified liberal basis of the economic order (Albert
Hensel)12, as state-bound institutions (Ernst Rudolf Huber)13 and as a blan-
ket for the legislature (Franz Böhm).14 Before this discussion could unfold,
the Weimar Constitution eroded with the National Socialists’ rise to power
7 K. W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen, op. cit., p. 167; M. Schmoeckel and M. Maetschke,
Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft, 2nd ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. 500 ff.
8 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 181 ff.
9 See supra in this volume, G. Grégoire, « The Economic Constitution under Weimar :
Doctrinal Controversies and Ideological Struggles ».
10 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 173.
11 F. L. Neumann, « Die soziale Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der Weimarer Verfassung », Die
Arbeit: Zeitschrift für Gewerkschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftskunde, 1930, vol. 7, pp 569–582.
12 A. Hensel, Grundrechte und politische Weltanschauung, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1931.
13 E. R. Huber, Das Deutsche Reich als Wirtschaftsstaat, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1931.
14 F. Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf. Eine Untersuchung zur Frage des wirtschaftkichen
Kampfrechts und zur Frage der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung,
Berlin, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1933, p. 337; K. W. Nörr, Die Leiden des Privatrechts,
Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1994, pp. 101 ff., pp. 146 ff.; K. W. Nörr, « On the concept of the
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in 1933.15 In relation to “economic life” it was replaced by state induced or
imposed cartelization with increasing state influence16 and resulted in new
forms of sectoral industrial organizations (Reichsvereinigungen) as instru-
ments of public steering.17 Eventually the “ordering of economic life” turned
into a war economy with the prioritization of military supplies.18
2 Early Scholarly Debates on the ‘Economic Constitution’ of the
Basic Law
With the new beginning of the state and the legal order after the fall of
the National Socialist dictatorship and the end of the Second World War,
a new perspective was also opened for the idea and practice of the legal
“ordering of economic life”. In midst of the seething time19 of the differ-
ent approaches of decartellization,20 the allied antitrust laws,21 the rise
of the ordoliberal doctrine (Walter Eucken,22 Franz Böhm)23 and the
concept of a social market economy (Alfred Müller- Armack,24 Ludwig
“economic constitution” and the importance of Franz Böhm from the viewpoint of legal
history », European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, n°4 , 1996, pp. 345–356.
15 See the legislative acts in H. Hildebrandt (ed.), Die deutschen Verfassungen des 19. und 20.
Jahrhunderts, Paderborn-Zurich, Schöningh, 1975, pp. 111 ff.
16 M. Schmoeckel and M. Maetschke, Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft, op. cit., p. 503;
L. A. Holm, Kartelltheorie und internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien,
Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 2013, pp. 210 ff.
17 Ibid., p. 223.
18 R. Wagenführ, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939–1945, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1954.
19 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 19 ff., pp. 36 ff., pp. 58 ff.
20 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17 –August 2, 1945,
Conclusions, in: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp (last consulted on
12 February 2022).
21 W. C. Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World, New York, Columbia
University Press, 2001.
22 W. Eucken, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1939; W. Eucken,
« Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung », ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung
von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1949, vol. 2, n° 1, pp. 1–99; K. W. Nörr, Die Leiden des
Privatrechts, op. cit., pp. 140 ff.
23 F. Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf, op. cit.; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft,
Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 81 ff.; K. W. Nörr, Die Leiden des Privatrechts, op. cit., pp. 146 ff.; K. W. Nörr,
An der Wiege deutscher Identität nach 1945: Franz Böhm zwischen Ordo und Liberalismus,
Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 1993; K. W. Nörr, « On the concept of the “economic constitu-
tion” and the importance of Franz Böhm from the viewpoint of legal history », op. cit.
24 A. Müller- Armack, « Soziale Marktwirtschaft », in Wirtschaftsordnung und
Wirtschaftspolitik: Studien und Konzepte zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und zur Europäischen
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Erhard)25 in the western zones of occupation and the nationalization and
establishment of a socialist planned economy in the Soviet zone of occu-
pation,26 the Federal Republic of Germany emerged with its Basic Law
(Grundgesetz) of 23 May 1949. Similarities and differences of the Basic Law
in comparison with the Weimar Constitution are a long-standing subject of
research and debate.27 In view of the constitutional “ordering of economic
life” the difference is striking. Different from the Weimar Constitution no spe-
cific part of the text of the Basic Law is devoted to “economic life”. This lack –
seen against the contemporary background of the political and ideological
struggles for the right order of the economy and of the different political
tracks pursued in the West and in the East –triggered a voluminous debate
on the “economic constitution of the Basic Law” (Wirtschaftsverfassung des
Grundgesetzes) immediately after the Basic Law’s entry into force. In particu-
lar three lines of thought determined the discussion.28
2.1 The Thesis of “Economic Theoretical Neutrality” of the Basic Law
The first line of thought promoted in particular by Herbert Krüger was linked
to the evident lack of a separate section on economic life in the Basic Law.
It deduced from this absence the thesis that economic policy and legislation
were constitutionally bound to be guided by “economically value-neutral
points of view” (wirtschaftstheoretisch wertneutrale Gesichtspunkte)29. During
the time of fierce ideological-political controversies over Germany’s economic
restructuring, Krüger argued that the constitution prevents every victorious
majority from filling the constitutional blanket solely in accordance with
its ideas. He concluded that any economic theoretical monism or purism of
Integration, Freiburg, Rombach, 1966, pp. 243–250; F. Quaas, Soziale Marktwirtschaft.
Wirklichkeit und Verfremdung eines Konzepts, Bern, Paul Haupt Verlag, 2000, p. 44; K. W.
Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 57 ff.; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der
Wirtschaft, Vol. II: Von der sozial-liberalen Koalition bis zur Wiedervereinigung, Tübingen,
Mohr Siebeck, 2007, pp. 3 ff.
25 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 40 ff.
26 M. Schmoeckel and M. Maetschke, Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft, op. cit., pp. 504 ff.;
Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ed.), Markt oder Plan –
Wirtschaftsordnungen in Deutschland 1945–1961, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 1997.
27 See, e.g., H. Dreier, « Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung. Vorbild oder Gegenbild des
Grundgesetzes », Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2019, vol. 69, n°16–17, pp. 19–26.
28 P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht,
Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1984, pp. 250 ff.
29 H. Krüger, « Staatsverfassung und Wirtschaftsverfassung », Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt,
1951, vol. 66, pp. 361–368, esp. p. 363.
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public economy policy would be unconstitutional.30 This statement echoes
the contemporary topicality of navigating in fierce political controversies
over the organization of the national economy. Krüger’s reasoning met broad
rejection.31 Indeed, a constitutional requirement that economic policy should
forego the chance of rationality embodied in economic theory would be pecu-
liar. It cannot be deduced from the Basic Law nor from the previous constitu-
tional deliberations.32
2.2 The Thesis of the Constitutional Guarantee of the ‘Social Market
Economy’
The most profiled positive thesis in early scholarly discussions on the content
of Basic Law in relation to “economic life” held that the Basic Law guaran-
teed the social market economy. It was developed by Hans Carl Nipperdey.33
Although no explicit wording in the Basic Law supported his view, Nipperdey
argued that this concept was inherent in the constitution and recogniza-
ble if looked at its composition of provisions from a viewpoint of economic
models. For this conclusion he relied on a distinction of four models: first
the liberalist market economy in the sense of the idea of “laissez faire, lais-
sez aller” (liberalistische Marktwirtschaft), second the central administra-
tion economy (Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft), third the “order neutrality”
30 Ibid.; H. Krüger, Grundgesetz und Kartellgesetzgebung, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1950, p. 11.
31 E.g. K. J. Partsch, « Die verfassungsmäßige Sicherung von Wirtschaftsprinzipien »,
ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1954, vol. 6, pp. 19–38,
esp. p. 22; E. R. Huber, « Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht », Die Öffentliche
Verwaltung, 1956, pp. 97–102, spec. p. 98 ff.; H. Ehmke, Wirtschaft und Verfassung : Die
Verfassungsrechtsprechung des Supreme Court zur Wirtschaftsregulierung, Karlsruhe, C. F.
Müller, 1961, pp. 43 ff.; E.-J. Mestmäcker, « Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung »,
in H. Sauermann and E.-J. Mestmäcker (eds.), Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung.
Festschrift für Franz Böhm zum 80. Geburtstag, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1975, pp. 383–419,
esp. pp. 394 ff.; R. Zuck, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Stabilitätsgesetz, Munich, Goldmann,
1975, pp. 31 ff.; H. H. Hollmann, Rechtsstaatliche Kontrolle der Globalsteuerung: Möglichkeiten
und Grenzen einer normativen Kontrolle globalsteuernder Wirtschaftspolitik am Beispiel
des Stabilitätsgesetzes, Baden- Baden, Nomos, 1980, pp. 82 ff.; P.- C. Müller-Graff,
Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 252 ff.
32 P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht,
op. cit., p. 253.
33 H. C. Nipperdey, Die soziale Marktwirtschaft in der Verfassung der Bundesrepublik, Karlsruhe,
C. F. Müller, 1954; H. C. Nipperdey, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Bundesverfassungsgericht,
Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1960, pp. 10 ff.; H. C. Nipperdey,
Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Grundgesetz, 2nd ed., Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, Carl
Heymanns Verlag, 1961, pp. 44 ff.
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(wirtschaftsrechtliche Neutralität) and fourth the “social market economy”
(soziale Marktwirtschaft). His comparison of the respective functional con-
ditions of these models with the complex constitutional statements on the
freedom principle and the social principle and their impact on the scope of
action of the ordinary legislator led Nipperdey to deduce and recognize the
“social market economy” as the economic order inherent in the Basic Law. In
this sense his thesis would not have been more than a (plausible) descriptive
summarizing statement of the fitting relation between the concept of the
social market economy34 and the content of the entirety of the constitutional
provisions.
However, Nipperdey’s thesis went further. It was not limited to the model-
like summation of the results of the (potential) application of the various con-
stitutional provisions, but essentially asserted a model guarantee as an inde-
pendent constitutional principle. In addition to the entirety of the explicit
constitutional norms, the “social market economy” emerges as an own con-
stitutional standard for the interpretation of individual provisions (such as
the notion of the “constitutional order” as a limit of the individual right of
every person to free development of his personality in Article 2 Basic Law or
as a standard for determining the relationship between different freedoms) as
well as a constitutional standard for assessing the legitimacy of economic law
legislation (such as trade law or competition law) and of economic policy (in
particular of state intervention in competition). In Nipperdey’s writings con-
crete consequences of this approach can be found such as the assessment of
the prohibition of cartel agreements as a concretization of the constitution35
and, by that, the precedence of the freedom of competition over the freedom
of contract (in the sense of concluding a cartel agreement); or a constitutional
conformity requirement for state intervention, in particular by means of state
aids, with a market economy.36 In the logic of this understanding of the Basic
Law, the constitutional admissibility of public interventions was restricted
to those aimed at safeguarding the functioning of the market economy or, as
an exception, to those that were not in conformity with the market economy
(marktinkonforme Interventionen), but could be legitimized on the basis of
overriding requirements of the constitutional order, in particular the constitu-
tional social policy principle.37
34 Supra, footnote 24.
35 H. C. Nipperdey, Die soziale Marktwirtschaft in der Verfassung der Bundesrepublik, op.
cit., p. 20.
36 Ibid., p. 21.
37 Ibid., p. 21.
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This understanding of the Basic Law did not prevail. Apart from doubts
about the possibility to derive precise criteria from the theory of the social
market economy38 for the judicial decision of a specific issue and apart from
the assumption that the Parlamentary Council which adopted the Basic Law
wanted to leave leeway for the realization of divergent programs,39 there is a
weighty categorical objection, namely the autonomy of the positivized consti-
tution. The opening up of the constitution to a model draft conceived outside
the constitution called “social market economy” in order to provide binding
standards for the constitutional assessment of economic legislation and eco-
nomic policy measures would make it possible to manipulate constitutional
statements from an extra-constitutional program.40 Nevertheless it seems to
me that this thesis has raised the awareness in the scholarly constitutional and
legal discussion for normative thinking in economic models and their inter-
nal rationality and, by that, the perception of economic models as a possible
source of legal arguments with persuasive authority.41
2.3 The Thesis of the Basic Law’s Institutional Guarantee of a Mixed
Economic Constitution
The third line of thinking, elaborated by Ernst Rudolf Huber, centered in the
thesis of an institutional guarantee of a mixed economic constitution in the
Basic Law.42 It is based on the premise that the Basic Law, despite the lack of a
separate section on economic life, has a certain system of the basic economic
order in mind.43 Ultimately, however, this thesis is limited to the statement
that constitutional guarantees of economic freedom are “balanced” with con-
stitutional social bonds by the Basic Law44 and constitute in this sense a mixed
38 Supra, footnote 24.
39 H. C. F. Liesegang, Die verfassungsrechtliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Zentralfragen
und Strukturprinzipien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung grundrechtstheore-
tischer Überlegungen, Hamburg, Hansischer Gildenverlag Heitmann, 1977, pp. 26 ff.;
N. Reich, Markt und Recht : Theorie und Praxis des Wirtschaftsrechts in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Darmstadt, Luchterhand, 1977, p. 80.
40 P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht,
op. cit., pp. 255 ff.
41 On the general benefit of reflecting on market rationality in legal issues W. Möschel,
Rechtsordnung zwischen Plan und Markt: am Beispiel von Preiskontrollen nach § 22 GWB,
Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1975, pp. 29 ff.
42 E. R. Huber, Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, op. cit., p. 101; E. R. Huber,
Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht, vol. I, 2nd ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1953, pp. 18 ff., pp. 30
ff. ; similar R. Schmidt, Wirtschaftspolitik und Verfassung, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1971,
p. 135; critical e.g. H. Ehmke, Wirtschaft und Verfassung, pp. 26 ff.
43 E. R. Huber, Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, op. cit., p. 98.
44 Ibid.
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economy. The result of this approach is a summary of the general applicability
of the constitutional provisions on economic policy and legislation and the
description of their tension to be resolved for economic issues, but not the
establishment of an own comprehensive constitutional criterion. It also seems
to imply a kind of resignation to the intrinsic scientific task of searching and
identifying the inner substantive system of principles that connects the indi-
vidual provisions and that can unfold the persuasive authority of considering
systemic rationality for consistent interpretation of existing provisions and for
legal policy.
3 The View of the Federal Constitutional Court
The debate on the economic constitution of the Basic Law reached the Federal
Constitutional Court (fcc) as early as in 1952, 1953 and 1954.45 78 companies
had lodged constitutional complaints (Article 93, par. 1 no 4 lit. a Basic Law)
against the statutory obligation to pay a one-off amount in the course of the
reconstruction of the German economy to cover the urgent investment needs
of coal mining, the iron-making industry and the energy sector (Investment
Aid Act or Investitionshilfegesetz). In addition to their assertion of a violation of
their fundamental rights (among them the freedom of action and in particular
the right of free entrepreneurship and the guarantee of property), they had
asserted a violation of the “unwritten” constitutional principle of economic
policy neutrality as well as a violation of the existing economic and social order
and of the requirement to use means in conformity with a market economy.
The fcc rejected the existence of such unwritten constitutional principles
by saying that the Basic Law neither guaranteed the “economic political neu-
trality” (wirtschaftspolitische Neutralität) of government and legislative pow-
ers nor a “social market economy” that could only be managed with market-
compliant means (martktkonforme Mittel).46 It added that the “economic
political neutrality” of the Basic Law only consists in the fact that the consti-
tution has not “expressly” taken a decision for a particular economic system
(Wirtschaftssystem). The fcc concluded that this constitutional situation
enables the legislature to pursue the appropriate economic policy, “provided it
observes the Basic Law”. However, this restriction (“provided”) is significant in
view of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law, which may only be restricted
45 BverfG, Judgement of 20 July 1954, Investitionshilfegesetz, BverfGE 4,7.
46 Ibid., D 5.
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under certain conditions (Article 19, par. 1 and 2 Basic Law), and in view of the
inherent possibility of judicial review of public measures (Art. 19 par. 4 Basic
Law). In this respect it can be said that the Basic Law’s fundamental rights
unfold micro-and macroeconomic functions.47
The fcc, in consequence of its reasoning, found that the economic and
social order of the time was an order possible under the Basic Law, but not the
only possible order. Hence the court stated the constitutional irrelevance of
whether the Investment Aid Act was in line with the previous economic and
social order and whether the means used to steer the economy were in con-
formity with the market (marktkonform). However, in a remarkable twist, the
fcc, when examining the compatibility of the Investment Aid Act with the prin-
ciple of equality (Article 3 Basic Law) also addressed the argument of the com-
plainants that the Investment Aid Act caused a shift in the “competitive position”
(Wettbewerbslage) at the disadvantage of the obliged entities.48 The court rec-
ognized that any economic intervention (Wirtschaftslenkungsmaßnahme), by
intervening in the process of social life, more or less corrects the free play of
forces (das freie Spiel der Kräfte) and the competitive situation.49 Although the
fcc found that such measures would not already be inadmissible by the sheer
fact that they change the competitive situation, it nevertheless held that their
inadmissibility could result from special circumstances (besondere Umstände)
that would justify the conclusion that the legislature would act arbitrarily.50
Concerning the Investment Aid Act the court found that the limits of the discre-
tion granted to the legislature had not been exceeded.51 But the fcc generally
emphasized that such laws must be required by the public interest and must
not arbitrarily neglect the interests of others that are worthy of protection.
This basic view has been confirmed by several subsequent judgments of the
fcc,52 in particular in the judgment on the ‘co-determination’ in enterprises
47 R. Scholz, Paritätische Mitbestimmung und Grundgesetz : verfassungsrechtliche Fragen zur
gesetzlichen Einführung der paritätischen Unternehmensmitbestimmung, Berlin, Duncker
& Humblot, 1974, pp. 38 ff.; R. Scholz, « Grenzen staatlicher Aktivität unter der grundge-
setzlichen Wirtschaftsverfassung », in D.Duwendag (ed.), Der Staatssektor in der sozialen
Marktwirtschaft, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1976, pp. 113 ff., esp. pp. 124 ff.; R. Scholz,
Entflechtung und Verfassung, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1981, pp. 87 ff.
48 BverfG, Judgement of 20 July 1954, Investitionshilfegesetz, loc. cit., E 1 lit. f.
49 Ibid., D 5 and E 1 lit. f.
50 Ibid., E 1 lit.f.
51 Ibid., D 5 and E 1 lit. f.
52 See, in particular, BverfG, Judgement of 11 June 1958, Pharmacies, BverfGE 7, 377; BverfG,
Judgment of 18 December 1968, Mills, BverfGE 25, 1; BverfG, Judgment of 16 March 1971,
Petroleum Storage, BverfGE 30, 292.
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(Mitbestimmungsurteil).53 9 companies and 29 employers’ associations had
filed constitutional complaints against the statutory establishment of the
participation of employees’ representatives in the board of certain types of
companies with at least more than 2000 employees (Mitbestimmungsgesetz).
The court recalled its understanding, that the Basic Law does not contain any
“direct determination and guarantee of a specific economic order”, but leaves
the order of the economic life to the legislature, which can decide freely “within
the limits drawn by the Basic Law”.54 It further stated that this legislative task,
as well as the guarantee of fundamental rights, is one of the constituent ele-
ments of the democratic constitution and hence cannot be restricted further
by way of an interpretation of fundamental rights than the individual funda-
mental rights require. In this respect the judgment clarifies that the question
of the constitutionality of laws for ordering the economy is primarily one of
safeguarding the constitutional freedom of the individual citizen, which the
legislature must also take into account when regulating the economy.55 Knut
Wolfgang Nörr criticized the reasoning of this judgment under the aspect that
the court had blocked the possibility of a sovereign overview and evaluation
of the connection of different individual laws for the totality of the economic
order and gave politicians carte blanche for regulatory carelessness.56
Nevertheless, due to the fcc’s emphasis on the individual freedoms in eco-
nomic matters, one cannot seriously dispute that, regardless of the fcc’s con-
ceptional and terminological hesitation, the consequence of the constitutional
freedoms is the basic guarantee of a market economy which is defined by free
coordination of free preferences of offer and demand as well as the freedom
of production and distribution and the guarantee of private property. This
does not preclude the admissibility of state interventions in the economy but
requires their justification, if they restrict fundamental freedoms as, e.g., con-
cretized and differentiated in the judgment on Vattenfall’s complaint against
the nuclear phase-out.57 Independent from this fundamental rights-based
approach, the additional question might be raised as to whether the most rel-
evant answer to the question of the constitutionally binding economic system
in Germany has not shifted from the Basic Law to the law of the European
Union (see iv.).
53 BverfG, Judgement of 1 March 1979, Mitbestimmungsgesetz, BverfGE 50, 290, recital 123 ff.
54 Ibid., recital 123: “keine unmittelbare Festlegung und Gewährleistung einer bestimmten
Wirtschaftsordnung”.
55 Ibid.
56 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 12.
57 BverfG, Judgement of 6 December 2016, Atomausstieg, BverfGE 143, 246, recital 214 ff.
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4 The European Overshadowing and Connection in the Question of
the Economic Constitution
4.1 The Content of the eec-Treaty and the Union Treaty
When in 1957 the Federal Republic together with five other European States con-
cluded the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (eec), the
implications of its content for the significance of the Basic Law for answering
the question of the relevant economic order in Germany went, it seems, unno-
ticed in the mentioned constitutional debate. However, in the separate schol-
arly discipline of European Community law the European economic order was
quickly thematized by German authors (Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung).58
It could not be overlooked that the decision for a common market, based on
58 In particular C. F. Ophüls, « Grundzüge europäischer Wirtschaftsverfassung », Zeitschrift
für das gesamte Handels-und Wirtschaftsrecht, 1962, vol. 124, pp. 136–181 ; E-.J. Mestmäcker,
« Offene Märkte im System unverfälschten Wettbewerbs in der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft », in H. Coing, H. Kronstein and E.-J. Mestmäcker (eds.),
Wirtschaftsordnung und Rechtsordnung. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Franz
Böhm, Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1965, pp. 345–391; W. von Simson, « Die Marktwirtschaft
als Verfassungsprinzip in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften », in: Rechts-und
Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Albert- Ludwigs- Universität Freiburg/Br. (ed.),
Zur Einheit der Rechts-und Staatswissenschaften, Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1967,
pp. 55–68; J. Scherer, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der EWG, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1970;
U. Everling, « Eigentumsordnung und Wirtschaftsordnung in der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft », in F. Baur, J. Esser, F. Kübler and E. Steindorff (eds.), Funktionswandel der
Privatrechtsinstitutionen. Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser, Tübingen, Mohr, 1974, pp. 379–401;
M. Zuleeg, « Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften », in Arbeitskreis
Europäische Integration (ed.), Wirtschafts-und gesellschaftspolitische Ordnungsprobleme
der EG, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1978, pp. 73–100; P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen
und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 280 ff.; T. Oppermann, « Europäische
Wirtschaftsverfassung nach der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte », in P.-C. Müller-Graff
and M. Zuleeg (eds.), Staat und Wirtschaft in der EG. Kolloquium für Bodo Börner, Baden-
Baden, Nomos, 1987, pp. 53–71; C. Joerges, « Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung
der Gemeinschaft und die Renaissance der regulativen Politik », Working Paper eui
law, n° 1991/15; J. Basedow, Von der deutschen zur europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung,
Tübingen, Mohr, 1992; A. Hatje, « Wirtschaftsverfassung », in A. von Bogdandy (ed.),
Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Heidelberg, Springer, 2003, pp. 683–745; P.-C. Müller-
Graff, « Die Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Herausforderung grenzüberschrei-
tender Unternehmensübernahmen », in E.-J. Mestmäcker, W. Möschel and M. Nettesheim
(eds.), Verfassung und Politik im Prozess der europäischen Integration, Baden-Baden,
Nomos 2008, pp. 195–222; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Das verschleierte Antlitz der Lissabonner
Wirtschaftsverfassung », Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels-und Wirtschaftsrecht, 2009,
vol. 173, pp. 443–453; C. Joerges, « Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise », Der
Staat, 2012, vol. 51, n°3, pp. 357–385; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Europäisches Binnenmarkt-und
Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht », in P.-C. Müller-Graff (ed.), Europäisches Binnenmarkt-und
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the normative concept of the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital59 with the intended enabling of transnational competition60 would
have normative consequences on the economic systems of the member states –
despite the Treaty’s statement that it “shall in no way prejudice the rules in
the Member States governing the system of property ownership”,61 which
was understood as the Treaty’s neutrality towards the alternative of privatiza-
tion or socialization;62 and also despite different national approaches to the
issue of the economic order;63 and also despite early efforts of the European
Commission and France to establish a kind of ‘planification’ on Community
level,64 which were, however, doomed to fail against the forces of private ini-
tiatives65 and competition unleashed by the transnational market access free-
doms of the common market. This perspective was, in particular, underlined
by the prohibitions of (non justifiable) restrictions of the free movement of
products and productive factors (today: Art. 26 et seq. tfeu) as well as by the
chapter of rules on competition addressing both anti-competitive conduct
of undertakings (today: Art.101 et seq. tfeu) and competition distorting aids
granted by states (Art.107 et seq. tfeu). These provisions mapped out the trail
to restricting regulatory state measures in order to guarantee the functioning
Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht, Enzyklopädie Europarecht, vol. 4, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden,
Nomos, 2021, § 1 (pp. 61 ff.).
59 Today Article 26, par. 2 tfeu.
60 Supra footnote 58. Ed.: regarding the effects in terms of ‘competition between jurisdic-
tion’, see also infra in this volume, the contributions in Section 6 on Global Governance
and New (Economic) Constitutionalism, esp. M.M. Mohamed Salah, « La mise en concur-
rence internationale des ordres juridiques nationaux », and T. Biscahie & S. Gill, « Three
Dialectics of Global Governance and the Future of New Constitutionalism ».
61 Today Article 345 tfeu.
62 U. Everling, « Eigentumsordnung und Wirtschaftsordnung in der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft », op. cit., pp. 379 ff.; G. Burghardt, Die Eigentumsordnungen in den
Mitgliedstaaten und der EWG-Vertrag. Zur Auslegung des Art. 222 EWG-Vertrag, Hamburg,
Appel, 1969.
63 D. W. Rahmsdorf, Ordnungspolitischer Dissens und europäische Integration, Kehl, Verlag
Engel, 1982; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Ordnungspolitische Divergenzen und wettbewerbliche
Lauterkeit in der Verfassung des Gemeinsamen Marktes », in H. Jahrrreiß, B. Börner and
K. Stern (eds.), Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit. Festschrift für Karl Carstens, Cologne/
Berlin/ Bonn/Munich, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1985, pp. 209– 230; P.-
C. Müller-
Graff,
Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., p. 65.
64 K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 32 ff. and pp. 36 ff.
65 P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Privatrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht », in P.-C. Müller-
Graff and M. Zuleeg (eds.), Staat und Wirtschaft in der EG. Kolloquium für Bodo Börne, op.
cit., pp. 17–52, esp. pp. 27 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Extending Private Party Autonomy Across
Borders », in S. Grundmann, W. Kerber and S. Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the
Role of Information in the Internal Market, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter, 2001, pp. 133–150.
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of the common market and hence of a normative system based on the concept
of a market economy with competition.66 While they were not explicitly linked
to an extra-legal specific order model in economic theory, it seems that a cer-
tain influence of the ordoliberal concept on their creation cannot be denied.67
Hence it didn’t come as a surprise that in 1992/1993 the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union included a clear normative statement on the economic order
in the European Community which today reads as a (programmatic) obliga-
tion of the Member States and the Union to adopt “an economic policy which
is based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic policies, on the
internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free compe-
tition” (today Article 119, par. 1 tfeu). Hence a principle of the intended nor-
mative order for the economy is enshrined in primary law. While in view of the
ecj this provision “do(es) not impose on the Member States clear and uncon-
ditional obligations which may be relied on by individuals before the national
courts”, but contains “a general principle whose application calls for complex
economic assessments which are a matter for the legislature or the national
administration”,68 concrete obligations in conceptual line with this obligation
are included in the treaties such as the mentioned prohibitions of restrictions
of the free movement or the mentioned rules on competition, in particular the
requirement of compatibility of state aids with the internal market.
Eventually in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon broadened the normative qualifi-
cation of the intended economic order of “an open market economy with free
66 E-.J. Mestmäcker, « Offene Märkte im System unverfälschten Wettbewerbs in der
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft », op. cit., pp. 354 ff.; P.- C. Müller-Graff,
Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 280 ff.;
P.-C. Müller-Graff, Binnenmarktziel und Rechtsordnung –Binnenmarktrecht, Bergisch
Gladbach/Cologne, Eul/O. Schmidt, 1989, pp. 30 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Die wettbewerb
verfasste Marktwirtschaft als gemeineuropäisches Verfassungsprinzip? », Zeitschrift
Europarecht, 1997, pp. 433–457.
67 E.-J. Mestmäcker, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union, 2nd ed.,
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006, p. 288 and pp. 290 ff.; S. Okruch, « Die Europäische
Wirtschaftsverfassung zwischen Input-und Output- Legitimation. Ein verfassungs
ökonomisches Impromptu » in C. Stumpf F. Kainer and C. Baldus (eds.), Privatrecht,
Wirtschaftsrecht, Verfassungsrecht –Privatinitiative und Gemeinwohlhorizonte in der
europäischen Integration. Festschrift für Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Baden-Baden, Nomos,
2015, pp. 1000–1005. Ed. : see also supra in this volume, F. Marty, « Évolution des poli-
tiques de concurrence en droit de l’UE : de la Wettbewerbsordnung ordolibérale à la More
Economic Approach néolibérale ? », and C. Mongouachon, « Les difficultés d’une inter-
prétation ordolibérale de la constitution micro-économique de l’Union européenne ».
68 ecj, Judgment of 3 October 2000, Échirolles, Case C-9/99, ecli:eu:c:2000:532, recital 25.
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competition” in the Union with the additional characteristics of “a highly com-
petitive social market economy”69 (Article 3, par. 3 tfeu) and also explicitly
included in the concept of the internal market “a system ensuring that compe-
tition is not distorted” (Protocol No 27). Although this general labelling of the
normatively intended economic constitution has not the quality of a directly
applicable provision, it nevertheless constitutes the primary law point of ori-
entation for the “economic life”.
4.2 The Constitutional Connection between European Union Law and
the Basic Law
It is obvious that these statements of European Union law are not without
relevance for answering the question of the legally binding economic system
in Germany. I submit that they are even constitutionally binding. This is the
result of the constitutional consequences of the opening clause of the Federal
Republic’s statehood by the former general Article 24 Basic Law70 and today’s
specific Article 23 Basic Law for the European Union.71 According to both pro-
visions “the Federation may transfer sovereign powers”, “by a law”, to an exter-
nal authority: in Article 24 Basic Law “to international organizations”, in Article
23 Basic Law to “the European Union that is committed to democratic, social
and federal principles, to the rule of law and to the principle of subsidiarity and
that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to
that afforded by this Basic Law”. Such a law which concretely opens the Federal
Republic’s statehood for accepting the rules of a common economic order had
been adopted already in form of the Consent Act to the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community and, later on (in form of the respective Consent
Acts), to all the subsequent amendments until today’s Treaty of Lisbon. Hence
the question of the economic constitution in the Federal Republic cannot
be reasonably answered without taking into account the effects of European
Union law anymore. In this respect one can argue that the Basic Law as well
69 E.g. P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Soziale Marktwirtschaft als neuer Primärrechtsbegriff der
Europäischen Union », in P.-C. Müller-Graff, S. Schmahl and V. Skouris (eds.), Europäisches
Recht zwischen Bewhärung und Wandel. Festschrift für Dieter H. Scheuing, Baden-
Baden, Nomos, 2011, S. 600–623; C. Stumpf, « Das Recht der sozialen Marktwirtschaft
im Binnenmarkt », in P.- C. Müller- Graff (ed.), Europäisches Binnenmarkt-und
Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht, op. cit., p.1471 ff.
70 P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht,
op. cit., pp. 320 ff.
71 R. Streinz, « Art.23 GG par. 54 et seqq. », in M. Sachs (ed.), Grundgesetz Kommentar, 6th
éd., Munich, C.H. Beck, 2012, pp. 939.
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as the constitutions of the other member states have been transformed into
European national constitutions.72
5 The Permanent Intrinsic Task of Scholarly Legal Doctrine
The current situation of Germany’s ‘economic constitution’ (in the sense of
constitutionally rooted provisions for the economic life) leaves scholarly legal
doctrine with the permanent intrinsic task of clarifying the substantive coher-
ence of the normative system of the (moving) applicable legal provisions with
a view to their consistent interpretation and to counseling legislation and pol-
icy. It comprises in particular four aspects.
5.1 Upholding the Autonomy of the Complex Legal Order
First of all legal doctrine in search of a coherent normative system for the
applicable legal economic order has to methodically uphold the autonomy of
the complex legal system in relation to models of economic theory.73 However,
this caveat is without prejudice to take account of its insights in causal eco-
nomic relationships74 (systemic rationality).
5.2 Identifying and Collecting Relevant Principles
The second aspect concerns the identification and collection of the principles
in the legal economic order such as, in particular, the principle of an open mar-
ket economy with free competition (Article 119, par. 1 and 2 tfeu), the freedom
to conduct a business (Article 16 Charter of Fundamental Rights [cfr]; Article
2 and 12 Basic Law), the right to property (Article 17 cfr; Article 14 Basic Law),
the freedom of contract (Article 6 cfr; Article 2 Basic Law), the equality prin-
ciple (Article 20 cfr; Article 3 Basic Law); the freedom of association (Article
12 cfr; Article 9 Basic Law); the transnational market access freedoms of the
internal market (Article 26 et seq. tfeu) with a system of ensuring that com-
petition is not distorted in it (Protocol No 27); the principles of stable prices,
sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of
payments (Article 119, par. 3 tfeu); the normative objective of a highly com-
petitive and social market economy (Article 3, par. 3 tfeu); the functioning of
72 For France, see H. Gaudin (ed.), La constitution européenne de la France, Paris, Dalloz, 2017.
73 W. Möschel, « Der Einfluß der europäischen auf die deutsche Rechtsordnung », in
M. Lieb, U. Noack and H. P. Westermann (eds.), Festschrift für Wolfgang Zöllner, Cologne,
Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1999, pp. 395–410.
74 W. Möschel, Rechtsordnung zwischen Plan und Markt, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.
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services of general economic interest (Article 14 tfeu); the principle of eco-
nomic, social and territorial cohesion (Article 174 et seq. tfeu); the principles
of sustainable development and social progress (Article 3, par. 3 teu).
5.3 Classifying and Evaluating Legal Norms in Relation to the Basic
Principle of the Legal Economic Order
A third aspect of the task of scholarly legal doctrine is the classification and
evaluation of legal norms in relation to the basic principle of the legal eco-
nomic order. Since Article 3 teu as well as Article 119 tfeu center in the prin-
ciple of a market economy, a possible structural understanding of the variety
of norms with relevance for the economy can be found in their classification
according to their objectives in relation to this principle. To these ends I pro-
pose to distinguish six groups of provisions according to their objective:75
provisions of guaranteeing economic freedoms for acting on the market;76
provisions for protecting the functioning of this system of freedom and com-
petition against internally caused perversions by the conduct of its actors (in
particular cartel agreements,77 abuses of dominant positions in a market78,
concentration which would significantly impede effective competition)79 as
well as against externally caused distortions of competition by public inter-
ventions (in particular state aids,80 preferential treatments in public pro-
curement,81 preferential treatments of public undertakings)82; provisions
for protecting specific common goods (Schutzgüter)83 or serving mandatory
requirements84 in a competitive market economy (such as, e.g., health, the
75 See P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Europäisches Binnenmarkt-und Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht », op.
cit., pp. 68 ff.
76 E.g., Articles 6, 16, 20 cfr; Articles 2, 12, 14 Basic Law.
77 Article 101 tfeu; § 1 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl.
I S. 2).
78 Article 102 tfeu; § 19 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl.
i s. 2).
79 Article 2, par. 3 Council Regulation (ec) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the con-
trol of concentrations between undertakings, oj 2004 L 24/1; § 36 par. 1 Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl. I S. 2).
80 Article 107 tfeu.
81 E.g. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/e c, oj 2014 L 94/65; § 97 et
seqq. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021, bgbl. I S.2).
82 Article 106, par. 1 tfeu.
83 E.g., Article 36 and 114, par. 3 tfeu.
84 Leading decision: ecj, Judgment of 20 February 1979, Cassis de Dijon, Case 128/78,
ecli:eu:c:1979:42.
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self-determination of the consumer, labour conditions, social standards, envi-
ronmental and climate protection standards); provisions for reaching certain
sectoral economic results (such as, e.g., the supply of agricultural products85 or
energy at reasonable prices,86 the standard of living for the agricultural com-
munity,87 the functioning of interstate transport services);88 provisions for
reaching macroeconomic goals (such as price stability, full employment, bal-
anced economic growth:89 sustainable balance of payments)90; and provisions
for the political distribution of economic gains in a polity (in particular tax law
and social security law).
5.4 Interpreting Individual Provisions and Defining Constitutional
Conditions for Their Compatibility and Admissibility
A fourth aspect of the task of scholarly legal doctrine can be seen in interpreting
individual provisions in relation to the basic principle of the legally intended
economic order and in defining the constitutional conditions (national and/
or European) for the compatibility of an individual legal provision or other
policy measures in economically relevant matters. If the basic principle of an
economic order is defined as a market economy, it seems adequate to take the
economic freedoms as the starting point for fulfilling the basic objective of
justice to decide structurally equal conflicts in an equal way and structurally
different conflicts in an adequately different way.
As a consequence for the interpretation of a provision (given that it is
interpretable), the less restrictive version for the economic freedom should
prevail.91 As far as economic and legal policy is concerned legal scholarship
is called to identify the general normative criteria for the justifying conditions
for restrictions of economic freedoms including the freedom of competition
as well as for distortions of competition and, by that, to identify the limits of
85 Article 39, par. 1 lit. d tfeu.
86 Article 194, par. 1 tfeu; § 1 par 1 Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts-und Gasversorgung
(Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) (7 July 2005; bgbl. I S. 1970, 3621).
87 Article 39, par. 1 lit. b tfeu.
88 Article 91 tfeu.
89 Article 3, par. 3 subsection 1 s. 1 teu; § 1 Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des
Wachstums der Wirtschaft (8 June 1967; bgbl. I S. 582).
90 Article 119, par. 3 tfeu; § 1 Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der
Wirtschaft (8 June 1967; bgbl. I S. 582).
91 Like for example in ecj, Judgment of 20 February 1979 (Cassis de Dijon), loc. cit., in the
interpretation of the necessity for accepting obstacles (caused by a specific national
rule on consumer protection in marketing fruit liquors) to the free movement of goods
(today’s Article 34 tfeu) and, by that, to border-crossing competition in the common
market.
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