BACKGROUND DISEC Topic A: The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles - IMUNA
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BACKGROUND DISEC
GUIDE
Topic A: The Proliferation of
Remote Weapons Systems and
Unmanned Vehicles
Topic B: Regulating the Use, Pro-
2 0 2 1 duction, and Disposal of Chemi-
cal Weapons
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.org
Secretary-General Dear Delegates,
Maura Goss
Welcome to NHSMUN 2021! I’m Jared Butler, and I have the pleasure of being your Session I Di-
Directors-General
rector of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). Over the past several
Rose Blackwell
months, my co-director, Andrew, and I have been hard at work selecting and researching topics that
JJ Packer
we thought would give you the best opportunities to learn and have fun. Within the pages of this
Conference Services Background Guide are the basic tools you’ll need to get started with your research so that you can
Hannah Lilley come fully prepared to debate the topics from your country’s perspective in committee.
Alisa Wong
Delegate Experience Before we get into that, however, I’d love to tell you a little about myself. I was born and raised in
Akanksha Sancheti Montgomery, Alabama, and currently attend school at Rice University in Houston, Texas, studying
John Wood cognitive sciences and business. My Model UN journey started five years ago when I joined my high
school’s Model UN traveling team as a freshman, and I never looked back. This will be my third
Global Partnerships
Sofia Fuentes NHSMUN. My first was as a delegate in the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC),
Salmaan Rashiq and last year I had the honor of being the Assistant Director for DISEC. Outside of Model UN, I
love to sing a cappella with my group, the Rice Philharmonics, play golf, and generally philosophize.
Under-Secretaries-
General Andrew and I created this guide to provide you with an overview of our topics, “The Proliferation
Jon Basile
of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles” and “Regulating the Use, Production, and
Ankita Bhat
Destruction of Chemical Weapons.” Additionally, you will be empowered with the tools to start
Beatriz Circelli
Caitlyn Johnson your research on the topics from your country’s perspective. While we highly recommend reading
Patrick Leong this guide, we also encourage you to use it as a starting point for developing your own creative
Kathy Li solutions and perspectives to the topics and their many implications. We want each of you to feel
Pablo Maristany de confident debating your country’s position on each topic, and the best way to do so is to come pre-
las Casas pared with a thorough grasp on the history and context of each issue. The research we included in
McCall Olliff this guide was illuminating, and we are so excited to share it with you!
Abolee Raut
Pranav Reddy All of that to say, Andrew and I could not be more proud and excited to welcome you to NHS-
Clare Steiner MUN 2021. We know that you will use it well to guide your thoughtful research, and we truly can-
Ann Williams not wait to meet you all and discuss these topics with you. I wish you and your family health and
safety during these uncertain times. If you ever need anything at all--whether it’s about Model UN,
college, or you just want to talk—feel free to reach out to Andrew or me. We are here solely as a
resource for you. Best of luck, everyone! I couldn’t be more excited to see all of you thrive this year!
Jared Butler
jared.butler@imuna.org
Director of DISEC
Session I
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.org
Secretary-General Dear Delegates,
Maura Goss
Let me be one of the first to welcome you to NHSMUN 2021. My name is Andrew Luzzatto,
Directors-General
and I will be your Session II Director for the Disarmament and International Security Committee
Rose Blackwell
(DISEC). My co-director, Jared Butler, and I have spent the past few months selecting, researching,
JJ Packer
and analyzing two topics on international security, the results of which are reflected in the following
Conference Services pages of this document.
Hannah Lilley
Alisa Wong Before proceeding any further, allow me to tell you a bit about myself. My experience with NHS-
Delegate Experience MUN started my junior year of high school when I participated as a delegate in NHSMUN 2018
Akanksha Sancheti in the International Telecommunication Union and the Crisis committee in 2019. After graduating,
John Wood I found my way onto NHSMUN staff, where I was an Assistant Director for the 2020 session of
DISEC. Outside of NHSMUN, I am also a sophomore at Norwich University, where I am double
Global Partnerships
Sofia Fuentes majoring in Cyber Security and International Studies. There, I am a corporal in the school’s corps
Salmaan Rashiq of cadets, and a member of the university scouting association and, of course, our Model UN team.
Model UN has had a profound impact on my life, and I could not be more excited to share all that
Under-Secretaries-
General I have gained with you both out of and in committee.
Jon Basile
In your hands is the Background Guide for the NHSMUN 2021 DISEC committee. Here, you will
Ankita Bhat
find a basic overview of the two topics Jared and I have chosen for this session, those being “The
Beatriz Circelli
Caitlyn Johnson Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles” and “Regulating the Use, Pro-
Patrick Leong duction, and Destruction of Chemical Weapons.” The following pages are meant to provide only
Kathy Li the fundamental knowledge required to understand these two very complex subjects. Though there
Pablo Maristany de is a lot to be gained from reading this guide, it is highly encouraged that you also look beyond what
las Casas Jared and I have written so that you can develop more comprehensive and effective resolutions.
McCall Olliff Doing your own research is a crucial part of learning how your assigned country’s position on these
Abolee Raut issues. Additionally, the more you know about these two subjects ahead of time, the more you can
Pranav Reddy
focus on immersing yourself in the discussion, participating in debate, and overall having a good
Clare Steiner
experience when the conference finally comes around.
Ann Williams
That being said, I cannot wait to see you all in the committee this March. Whether this is your first
time participating in a Model UN conference or if you are an experienced delegate, I have no doubt
that this session of NHSMUN will be a highly enriching experience. Remember, if you have any
questions, please do not hesitate to send me an email. Jared and I are always here to help you out as
you prepare. I am so excited to see all that you will accomplish this year in committee
Andrew Luzzatto
andrew.luzzatto@imuna.org
Director of DISEC
Session II
DISEC 4| Table of Contents Table of Contents A Note on the NHSMUN Difference 5 A Note on Research and Preparation 7 Committee History 8 The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles 10 Introduction 11 History and Description of the Issue 12 Current Status 23 Bloc Analysis 27 Committee Mission 29 Regulating the Use, Production, and Disposal of Chemical Weapons 30 Introduction 31 History and Description of the Issue 32 Current Status 44 Bloc Analysis 49 Committee Mission 51 Research and Preparation Questions 53 Important Documents 54 Works Cited 56
DISEC
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference |5
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference
Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Welcome to NHSMUN 2021! Our names are Rose Blackwell and JJ Packer, and we are this year’s Directors-General. Thank
you for choosing to attend NHSMUN, the world’s largest and most diverse Model United Nations conference for
secondary school students. We are thrilled to welcome you to our conference in March!
As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to transform today’s brightest thinkers into tomor-
row’s leaders. Our organization provides a uniquely tailored experience for all in attendance through innovative and accessible
programming. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience, and this
idea permeates throughout NHSMUN.
Debate founded on strong knowledge: With knowledgeable staff members and delegates from over 70 countries, NHSMUN
can facilitate an enriching experience reliant on substantively rigorous debate. To ensure this high quality of debate, our staff
members produce extremely detailed and comprehensive topic overviews (like the one below) to prepare delegates for the com-
plexities and nuances inherent in global issues. This process takes over six months, during which the Directors who lead our
committees develop their topics with the valuable input of expert contributors. Because these topics are always changing and
evolving, NHSMUN also produces update papers intended to bridge the gap of time between when the background guides are
published and when committee starts in March. As such, this guide is designed to be a launching point from which delegates
should delve further into their topics.
Extremely prepared and engaged staff: The detailed knowledge that our directors provide in this background guide through
diligent research aims to spur critical thought within delegates at NHSMUN. Before the conference, our Directors and Assistant
Directors are trained rigorously through copious hours of exercises and workshops to provide the best conference experience
possible. Beyond this, our Directors and Assistant Directors read every position paper submitted to NHSMUN and provide
thoughtful insight on those submitted by the feedback deadline. Our staff aims not only to tailor the committee experience to
delegates’ reflections and research but also to facilitate an environment where all delegates’ thoughts can be heard.
Emphasis on participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its Member States to create resolutions most likely to make
a dramatic impact on the world. That is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. We believe that to properly delve into an issue and
produce fruitful debate, it is crucial to focus the entire energy and attention of the room on the topic at hand. Our Rules of
Procedure and our staff focus on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of each delegate’s country assignment
or skill level. However, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference. MUN
delegates are well researched and aware of the UN’s priorities, and they can serve as the vanguard for action on the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, we are proud to also connect students with other action-oriented organizations to en-
courage further work on the topics.
Focused committee time: We feel strongly that interpersonal connections during debate are critical to producing superior com-
mittee experiences and allow for the free flow of ideas. Ensuring policies based on equality and inclusion is one way in which
NHSMUN guarantees that every delegate has an equal opportunity to succeed in committee. We staff a very dedicated team
who type up and format draft resolutions and working papers so that committee time can be focused on communication and
collaboration.
Educational emphasis, even for awards: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. As such, when NHSMUN
does distribute awards, we de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity.
DISEC 6| a noTE on ThE nhSMUn DIffErEnCE NHSMUN seeks to reward schools whose students excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. More importantly, we seek to develop an environment in which delegates can employ their critical thought processes and share ideas with their counterparts from around the world. We always prioritize teamwork and encourage our delegates to engage with others diplomatically and inclusively. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership that strives towards consensus, as delegates do in the United Nations. Realism and accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. Each NHSMUN committee is a simulation of a real deliberative body so that delegates can research what their country has said in the committee. Our topics are chosen from the issues currently on the agenda of that committee (except historical committees, which take topics from the appropriate time period). This creates incredible opportunities for our delegates to do first-hand research by reading the actual statements their country has made and the resolutions they have supported. We also incorporate real UN and NGO experts into each committee through our committee speakers program and arrange for meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System. As always, we welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2021 and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. Delegates, it is our sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an in- credible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. We look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference. Best, Rose Blackwell and JJ Packer Directors-General
DISEC
A Note on Research and Preparation |7
A Note on Research and Preparation
Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the conference’s intellectual and
cosmopolitan perspective. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your com-
mittee. This document is designed to give you a description of the committee’s mandate and the topics on its agenda. We do not
intend to represent exhaustive research on every facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore
the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to NHSMUN in March. Delegates must be
prepared to intelligently utilize your knowledge and apply it to your country’s unique policy.
The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging, but to assist delegates, we have updated our Beginner Delegate
Guide and Advanced Delegate Guide. In particular, these guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a
position paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage—they can help
transform a sometimes-overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate a given state’s views in writing. Ac-
cordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a posi-
tion paper for both topics on the committee’s agenda. In delegations with two students, we strongly encourage each student to
participate in the research for both topics, to ensure that both students are prepared to debate no matter what topic is selected
first. More information about how to write and format positoin papers can be found in the NHSMUN Research Guide. To sum-
marize, position papers should be structured into three sections, described below.
I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate’s coun-
try. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic background, but rather focus on the details that are most
important to the delegation’s policy and proposed solutions.
II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation’s policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy
in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Compari-
sons with other global issues are also appropriate here.
III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation’s proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of
each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential
obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country’s policy.
Each topic’s position paper should be no more than 10 pages long double-spaced with standard mar-gins and font size. We
recommend 2-4 pages per topic as a suitable length. The paper must be written from the perspective of the country you are
representing at NHSMUN 2021 and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.
Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of its papers to their committee Directors via myDais on or before 19 Febru-
ary 2021. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee’s dais, a position must be submitted on or before
29 January 2021. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the dais of each committee and returned prior
to your arrival at the conference.
Complete instructions for how to submit position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via the email submitted at registration.
If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, they should contact us at info@imuna.org as soon as possible.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to directors will be ineligible for awards.
DISEC 8| Committee History Committee History The United Nations (UN) Disarmament and International Security Committee was created in 1945 with the ratification of the UN Charter.1 Often shortened to DISEC, the Disarmament and International Security Committee is also known as the First Committee because it was the first Main Committee of the GA.2 DISEC was formed to address and solve international threats to peace and security in a multilateral and comprehensive way by increasing global stability, cooperation, and regulation.3 Per the UN Charter, DISEC “considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations.” DISEC also has the power of direct advisement to the Security Council.4 Pursuant to its mission of international cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, DISEC also works closely with other entities such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. Through cooperation with these entities, and oversight over various subsidiary committees within the UN, DI- SEC guides the topic of disarmament and security on a global scale. DISEC sets the norms that define the peace and security initiatives of the entire international community, including but not limited to UN member states. DISEC has made great strides towards its goal of achieving greater global security. When it was founded, the committee first focused on organizing itself and establishing commissions that would help with achieving global disarmament. DISEC’s first resolution, Resolution 1, created a new commission dedicated to understanding and regulating nuclear power and weapons.5 Af- ter this, the committee started working on functional resolutions that impacted global disarmament, such as Resolution 34/88, which set standards for negotiating disarmament, and Resolution 42/28, which describes the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.6 More recently, DISEC has shifted its focus from weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear and chemical weapons to the more pervasive security issues in the world, namely the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was the first ever binding UN document to address the conventional weapons trade and came into force as part of GA Resolution 67/234B in 2013.7 DISEC has also placed a strong emphasis on 2015’s Sustainable Development Goals. To solidify the role of the SDGs in DISEC’s work, the theme of the 71st DISEC session was “the Sustainable Development Goals: a Uni- versal Push to Transform our World.”8 Regarding disarmament, the United Nations—mainly through DISEC—has helped governments change their perspective from national interests to global interests by providing spaces to governments and civil society to come together and explore all viewpoints to develop sustainable cooperative solutions.9 Currently, countries are facing many issues that require the help of the international community ranging from climate threats, refugees, ocean protection, financial stability, and nuclear threats.10 However, global issues and perspectives have yet to be translated into a profound shift in national priorities required to deal with 1 UNGA, “First Committee,” United Nations, accessed 30 June 2019, https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml. 2 UNGA, “First Committee.”. 3 UNGA, “First Committee.” 4 UNGA, “First Committee.” 5 Disarmament and International Security Council resolution 1, Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy, A/RES/1(I) (1 February 1946). 6 Disarmament and International Security Council resolution 34/88, Declaration on International Cooperation for Disarmament, A/RES/34/88, (11 December 1979); Disarmament and International Security Council resolution 42/28, Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, A/RES/42/28, (30 November 1987). 7 Peter Woolcott. The Arms Trade Treaty. (New York: UN Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2013) Accessed 22 September 2019, from http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/att/att.html. 1-4. 8 “71st Session, 2016, United Nations General Assembly.” United Nations. Accessed 22 September 2019, from https://www.un.org/en/ ga/71/. 9 “Nuclear disarmament-Can the United Nations deliver?”, Unfold Zero, accessed 20 September 2019, from http://www.unfoldzero.org/ nuclear-disarmament-can-the-united-nations-deliver/ 10 “Nuclear disarmament-Can the United Nations deliver?”
DISEC
Committee History |9
these issues effectively.11 Despite an obligation under the UN Charter to reduce military expenditure to fund social and economic
needs (Article 26), governments continue to invest over USD 1.7 trillion annually in militaries.12 DISEC has achieved a great deal
of progress towards addressing these issues; however, member states must continue to cooperate so that international security
can be strengthened.
11 “Nuclear disarmament-Can the United Nations deliver?”
12 “Nuclear disarmament-Can the United Nations deliver?”
DISEC
NHSMUN 2021
Topic A:
The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Kristi MachadoTopic A: The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
Introduction |11
Introduction
Over the past 100 years, innovations in remote weapons systems and unmanned vehicles, or drones,
have revolutionized how states conduct warfare. These innovations have come in a variety of forms,
which include an increased range for longer and farther missions, more powerful sensors and cameras,
highly advanced remote and autonomous piloting systems, and a massive suite of lethal ordnances.
Accompanying these rapid, across-the-board advancements has been a decline in the research and
development, infrastructural, and operational costs associated with acquiring drone technology.1 This
trend of developing drone systems with increasingly advanced technology at a reduced cost com-
pared to manned systems has led to the largely unchecked global proliferation of drone technologies.
The multi-billion-dollar drone industry is fueled by hundreds of manufacturers operating in states all
across the globe. The decreased cost and increased capacity of modern drones have allowed coun-
tries that otherwise might not have the political or economic capital to invest in drone programs to
acquire fully armed drones capable of engaging in lethal missions.2 Furthermore, widespread drone
proliferation has powerful surveillance and security implications. Drones were originally designed for
conducting surveillance and reconnaissance and have only become more capable of doing so.3 In
turn, this has led many states to engage in increasingly pervasive, persistent, and hostile surveillance
campaigns even across interstate borders.4 This trend deepens concerns about the changing nature
of state sovereignty and how asymmetric use of drones in interstate conflict may erode states’ ability
to defend themselves from outside attacks and political influence.5
Amplifying concerns about the growing usage of drones is in pervasive and destructive campaigns of airstrikes or tar-
their resistance to existing regulatory mechanisms and con- geted killings in extraterritorial contexts and even outside of
tentious relationship with international law. Mechanisms like the context of open armed conflict.8 These concerns have be-
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Missile Technology Control come only more relevant as drone technology has exhibited
Regime (MTCR), and Wassenaar Arrangement make use of paradigm-shifting advancements with the advent of drone-
some categorization of drones that forces them to operate swarm technology armed with artificial intelligence (AI).
with the same regulatory restrictions as other conventional These systems pose a familiar but novel threat to international
weapons.6 However, these classifications are not standard disarmament and security and call for improved drone regula-
across all countries, and membership and adherence to these tions that are more proactive and sustainable.
regulatory regimes are not universal, leading to disagreements
between states over the scope of these regulatory mechanisms To properly address the proliferation of drones and associ-
and calls for their clarification and consolidation.7 Addition- ated weapons and vehicle technologies, countries will have to
ally, the use of drones to dispense lethal force has led to vary- critically consider the following: how and why drones have
ingly expansive interpretations of international human rights become so widespread, how that has affected their conduct
and humanitarian law and even caused some states to engage both within and outside of the contexts of armed conflict,
1 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions: Security Implications of Growing Proliferation in Emerging Military Drone Markets
(Utrecht: PAX, 2018), https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/unmanned-ambitions.
2 “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” Human Rights Council, May 28, 2010, https://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/14/24/Add.6.
3 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
4 “Report of the Special Rapporteur.”
5 Matteo Besana, “Targeting Westphalian Sovereignty: The Use of Armed Drones in Non-Conflict Areas,” Master’s thesis, Leiden Univer-
sity, 2017, https://core.ac.uk/reader/84908296.
6 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
7 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
8 “Report of the Special Rapporteur.”12|TH opic A: The Proliferation of Remote
istory and Description of the Issue
Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
what cost it has had on civilian lives and state sovereignty,
and how existing regulatory regimes can be either bolstered or
replaced. Given the versatility of drones, they will continue to
be used by different actors in various ways. They have various
lethal and non-lethal, military and commercial, tactical and en-
vironmental uses that they often perform better in and at a
lower cost than manned vehicles. However, DISEC and the
greater international disarmament and security regime have
a responsibility to institute a lasting policy that reflects and
builds on existing measures to promote human life, rights, and
prosperity.
History and Description of the Issue
Development and Innovation of Remote
Weapons Technologies
Remote weapons technologies have taken many forms over
the history of armed conflict. Unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), which are also known as unmanned aerial systems
(UASs), remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), or drones, as they
will be henceforth mentioned, are armed aircraft with no on-
board passengers or pilots.9 Unarmed drones for hobby or
commercial use—while subject to many of the same con-
Use of observation balloons in the Battle of Fleurus, 1794
cerns—are beyond the scope of this topic and committee.10
robust construction, these balloons had increased capacity for
Before World War I, drone technology was primitive. It of- 11
more occupants and communications technology such as sig-
ten included some payload, sensors, and a method of flying, nal flags or telegraphs.14
the most popular of which were hot-air balloons.12 War obser-
vation balloons would be developed and used by the French However, unarmed, manned observation balloons were not
Aerostatic Corps, the world’s first air force, to aid in recon- the only type of war balloons used. In 1849, nearly 50 years
naissance in the French Revolutionary Wars.13 The usefulness after the development of the first war balloons, the Austrian
of observation balloons in major conflicts was reaffirmed Empire would use similar aircraft outfitted with bombs set
during the American Civil War, in which the Union Aeronau- to explode a half-hour after deployment during the Siege of
tics Corps created balloons made with tougher materials that Venice that ended the First Italian War of Independence. De-
could fly upwards of 300 meters. In addition to their more spite its limited military success, this would mark the world’s
9 Ministry of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, JPD 0-30.2 (London: Ministry of Defense, 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/673940/doctrine_uk_uas_jdp_0_30_2.pdf.
10 “Facts + Statistics: Aviation and Drones,” Insurance Information Institute, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-
statistics-aviation-and-drones.
11 “The Evolution of Commercial Drone Technology,” Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems, October 17, 2018, accessed June 21, 2020,
https://nias-uas.com/evolution-commercial-drone-technology/.
12 “The Evolution of Commercial Drone Technology,”
13 “Balloons in War,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, March 3, 2017, accessed June 21, 2020, https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/
editorial/balloons-war.
14 “Civil War Ballooning,”American Battlefield Trust, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/civil-war-ballooning.Topic A: The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
History and Description of the Issue |13
first air raid, inspiring countries across the world to consider Although the US has historically led the development of
further development of armed, unmanned aerial vehicles.15 drone technology, states like Israel, China, and European
Union states have challenged the US’s dominance and ex-
By 1918, the United States had begun developing aerial tor-
panded the international drone market. These market expan-
pedoes that, while they did not see use in WWI, would be-
sions and the ambitions of pre-eminent drone manufacturing
come the basis for further drone innovations. In the following
states have led to rapid and powerful innovations in drone
decades, drones became increasingly popular as their tactical technology.19 Drones like the MQ-1 Predator designed and
use cases grew to include acting as decoys, delivering lethal manufactured by General Atomics (GA-ASI), in collaboration
and non-lethal payloads, and reconnaissance.16 More recog- with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were designed
nizably modern drones were developed before and during to fly like traditional military reconnaissance aircraft, but with-
WWII and the Cold War, primarily for espionage and sur- out the use of an onboard pilot.20 These drones would be
veillance between actors like the United States and USSR. 17
outfitted with sensors and cameras to collect data about the
These systems, with continued advancements, would later be- drone’s environment and position in space. This included a
come an essential player in the Vietnam War, where they were suite of satellite and ground-based communications systems
used strictly for reconnaissance. Following the Vietnam War, to send data to and from the ground station. Additionally, the
drones would see less international enthusiasm until their re- vehicle itself was made quieter than its predecessors while fly-
surgence in 1982 due to the Israeli usage of drones to neutral- ing higher and longer before refueling or losing connection to
ize Syrian air defense systems in the Bekaa Valley. 18
the ground controllers.21
General Atomics MQ-1 Predator
15 Leslie Reade, “Bombs over Venice,” History Today 8, no. 6 (June 1958): 1, https://www.historytoday.com/archive/bombs-over-venice.
16 “A Brief History of Drones,” Imperial War Museums, January 3, 2018, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/a-brief-
history-of-drones.
17 “Evolution of Commercial Drone Technology.”
18 Paul G. Fahlstrom and Thomas J. Gleason, Introduction to UAV Systems 4th Edition (John Wiley & Sons, 2012).
19 George Woodhams, Weapons of Choice: The Expanding Development, Transfer and Use of Armed UAVs (Geneva: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, 2018), https://www.unidir.org/publication/weapons-choice-expanding-development-transfer-and-use-armed-uavs.
20 Roger Connor, “The Predator, a Drone That Transformed Military Combat,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, March 9, 2018,
https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/predator-drone-transformed-military-combat.
21 “MQ-1B Predator,” United States Air Force, September 23, 2015, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/14|TH opic A: The Proliferation of Remote
istory and Description of the Issue
Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
In the 21st century, drones have advanced even further by defense industry, which has invested heavily in research and
increasing autonomy and tactical capabilities. Modern drones development for both the vehicles and ordnances that make
like the MQ-9 Reaper make up a whole new class of drones: up drone systems. With roughly 300 manufacturers worldwide
the long-endurance, medium to high-altitude “hunter-killer” vying for a piece of the military drone market projected to
UAV. These drones, like their predecessors, have all the power value USD 21 billion by 2021, states that lack the complex
and equipment necessary to carry out long-range reconnais- communications, production, and computing infrastructure
sance and surveillance missions. They are different in their to develop and operate their own drones are steadily entering
increased capacity for ordnance payloads that can be used to the market by purchasing such technologies from other states
initiate airstrikes from cruising altitude in seconds. This new directly or from any one of these global manufacturers. This
capability, coupled with improved computing and even the decreased barrier to entry into the drone industry has allowed
introduction of artificial intelligence, has allowed drones to at least 21 states to produce over 60 different military drones.
go on longer missions, autonomously operate while cruising, The majority of these drones lack the sophistication of the
and quickly “perform strike, coordination, and reconnaissance MQ-9 Reaper and similar models. However, they are more
against high-value, fleeting, and time-sensitive targets.”22 than capable of completing a wide range of tasks, including
lethal force. Additionally, due to unclear, insufficient, or non-
However, drones are not just increasing in size. Some of
existent global trade regulations, the proliferation of these
the latest innovations in drone technology involve making
drones has gone largely unchecked.24
them smaller and more autonomous so that they might act
in “swarms” capable of being deployed by other drones or The three most prolific producers of drones and related tech-
manned aircraft during missions. The UNIDIR notes that nologies are the United States, China, and Israel.25 These states
some small, consumer-sized drones are increasingly capable have complex international trade relationships and strategic
of being deployed in large swarms, making use of artificial alliances that have caused them to contribute to the global
intelligence technology to act autonomously. With smaller and proliferation of drones. Although the US was one of the first
more autonomous drones, the infrastructure needed to design, producers of drones and the very first country to launch a
manufacture, and operate them is greatly reduced, there is an lethal payload from a drone in 2001, it has a history of trade
increased burden on the international security community to restrictions that prevent it from exporting freely.26 However,
monitor and regulate their development, trade, and usage.23 these laws have also loosened the restrictions on drone trade
to US allies, allowing it to empower allied countries with drone
Growing Proliferation Through Unchecked technology without them having to endeavor on the costly
Trade
venture of drone research and development.27 Israel, however,
The history of innovation that has empowered drones with has less strict laws governing the export of drones; conse-
such a robust set of tools and uses has led to the birth and quently, it has become one of the world’s largest exporters of
growth of a global industry that, with limited intervention, drone technology.28 By being one of the first and only coun-
has caused the widespread proliferation of drone technology tries in the world to establish a robust drone development
worldwide. This new drone industry is a subset of the greater infrastructure and freely exporting that technology, Israel has
Display/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator/.
22 “MQ-9 Reaper.”
23 David Hambling, Change in the Air: Disruptive Developments in Armed UAV Technology (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, 2018), https://www.unidir.org/publication/change-air-disruptive-developments-uav-technology.
24 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
25 George Woodhams, Weapons of Choice.
26 Aaron Mehta, “Trump Administration Launches Review of Drone Export Regulations,” Defense News, Sightline Media Group, August
3, 2017, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/08/03/trump-administration-launches-review-of-drone-
export-regulations/.
27 Aaron Mehta and Paul McLeary, “New Armed UAV Export Rules Help US Firms,” Defense News, Sightline Media Group, February 21,
2015, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2015/02/21/new-armed-uav-export-rules-help-us-firms/.
28 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.Topic A: The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
History and Description of the Issue |15
continued to drive and innovate the drone industry.29 Due to commercial drones to “surveille enemy positions.” More so-
the strict US drone export restrictions and possible politi- phisticated rebel groups like the Islamic State have been seen
cal tensions between buyers and the US or Israel, China has using commercial drones outfitted with munitions in formal
found and occupied a major portion of the drone export mar- drone units like the “Unmanned Aircraft of Mujahideen”
ket.30 By trading with countries in the Middle East and Africa, which attached explosives to small fixed-wing drones to carry
China has built up a strong enough infrastructure to support out attacks. Due to the complex supply lines of these NSAs,
the mass production of its advanced drone systems, such as they often involve trafficking commercial drones across sev-
the Cai Hong 5 (CH-5), which officials claim rivals the MQ-9 eral countries from several different manufacturers around
Reaper in performance and capabilities.31 Despite its relatively the world.37 Since these acquisitions violate international law,
new status as a primary global drone exporter, China’s will- they are outside the scope of direct DISEC intervention.
ingness to trade more freely and offer lower prices has and However, through international arms trade registries and mul-
will continue to significantly contribute to the proliferation of tilateral drone proliferation forums, DISEC and the greater
drone technology to smaller, less capable militaries.32 disarmament community have already devised ways to address
While these states are pre-eminent drivers of the drone in- the root causes of drone trafficking and their use by NSAs.
dustry, they are only a small part of the larger drone prolifera- Most of the unintended consequences of widespread drone
tion industry. It is estimated that as of 2018, 78 countries use proliferation can be monitored, controlled, and prevented by
drones “solely for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- improving or developing new international mechanisms for
sance operations.”33 In contrast, as of 2020, upwards of 39 tracking and securing drones from the moment they leave the
countries report having armed drone capabilities with at least manufacturer.
an additional 10 countries having “companies or armed forc-
es that have acquired, displayed, developed, or ran test-flights Surveillance and Security
of armed drones.”34 With drone trades occurring in various Excluding the implications associated with drones’ capacity
ways, including from private companies directly to drone buy-
to deliver lethal payloads, two of the primary concerns raised
ing and drone producing states, the number of states with
by the employment of drone technology are surveillance and
some form of armed drone capability is steadily increasing.
security. Surveillance, close monitoring to gather information
These increased drone trades between states and private com-
on or influence subjects, was a primary driver in the inception
panies have presented a unique challenge for regulators and
and development of drone technology.38 Like with all-pow-
had many unintentional consequences for the armed conflict
erful surveillance technologies, drones raise serious concerns
landscape.35
for the future of individual privacy and state sovereignty. Ad-
An unintentional result of this unregulated drone market is ditionally, with such a powerful suite of surveillance and strike
drones by non-state actors (NSAs).36 NSAs in several differ- capabilities, steps must be taken to secure drones from cyber-
ent regions, including South America and Africa, have used attacks and even hijackings.39
29 Harriet Sherwood, “Israel is World’s Largest Drone Exporter,” Guardian, May 20, 2013, accessed June 21, 2020, https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/may/20/israel-worlds-largest-drone-exporter.
30 Jon Walker, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) - Comparing the USA, Israel, and China,” Emerj - Artificial Intelligence Research and Insight,
February 3, 2019, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/unmanned-aerial-vehicles-uavs/.
31 Jon Walker, “Comparing the USA, Israel, and China.”
32 Jon Walker, “Comparing the USA, Israel, and China.”
33 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
34 Peter Bergen, Melissa Salyk-Virk, and David Sterman, “World of Drones.”; Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
35 Peter Bergen, Melissa Salyk-Virk, and David Sterman, “World of Drones.”
36 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
37 Peter Bergen, Melissa Salyk-Virk, and David Sterman, “World of Drones.”
38 “Evolution of Commercial Drone Technology.”
39 Mohiuddin Ahmed and Paul Haskell-Dowland, “Aerial Threat: Why Drone Hacking Could be Bad News for the Military,” The Conversa-
tion US, October 7, 2019, accessed June 22, 2020, https://theconversation.com/aerial-threat-why-drone-hacking-could-be-bad-news-for-the-
military-124588.16|TH opic A: The Proliferation of Remote
istory and Description of the Issue
Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
The vast majority of modern drones are used for surveillance pilots, who experience deteriorated performance with longer
and reconnaissance.40 These systems have become increas- missions.44 With ranges reaching into the thousands of kilo-
ingly capable with advancements in sensor and camera tech- meters and loiter times of days in some cases, drones can be
nology that have allowed for live-feed video, infrared and heat deployed anywhere in the world to carry out surveillance, re-
sensing, advanced radar, and more tools. Additionally, mod-
41
connaissance, and strike missions.
ern drones may hover over an area for several hours before
The increased capability and usage of drones for surveillance
delivering munitions, marking a target for a strike, or landing.42
purposes has had a dual effect on state sovereignty. States that
High-definition and high-fidelity surveillance of unwitting or
are targets of drone surveillance have seen an erosion of their
effectively powerless targets from altitudes of over 20 kilome-
autonomy as external states can monitor and thus influence
ters has raised concerns domestically about individual privacy
their state of affairs. Conversely, drone surveillance has been
and internationally about state sovereignty and autonomy.43
beneficial to the states that use them when strengthening their
As a means of international surveillance, drones are in a national defense and security.45 An example of this duality
league of their own. Drones are uniquely capable of fitting is evident in the US’s use of drone surveillance and strikes
the needs of surveillance and reconnaissance as their smaller, in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in
quieter vehicles are less conspicuous than many manned sur- 2004.46 While the US was able to pre-emptively defend the
veillance vehicles. Furthermore, their steadily increasing loiter interests of its government and citizens at home according to
times and range, more efficient power sources, and fast speed its policy of “active defense” against terrorism, Pakistan was
of deployment make them a preferable option over human unable to defend its citizens, government, and territory from
Example of a commercial drone surveillance device
40 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
41 “Surveillance Drones,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, accessed June 22, 2020, https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones.
42 “MQ-9 Reaper.”
43 “Surveillance Drones.”
44 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
45 Matteo Besana, “Targeting Westphalian Sovereignty.”
46 Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/
drones-myths-and-reality-pakistan.Topic A: The Proliferation of Remote Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
History and Description of the Issue |17
surveillance and attack.47 Although evidence suggests some or compromising its data, or gaining access to classified docu-
cooperation between the US and Pakistani governments on mentation on militaries’ drone programs. There is a multitude
target selection, the use of drone surveillance, in this case, of ways that drones can be compromised during operations.
demonstrated a clear duality of drone technology’s ability to For instance, drones that use the Global Positioning System
both erode and bolster state sovereignty.48 (GPS) and gyroscopes to orient and pilot themselves can be
injected with false or “rogue signals” from the ground that
When domestically used, drone surveillance poses an equally
would render the vehicle unpredictable and even dangerous
pressing threat to individual liberties and the right to privacy
to civilians below. With some technical knowledge, hackers
of citizens. Privacy policy advocates note that drones carrying
may even directly compromise the on-board cameras, sen-
cameras and other sensors offer a whole new avenue for the
sors, and even flight control systems to either feed false data
constant and routine surveillance of a state’s citizens.49 These
technologies allow governments to pursue more pervasive, to ground operators or outright take control of the vehicle.
invasive surveillance of their citizens due to their cheaper Furthermore, hackers might indirectly compromise drones
operating costs than manned surveillance vehicles.50 While by hacking into secured military computers and obtaining
military-class drone systems are more expensive and require information on their capabilities and operations.54 Such an
many highly trained operators to use, the steadily decreasing event already occurred in 2018 when an unidentified hacker
cost of such drones and advancements in smaller, commer- attempted to distribute information on US combat drones
cial drones may encourage governments to adopt the technol- stolen from a military officer’s computer.55 This demonstrates
ogy sooner rather than later.51 Despite this growing source a pressing need to fortify every aspect of drone technology,
of concern, many states lack the legislation or even desire to from the vehicles themselves and their on-board instruments
regulate domestic drone surveillance.52 While a range of pos- to the servers containing data on them, against the growing
sible solutions exists, including requiring warrants for drone threat of cyber attacks.
surveillance, imposing time restrictions to prevent “persistent
surveillance,” extending individual property rights to the air- Attempts to Regulate Drone Industry
space above one’s property, and increasing the level of suspi-
One of the primary tools of the international disarmament
cion necessary to deploy drone surveillance, each has its own
and security regime is regulation, trade, and usage. Regulations
caveats that may result in unintended privacy and state gov-
can help establish international norms and best practices that
ernment supremacy implications.53
can not only help prevent the escalation of conflicts, but miti-
Accompanying much of the concern surrounding drone sur- gate many of the concerns surrounding drone technology.
veillance is that of drone security. With such a wide range of The international community, through a host of unilateral and
capabilities, including lethal force, drones are a prime target multilateral directives, has made several attempts at regulating
cyberattacks focused on either hijacking the vehicle, stealing the drone technologies, markets, and uses.56
47 Matteo Besana, “Targeting Westphalian Sovereignty.”
48 Drones: Myths and Reality.
49 Jay Stanley and Catherine Crump, Protecting Privacy From Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft (New York:
American Civil Liberties Union, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/report/protecting-privacy-aerial-surveillance-recommendations-government-
use-drone-aircraft.
50 Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations For Legislators (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf.
51 Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance.
52 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.
53 Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance.
54 Mohiuddin Ahmed and Paul Haskell-Dowland, “Aerial Threat.”
55 Dustin Volz, “Stolen U.S. Military Drone Documents Found for Sale on Dark Web, Researchers Say,” The Wall Street Journal, July 11,
2018, accessed June 22, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/stolen-u-s-military-drone-documents-found-for-sale-on-dark-web-researchers-
say-1531301401.
56 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions.18|TH opic A: The Proliferation of Remote
istory and Description of the Issue
Weapons Systems and Unmanned Vehicles
Perhaps most notable amongst the attempts to regulate the 2006, the UNROCA’s Group of Government Experts (GGE)
trade of drones is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).57 The ATT issued an opinion stating that category IV already covered un-
entered into force on December 24, 2014, and forms the basis manned platforms implicitly.64 This policy serves as the foun-
for much of the international arms trade norms seen today as dation of the GGE’s and UNROCA’s recommendations to
“the first treaty to establish legally binding standards for regu- states on how to report their drones.65 Over the next decade,
lating global trade in conventional weapons.”58 Article 6.3 of the GGE would issue a range of recommendations culmi-
the ATT prohibits the transfer of munitions “if there is a risk nating in the 2016 UN Register GGE recommendation that
that they might be used to…violate international humanitari- the UNROCA adjust the category IV (combat aircraft) title
an law, international human rights, or to facilitate terrorism.”59 and description to include an explicit reference to “unmanned
However, while ATT directives and prohibitions are fairly combat aerial vehicles (UCAV).”66 Though this recommenda-
clear, questions have been raised about the scope of the ATT tion did not exist two years prior when the ATT entered into
since its inception. Since drones are not one of the categories force, the ATT annual report template has been adapted to
of conventional weapons identified in Article 2.1 of the ATT, reflect the new sub-categories that account for unmanned ve-
and these categories themselves are largely undefined by the hicles.67
document, there remains ambiguity about whether or not the
Even with this attempt at improved clarity, states have varied
scope of the ATT includes drone technology.60
approaches to how or whether they choose to include drones
There have been several attempts, even in the original text of in their UNROCA reports, perpetuating the lack of clarity
the ATT, at resolving this ambiguity surrounding the scope surrounding drone trade reporting. While the ATT makes
of ATT as it regards drones.61 One such attempt is that of great strides towards “establishing responsible and appropri-
Article 5.3 of the ATT, which states that the national defini- ate standards for the use of [drones],” its failure to clearly
tions of the weapons systems enumerated in Article 2.1 must communicate the scope of its applicability and the methods
“not cover less than the descriptions used in the UN Register by which it ought to be implemented by states has limited
of Conventional Arms [UNROCA].” This means that states its success as a truly comprehensive international drone trade
are mostly free to report their definitions for their weapons regulation framework.68
systems, so long as they are at the least inclusive of the de-
Another promising attempt at establishing international drone
scriptions in the UNROCA.62
regulations is the Joint Declaration for the Export and Sub-
The UNROCA offers definitions for seven of the eight catego- sequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial
ries of weapons systems listed in the ATT, including category Vehicles, or Joint Declaration as it will be henceforth men-
IV (combat aircraft) and category V (attack helicopters).63 In tioned.69 The Joint Declaration was originally developed from
57 Rachel Stohl And Shannon Dick, The Arms Trade Treaty and Drones (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), https://www.stimson.org/
wp-content/files/file-attachments/Stimson_The%20Arms%20Trade%20Treaty%20and%20Drones_August%202018.pdf.
58 Rachel Stohl and Shannon Dick, Arms Trade Treaty and Drones.
59 “Arms Trade Treaty,” December 24, 2014, United Nations Treaty Series 3013, no. 52373, https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
60 “Arms Trade Treaty.”
61 Rachel Stohl and Shannon Dick, Arms Trade Treaty and Drones.
62 “Arms Trade Treaty.”
63 “Categories of Major Conventional Arms,” United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, accessed June 23, 2020, https://www.unroca.org/
categories.
64 A/61/261, “Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development,” August 15, 201,
https://undocs.org/A/61/261.
65 Rachel Stohl and Shannon Dick, Arms Trade Treaty and Drones.
66 “Categories of Conventional Arms.”
67 Rachel Stohl, Reporting on Conventional Arms Trade: Synthesis Handbook (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2018),
https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/reporting-on-conventional-arms-trade-synthesis-handbook-en-699.pdf.
68 Rachel Stohl and Shannon Dick, Arms Trade Treaty and Drones.
69 United States Department of State, Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) (Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811.htm.You can also read
