Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
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doi:10.5477/cis/reis.176.3
Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors
in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
Pobreza e impunidad, factores relevantes en las variaciones
del catolicismo en América Latina
Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá
and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala
Key words Abstract
Catholic Adscription In the last 25 years the Catholic population in Latin America has
• Latin America decreased considerably, some studies attribute the increasing
• Corruption secularization to the economic and social changes that marked the
• Econometric Models end of the 20th century. In this sense, this work aims to analyze
• Poverty the incidence of socioeconomic factors in the reduction of Catholic
• Violence membership. The methodology is based on econometric linear
regression models. The main results show that the catholicity index
and economic growth are not related; but the growth of poverty did
have a negative effect, particularly when analyzed by region. Finally, by
combining violence and corruption, impunity emerges as a significant
factor in the variation of Catholicism.
Palabras clave Resumen
Adscripción católica En los últimos 25 años la población católica en América Latina
• América Latina disminuyó considerablemente, algunos estudios atribuyen la creciente
• Corrupción secularización a los cambios económicos y sociales que marcaron el
• Modelos fin del siglo xx. En ese sentido, este trabajo tiene por objetivo analizar
econométricos la incidencia de factores socioeconómicos en la reducción de la
• Pobreza feligresía católica. La metodología se basa en modelos econométricos
• Violencia de regresión lineal. Los principales resultados muestran que el índice
de catolicidad y el crecimiento económico no están relacionados; pero
el crecimiento de la pobreza sí tuvo un efecto negativo, particularmente
cuando se analiza por regiones; por último, al combinar violencia
y corrupción, la impunidad surge como un factor significativo en la
variación del catolicismo.
Citation
Andrade Rosas, Luis Antonio; Gaytán Alcalá, Felipe and Jiménez-Bandala, Carlos Alberto (2021).
“Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America”. Revista Es-
pañola de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 176: 3-20. (doi: 10.5477/cis/reis.176.3)
Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas: Universidad La Salle (México) | luis.andrade@ulsa.mx
Felipe Gaytán Alcalá: Universidad La Salle (México) | felipe.gaytan@ulsa.mx
Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala: Universidad de Quintana Roo (UQROO) (México) | carlos_jimenez@ulsa.mx
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-204 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
Introduction suffering. In this article, we consider these
factors as socioeconomic variables (pov-
Latin America (LA) has historically and cul- erty, violence and corruption) and analyse
turally been identified with Catholicism, their influence on levels of Catholicism in
not only because the majority of the po- the region using econometric modelling.
pulation identifies as Catholic in popula- In theoretical terms, we suggest that
tion census, but also because of the pre- the decline in Catholicism refers to affilia-
dominance of Catholic references in public tion and not to ways of thinking and prac-
spaces, which merge with national cultures tices; while in terms of methodology, we
and identities. The Church has played an analyse the correlation of the decline in
influential role in social and political sphe- Catholicism with poverty, violence and im-
res, changing or promotion of laws that it punity. One of the limitations of our anal-
sees as favourable through the actions of ysis is the inability to determine where
Catholics that occupy relevant political and members who abandon the Church based
economic positions (McCleary and Barro, on these factors go. We can only infer the
2019). social impact that Evangelical and Protes-
With the foundation of national states tant churches have had through the eco-
in the 19th century, the Church became an nomic support they receive in high poverty
important actor, whether in the design of areas (Guadalupe, 2018; Semán, 2019;
public polices (Peru, Chile and Argentina) Mansilla and Orellana, 2019; Carbonelli,
or in opposing liberal elites fighting for a 2019).
secular state (Mexico and Uruguay) (Blan- This article is organised into three sec-
carte, 2002). This situation continued, in tions. In the first we discuss our frame of
some cases, until the beginning of the 20th reference, including the concept of secu-
century. larisation, the relationship between the eco-
However, in the second half of the 20th nomic and social variables with Catholicism
century, the Catholic Church became con- and the concept of impunity. The second
cerned about low attendance at religious section presents the methodology, the data
services. Sociological explanations at the and the construction of our variables. The
time coincided in suggesting that it was not third section presents the results of the
a conjunctural problem, but rather a struc- econometric analysis and a discussion of
tural one rooted in a loss of religiosity and those results. Lastly, we present our con-
explained by social modernisation (Berger, clusions.
Davie and Fokas, 2008) and secularisation
centred around a pronounced individualism
(Dobbelaere, 2008).
Analytical framework
The downward trend in levels of Ca-
tholicism has continued in this century Secularisation in Latin America
(Zerpa, 2019); some hypotheses suggest
that it is higher economic segments of the Catholicism has declined drastically in La-
population and with a certain social sta- tin America (Graph 1). This is most clearly
bility that have abandoned the Church in seen in Central America, where Catholics
greater measure, while the poor population went from representing 90% of the popu-
living in contexts of insecurity have main- lation in 1970 to less than 50% in 2014. In
tained a greater attachment to Catholicism South America the most significant decli-
as a way of counteracting uncertainty and nes over this time were in Brazil, where the
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-20Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala 5
percentage of the population identifying as churches, as well as the growth of non-
Catholic decreased by 32 points. In con- Christian communities (Gaytán, 2020); and
trast, the decline in Paraguay was only 5%. secondly, a deinstitutionalisation of religious
While in Mexico, considered overwhelmin- beliefs and practices, especially among
gly Catholic, the number of church mem- Catholics, who have stopped participating
bers declined from 96% of the population in religious services but maintain their
to 82%1. religious affiliation for tradition. This has
The decline in religiosity was already led to an exodus toward other practices,
being analysed during the second half of including those based on concepts of
magic, energies and other rituals (Hoevel,
the 20th century. This ongoing change in
2016).
the conception of the world has been re-
ferred to as secularisation, a polysemic con- Several transformations resulting from
cept that has acquired different levels and the social and economic modernisation of
scope. For some theorists, the secular was the region converged in this process; for
understood as the lack of a presence of the example, migratory flows between coun-
religious in public spheres. For others, the tries and regions modified social and moral
concept referred to confining the sacred to standards in communities that were pre-
the conscience of the individual, each hav- viously closed but had become exposed
ing the freedom to believe or not in some- to diversity (Parker, 2013; Morello and
thing supernatural (Díaz Salazar, 1994). In Rabbia, 2019). In response, the Catho-
this respect, Dobbelaere (2008) comments lic Church revealed itself to be conserva-
on religious identity no longer being a core tive and largely intolerant, generating ten-
pillar in society, but only an additional di- sions between members and the church
mension. hierarchy (Aparicio, 2019). Data from 2014
shows that those confessing loyalty to the
Regarding Latin America, understanding
Church had dropped from 91% in 1970 to
secularisation has been less concerned with
only 68% in 2014 (Pew Research Center,
forms of social differentiation of religion
2014).
or its privatization from public spheres,
and more with the expansion of religious The decline in Catholicism does not
diversity in the face of a Catholicism necessarily imply a conversion to Protes-
dominant in the public sphere. This is the tantism and/or to Evangelical churches
result of two factors, first, an expansion (Aparicio, 2019). Although data from dif-
of religious diversity in different countries ferent agencies, among which stand out
where Catholicism has dominated over the demographic report by CEPAL (2016),
much of the past century, in particular the indicate that by 2025 the population that
expansion of Protestant and Evangelical will identify with other religious denomi-
nations, particularly Protestant and Evan-
1 In addition to the surveys consulted for this study
gelical, will equal that which identifies as
(Latinobarómetro, Pew Research Center, Gallup Inter- Catholic. However, the decline of one re-
national), we refer to other surveys that indicate a de- ligious affiliation does not correlate with
cline in the attachment to Catholicism. Among these the rise of another. In addition, a growing
are the Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina
of the Universidad de Vanderbilt, national surveys car- percentage of the population states it is
ried out by the Red de Investigadores del Fenómeno without religion, that is, many may con-
Religioso in México (RIFREM, 2016) and the Segunda tinue being Catholic, but they do not iden-
Encuesta Nacional de Creencias y Prácticas Religio-
sas in Argentina 2019, carried out by the CEIL–CON- tify with the institutional structure (Mora,
ICET team. 2017).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-206 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
Graph 1. Percentage of population that is Catholic in Latin America (1970-2014)
1970 2014
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Arg Bol Bra Chi Col Cri Ecu Esl Gtm Hon Me x Nic Pan Par Per Dom Uru Ven
Source: By authors based on data from the World Religion Database (Johnson and Grim, 1970 and Pew Research Center (2014)).
Poverty, corruption and impunity in the tholicism, suggesting that the poor popula-
context of Latin American Catholicism tion finds refuge in its Catholic beliefs and in
belonging to local church communities.
Analysis of the influence of socioecono-
Along the same lines, Sota (2005) com-
mic variables on the religious sphere can
ments that persons in situations of poverty
be in different directions. For example, Iyer
look to religion to escape their problems,
(2018) suggests that economists should be
reconfiguring their beliefs and practices
interested in religious services, because the based on the context of poverty in which
Church’s behaviour as supplier on social is- they are immersed. The relationship be-
sues reveals characteristics related to busi- tween levels of Catholicism and poverty is a
ness competition and innovation. McCleary result of networks of support and solidarity
and Barro (2019) mention that an analogy schemes that the Catholic Church in Latin
can be made between religion and econo- America has developed, part of a new evan-
mic growth, arguing, from a Weberian pers- gelisation strategy in response to the grow-
pective, that religious beliefs foster cha- ing presence of Evangelical and Pentecostal
racter traits such as a work ethic, honesty churches (Guadalupe, 2018). Similarly, Tho-
(non-corruption) and saving, which, directly mas and Hopkins (2009) of Africa carry out
or indirectly, as Andrade and Vega (2015) religious rituals to confront systems of pov-
show, affect economic growth. erty; they use these acts as mechanisms to
Regarding Latin America, we find slow cope with the structures that negatively af-
economic growth in general over recent years fect them due to race, gender and class.
and at the same time an inability to reduce Regarding the generalisation of the pov-
poverty (Andrade and Jiménez-Bandala, ertns argue that the peoply-religion rela-
2018). From this perspective, it could be in- tionship within the population, Schwadel
ferred that the greater the economic well- (2008), through an analysis of religious
being, the more the population abandons its youth in the United States, points out that,
Catholic affiliation, which would imply that although poor youth are likely to pray and
poverty is correlated with higher levels of Ca- read religious scripture, they are unlikely to
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-20Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala 7
regularly participate in organised religious which functions as a type of social support
activities. For their part, Ranjith and Rupas- for individuals.
ingha (2012) analyse if religious affiliation is All of this occurs in Latin America in a
a determinant in child poverty in the United context of growing rates of corruption and
States, showing that disaggregating those criminal violence (robberies, homicides, kid-
with a religious affiliation into mainly Prot- nappings, drug trafficking, etc.) and domes-
estants, Evangelicals and Catholics, reveals tic violence (physical and emotional abuse)
different effects on child poverty. (Wielandt and Artigas, 2016). According
Based on their findings, we can ask to the Latinobarometer (2018), LA popula-
about the direct and causal relationship tions perceive a growth in violence (above
between socioeconomic situation and reli- 55% on average), with intrafamily violence
gious affiliation. This affiliation is accentu- being the most common, particularly to-
ated in the poorest sectors of the popula- wards women (64%) and children (63%),
tion, who require relief from their precarious while feelings of insecurity in the street have
situation and seek well-being and the gen- also increased (51%). Regarding corrup-
eration of circuits of solidarity; in contrast, tion, it is in fourth place in terms of the most
the upper middle class, characterised by urgent issues to address, only behind the
high levels of education and consumption, economy, crime and political conflict; how-
is less religious. In this respect, Bäckström ever, in Mexico, it is in first place (Latino-
(2017) analyses the role of churches as barómetro, 2018).
agents of welfare in the social economy Although there is a negative correla-
and how their assistance has been essential tion between religious affiliation and income
to religious affiliation. Religion is a survival and education, this does not mean that the
strategy that constructs bonds of solidarity, Church finds greater approval among the
which permit individuals to face uncertain poor in comparison to higher income sec-
conditions (Camargo, 2019). Levine (2011) tors or those with higher levels of education;
argues that in critical situations, such as be- lower education is not synonymous with ap-
ing without work, a greater number of per- proval (Hoevel, 2016; Camargo, 2019). In
sons maintain their religious beliefs or re- the same way, positive correlations between
turn to them, unemployment serving as a religiosity and violence, and religiosity and
link between poverty and religion. corruption do not imply that religion is an in-
The strategic use of religion to face un- stitutional means of protection. However, it
certainties is also found in Inglehart and does appear as such when we use the com-
Norris (2016), who argue that secularisation posite variable, impunity, which refers to
appears in societies with high levels of wel- both violence and the lack of punishment
fare and development, where institutional for its perpetrators because of failures in the
mechanisms of social protection work. This justice system due to corruption (Le Clercq,
is consistent with the results from a Gallup 2018). However, the concept of impunity
International study (2017) that shows that refers not only to the lack of any sanction
individuals that manifest greater religios- for crime, but to the vulnerability and help-
ity have lower income and educational lev- lessness that the population feels in the
els. In addition, this study finds that greater face of the failures of authorities to address
religiosity is correlated with contexts of in- crime (Vilalta, Castillo and Torres, 2016). As
security and corruption. Thus, it seems we a response, many communities have estab-
might hypothesise that circumstances of lished support and defence networks to pre-
social and economic uncertainty and vul- vent crime and/or to demand that the state
nerability facilitate religious attachment, apply the law (Bonet and Alija, 2009).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-208 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
The Catholic population finds legal and where, Yi represents the dependent or ex-
psychological support in facing the conse- plained variable and X1, X2, ..., XK the pos-
quences of crime in their parochial commu- sible k independent variables. The coeffi-
nity networks. The Church has established cients a j represent the effects from the
civic organisations to denounce impunity changes in the independent variables over
and, in extreme cases, self-defence groups the dependent variable, expressed as
have formed to confront drug traffickers and !Yi
= a j , for j = 1, 2, ..., k.
organised crime (Valenzuela and Odgers, !X j i
2014; Burbano, 2010). The impunity variable For their part, Ui represents uncontrolled
has a positive impact on levels of Catholi- and random variables, referred to as dis-
cism, however, not in terms of an increase in turbances; classic examples of these dis-
belief, but rather as a safety mechanism pro- turbances are a crisis, a war and disease,
vided by belonging to a religious institution. among others. Lastly, effects that are not
Thus, impunity is a variable that reveals, represented in the independent variables
on the one hand, perceptions of insecurity re- are attributed to these disturbances (Gu-
garding violence and, on the other, the inabil- jarati, 2003).
ity of authorities to punish delinquency. This The expression (1), which considers the
produces a sensation of vulnerability to crime unrepresented effects of the independent
as well as toward authority (Le Clercq, 2018), variables on the dependent variable, in con-
as authorities unable to persecute and punish junction with the disturbance factor, repre-
crime may also be in collusion with criminals. sents an econometric model. This model,
The uncertainties of daily life, social conflicts must meet the following assumptions:
and discontent, all have a negative impact
on citizens’ perceptions of the political sys- i) Ui is a random variable with normal dis-
tem and on trust and solidarity as well, factors tributions, with mean 0 and constant va-
which play a role in religiosity (PNUD, 2013). riance, that is, Ui~N (0, σ2).
ii) The explanatory variables X1, X2, ..., Xk,
have to be uncorrelated, that is, what
Methodology explains Xj has to be completely diffe-
rent from the explanation for Xj, for all
Econometric model i≠j.
iii) The Ui have to be independent, which
In an econometric analysis, to show the co-
means, for example, that if we want to
rrelation between variables, two conditions
explain religious change in a country in
must be met: i) an existing intuitive part
terms of the observed variables X1, X2,
that reflects the expected theoretical analy-
..., Xk, a disease in one country should
sis (direction of the relationship represen-
not affect religious change in other
ted in the slope of the resulting equation)
countries.
and, ii) a measurement of statistical signifi-
cance, which shows the minimum explana- To find the values of the coefficients aj
tory error revealed in analysing the relation- (j = 1, 2, ..., k) we use ordinary least squares
ship between the independent variable and (OLS), which estimate the average behav-
the dependent variable. iour Yi given the observations X1, X2, ..., Xk,
To capture conditions (i) and (ii), we use as shown in (2),
the following linear expression, Y! ! = E (Yi X1, X 2 ,…, X k ) = a!0 + a!1X1i + a!2 X 2i +!+ a!k X ki
! = E (Yi X1, X 2 ,…, X k ) = a!0 + a!1X1i + a!2 X 2i +!+ a!k X ki
Yi = a0 + a1X1i + a2X2iY+! ... + aki + Ui (1) (2)
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-20Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala 9
To test if the variables X1, X2, ..., Xk, are 2
Where, RR refers to the R2 of the re-
individually significant on Yi, we propose 2
duced model (5) and RC to the R2 of the
the following hypothesis test, k!g
complete model (6). If Fobs > Fn!k!1 we do
H0: aj = 0 vs. Ha: aj ≠ 0, para j = 1, 2, ..., k (3) not reject H0 and, therefore, the aggrega-
tion of the new variables is not justified.
To check it we use p values (error prob- However, the explanatory variables in (1)
ability). A pvalue < 0.05 shows that the value are quantitative, but in some cases it is of
X is statistically significant to explain the interest to include qualitative variables to
behaviour Yi at least to a 95% confidence consider other effects on the dependent
level. variable. A particular case for these qualita-
If we want to show the significance of tive variables is the dichotomous or binary
the overall model, the hypothesis test is variables.
Thus, let D be a variable representing
H0: a1 = a2 = ...ak = 0 vs. H0: aj ≠ 0, the broader place to which a country be-
para j = 1, 2, ..., k (4) longs, defined as,
To verify it we constructed a statistical F, !# 1 if the country is in Central América
n ! (k + 1) R 2 that follows a Fischer D="
Fp = #$ 0 other case,
k 1! R 2
distribution (Gujarati, 2003) and compare it
k Then, if Yi represents the level of religi-
with the quantile Fn! (k+1) that the statistical
osity of a country, we can analyse the ef-
packages yield. If Fp > Fn – (k + 1) does not
reject H0, this implies that at least one vari- fect of X1i (in particular) on Yi, depending on
able impacts the model. whether the country is in Central America or
another region. For this analysis, we begin
Lastly, we consider the case of the fol-
with the following expression,
lowing model,
Yi = a0 + a1X1i + a2X2i + ... + akXki
Yi = a0 + a1X1i + a2X2i + ... + akXgi +Ui (5)
+ ak + 1DiX1i + Ui (8)
We aggregate more independent varia-
bles to (5), as shown in (6), In this case, the model estimate for the
non-Central American countries is,
Yi = a0 + a1X1i + a2X2i + ... + agXgi
+ ... + akXki Ui (6) Y! ! = E (Yi X1, X 2 ,…, X k y Di = 0) = a!0 + a!1X1i + a!2 X 2i +!
! = E (Yi X1, X 2 ,…, X k y Di = 0) = a!0 + a!1X1i + a!2 X 2i +!+ a!k X ki
With k > g, toY !verify if the aggregation of (9)
k – g variables was significant, we propose
the following hypothesis test, And, for Central American countries it is,
H0: ag + 1 = ag + 2= ...ak = 0 vs. H0: aj ≠ 0, Y! ! = E (Yi X1, X 2 ,…, X k y Di = 1) = a!0 + (a!1 + a!
k+1) X1i + a2 X 2i
!
para j = g +1, g + 2,! ..., k (7)
Y ! = E (Yi X1, X 2 ,…, X k y Di = 1) = a!0 + (a!1 + a!
k+1) X1i + a2 X 2i +!+ ak X ki
! ! (10)
To test it, we construct the statistical
test To validate the difference between the
models, an individual hypothesis test is pro-
RC2 ! RR2 (k ! g) posed for the coefficient of the binary vari-
Fobs = ! F k!g
(1! RC2 ) (n ! k ! 1) n!k!1 able, a!
k+1 .
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-2010 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
Data and Variables tion that economic variables, in contrast
to social variables, can be perceived by in-
For this study we propose the variable descri- dividuals over a longer period of time. We
bed in Table 1. Where Y is the dependent va- consider 2000 to 2013, one year before Y
riable and X1 ...X4 the independent variables. (level of Catholicism), to make economic
If X1 and X4 were considered as rates changes compatible with individuals’ per-
of growth, as we begin from the assump- ceptions.
TablE 1. Description of the variables in the model
Literal Variable Description
Percentage of the population that is Catholic in the 2014 Pew Research
Y Level of Catholicism Center survey of religious preference. It takes the values of 0 to 1, where 1
indicates complete Catholic preference.
Real growth of Gross Domestic Product for the period from 2000 to 2013,
considering the figures of constant prices from the statistical compendium
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA):
X1 Economic Growth
pib2013 ! pib2000
X1 =
pib2000
It is a continuous variable that can have negative values.
Percentile of the lower limit for the variable “control over corruption” devel-
oped by the World Bank for 2014 to be comparable in time with the de-
X2 Corruption
pendent variable. It has values from 0 to 100, 100 being the country with
the greatest control and equivalent to the least corrupt.
Homicide rate per 100 thousand inhabitants for the year 2014, based on
X3 Violence a statistical compendium of the World Bank. It has a positive value, the
closer to zero the less violent is the country.
Growth of the Economically Active Employed Population that is under the
poverty threshold for the period from 2000 to 2013, based on ECLA data:
X4 Poverty pob2013 ! pob2000
X4 =
pob2000
It is a continuous variable that can have negative values.
Source: By authors.
Due to the complexity in directly X 2 ever, there is an implicit bias in using this
measuring this phenomenon, for cases of measurement, as more corrupt countries
(corruption), X3 (violence) and X4 (poverty) may report fewer complaints. Morris (1991)
we use proxy variables. Their selection was proposed counting reports in the press,
based on the following criteria. but again, more corrupt countries may co-
For corruption there are different ways opt journalists. Other ways of approaching
of measuring it. Buscaglia (2001) suggests this phenomenon are surveys of percep-
the number of denunciations filed, how- tions, such as the one carried out by Trans-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-20Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala 11
parency International, considered an index the thresholds are based on intermediate
of indices because it has been published criteria and as a result, inclusion errors are
since 1995 (Johnston, 2005), although there reduced. We chose this option.
are also certain problems with endogeneity Data for 18 Latin American and Carib-
due to perceptions often being constructed bean countries were obtained (Appendix 1)
based on the media (see Transparency In- and the results are presented in the follow-
ternational, 2018). For their part, Kaufman, ing section.
Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) created an
indicator for control over corruption that the
World Bank (2014) adopted, which weighs
both perceptions and verifiable data. Al-
Analysis and Results
though, it is strongly correlated with the Economic Growth and Poverty
results of Transparency International, the
World Bank indicator tends to be more ef- We analyse the relationship between the
fective if we consider that perception is a economic variables and level of Catholi-
social construct, and may follow a differ- cism. Initially, the estimate of the effect of
ent pace than reality. As a result, we con- the level of poverty (X4) is,
sidered the latter to represent the variable
in the model. Y! ! = 57.88 ! 19.84X 4 i ,
(11)
Regarding violence, measuring it is also pvalue = 0.079, RR2 = 0.180
complex due to different definitions. The In this case, poverty is significant with a
simplest is to define it as only physical acts. confidence level of 93%. In the expression
But if we consider that indicators of vio- (11) growth of GDP (X1) was aggregated to
lence are constructed based on reports of obtain the following estimation,
crimes or the records of local prosecutors
(public authorities) and that these tend to Y! ! = 97.19 ! 19.25X 4 i + 5.63X1i ,
be underestimations, then the indicator for pvalue = 0.097 0.606 (12)
homicides, which are inevitable reported as
RC2 = 0.195
deaths, may be the closest to accurately re-
flecting the level of violence in a country. Based on the results in (12), we see that
Thus, for violence we use the homicide rate aggregating growth in GDP was not signifi-
per 100 thousand persons, following Vilalta, cant. This supports the argument that the
Castillo and Torres (2016). secularisation process, at least as found
Lastly, poverty is also difficult to meas- among those countries that experienced
ure because it is constituted of multiple significant growth in GDP, maintains social
subjective and objective dimensions. The differentiation between social spheres, the
most commonly used measurement is in- economy having no direct impact on reli-
come level (World Bank, 2009); however, gious behaviour, at least in terms of identity
this variable is limited because it excludes and religious attachment (Guiso, Sapienza
important factors. Some authors propose and Zingales, 2003).
measures based on unmet basic needs To discard any form of correlation be-
(UBN) (Santos, 2013; Bielchowsky and tween economic growth (X1) and level of
Torres, 2018). Another way is to mix both Catholicism (Y), two binary variables were
approaches (Boltvinik, 1992). The most constructed. The first (δ 1) to distinguish
comprehensive way is the threshold meth- those countries with accumulated growth
odology that the ECLA (2018) constructed above 70% from those that did not reach
based on Alkire and Foster (2011), in which that threshold, that is,
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-2012 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
"$ 1 if crecpib ing the country’s successful insertion in glo-
00!13 > 0.70
!1 = # balisation, in contrast to Europe, where the
$% 0 other case, process of secularisation provoked a loss of
religious values and had a negative impact
The results are shown in (13), on levels of industrialisation.
Y! ! = 97.19 ! 18.67X 4 i + 5.66" 1j , However, based on the data used here
pvalue = 0.102 0.390 (13) we can say that the empirical evidence for
2
Latin America shows that economic growth
R = 0.221 has no significant relationship with religios-
We can see that the binary variable to ity, neither quantitatively (expression [12]),
identify the economic factor is not signifi- nor qualitatively (expression [13]). These re-
cant either individually or jointly; in effect, sults support the findings of Esquivel (2017),
who found that economic growth had no
H0: = ß1 = ß2 = 0 vs. H0: = ß1 ≠ 0 impact on levels of Catholicism.
While economic growth was not found
n ! (k + 1) R 2
Note that Fp = y P (F to
= 2.13 and be )significant,
> 2.13 = 0.153, poverty was. This can be
k 1! R 2 explained by the dynamic in Latin America
= 2.13 y P (F > 2.13) = 0.153, of economic growth being disconnected
For the second variable (δ2), we con- from any reduction in poverty, as the eco-
sidered the size of GDP and created two nomic benefits of growth are concentrated
groups of countries, with the six largest among the highest income strata, making it
—Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and the most unequal region on the planet (CE-
Colombia— in one group; the binary vari- PAL, 2018). This is reflected in expression
able was (11), a model that shows that poverty rates
negatively affect the level of Catholicism in
!# 1 if the country is in the largest group
!2 = " the region; thus, an increase in poverty of
$# 0 other case, 1% is reflected in a decrease of 19.84% in
the number of Catholics.
The resulting estimation is shown in (14),
This result contradicts what was dis-
Y! ! = 56.24 ! 17.39X1 + 7.73" 2 cussed in section I, and even contradicts
pvalue = 0.123 0.257 (14) other findings, such as the one showing
that people with higher incomes consider
R2 = 0.250 themselves less religious, while those at
The model is not globally stable, that is, poverty thresholds are more religious (RedC
P (F > 2.50) = 0.115. Opinion Pol-Win Gallup International, 2012).
The argument for a relationship between Gallup International (2017) confirms a rela-
religion and economic factors is found in tionship between higher levels of poverty
the seminal work of Weber (2011), who and religiosity.
proposed a relationship between the prot- This different behaviour for Latin Amer-
estant ethic and capitalism. Allen (2004) ica may be a result of the way in which in-
also refers to the support that Protestant- dividuals face poverty: migration can be a
ism provided to capitalism through justify- response to unemployment and lack of op-
ing the material exploitation of the proletar- portunities (Delaunay, 2005). This phenom-
ian masses. In this respect, Ferguson (2004) enon may be associated with a loss of Cath-
points out that religious factors modified olic affiliation and the influence of other,
the work ethic in the United States, foster- “American style” Christian churches (the
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-20Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala 13
U.S. being a country receiving LA migrants). Thus, in Central America and the Carib-
These churches carry out a conversion strat- bean, when poverty increases by 1% Ca-
egy through networks of support and soli- tholicism increases by 10.84%, while in
darity (Semán, 2019; Carbonelli, 2019). South America the behaviour is the oppo-
This would indicate that Catholics have site. An increase in poverty of 1% in the
increasingly adopted a strategic approach latter region results in a decline in Catholi-
in response to their economic situation and cism of 24.64%. The result for model (15A)
that this has had an impact on their religious is similar to the overall findings, not so for
affiliation (Camargo, 2019). To test this, we (15B). Given that, historically, Central Amer-
verify if the correlation between poverty and ican and Caribbean countries, including
Catholicism is consistent in Latin America Mexico, which experienced a rapid decline
(CEPAL, 2016). For this purpose, we use a in living conditions during the neoliberal pe-
binary variable (δ3) that distinguishes be- riod (Jiménez-Bandala, 2018), have suffered
tween two regions that have been historically greater levels of poverty than South Ameri-
recognised for their geographic proximity can countries, we can say that the increase
and social and economic similarity: Central in poverty in poorer countries increases af-
America and the Caribbean on the one hand filiation to the Catholic Church; in contrast,
(Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salva- the increase in poverty in other LA countries
dor, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico and the may lead to changes in religious affiliation,
Dominican Republic), and South America as we see, for example, in the increase in
on the other (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, recent years in affiliation to other Christian
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and churches in Brazil.
Venezuela). They are described in the follow- The expression (15A) is also consist-
ing manner: ent with the actions of the Catholic Church
in the region, which has played a role in the
! if the country is in Central America
# 1 formation of networks of solidarity in de-
!3 = " or the Caribbean fence of human rights and in support of mi-
# grants, creating shelters and developing a
$ 0 other case,
political activism that has even cost the lives
The estimation incorporating the region of a number of priests (González, 2019). Ca-
is shown in (15), tholicism has had an intense presence in
both parishes and communities with deep-
Y! ! = 60.26 ! 24.64X 4 + 35.48" 3 X 4 rooted pastoral missions, and at times,
pvalue = 0.015 0.014 (15) with guerrilla movements and other militant
2 groups, which for some is seen as a strategy
R = 0.463, P (F > 6.40) = 0.009
to maintain the Church’s public presence in
The results show that both variables are sig- the face of other religious offerings, such as
nificant to a 95% confidence level (Pvalue), while the Evangelicals (Burbano, 2010).
the model is globally stable with a 1% error.
In this way, we have the model for the
Central American-Caribbean countries in Violence and corruption: Impunity
(15A) when δ3 = 1 and for South America in
The estimation of the level of violence (X3)
(15B) when δ3 = 0,
on levels of Catholicism (Y) is shown in (16),
Y! ! = 60.26 + 10.84X 4 i (15A)
Y! ! = 71.21! 0.24X 3i (16)
Y! ! = 60.26 ! 24.64X 4 i (15B) pvalue = 0.120,
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-2014 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
The results shows that rates of violence percentage of Catholicism declines consid-
were not significant in changing religiosity; erably. This finding is important if we con-
which is consistent with other studies, such sider that violence and corruption shape
as the those of Blancarte (2019), Mallimaci a state of impunity that weakens levels of
(2011) and Valenzuela and Odgers (2014), Catholic affiliation. In contrast, when con-
who showed that in highly Catholic areas, sidered separately, violence (expression 16)
such as Mexico City and Tijuana (Mexico), and corruption (expression 17) do not im-
Sao Paulo (Brazil) and Buenos Aires (Argen- pact levels of Catholicism.
tina), increasing violence did not impact ei- While one aspect of impunity is the
ther the level of Catholicism or religious af- absence of state institutions investigating,
filiation. prosecuting and punishing those responsible
Regarding corruption (X2), its correlation for crimes (Le Clercq, 2018), another
with Catholicism can be seen in (17), al- aspect is the generation of perceptions of
though it was not significant, vulnerability and helplessness in the face
of violence and criminality among the
Y! ! = 71.03 ! 0.19X 2i population. Thus, impunity as a concept
(17)
pvalue = 0.181 must include both these dimensions (Bonet
and Alija, 2009).
Scandals related to political abuses, il-
licit enrichment and looting of the public Based on our results in (18), if the level
treasury, which have become common in of violence (X3) declines by a percentage
Latin America, seem to have no impact on point along with a decline in the level of
religious preference, despite cases involv- corruption (X2), this generates an increase
ing members of the Catholic Church itself. of 34.92% in Catholic affiliation2 (subtrac-
On the contrary, it is often members of the tion of coefficients). The result is coherent
Church that have spoken out against vio- given the existence of networks of protec-
lence and corruption. If we look at the re- tion and self-defence in Central America,
sults of Latinobarometer surveys (1995- some led by Catholic priests (the Centro
2017) we find that an important percentage Agustín Pro in Mexico and the Centro Ar-
of Catholics tolerate corruption when it ap- nulfo Romero in El Salvador), as well as
pears that public authorities are solving the groups for protection and critical thinking in
country’s problems; for example, religious Colombia (Centro de Pensamiento Camilo
individuals justify stealing when those who Torres Restrepo) and Argentina (Movimien-
do so appear to provide support to the tos de Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo).
poorest (Aparicio, 2019). There seems to be a clear image: increases
in violence and the ineffectiveness of the
Although the individual variables were police lead to the establishment of groups
not significant, a joint model is proposed in which the religious and the non-religious
whose estimation is as follows, join together in the face of a state that does
Y! ! = 82.49 ! 35.21X 3 + 0.29X 2 not apply the law.
pvalue = 0.02 0.03, (18) However, if corruption (X2) increases and
2 violence (X3) decreases, the result will be
R = 0.37, P (F > 4.56) = 0.028
The above means that our indicators for
violence and corruption, when combined, 2 Remember that the value of corruption is measured
are significant to a 95% confidence level. on a scale from 0 to 100, through levels of transpar-
ency, in which values closer to 100 mean less cor-
The results show, in particular, that with ruption and values closer to 0 mean more corruption.
greater violence and lower corruption, the Hence, the subtraction of coefficients.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-20Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Felipe Gaytán Alcalá and Carlos Alberto Jiménez-Bandala 15
an increase in Catholic affiliation of 35.5% cial vulnerability and dispair. Catholics have
(adding the coefficients). Sectors of the greater trust in their church than in public
Catholic Church (including both clergy and institutions (Ameigeiras, 2019; Mallimaci,
laity) have condemned existing impunity, Giménez and Esquivel, 2019) As a result, the
organised protests and formed organisa- Church becomes a fortress for addressing
tions to pressure public authorities to pun- the uncertainty generated by the incapacity
ish the guilty and to stop the violence, all of systems to effectively achieve justice.
of which has strengthened the credibility of
the Church in the eyes of its parishioners.
Concerns about impunity make sense Conclusions
when violence is perceived to be on the rise
and the authorities fail to punish criminals, Secularisation in Latin America has been
whether for collusion or negligence (both understood as an intense process of mo-
demonstrate corruption). In Latin America dernisation, associated with urbanisation,
this leads to a decline in Catholicism, but, industrialisation and technification. It has
if we look at the coefficients of the results had a direct effect on the Catholicism that
in (18), corruption has less effect than vio-
has long predominated in the region. Va-
lence; which is also consistent with other
rious studies have pointed to certain eco-
studies that show a greater tolerance in
nomic and social factors as direct cau-
Latin America for corruption than for vio-
ses of the changing fortune of the Catholic
lence (Aparicio, 2019).
Church. In this article, using an econometric
However, the impunity factor —which analysis, we have put these factors to the
appears constantly and is referred to in test, measuring their impact on the decli-
different studies and Latin American in- ning proportion of the population that pro-
dexes— is not a conjuntural phenomenon fesses a Catholic faith.
in Latin America, but rather a structural one.
Our results show that economic growth
In this regard, Wielandt and Artigas (2016)
and size of GDP do not have a direct im-
argue that impunity is a key obstacle to re-
pact on countries’ levels of Catholicism.
gional development. In addition, it has been
This suggests that individuals translate their
a centre of debate for its impact on human
economic problems into a rational strategy
rights and for the weakness of justice sys-
rather than giving it a religious sense.
tems to punish criminality (Vilalta, Castillo
and Torres, 2016; Bonet and Alija, 2009). In contrast, we find that poverty is signif-
The importance of impunity as an academic icant in a negative direction, which appears
issue in recent years has led to more and to contradict what surveys seem to find. The
better monitoring of the problem, as seen, explanation for this may be due to unfulfilled
for example, in the indexes presented by expectations regarding well-being and con-
Transparency International in its chapter on ditions of necessity generating simple stra-
Latin America (2018) and those of the Uni- tegic paths for action. However, this effect
versidad de Las Américas Puebla (UDLAP) changes when we separate Central Ameri-
(Le Clercq and Rodríguez, 2017). can and Caribbean countries (higher poverty
It is important to highlight that growth in and higher levels of religiosity) from those of
levels of Catholicism does not mean that in- South America (where we find the opposite
dividuals’ faith or beliefs are stronger, as hy- relationship between poverty and religiosity).
pothesised by Inglehart and Norris (2016). An additional explanation for the aban-
Simply put, people see Catholic communi- donment of the Catholic Church by the poor
ties as circuits of support for feelings of so- in South America could be community sup-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 3-2016 Poverty and Impunity, Relevant Factors in Variations in Catholicism in Latin America
port networks that Evangelical churches have for Developing Countries” / “El desempleo y la
constructed, but we cannot say that Catho- probabilidad de caer en trampas de pobreza: con-
lics have become Evangelicals. Further quan- sideraciones para países en vías de desarrollo”.
Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas,
titative analysis is necessary to explain where
164: 3-20. doi: 10.5477/cis/reis.164.3
the Catholic faithful go when they abandon
Aparicio, Abraham (2019). “Valores políticos y so-
their Catholicism. Do they abandon their re-
ciales de católicos, evangélicos y personas sin
ligiosity or change their church affiliation?
religión en Latinoamérica”. Revista de Ciencias
Beyond the hypotheses addressed, the Sociales, 25(1): 264-280.
analysis has permitted us to unravel some Bäckström, Anders (2017). “The Wave Project as a
common-sense relationships that pointed Record of Religious and Social Transformations
to violence and corruption as factors in the in Northern Europe”. In: Bäckström, A.; Moloko-
growth of Catholicism as a source of cer- tos-Liederman, L. and Davie, G. (eds.). Religion
tainty and protection. However, what we and Welfare in Europe: Gendered and Minority
have found is the lack of significant variability Perspectives. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
in levels of Catholicism in relation to violence Banco Mundial (2009). Indicadores mundiales de
and corruption when these factors are exam- Desarrollo. Washington D.C.: Banco Mundial.
(Papers and Reports).
ined separately. Their impact is seen when
we construct a composite variable measuring Banco Mundial (2014). Indicadores mundiales de
buen gobierno. Washington D.C.: Banco Mun-
impunity, which transforms Catholic affiliation
dial. (Papers and Reports).
to a rational strategy that is based on solidar-
Berger, Peter; Davie, Grace and Fokas, Effie (2008).
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Bielchowsky, Ricardo and Torres, Miguel (2018).
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