CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - Narratives of Control and Influence
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CHALLENGES TO THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
Narratives of Control and Influence
Łukasz Adamski
Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois
Šarūnas Liekis
Viktorija Rusinaitė
Ernest Wyciszkiewicz
VILNIUS 2021Reviewers:
Prof. dr. Giedrius Česnakas, General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania
Prof. dr. Mindaugas Jurkynas, Vytautas Magnus University
In collaboration with
Challenges to the European Security Architecture: Narratives of Control and Influence. Policy paper
ISBN 978-609-8281-03-3
© 2021 Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis
© 2021 Łukasz Adamski, Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois, Šarūnas Liekis,
Viktorija Rusinaitė, Ernest WyciszkiewiczTABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 2 CHAPTER I. A LAW-BASED APPROACH TO REGIONAL ORDER 6 Why international law matters 6 “Russian international law” 7 Between lawfare and lawtalk 9 Not only cynicism 11 Breaches of the international law as a problem in Russia’s relations with its neighbours 14 CHAPTER II. RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 16 Putin’s rule and the return of great power ambitions 19 Tools for strategic narration 23 Narrative 1. European security architecture is in crisis 26 Narrative 2. The US / and NATO / are destabilising the region 29 Narrative 3. The Russian sphere of influence 31 Narrative 4. The irrational Baltic States and Poland 33 The way forward 34 CHAPTER III. EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY TO RUSSIAN NARRATIVES AND INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 36 A possibly lighter American engagement 36 France as a leader of the “European autonomy” initiative 40 Germany as a leader of dialogue on European security architecture 44 The receptiveness of Russian narratives on European security architecture in the West 48 Conclusion 51 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52
CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
INTRODUCTION
The European security order, based on commonly politicians and experts, open-mindedly welcoming
agreed principles, norms and common institutions, “all sides concerned”, produce proposals that seem
such as the EU, NATO, the OSCE and its acquis – to be much closer to the Russian vision than to a
the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, arms European one. Western representatives, approach-
control agreements and confidence and security ing these debates with their democratic habitus, are
building measures, is being increasingly challenged divided, questioning and compromise-prone, often
today. Russia has emerged as a major contender: self-critical, and are not necessarily well prepared
having disregarded international law and regional (in terms of coordination and clarification of con-
agreements and having disrespected the sovereignty crete interests). The Russians, on the contrary, both
of neighbouring independent states, it attempts to at the political and the expert level, seem to know
drive wedges within the Euro-Atlantic community, very well what they are after. Their messages are
exploits loopholes in arms control regimes and de- well formulated and verified, underpinned by well-
ploys large efforts to influence and destabilise Eu- constructed narratives, their agenda is consistent.
ropean democracies through information warfare
Among these narratives, one will find a rationalisa-
and election meddling. The United States, the
tion for the illegal annexation of Crimea and war in
strongest guarantor of security in Europe over the
Donbass, where it is claimed that Russia had been
past seventy years, is reassessing the merits of its
“provoked by the West”. Military and economic
involvement in the continent, while European na-
pressure against the sovereign neighbouring states,
tions are questioning themselves about the future of
aspiring to join NATO or seek enhanced coopera-
the institutions that bind them together.
tive agreements with the European Union, is ex-
The stakeholders in the European security order, as plained away with the claim for “privileged inter-
constructed since the end of the Cold War, are in ests” in the “near abroad”. These rationalisations are
need for solutions to bridge the growing divides, the reinforced by the argument that all states behave
largest of which today is that between the West and egoistically in the anarchical international order,
Russia. Any common ground for mutual under- that this is a matter of interests which must be re-
standing and trust is slipping away. While Russia spected, and that Russia is not to be blamed for ag-
advances across Europe, tightening its grip on the gressive behaviour any more than the West itself.
neighbouring countries, nurturing conflictual grey Indeed, the assertion that both, the West and Russia,
zones, annexing foreign territories, brokering deals are equally responsible for shattering the European
in what it claims to be its zone of influence, Euro- security order is very strong. Finally, in order to
pean powers have less and less leverage to deter avoid the blame-game, and disguise those instances
Russia or to defend those nations which choose de- in which the Kremlin undermines European secu-
mocracy and want to come closer to European insti- rity, the order itself is criticised as outdated, exclu-
tutions. Meaningful dialogue on a majority of criti- sive, and out of sync with the “new realities”.
cal security issues has stalled, room for compromise
It is illustrative that many of the above-mentioned
is shrinking, and trust-building is at its lowest.
narratives appear in various “compromise-based”
Efforts to reinvigorate thinking about an inclusive proposals for the future of European security. They
European security order do not seem to deliver ade- agree to suggestions to reform the European secu-
quate results. Most of the discussions among rity architecture, to activate European dialogue with
2Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
Russia and to bow to the politics of balance between democratic European nations should defend is
power blocks, where the big states would guarantee imperative.
security and economic welfare for small “states in
This report is a joint effort by Polish and Lithuanian
between” in their respective zones of privileged in-
experts to examine how the European security ar-
terests.1 The principles and values that have been so chitecture and international law are challenged by
dear to Europe are dangerously put aside: the under- strategic narratives2 promoted by Russian foreign
standing that no security order can be sustainable
policy elites who seek “great power” status for their
without respect for human rights and freedoms, the
country, pursue exclusive influence in Russia’s Eu-
acknowledgment of sovereign equality between
ropean neighbourhood, and are increasingly active
states, the respect of agreements, the reckoning with
in efforts to destabilise Western democracies. It also
truth and the rendering of justice, refraining from
explores how these narratives are perceived among
the use of force, and the restraint of power by law.
the allied partners and what consequences the shift
Long years of experience within the Western secu-
of perceptions towards those desired by the Kremlin
rity community have taught Europeans that no last-
might have for European security.
ing cooperation is possible without basic bona fides
and that communities do not last if they do not sub- We understand narratives as instruments to create a
scribe to the minimum of common principles. In a shared meaning of the international system, and nar-
self-defeating manner, Europeans seem to accept ration as an effort to shape and drive the perceptions
not only the claim that reality has changed, but that of strategic elites in order to solve strategic issues in
the basic tenets, upon which the European security security and foreign policy.3 Narratives help to or-
order had been constructed since the end of the Cold ganise seemingly separate events and their rational-
War, have lost their validity too. isations into one coherent storyline, defining the
concept of international security order, what posi-
It has become clear that a critical assessment is
tions different actors hold, and the priorities and ob-
necessary not only of the current security chall-
stacles for different states within this order. Alt-
enges to the European security architecture, and
hough narratives of the international security order
the capacity of European states to respond to
concern not only policy circles but also media and
them, but also – the perception and the intellec-
social networks, the main narrators analysed in this
tual framing of these challenges and solutions
report are policy elites and policy experts.
proposed. This report argues that the discussions
on the new European security order need to be We consider narratives to be part of strategic actions
underpinned by a clear reinstatement of the fun- taken by a state. Narratives often go together with
damental principles upon which this order has political, military and civil operations, both overt
been built, and which are by no means outdated. and covert, promoted by state and non-state actors.
A candid evaluation of the interests that They supplement, explain, rationalise and help push
through acceptance of the actions undertaken.
1
Among others, see for example expert discussion pro- From’, 8 March 2018
ceedings that were supported by the Carnegie Corpora- https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed-
tion of New York, the Swiss Federal Department of For- ings/CF382.html
2
eign Affairs, and prepared in partnership with Friedrich Ben O’Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Ro-
Ebert Stiftung - Samuel Charap et al., ‘A Consensus selle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and In-
Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet ternational Relations, (Michigan: University of Michi-
Europe and Eurasia’, 8 October 2019, gan Press, 2017).
https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed- 3
Ibid.
ings/CF410.html Samuel Charap et al., ‘Getting Out
3CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
While these narratives often appear in disinfor- analysis will illuminate the contrast which exists be-
mation campaigns and are promoted by malign non- tween the Russian way of thinking and the thinking
state actors, it is equally possible to come across that is fundamentally European, and optimistically
them in all domains of policy practitioner and expert was thought to be shared with Russia. Having estab-
circles, where Russian interests intersect with those lished this difference, we conclude with recommen-
of the West. The Russian narration of the European dations, the thrust of which suggests that the right
security order within diplomatic, civil, military and solution before diving into a dialogue with Russia is
legal domains invites us to explore narratives in the to assess which elements of our own thinking we are
context of hybrid, multi-domain or grey zone chal- ready to sacrifice in a compromise with Russia, and
lenges. This is why our analysis will include not which elements are fundamental to our own integ-
only the identification of the narratives themselves, rity.
but also the description of the context in which they
are promoted, and the actions which they underpin. This work is composed of three chapters.
Competition of the visions for a European security
In Chapter I, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz and Łukasz Ad-
architecture occurs simultaneously across multiple
amski focus on the significance of international law
domains in local and global contexts. This is why
in the shared European security environment and
the preparedness of the Euro-Atlantic allies to
show how Russia exploits international law in its ef-
properly react to them is essential.
forts to fulfil its political needs. There is a misalign-
Do those to whom these narratives are tailored take ment between words and deeds in Russian foreign
them at face value? Our report is of course deemed policy, as is shown by repeatedly stressing the im-
to conclude negatively. The Russian strategic narra- portance of sovereignty in their own foreign policy
tives collude with the strategic narratives of the documents, while at the same time pursuing wars in
West, with the complex interests of states and alli- Georgia and Ukraine. In this chapter the authors ex-
ances, and within the conditions that shape their re- plain the psychological mechanisms at work used to
lations with Russia. Among the drivers of these re- reconcile words and deeds into coherent strategic
lations are not only strategic security interests, but narratives. Throughout their work, the authors delve
also the historical and cultural imagination of Eu- into the vocabulary used by Russia in order to forge
rope and the West. The Western narratives rely not similar adversarial thinking about countries in Eu-
only on the vision of Europe as a cradle of continu- rope through an imperial lens.
ously developing democracies, their norms and val-
In Chapter II, Viktorija Rusinaitė and Šarūnas
ues, but also on the imagination of the role of the
Liekis focus on an analysis of specific Russian stra-
United States and the European states in the security
tegic narratives promoted as part of high level dip-
architectures of the past, their relations to Russia
lomatic and expert policy advisory efforts. The au-
both now and throughout history. These contexts in-
thors explore the narratives used to undermine the
fluence the acceptance of Russian narratives, and
international security architecture and shift the
the possibility to reconcile them with the European
blame for the militarisation of Europe from Russia
vision of security.
to the West in general, and the US and NATO in
This study is focused upon the following elements: particular. They analyse Russian narratives that pro-
Russia’s own narrative of international law, its role mote claims about the crisis of the European secu-
and its purposes, the narratives of Russia’s role and rity architecture, about the destabilisation of the re-
interests in the international system, and the ways in gion by the US and NATO, the legitimisation of the
which the West reacts to these narratives. The Russian spheres of influence, and discreditation of
4Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
the “Russophobic” Baltic States and Poland. In their security architecture is facing are understood in Eu-
analysis they look into how these narratives help to rope, especially in France and Germany. The author
project Russia as a constructive and peaceful actor, also discusses how Russian strategic narratives are
and the international system as biased against Rus- received in policy and expert circles in these coun-
sia. tries and how they influence the future visions of
European security that are being actively discussed
In Chapter III, Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois analyses
today.
the ways in which the challenges that the European
5CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
CHAPTER I. A LAW-BASED APPROACH TO REGIONAL ORDER
Why international law matters opt for vague concepts of “great power manage-
ment”.
The main Russian narrative today is that the
International law matters when it is reflected in
contemporary international system is in de-
the political practice of states and, most of the
cline. Apparently, the old rules are not valid an-
time, most international actors wilfully comply.
ymore, so new ones must be quickly installed to
Some of them do so out of fear of sanctions (or
avoid a world with no rules at all. Proponents of
hope for profit), but a majority choose this path
such thinking rarely, if ever, notice, that it was
due to the need to behave according to mutually
actually Russia that decided to undermine the
accepted rules to resolve conflicts in an orderly
normative foundations of international relations
manner, to receive reciprocal treatment, or to
as defined in the UN Charter or the Helsinki Fi-
avoid criticism. In many countries that are usu-
nal Act, to name just a few key documents. Ob-
ally democratic and committed to the rule of
viously, there were also other examples of
law, proper international behaviour and an apt
norm-breaching in recent decades by other
assessment of misbehaviour needs to be in-
countries, though rather different in scale and
cluded into the political calculus of those in
content. None of them, however, can justify
power. But even autocrats dress their unlawful
calls for a new normative architecture.
actions in a quasi-legal costume to keep up the
Recurring criticism of international law is that appearance of being law-abiding citizens.
it fails to influence the behaviour of states due
Nonetheless, one can often hear that interna-
to the lack of central legislative or executive
tional law does not work because it is violated
power. This kind of view relies upon a superfi-
regularly. Interestingly, similar concerns are
cial comparison with domestic law, whereas
rarely voiced about the Highway Code, which
both domains are distinct and deserve a differ-
is violated even more often. Due to selection
ent approach. International law carries signifi-
bias, serious transgressions of norms, though
cant normative and political weight. Interna-
quite rare, attract more public attention than
tional law was, is and will be violated as any
day-to-day obedience. Blunt violations of fun-
other system of norms, but at the same time, a
damental norms do still occur, as in the case of
system of norms has always been constitutive
the annexation of Crimea, yet the general track
to any form of governance. Mutually accepted
record of compliance looks quite positive.
and internalised customary and treaty-based
norms are an indispensable part of the stable in- Attempts to undermine the significance of in-
ternational order. Obviously, they cannot elim- ternational law are driven either by ignorance,
inate international crimes and misdemeanours naïve interpretation, misunderstanding or polit-
once for all, but they significantly increase the ical agenda. But, flawed as they are, these at-
political and economic costs of such actions. tempts to frame international law as useless or
Furthermore, they provide for all actors a pro- dysfunctional do matter, as they might trigger a
tective shield against the appetites of those who self-fulfilling prophecy and push international
6Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
order down a slippery slope. For actors that do the Russian Constitutional Court approved the
not aspire to play their power games at the ex- “accession” of Crimea to the Russian Federa-
pense of others but are instead interested in tion without even thinking about the compati-
rule-based cooperation and competition, such a bility of this decision with the UN Charter, in-
scenario would be dangerous. The same applies voking historical rights and the supremacy of
to the world order in general. The balance of domestic law over international law, just to sat-
power between great powers – presented some- isfy its political needs.4
times as the preferable model for global govern- In Soviet and Russian political parlance, the
ance – does not mean bringing stability to the meaning assigned to legal notions follows po-
whole system, but rather transferring instability litical needs. So, legal concepts are re-invented
from some regions to others, and consequently whenever authorities find it useful. There is a
leading to even greater local and global uncer- great deal of purposeful mimicry to make things
tainty and unpredictability. sound like their Western equivalents, but very
often with the opposite meaning. Take these
“Russian international law” two brief examples. In the past, the Stalinist
constitution of 19365 strongly protected human
Russia’s attitude towards international law is a and civil rights that were actually non-existent
derivative of a specific understanding of the re- in the Soviet Union, as was vividly illustrated
lationship between law and power, with the for- by the Great Terror. Today, the very title “Rus-
mer seen mostly as an instrument of the latter. sian Federation” is confusing since Russia does
It is a by-product of a long tradition of an au- not meet the basic criteria of a federation. The
thoritarian system of governance. Past and cur- same quasi-postmodern game of shuffling with
rent Russian leaders were not keen to accept concepts also applies to international law,
any system of checks and balances that would which for Russian political elites has never had
not be dependent solely on their will and discre- universal but rather instrumental value. So, un-
tion. Nowadays in foreign policy, this purely in- surprisingly, it was in Tsarist Russia that the
strumental approach is best illustrated by the concept of “Russian international law” was
lack of consistency between Russian statements coined.6 Later on – to fight Western predomi-
and deeds. The Russian government strongly nance – Moscow invented “progressive” (in the
supports the UN Charter while blatantly violat- Soviet, not the contemporary meaning) interna-
ing its provisions (as in the case Crimea) with- tional law in opposition to its “bourgeois” coun-
out batting an eyelid. The rule of law has lost in terpart.7 Up to this day, Russian elites try to
this competition to rule by law. For example, “nationalise” international law by twisting and
4 6
Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 182. Law, p. 15.
5 7
Конституция (Основной закон) Союза Советских For more see, Alina Cherviatsova, Oleksandr
Социалистических Республик (утверждена поста- Yarmysh, ‘Soviet International Law: Between Slogans
новлением Чрезвычайного VIII Съезда Советов Со- and Practice’, Journal of the History of International
юза Советских Социалистических Республик от 5 Law 19 (2017): 296–327.
декабря 1936 г.), http://constitution.garant.ru/his-
tory/ussr-rsfsr/1936/red_1936/3958676/
7CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
turning well-known concepts for their own po- of international relations would work fine if
litical benefit.8 peace and stability among a few could be
equated with global peace and stability. Yet,
As the legal continuator of the USSR, Russia
this has not been the case even in the midst of
inherited not only a permanent seat in the UN
the Cold War, let alone today with many other
Security Council (UNSC), but also the charac-
weaker actors enjoying a relatively high impact
teristically Soviet reluctance to accept the uni-
on world or regional affairs. Russian political
versal applicability of international norms. It
elites (and to be fair, also many representatives
quickly absorbed the classic great power atti-
of other real or self-proclaimed powers) have
tude (with the problematic record of the US in
always had difficulty in accepting this change.
this field as a pretext) based on the presumption
There is a long tradition in Russia to perceive
that international law should work up to the
its own territorial conquests as normal, neces-
lines delimited by key actors, preferably the
sary, or even defensive. Great power instincts
US, Russia, UK, France and China, with sec-
have not died out elsewhere, but at least they
toral/regional input from a few others (i.e., In-
are kept at bay thanks to the internalisation of
dia, Brazil, South Africa, Japan). Russia sees it-
international law. For Russia it is still the bal-
self as a veto power, not only when it comes to
ance of power that constitutes a level-playing
specific UN codes of conduct, but also more
field for key actors, whereas international law
broadly at any time when it feels the existing
is a constructed level-playing field for the rest.
rules encroach its room for manoeuvre. Then it
In Russia’s view, this kind of a normative order
simply violates them and invites others to ac-
also hides behind such nicely framed concepts
cept a redefinition of what it feels uncomforta-
such as “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok”
ble with. It is not about changing the rules as
or “New Security Architecture”: these seem-
such, but seeking support for the claim that
ingly inclusive concepts maintain the possibil-
those rules are for the others, not the major
ity of “privileged” zones, dependent on Russia
powers who are predestined to be political and
as a great power.
legal trend-setters and enforcers. Use of force,
cyberattacks, interference in elections, and the Old Russian aspirations to have veto over
use of chemical weapons are seen by Russian NATO enlargement, and ongoing irritation
authorities merely as tools at the disposal of key over the increasing military capabilities of not-
actors. The remainder are supposed to accept so-new members serve as a good illustration of
this as a fact of nature. the deep conviction that some states should give
up control over their decisions to the more pow-
Realists of all kinds typically argue in the same
erful. Such thinking can be found also in the so-
style, claiming that international law simply re-
called “realist” circles in the West. It makes
flects the distribution of power, so great powers
Russian elites believe that everyone treats the
are to be followed voluntarily by others, either
law instrumentally, but some are just better at
by necessity or by force. This comforting image
8 provision was expanded about precedence of the Consti-
Constitutional changes introduced in 2020 illustrate
this attitude vividly. Apart from the most discussed is- tution over international law. The list of amendments:
sue regarding the nullification of presidential terms, a http://duma.gov.ru/news/48045/.
8Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
hiding it. Such cynicism refuses to take into ac- • When Russia thinks that existing rules re-
count the essential understanding from which duce room for manoeuvre, it violates them
and presents this as an opportunity to rede-
the possibility of all-encompassing civilised co-
fine international law.
operation springs. It is not that mistakes and vi- • Russia has never accepted that interna-
olations are made impossible by international tional law could be a regulatory force in the
law, it is that the very existence of international post-Soviet area and views Ukraine, Bela-
rus, Moldova and other states as protec-
law allows them to be considered as violations,
torates, rather than sovereign states.
and not as the natural order of things. Western
adherence to the rule-based order is real in gen-
eral, nonetheless it needs to be supported by
both words and deeds on a constant basis.
Between lawfare and lawtalk
Russia has never accepted fully that interna-
If one were to take Russian foreign policy doc-
tional law could be the valid regulatory force in
uments and statements at face value, Moscow
the post-Soviet area, as it would limit its room
would be considered the major guardian of in-
for political manoeuvre. Ukraine, Belarus, Mol-
ternational law. Yet, in this case practice has not
dova and others have never been treated as
followed preaching. Among Russian elites, in-
equal partners but rather as protectorates to be
ternational legal doctrine has usually been a de-
governed in a more or less subtle way. The term
rivative of foreign policy. Thus, compliance
‘near abroad’ that for many years was used in
with or breaching norms were treated as tricks
official Russian documents to describe post-So-
up one’s sleeve to be used when required.
viet neighbours (now excluding the Baltic
States) clearly depicted its post-imperial phan- For example, official praise for the sovereignty
tom pains and conviction that there were other principle was accompanied by blatant acts of its
‘laws’, apart from those rooted in the UN Char- violation in the case of Georgia and Ukraine. It
ter, that should regulate state interactions in the showed that it was more about Russia’s sover-
area. This has always been the widespread and eign right to decide upon others, in particular to
undisguised belief in natural spheres of influ- limit the sovereignty of neighbours in the name
ence, as any higher normative order with inter- of self-declared entitlement to regional domi-
national law has been subjugated. nance. Those who opposed were sometimes
called irresponsible members of the interna-
In a nutshell: tional community that did not grasp the proper
code of conduct set by the most powerful, or
• Russia views international law as an in-
were too eager to follow the wrong ones.9 Rus-
strument of power.
sia undermined the principle of sovereign
9
Minister Lavrov produced plenty of comments about “the EU is so far unable to get the better of its Russo-
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland in this respect: phobic minority, which is taking advantage of the prin-
“EU policy should not be placed at the disposal of some ciple of consensus and solidarity to block the more or
marginal entities that are following instructions from less constructive approaches to the development of rela-
overseas”. (Interview with the Sputnik, Echo of Moscow tions with Russia” (Interview with Sputnik, Komso-
and Moscow Speaks radio stations, 22 April 2015); or molskaya Pravda and Govorit Moskva, Moscow, 14 Oc-
tober 14 2020).
9CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
equality that it publicly cherished. Yet, it was Russian propaganda juggled with various types
exactly this kind of peculiar game of contradic- of argumentation to target specific audiences.
tions and inconsistencies that was meant to ‘Legal’ posturing was offered to the West so
leave the West confused and unable to react that we could start public hair-splitting of Rus-
properly. sian views instead of a quick rejection of rea-
sons born out of sheer cynicism. Russia has not
Russia firmly stood for the pacta sunt servanda
stopped presenting itself as a constant warrior
principle, even when there was no treaty-based
for international law. In October 2014, Putin
obligation (see the alleged promise from 1989
said “…international relations must be based on
by the US to the USSR not to enlarge NATO),10
international law, which itself should rest on
and at same time regularly violated ratified
moral principles such as justice, equality and
agreements (see Ukraine) and undermined key
truth”.13
political documents (i.e., the Budapest Memo-
randum, NATO-Russia Founding Act). In Russia in the field of international law “noth-
ing seems to be true and everything seems to be
For decades in the USSR and in Russia, the pre-
possible”.14 In international law, as in politics,
dominant view was that the use of military force
the instrumental framing of issues is understood
is legal only in self-defence or when authorised
as the process of creating reality.15 Russia’s of-
by the UNSC. As Putin said in September 2013,
ficial messaging about ‘international law’ has
“anything else is unacceptable and would con-
been more intense than any other UNSC mem-
stitute an act of aggression”.11 And then, a U-
bers. It is sufficient to read Putin’s remarks de-
turn in February 2014 happened, so that Russia
livered half a year after the Crimean annexa-
could rhetorically ‘legalise’ and ‘legitimise’ the
tion: “International law has been forced to re-
annexation of Crimea. So, there was no aggres-
treat over and over by the onslaught of legal ni-
sion, no annexation and no occupation of
hilism. Objectivity and justice have been sacri-
Ukraine, only the ‘protection of compatriots’
ficed on the altar of political expediency. Arbi-
and ‘care for self-determination’. Along with
trary interpretations and biased assessments
these ‘legal’ rationalisations, different kinds of
have replaced legal norms”.16 It suffices to jux-
arguments came up as well, such as the ‘return
tapose this wording with the practice of the
of historical lands’ or ‘laws of geopolitics’.12
Russian state to reach the conclusion that any
10
Mark Kramer, ‘The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlarge- 14
Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is
ment Pledge to Russia’, Washington Quarterly, 32/2 Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia, (Publi-
(April 2009): 39-61. cAffairs, 2014).
11
Vladimir Putin, ‘A Plea for Caution From Russia’, 15
For a glimpse of how this reality is constructed, it is
New York Times, 11 September 2013, https://www.ny- useful to read the column, published on 11 February
times.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution- 2019 by Vladislav Surkov, called ‘Putin’s Long State’,
from-russia-on-syria.html?auth=login-google. https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02-
12
Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 11/5_7503_surkov.html?fbclid=IwAR0YyDI5ooq5Q5A
March 2014 (accessed 20 November 2019), 7TGFzemFL91Fzt5RNsctsOHad9PySSxfrHx-
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. cRT9ymtec.
13
President of Russia, ‘Meeting of the Valdai Interna- 16
Ibid.
tional Discussion Club’, 24 October
2014 (accessed 20 November 2019), http://eng.krem-
lin.ru/news/23137.
10Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
serious conversation about international law as Not only cynicism
seen in the West becomes useless given such
levels of cynicism. The science of psychology has developed sev-
eral notions that are useful to understand how
For Russian elites, international law seems to be
the rhetoric of justifications and manipulation
instrumental just to keep its status as a perma-
of meanings, attributed to the rules and their vi-
nent member of the UN Security Council, seen
olations, help to create the sense that a certain
as a club of global managers who set rules for
kind of behaviour is normal. Since few people
the others. Any criticism of this de facto ‘oli-
are morally ready to accept their own disrespect
garchic’ Yalta-driven system is framed as his-
for social norms, they seek to exculpate deviant
torical revisionism aimed at questioning the re-
behaviour. To explain this phenomenon, one
sults of World War II. Recurring historical at-
can refer to knowledge developed by social
tacks against Poland, and also the Baltic States,
psychology. The so-called defence mechanism
have been closely related to this narrow and in-
is at play here, which reduces the cognitive dis-
strumental view of international law equated
sonance felt after dishonest behaviour, such as
with the global power arrangement of 1945. In-
projection, rationalisation, denial or repression.
ternational law is not about a code of conduct to
sustain a stable environment, but to fight for Projection is about attributing your own way of
status and to compensate for weakness in other thinking onto others. The Russian elites’ world
domains. Legalistic Russian rhetoric is just part view is characterised by a dismissive attitude
of lawfare, i.e., abuse of law for military and towards the law. They treat it not as a complex
political ends. Peremptory norms, broadly ac- of binding directives, but merely as general sug-
cepted by the international community as man- gestions. They think of it not as a specifically
datory, such as the ban on use of force or sov- Russian phenomenon, but rather a universal
ereign equality, are treated as flexible. one. Hence Russia’s breaches of international
law are seen not as crimes but as misdemean-
In a nutshell: ours that are committed from time to time by
powerful states. The others (the West) are just
• Russia views the principles of interna- better at hiding their real intentions or justifying
tional conduct as something declarative,
their actions in the eyes of public opinion, but
but not necessary to follow.
• Official praise of the sovereignty princi- they are alike when it comes to a selective ap-
ple goes hand in hand with limiting the proach to international law.
sovereignty of neighbours.
Another mechanism is the post-rationalisation
• Its official position on the use of military
force only in self-defence does not pre- of decisions or actions. It is difficult to estimate,
vent it from annexing part of Ukraine. inasmuch the annexation of Crimea is currently
• It then shapes the perception of these assessed as a justified step in Russia. However,
digressions from the norm by heavily re-
without any doubt, the act of sending and sup-
lying on targeted propaganda.
porting armed bands of troops in Eastern
Ukraine that resulted in international sanctions
brought no visible benefits to Russia or to the
11CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
regime. Russian politicians seem however to would arise to accept at least some of the Krem-
believe that the decision taken in the spring of lin’s expectations with regard to foreign affairs,
2014 was fully justified and righteous and was which in turn would only increase incentives
preceded by a rational analysis of the situation. for Russian leaders to further dismantle interna-
tional law-centred order, knowing they could
The rationalisation of the past is supplemented
count on de facto impunity for their actions. Let
and enhanced by two other defence mecha-
us analyse some of the most widespread beliefs
nisms – denial and repression. They boil down
with regard to Russia closer:
to ignoring thoughts which could cause painful
reactions or threaten the cohesion of the person- The EU, NATO and Russia bear joint responsi-
ality of an individual or of a group. In practical bility for instability, conflict and wars in East-
terms, it means the repression of possible evi- ern Europe and the Caucasus.
dence or arguments which could cast a critical
This view, often heard during conferences or
shadow on decisions made, e.g., in 2014.
encountered in policy papers and op-ed pieces,
There is a danger that taking at face value the clearly contradicts the reality, given the con-
reasons for Russia-EU/NATO disagreements, stant efforts of the EU and NATO to provide
presented by the Kremlin itself or many Rus- stability and prevent conflict and wars in the re-
sian commentators, can result in giving recom- gion and, on the other side, the numerous ac-
mendations detrimental to international and re- tions of Russia to bring instability, conflicts and
gional security, in particular for Central and wars to the region, with the Georgian and
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. This may Ukrainian wars as the most obvious cases. In
happen, since the subjective perception of real- searching for the reasons why this opinion is so
ity, shared by Putin and his inner circle, also un- widespread, one can assume that it is either an
der the influence of psychological defence expression of genuine belief, based on an anal-
mechanisms, is often interpreted by many cir- ysis with fallacious assumptions, or a political
cles in the EU/NATO countries as a description signal.
of objectively existing and unchangeable Rus-
In the first case, proponents of this view commit
sian national interests. This false diagnosis, pre-
a golden mean fallacy. Namely, they assume
pared on the basis of logically fallacious argu-
that truth “lies in the middle”, so its identifica-
mentations, unconscious biases or deliberately
tion requires making a compromise between
politically motivated language, axiological rel-
two opposite positions. The expression of this
ativism and judicial carelessness, does not con-
view might be preceded by reasoning resting on
tribute to stable order in the region. Quite on the
the assumption that one has to adopt a politi-
contrary, those in Russia who wish to democra-
cally motivated approach of a guilt-symmetry
tise the domestic situation in their own country
between Russia and the EU to help Russian
can be demotivated, and those in Russia’s
elites save face, in the hope that they would
neighbourhood who desire to strengthen de-
change their policy in future. In the other case,
mocracy and the rule of law in their states to
this approach, irrespective of any backstage in-
increase their ties with NATO and the EU may
tentions, becomes a form of crime denial.
be discouraged. Moreover, the temptation
12Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
Avoiding terms supporting the claims of one aging prognosis that their work cannot succeed,
party in the conflict is a form of abdication from since Russia is bound to be imperial and non-
the normative roles of language. It exacerbates democratic.
the feeling of injustice and grievances of one
party, while in parallel confirming for the other All states behave the same and Russia is no ex-
ception.
party – the Kremlin – the view that cynicism
and a rejection of ethical and legal norms is the This view is also analytically erroneous, being
right strategy. Hence, stable order in the region a form of hasty generalisation. The politics of a
cannot be built on euphemisms and axiological state hinges on various conditions, including
relativism when diagnosing, whence the prob- the political system and values which the re-
lems result. spective society shares, and the latter’s vision
of national interests. Thus, certain actions may
Russia was, is and will be a non-democratic indicate an ostensible similarity, but de facto
country conducting policy based on an imperial they are motivated by various reasons. Moreo-
approach (zone of influence, concentration of ver, the opinion that all states behave in the
powers), hence the EU and NATO must come to
same way, if applied consistently, is also a hid-
terms with and accept the reality.
den ‘whataboutism’ tactic, known also as a tu
This view is a bright example of determinism, quoque fallacy. It aims at washing away one’s
i.e., the belief that the future and present are crimes, sins or misdeeds by pointing to the mor-
permanently bound by a cause-and-effect relat- ally dubious actions of others (i.e., NATO in
ionship. Practically, it emphasises the weight of Kosovo) in the hope that it would change the
existing conditions for predicting the future and legal and moral assessment of Russian actions.
plays down the significance of random events Politically speaking, this kind of slogan only
or changes in circumstances on the future be- discourages the Russian people to protest
haviour of states. Hence, the analytically unjus- against the foreign policy of their state and di-
tified, misleading diagnosis suggests that Rus- minishes support for the Western public opin-
sia is a non-democratic country with, overall, a ion in favour of sanctions or other measures un-
non-democratic and imperial past, and has no dertaken to condemn Russian breaches of inter-
chances for a democratic, non-imperial future. national law that have been committed so far,
To some extent, this approach also bears the as well as to prevent them in the future.
hallmarks of one that could be called political
The security architecture in the region is deter-
racism, since it implies that certain societies or
mined by an objective rivalry between NATO
nations, due to their “inherent” features, are un-
and Russia, which feels endangered and encir-
able to establish democracy and implement rule cled.
of law. It is redundant to say that this kind of
This view is a classical mind-projection fallacy,
approach diminishes the chances to change the
occurring when someone’s perception of reality
Russian political system from the inside. It de-
is being confused with the reality itself.
prives Russian civil society of belief in the
sense of the struggle for freedom and democ- Putin’s perception that NATO’s activity in the
racy, inasmuch as it offers them the discour- region constitutes a threat to Russian national
13CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
security starts to be taken for granted as an ob-
jectively existing state. The solution is however In a nutshell:
not a change in policy to satisfy the opponent’s • To explain its misdemeanours in inter-
phobia-based expectations, but rather to assist national law, Russia uses ex-post ration-
in combating the phobia itself. alisations.
• It denies and represses any possible evi-
We cannot oppose the reality, so we have to ac- dence or arguments which could cast a
cept the natural inequality of states when it shadow on its past political decisions.
• Some of the main narrative strategies
comes to their status and capacities to act.
used to cover up infringements of inter-
This view assumes that policy based on interna- national law are: golden mean fallacy,
tional law towards Russia is ineffective and the determinism, generalisations, mind pro-
jection, false alternative fallacies.
only alternative is to accept Russia ‘as it is’,
along with its vision of foreign policy – the
view that great powers have the natural right or Breaches of the international
predisposition to decide about the choices of law as a problem in Russia’s
less powerful middle and small countries. This
relations with its neighbours
kind of approach, resting on unproven premises
and a false alternative fallacy, clearly contra- There are currently several cases of conflicts in-
dicts both the spirit and letter of international volving Russia as a violator of international
law, which asserts that all states are equal. Fur- law. The obvious case is Crimea which, accord-
thermore, taking this view as a basis for strategy ing to Ukraine and almost all the UN countries,
towards Russia would make stability and peace was annexed (illegally incorporated) to the
even more remote, because only a particular Russian Federation and has been under Russian
harmonisation of values and development mod- military occupation since then. According to
els within the political culture of Russia, its Eu- Russia, it was incorporated based on the seces-
ropean neighbours and Western countries could sion of the peninsula in March 2014 from
remove the obstacles in the way of reducing Ukraine and as an exercise of the right to self-
tensions and increasing mutual understanding. determination by the local population. Russia is
The possible implementation of practical ac- undoubtedly also an aggressor under the Lon-
tions derived from the above-mentioned views don Convention for the definition of aggression
would lead to the limited sovereignty of minor (1933) in Eastern Ukraine (Donbass), since it is
states, if not formally, then factually. Thus, a at least the state which “provided support to
new Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty armed bands formed in its territory which have
would emerge. Since this kind of status cannot invaded the territory of another State, or refusal,
count on popular acceptance in many states, notwithstanding the request of the invaded
first of all in Central and Eastern Europe, which State, to take, in its own territory, all the
is a conditio sine qua non to stabilise the situa- measures in its power to deprive those bands of
tion, the strategy of ‘accepting reality’ will not
resolve any of the existing problems.
14Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
all assistance or protection,”17 if not the state 1944–1945 (Poland), and in 1940–1941 and
which carried out “Invasion by its armed forces, 1944–1991 (Baltic States), nor is it intent on re-
with or without a declaration of war, of the ter- turning the cultural objects and archives looted
ritory of another State”. Russia also occupies – in this period.
after war against Georgia – parts of the latter’s Overall, all these remarks should incline the
internationally recognised territory in Abkhazia CEE states to:
and South Ossetia. It is also a guarantor of de
● Give due attention to the political power of
facto independence of the Moldavian breaka-
way territory, from where it has failed to with- international law and a normative approach
to the international relations.
draw its troops, despite international obliga-
tions going back to 1999. ● Combat analytically unsound descriptions
of the situation in the region in the political
When it comes to Russian-Belarusian relations,
it is beyond any doubt that supporting a regime discourse, in particular when discussing Eu-
ropean security architecture.
with no social legitimacy and violating basic
human and civil rights constitutes a delict under ● Use references to legal and moral obliga-
international law, since it prevents the sover- tions (international law and international de-
eign – the Belarusian nation – to exercise their cency) as leverage, which along with politi-
right with regard to the composition of govern- cal correctness would contribute to stability
ment, freedom of speech, assembly and many in the region and contain states from actions
others. Russia has also legal problems arising that would endanger peace.
from its history with Poland and the Baltic
States – it has refused to recognise the occupa-
tion of these territories – in 1939–1941 and
17
Soviet-Lithuanian registration of the treaty in the https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Vol-
League of Nations Treaty Series ume%20148/v148.pdf (p. 81‒85).
15CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
CHAPTER II. RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
Russia18 has been among those players who ac- narrative of the global order. The National Se-
tively pursue strategic narration of the global curity Concept of the Russian Federation 2000
order. Political actors employ strategic narra- and Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 both rein-
tives to foster a shared meaning of the past, pre- force ideas of Russia’s greatness, by claiming
sent and future of international relations and that it is a centuries-old country among the larg-
their place within it. These narratives help to est of the Eurasian powers.22
situate events and causalities into a seemingly The desire to be recognised as great is a power-
coherent linear order, while at the same time in- ful theme running through Russia’s foreign pol-
fluence the behaviour of other local and inter- icy narrative. Its own narrative seeks to contain
national actors, including strategic policy elites actors Russia sees as powerful, while simulta-
and international organisations. The broad goal neously strengthening its own status and auth-
of strategic narratives is usually to provide de- ority.23
sired outcomes for the states fostering those
Russia projects itself as a key player within the
narratives.19
international system and therefore as an integral
Russia employs strategic narratives to shape part of the international framework of institut-
perceptions and ensure the development of ions, organisations and systems that are gov-
Russian political, economic and military inter- erned by international law and agreements. To
ests.20 In its strategic narrative, Russia projects project its centrality, it is essential for Russia to
the international system as being populated by show itself as constructive, predictable, relia-
“great powers working in concert, an elite ble, pragmatic, transparent and “oriented at re-
group of states reinforcing a hierarchy to which solving problems”.24 But this is difficult to do,
Russia claims membership”.21 Russia occupies given Russia᾿s preference for enforcing its
a central place in its foreign policy narrative and
18
Authors would like to thank Rokas Kriaučiūnas, Eli- of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric
jah Liampert, Uladzislau Bass and their contributions to World’, Politics and Governance 5 (29 September
Grey Zones Project in Vilnius Institute, some of the data 2017): 111, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017,
collected was used in this chapter.
19 Russian National Security Concept and Nuclear Policy,
Ben O’Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Ro-
21 July 2020, https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/nsc.htm
selle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and In- and The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federa-
ternational Relations, 2017. tion, Federation Of American Scientists, 28 June 2000,
20
Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm.
Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a 23
Ben O’Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Ro-
Polycentric World’, Politics and Governance 5 (29 Sep-
tember 2017): 111, selle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and In-
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017 ternational Relations, 2017.
21 24
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 115.
22
For more on Russia’s strategic narratives see Alister
Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Narratives
16Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz
presence and influence through military means but it is also a pre-emptive tactic seeking to pre-
and hybrid meddling. There are discrepancies vent any future exclusions.
in how Russia projects itself as a constructive To deal with these discrepancies between activ-
actor and its own illegal actions in Georgia and ities that do not correspond to the projection of
Ukraine. While inside the country the archetype constructive and reliable actor, after the occu-
of “Russia that cannot be grasped by the mind” pation of Crimea, Russia resorted to the idea of
might be enough to explain these discrepancies, ‘guilt symmetry’ or golden mean fallacy, as de-
it is not a sufficient working ground on which scribed in Chapter I. In multiple statements, the
international relations can function. There is a Russian policy establishment called the West as
strong need for narratives that would “soften” being responsible for war in Ukraine. For ex-
the perception of Russia’s breaches of interna- ample, in his speech to the Youth Public Cham-
tional law in the eyes of policy players in Eu- ber, Lavrov claimed that “The Ukraine crisis
rope and the US. is a direct fallout of our Western col-
Some prefer the explanation that Russia is “act- leagues᾿ attempts to maintain and move east-
ing out” because it has not been included in ma- ward the ‘dividing lines’ of the Euro-Atlantic
jor security decisions concerning Europe. space”,25 while in his speech to the RIAC, Lav-
Pushed forward by Russian state-funded think rov presented the situation in Ukraine as a
tank experts, this rationalisation ignores all the chance for more improved relations, expressing
factual steps that Europe and the US took and the hope that “the current crisis will become a
continue to take, including the Russia-NATO kind of ‘refreshing storm’”.26
Founding Act, inclusion of Russia into the The guilt symmetry approach plays an im-
Council of Europe, G8 Obama’s “Reset” pol- portant role in the Russian narration of the in-
icy, etc. The “acting out” rationalisation is an ternational system. The line of lack of recogni-
integral part of Russian strategic narration not tion of legitimate Russian interests and the guilt
only providing a “political cushion” to mini- of the West runs through later policy documents
mise the repercussions of international law in- and political statements.27 In their speeches,
fringements – after all, the West started first – Russian officials often list instances of the
25
‘Opening remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov TV Channel and “Vesti Nedeli” on “Rossiya” TV Chan-
at a meeting with the Youth Public Chamber of Russia, nel, New York, 27 September 2014’, accessed 9 De-
Moscow, 22 October 2014’, accessed 9 December 2020, cember 2020, https://www.mid.ru/press_service/minis-
https://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/- ter_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/con-
/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/716014. tent/id/668812, or ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s
26
For more analysis on this, see Alister Miskimmon and Interview to Zvezda TV Channel, December 30, 2015’,
Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: accessed 9 December 2020,
Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World’, Politics https://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/-
and Governance 5 (29 September 2017): 111, /asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/con-
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017. p. 115. See: tent/id/2004143, Washington Post Staff, ‘Read Putin’s
‘Sergey Lavrov Meets RIAC Members’, 9 June 2014, U.N. General Assembly Speech’, Washington Post, ac-
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/news/sergey-lavrov-meets- cessed 9 December 2020, https://www.washing-
riac-members/. tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-
27
See, for example ‘Interview given by the Russian For- putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/.
eign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to the “Russia Today”
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