Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience - No11 2017 - NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence
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Hybrid Threats:
Overcoming Ambiguity,
Building Resilience
No 11 2017
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 11
2 No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience
3
Contents
4 Editorial
5 Hybrid threats: overcoming ambiguity,
building resilience Expert Level Workshop
9 What to do with hostile information campaign/propaganda?
13 A NATO Land Domain Perspective
18 Hybrid threats on energy infrastructures and supply lines
25 The energy weapon that could not Assessing European
energy security in the stand-off with Russia, 2014-2015
33 Energy in New Generation Warfare. Learned lessons
from Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine
40 Critical Infrastructure Protection: the challenges
connected to working out the Green Paper on CIP in Ukraine
46 Social Resilience in Lithuania: The Lithuanian
Riflemen’s Union Experience
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 11
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Editorial
Dr. Jaroslav Hajek
Subject Matter Expert
Strategic Analysis and Research Division, NATO ENSEC COE
O
n 10th-11th September 2015, NATO of the Iron Curtain. He discusses in particular
Energy Centre of Excellence (ENSEC one of the several studies conducted by NATO
COE) organized a workshop entitled StratCom COE which analyses, inter alia, two
“Hybrid threats: overcoming ambi- of the most dangerous information campaigns
guity, building resilience” in cooperation with conducted today, namely Daesh’s Information
the Institute of International Relations and Campaign and Putin’s Propaganda Campaign
Political Science of the Vilnius University and against the Western world. Political Advisor
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania. in NATO Land Component Command Heidi
Meyer’s article discusses some measures that
The aim of the workshop was to discuss se- NATO should consider taking up to adapt to
curity issues in Eastern Europe and lessons ambiguous threats so that decision-making
learned from the Ukrainian crisis. The event is not so challenging and political and military
brought together leading experts from NATO responses are at the right level and at the right
and national bodies, academic scientists, re- time. Research Director of the Ecole Militaire
searchers and media representatives who Strategic Research Institute (IRSEM) of the
exchanged their experiences and their per- French Ministry of Defence Christophe-Alex-
spectives on hybrid threats and their preven- andre Paillard analyses the key energy chal-
tion, as well as on energy security issues and lenges that the members of the EU and the
critical energy infrastructure protection. The European members of NATO have to face. In
workshop provided a platform who profitably doing so, he specifically focuses on the Mid-
contributed to raising awareness about secu- dle East and Northern Africa (MENA) area.
rity issues and hybrid threats and to increas- Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Security in
ing knowledge on countering misinformation, the Czech Republic Vaclav Bartuška assesses
deconstructing propaganda and dealing with the European energy security in the stand-off
ambiguity. This was also a valuable contribu- with Russia in 2014-2015. Executive Director
tion for exchanging practical insights about of the Centre for Global Studies Andrii Chubyk
the ways of improving EU’s and NATO’s in- and President of the Centre for Global Studies
struments for coping with hybrid threats. “Strategy XXI” Mychailo Gonchar analyse the
energy component in New Generation Warfare
In order to spread the good results achieved, with a focus on the Russian hybrid war against
NATO ENSEC COE has decided to publish this Ukraine. Head of Energy Security and Tech-
issue which contains eight selected texts. Ma- nogenic Safety Department of the National
jor General Edvardas Mažeikis focuses his Institute for Strategic Studies Oleksandr Suk-
keynote speech on hybrid war. He provides hodolia describes energy dimension of hybrid
valuable examples and explains the difference warfare against the Ukrainian critical energy
between past and present hybrid war while infrastructure. Co-founder and CTO/Head of
presenting the necessary measures to coun- epitaxy of Brolis Semiconductors Kristijonas
tering hybrid threats. Deputy Director of NATO Vizbaras’ article discusses the volunteer mili-
Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence tia organisation “Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union”
(StratCom COE) Colonel Aivar Jaeski high- (LRU), which has attracted many members as
lights the fundamental role played by NATO a reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea
COEs in helping the Alliance to deal with the in 2014 and which is the most important or-
new security environment since the collapse ganization of its kind.
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience
5
Keynote Speech
Maj. Gen. Edvardas Mažeikis,
NATO Standardization Office, Belgium
B
efore I start talking about hybrid dier monument relocation in Estonia in April
threats, I would like to ask you: Are 2007. This can be seen as a quite modern
the means and methods used for hy- approach to hybrid warfare. Riots during the
brid warfare new? Is the definition of known Bronze Nights in Tallinn were orches-
‘hybrid warfare’ new or old? Of course, it is as trated and organised by a group of people
old one like the Earth and the wars on it. I can all looking alike, having short haircuts and
name one of the typical hybrid warfare exam- civilian black jackets. The besieging of the
ples from ancient times: the story of the “Tro- Estonian embassy in Moscow for a week and
jan horse”, when Greeks constructed a giant cyber-attacks on Estonian organizations are
wooden horse with soldiers in it to enter the examples of continuing steps of hybrid war-
city of Troy. Also, at the beginning of II WW, fare used against Estonia. Therefore, look-
with the attack on Poland, the Winter War ing at the historical view of hybrid warfare, I
with Finland in 1939 or the so called casus can say that lying and cheating have always
belli, which started the war, can be treated been a basis for hybrid war. The number of
as hybrid warfare as well. The Nazis organ- activities conducted by the USSR throughout
ized an attack on their own radio station by a the Cold War might now be described as a hy-
group of people dressed in polish uniforms. brid threat. The Soviets secretly participated
The Soviet Union organized the shelling of its in many regional wars, amongst others, the
own border guard post (4 killed, 9 injured) at wars in Vietnam, Korea, the Middle East and
the Finnish - Soviet border and later blamed Africa in which different specialists and front-
the Finns. After the war started, they imme- line fighters such as pilots, air defenders and
diately organized a puppet government for so on were used, without a clear national
Finland headed by Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen. identity shown on their uniforms.
A more recent and geographically closer What is the main difference between past and
example of hybrid attack is the Bronze Sol- present hybrid war? Today the information
Maj. Gen. Edvardas Mažeikis, NATO Standardization Office, Brussels
Maj. Gen. Edvardas Mažeikis took over the position of Director of the NATO Standardization Office on 1st July 2014.
Previously, he served as Commander of the Lithuanian Air Force and as Chief of Defence Staff at the Ministry of
National Defence. Here, he ran the Defence Capabilities Planning Department and Armaments and the Communi-
cation Systems Department. Between 2008 and 2010, Maj. Gen. Edvardas Mažeikis served as Commandant of the
Lithuanian Military Academy. From 2004 to 2008 he had been appointed as Lithuanian Military Representative to
NATO and to the EU Military Committees in Brussels. In 2007 he was nominated Dean of NATO Military Committee
for one-year. From 2000 to 2004 he was the first one to serve as Commanding Officer of Lithuanian Air Force with
the aim to reform the Air Force to meet the requirements of NATO membership.
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 11
6
service has become a hybrid combat service Hybrid threat: A state or a non-state actor
in some states or terrorist organizations. The that has the capacity and apparent willing-
Russian President Putin awarded a group ness to employ a hybrid strategy. A hybrid
of “news makers” belonging to the Russian threat is manifested in activities that fall
propaganda machine after the Crimea cam- short of direct conventional military action
paign with high level state awards. They were and that can be conducted for extended pe-
addressed with the pseudo ‘funny’ term “in- riods of time.
formation troops” (informacyonnye vojska).
As Russians like to say: each joke contains Russia is the primary practitioner of hybrid
just a part of the joke – the rest is true. In- warfare. It has a great deal of experience in
formation wars today have become as impor- using it if we take this country as the main
tant as a real artillery shelling on an enemy successor of the Soviet Union. Other actors
position. Manipulating of information is at including terrorist organisations have pur-
the heart of hybrid strategies. For a regime sued hybrid strategies, too. Simultaneous,
without any moral limits (in western under- opportunistic, synergistic and sophisticated
standing), being it Russia with its leader- combination of conventional, irregular and
ship’s criminal mentality or Islamic State of criminal/corrupt actions in designated geo-
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) with its terrorist graphical areas to achieve political aims is
mentality, lying and cheating is not a problem common to state and non-state models.
at all.
Russia’s approach seeks to create ambigu-
Another modern hybrid threat is cyber-at- ity aiming at blurring the distinction between
tack. With limits placed on tracing the ori- war and peace and at concealing the instiga-
gin of the attacker, being relatively cheap yet tor’s role as a party in the conflict. This latter
quite effective, it fits in very well with the hy- is a key element in undermining the decision-
brid threat definition. making and in weakening the effects of the
tools available for a response in the nations
As I started talking about modern hybrid targeted and governed by the consensus or-
threats, I would like to read the clear defini- ganizations.
tions which we are using in the Alliance. It
is my duty as Director NSO, because we are Both Russia and Daesh (ISIL) are now en-
also responsible for the terminology and the gaged in hybrid warfare against their per-
agreed language in NATO. ceived adversaries. The possibility to use
an overt military action as part of the hy-
Hybrid strategy: A comprehensive strategy brid strategy cannot be discounted. Russia
to achieve (geo)political and strategic objec- has not employed a hybrid strategy against
tives based on a broad, complex, adaptive Ukraine alone. Rather it has adopted a hybrid
and often highly integrated combination of model that targets Ukraine and the nations
conventional and/or unconventional means, and organizations that Russia sees as oppo-
overt and/or covert activities, military, para- nents to its global aims and interests. Simi-
military, irregular and/or civilian actors, con- larly, Daesh’s approach focuses on individu-
ducted across the full spectrum of elements als as well as on nations and international
of power (diplomatic/political, information, organizations.
military, economic, financial, intelligence, le-
gal – DIMEFIL) intended to create ambiguity Discussions about hybrid threats started im-
and targeted at an adversary’s weaknesses mediately after the 2014 Wales Summit. RAP
and vulnerabilities. Hybrid strategies have a (Readiness Action Plan) is central to NATO’s
particular focus on decision-making process. ability to counter all threats including hybrid
ones. Findings about hybrid threats and how
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience
7
to counter them will be reflected in the pro- In the early stages of a hybrid campaign, the
cess of new doctrine development. The Al- actions targeted against nations are likely
liance is in the position today that all main to principally constitute an internal secu-
doctrines should be revised. This is a normal rity challenge. It is therefore the nations to
procedure carried out every three years. But be threaten by such a campaign that should
this time is special, because of the Alliance’s have the primary responsibility in respond-
centre of gravity shift from Counter insur- ing. The requirement is for a ‘whole of gov-
gency operations (Afghanistan) to Article 5 ernment’ response that combines all na-
activities. The NSO is starting an Allied Joint tional instruments as part of a national plan.
Doctrine Campaign together with all NATO This plan can foresee an option for a nation to
Member Nations and main Alliance com- turn to the Allies and the wider international
mands, where ACT is playing a very impor- community for assistance. International or-
tant role. ganizations (NATO, EU, OSCE and UN) can be
effective but the assistance should be coor-
The possibility to be proactive depends very dinated by the receiving national authorities
much on the possibility of receiving warnings in concert with their national plan for coun-
and indicators regarding incoming actions. tering the challenge they face. First and very
Activities in the context of Confidence and Se- important: effective analysis and early recog-
curity Building Measures (CSBM) and arms nition based on intelligence and information
control can contribute to providing warning gathering from different sources.
indicators. In the case of hybrid threat warn-
ing, indicators and monitoring are the most Measures can be described by three words:
important basis for decision-making. Deci- Prepare, Deter, Defend. These are not neces-
sion-making is really difficult when the line sarily sequential activities, but functions that
between war and peace is blurred, like in the may have to be undertaken simultaneously to
case of a cyber-attack. ensure resilience and an effective response
against hybrid threats, depending on how a
Civilian/political actions should be taken im- hybrid campaign is applied and evolves.
mediately, even before the possibility of mili-
tary response, when the warnings and indi- Prepare:
cators show the hybrid campaign has been
Building resilience. Hybrid strategies seek to
launched against a nation. In his interview to
find and exploit vulnerabilities in the target
the mass media, an Estonian general talked
nation and the international organization. At
about the possible reaction to an invasion of
the national level, effective resilience would
the so called “green men”: shoot the first
include a coherent and up to date national
“green man” who crossed the state border
crisis organization, developed security and
and the issue would be solved quickly. In the
defence structures, and capabilities and civil
Baltic nations, the well-known British jour-
preparedness. Respected and transparent
nalist Edward Lucas agreed in one of his ar-
governance is also very important. Cyber re-
ticles that sometimes it can be effective. At
silience is very essential as well.
the same time, what if instead of the “green
man” with a weapon in his hands there was
Comprehensive analysis. At the national and
a 15 year old Russian speaking girl partici-
the international level, accurate and timely
pating in aggressive demonstrations against
shared intelligence information supported
NATO, the EU or the Estonian Armed Forces
by comprehensive analysis are fundamental
in Narva (which is close to the eastern state
to the identification of hybrid threats, to the
border, where the overwhelming majority of
recognition of their employment and to the
Russian speaking population is living in Es-
anticipation of the need to react to them.
tonia)? Then the principle “shoot first – think
later” does not work.
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 11
8
Deter: FFAO (Future Framework Alliance Opera-
tions) is a new document developed at ACO.
The requirement is for the ‘whole of govern-
It is currently being discussed by Allied Na-
ment’ response that combines all national
tions and different NATO committees. It says
instruments as part of a national plan. Mili-
the following about emerging technologies:
tary and civilian preparedness postures and
emerging technology will provide many op-
means are complementary. From NATO’s
portunities for the Alliance, but it will create
perspective, strong political will and Allies
significant challenges as nations and non-
solidarity, including visible military deter-
state actors seek to narrow NATO’s current
rence, will contribute to deterring a hybrid
technological advantage. Allied forces will
campaign. Capability and readiness to deploy
need to understand technology and be able
forces quickly and Alliance responsiveness,
to innovate new and creative tactics, tech-
including effective and timely decision mak-
niques, procedures, capabilities and doctrine.
ing, are key to achieving a credible deter-
The Alliance will need to be cognizant of the
rence.
acquisition and innovative use of technology
by others. Without incurred cost of research
Defend:
and development, nations and non-state ac-
A Nation under attack can be supported by tors can capitalise on technological advance-
the means of Article 5. But blurred lines ments and translate them into capabilities
between war and peace in the case of a cy- that threaten the Alliance. While it is impos-
ber-attack for example, or a combination of sible to predict all the areas where technol-
protracted and indirect conflict, a blend of le- ogy could revolutionize warfare, some of the
thality, coercion and intimidation helps an ag- key areas to monitor include: directed energy,
gressor conceal and deny his real intentions. autonomous systems and sensors, quantum
This requires support and assistance from computing, unmanned systems, electromag-
NATO and the EU much earlier. Allied nations netically launched projectiles, renewable
can request the deployment of the rapid re- energy, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, ad-
action forces in response to a deteriorating ditive manufacturing, biotechnology and na-
situation. notechnology.
Generals are normally blamed for preparing When we discuss overcoming ambiguities
for the previous war. Just to try and change and building resilience for future hybrid
this old impression slightly, I would like to threats, we have to keep in mind that the tool
talk about the future. box creating such threats is very large, and
continually growing larger.
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience
9
What to do
with hostile information
campaign/propaganda?
Col. Aivar Jaeski,
Estonian Defence Forces, Estonia
T
he North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- relying on one source or one perspective.
tion (NATO) as a defensive alliance The collective effort always provides better
uniting 28 members effectively com- results. Therefore, NATO creates collective
municates the intention to protect its multinational establishments.
members. It spreads this message not only
through speeches, articles and videos, but Since the collapse of the iron curtain, NATO
also through actions such as the rise of force has been flexibly adapting to the new security
posture, the establishment of new headquar- environment. The Partnership for Peace pro-
ters, and the increase of airpower presence gramme, the enlargement process, and pro-
and exercises. grams aiming at helping earthquake victims
are just some examples of its past endeav-
How effectively NATO as a collective organi- ours. Today, the main threats on the Alliance’s
sation handles the new security environment nations come from Hybrid Warfare, which in-
depends on each single nation out of 28. The cludes areas such as cyber space, energy and
chain constituted by the member states is communication. With the help of the Centres
NATO’s strongest and weakest character- of Excellences, the Alliance thoroughly stud-
istic at the same time. National positions ies those threats. Multinational NATO Centres
are often driven from geographical location, of Excellence provide a unique opportunity to
economic development and historical experi- bring together the collective knowledge and
ence. A single country cannot gain knowledge experiences of the Alliance’s nations and part-
by ignoring the wisdom already gathered. It ners by translating them into proposals to en-
is hard to get an objective assessment only hance NATO’s processes and capabilities.
Col. Aivar Jaeski, Estonian Defence Forces, Tallinn
Col. Aivar Jaeski joined the Estonian Defence Forces in 1992. He has served in the Armed forces as platoon leader,
company commander and battalion commander. Col. Jaeski has been also commanding officer of the Estonian
Peace Operation Centre (EPOC), responsible for training soldiers for international missions.
In 2003, he was appointed Deputy Military Representative (DEPMILREP) at Estonian Delegation to NATO Head-
quarters (HQ) in Belgium. Col. Jaeski has also served as defence planning section head of the Estonian General
Staff J5/9 (planning) branch. In 2009, he was appointed as Section Head of the Information Influence Section of
the Operational Directorate Joint Effects Management Branch of NATO Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFCB).
In the autumn of 2012, Col. Jaeski worked as Chief of the Public Relations Department of the Estonian Defence
Forces HQ, which he changed into Strategic Communications Department. Since the 1st October 2014, Col. Aivar
Jaeski has been working as Deputy Director of NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence. Additionally,
Col. Jaeski has accomplished several missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 11
10
NATO Strategic Communication Centre of sonnel (fighters/foreign fighters), but also on
Excellence (StratCom COE) finalised several the financial, military, energy, and informa-
studies at the end of 2015. Important ones tional tools such as leaders’ announcements,
covered, inter alia, the most dangerous infor- writing on online media etc.
mation campaigns which are being conduct-
ed today, namely the DAESH’s1 Information Through communication, DAESH supports
Campaign and Putin’s Propaganda Campaign everybody interested in joining their ranks.
against the Western world. Their messages are well thought and struc-
tured: they call the muslim believers (young
In this regard, I will now present a compari- people in particular) for joining their army in
son between these two campaigns and a con- order to become soldiers of truth. They justify
clusion with recommendations for NATO’s their organisation’s violent actions by stating
decision- makers, nations and partners. I will that there is no life without Jihad.
also provide some food for thought to people
who are interested in these issues. With a united effort, DAESH uses the prom-
ises of a prosperous life and of a better ad-
The NATO StratCom COE’s studies on the ministration, which is something people do
DAESH’s Information Campaign and Putin’s not have today. Showing people pictures of a
Propaganda Campaign have discovered sev- “normal” life, of law and order under the rule
eral common issues between them. Firstly, of Islam works as a recruitment tool for fami-
their main goal is to get a dominant position lies who live a difficult life. In this context, the
in the world, if not in the whole globe, then for name ‘Islamic State’, which is used by terror-
sure in a certain region. ists, is powerful and influential.
The study of the audiences of DAESH, which A frightening line of effort works towards
has been conducted by grouping the mes- both external and internal communities. Ter-
sages that it receives, has allowed us to iden- rorists engage common people to reach their
tify four lines of effort which serve the main goals by putting words into action and by
objective. Those lines are Support, Unite, sharing their ambitions with them.
Frighten and Inform.
Looking DAESH’s Informing line of effort, we
can see that it uses tools (magazines, radio
broadcasts, TV stories) similar to those used
in developed countries. They are particularly
active in social media, which deliver informa-
tion very quickly and address a wide audi-
ence.
All those lines of effort were conducted when
and where so called Islamic State was an-
nounced at first, the external threat recog-
nised and the defeat of their internal adver-
saries started. The next step to defeat external
adversaries has already been initiated.
Figure 1. DAESH Information Campaign
When we look at Putin’s regime propaganda
In order to support those lines of effort, the campaign against the Western world, we can
organisation does not only focus on the per- observe similarities with the DAESH’s lines
1
Mass media sometimes refer to Daesh with the name ISIL or Islamic State.
2
The Guardian, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/jul/23/vladimir-putins-approval-rating-at-record-levels
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience11
of effort. Like DAESH, Putin wants to gather you respect me”. In this context, Putin makes
supporters for his path towards a dominant huge efforts to demonstrate Russia’s supe-
position in the international arena. Today, we riority. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine, the
can see that Putin’s regime has internally suc- annexation of Crimea, the flights of old Rus-
ceded. According to “The Guardian”, in Russia sian nuclear bombers, the opening of the
87% of the population trusts President Putin’s new Arctic Joint Strategic Command are just
actions2. Besides the massive use of media examples of military force aiming at showing
tools, we have also seen the great support of Russia’s strength. Additionally, diplomatic
the Russian Orthodox Church for the regime. and economic tools are also exploited togeth-
er with the cyber domain.
Outside Russia, Putin’s regime does not look
too much for external support. According to Russia has large natural resources available.
the PEW Research Centre’s Attitudes Survey, Energy resources and other natural raw ma-
he only has over 50% support from Vietnam terials have also been used as tools by the
and China. The average trust in his actions Kremlin to influence neighboring countries.
from abroad is 24%. His arrogant attitude has
driven President Putin’s position to be a re- While DAESH is just building its communica-
gional player who does not need internation- tion capabilities, Putin’s regime has managed
al cooperation, external wisdom and advice. to take control of the media inside Russia. At
the same time, it has invested in external tools
Therefore, instead like the TV channel “Russia Today” RT), and
of looking for coop- online media projects such as “Sputnic”. They
eration, the Kremlin now are the main tools to influence the West.
puts more emphasis
on means that cre- What are the conclusions of this comparison?
ate confusion and Why have not those regimes collapsed yet?
undermine the ex- Why does their propaganda even affect our
isting democratic democratic countries?
system in the West
and its values. This Firstly, both DAESH’s and Putin’s regime
is achieved by falsi- know their audiences very well. They know
fying historical and whom to address and how to send their mes-
real life facts and by sages efficiently.
influencing the pub-
lic opinion through Secondly, “the name” of the terrorist organi-
social media with sation or separatist built state has a strategic
the help of the ‘troll meaning. Relating yourself with something big
farms’ and of con- always has a significance in people’s minds.
spiracy theories
developed ad hoc. Thirdly, they carefully select facts and in-
Figure 2. Little confidence
in Putin
Names like Novo- formation to support their own propaganda
russia, used by sep- campaign. Most of the time, those facts con-
aratists and advertised by the Kremlin, have tradict the truth, since conspiracy theories
influenced and motivated many Russians to are built and history is falsified.
voluntarily go to Ukraine to fight against the
fascists. Fourthly, religion as a powerful tool is brought
into the game by both players.
The Kremlin’s violent rhetoric is driven from
the will to scare people, and is used by Rus- Fifthly, recruitment campaigns are effectively
sian convicts who argue that “боится значит organized by using powerful symbols and
уважaет”, meaning “if you are scared of me, names.
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 1112
Sixthly, the well-known fact that every com- discovered is often the forgotten old; build
municator should know is that “actions speak social awareness on adversaries’ propagan-
louder than words”. da campaign, and report every offensive mes-
sage and messages which are leading to rad-
Seventhly, for both DAESH and the Kremlin icalization, especially in Social Media; refine
there are no limitations or restrictions for and protect audiences who can be vulnerable
conducting their campaigns. Their goal is to to the adversaries’ propaganda campaign.
challenge the free speech and abuse it.
In the infrastructure domain, it is important:
This said, the list of recommendations of what to invest in supporting structures like com-
can be done is quite long. Therefore, in order munication capabilities, situational aware-
to help understand it better, we have grouped ness capabilities, education facilities, as
our proposals by using the PMESII (Political, well as deterrence infrastructures such as
Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and military bases and training facilities; to find
Information) domain. alternative structures for delivering energy
supplies. A good example is the Lithuanian
In the political domain, we should not be- investment into the Liquefied National Gas
come part of their information campaign – we (LNG) terminal in order to be independent
should choose words and actions carefully. from Russian gas suppliers.
We also should: revise the policies that are
delaying the effective recognition of threats In the information domain, we should: draw
and hampering fast decision-making pro- particular attention to the quality of mass
cesses; support free speech in areas and media; educate reporters to be truthful and
countries where it is needed; unite people/ to be able to recognise propaganda; maintain
organisation/countries to fight against the close cooperation with Social Media corpora-
adversaries; conduct strategic communica- tions in order to remove extremism from So-
tion! Speak out. What is obvious for some, is cial Media platforms; reveal lies, care about
new for others. the truth; use legal tools and be proactive,
cooperate; find a balance between reactive
In the military domain, we need: to invest in and proactive media. With new communica-
capabilities and deterrence; to study the in- tion platforms (social media), where news
formation environment and rise situational and ideas are exchanged much faster, lies are
awareness; to share, coordinate and coop- also spread much quicker.
erate; to allow others to use our capabilities
for situational awareness and analysis, avoid Finally, taking into account all those reco-
duplication; to prepare for the worst case mended “should”, what do we have to keep in
scenario - practice! Practice not only crisis mind? Firstly, we should remember that not
response operations, but also conventional every Islamic organisation supports DAESH,
conflicts. not every Russian supports Putin’s regime.
Secondly, social media, national webpages
In the economic domain, it is necessary: to and mass media are responsible for publi-
implement economic sanctions against ad- cation. This should not be taken for granted
versaries and advertise them globally; to be- when hate speeches and lies appear in the
come independent from energy sources and media. The available legal means should be
raw materials coming from adversaries; not used in order to protect our societies. And
to conduct business or trade with adversaries; last, but not least, there are organisations
to close our financial system to adversaries. that oppose DAESH’s and Putin’s regime. In
so doing, they diminish the influence of these
In the social domain, we should: educate the latter’s propaganda on target audiences. We
population and learn from history: the newly must cooperate and support them.
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience13
A NATO Land Domain
Perspective
Ms. Heidi Meyer,
NATO Allied LAND COMMAND, Turkey
Introduction:
T
he Euro-Atlantic region is dealing lenge for NATO on how to respond. Both
with a changed security environment Russian and IS strategies have elements of
that includes renewed state competi- hybrid warfare, which goes hand in hand with
tion with Russia and dynamic insta- ambiguity. This inevitably complicates things.
bility fuelled by radicalization and extremism RAP gives NATO a military response capabil-
from organizations such as the so called “Is- ity, but ambiguity makes the decision-making
lamic State” (IS). At the 2014 North Atlantic process of 28 NATO Allies and their ability to
Treaty Organization (NATO) Wales Summit, use this capability quite challenging: what
decisions were taken by NATO Allies to un- one nation may see as a threat is sufficiently
dertake the biggest reinforcement of NATO opaque as to make another nation think it is
since the Second World War (WW2) to re- not; ambiguity also challenges prioritization
spond to this changed security environment. of how to respond or at what level to respond;
Much of this reinforcement is embodied in ambiguity is better understood by those who
the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) – a NATO are surrounded by it than by those who are
plan to ensure that the Alliance is more ready not; when a threat is unclear as to where it
and responsive - which will be delivered at originates, this contributes to makinge it
the 2016 Warsaw Summit. As this reinforce- very difficult for 28 allied nations to reach
ment gets closer to completion, Allies are in- consensus on how to proportionally or ap-
creasingly showing their ability to respond to propriately respond without escalating ten-
the changed security environment more ef- sions. Responsiveness is just as much about
fectively and rapidly. making quick decisions as building military
capability. A quick decision to act can be a
But ambiguity in these threats still is a chal- good deterrent but, if the threat is ambigu-
Ms. Heidi Meyer, NATO Allied LAND COMMAND, Izmir
Heidi Meyer is Political Advisor to LTG John Nicholson US Army, Commander NATO Allied LAND Allied LAND
COMMAND in Izmir, Turkey. She came to Izmir from the US Department of State (DoS), Foreign Service Institute
in Virginia, US, where she was the faculty coordinator for the Civilian Security, Conflict Response and Prevention
program. From 2009 to 2011, she worked at the US Embassy in Kabul as US Department of State lead for Sub-Na-
tional Governance and Stabilization. In 2009 she worked at the US Department of Defence (DoD) as the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy representative of the Ambassador Holbrooke US Afghan Presidential Election
monitoring team. She was Country Director of the US Afghan policy desk in the OSD, Under Secretary for Policy
from 2007 and 2009 under the Bush and Obama administrations. From 2006 to 2007 she worked for the US DoD in
the Afghan Presidential Palace helping to build capacity with new officials in the Afghan National Security Council
and on police reform. From 2003 to 2006 she was Deputy Director of Operations at US Army NATO, SHAPE in Bel-
gium. From 1999 to 2000 she worked for NATO as a civil-military affairs NATO staff officer at NATO Headquarters
Naples, Italy and as civilian CIMIC desk officer during the Kosovo crisis. In addition to positions in NATO, US DoS
and US DoD, she has been a High School teacher in Italy; founder and Director of the Joint Relief International
NGO delivering humanitarian aid to forty countries; British Army Officer serving in Germany, London and Cyprus;
Associate Director of Admissions at Dartmouth College New Hampshire, US, a journalist and a ski instructor.
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 1114
ous, some nations worry that the decisions to holistic approach to responding to ambiguity.
act will escalate or exacerbate the situation. Therefore, NATO will need to further adapt to
So, by taking this into account, NATO will con- ensure a political, institutional and military
tinue adapting beyond RAP to be able to bet- comprehensive approach, which is far more
ter deal with ambiguity and to be better able effective in dealing with ambiguity than simply
to gauge how to respond in order to deter an a military response alone. The following sec-
ambiguous threat. Building consensus about tions discuss how and where NATO needs to
an ambiguous threat and agreeing on how to further adapt to deal with ambiguity.
respond in a consensus-based organization
such as NATO is difficult - but it is not im- Building Allies and Partners
possible and there are definitely areas where national resiliencies
NATO can and will improve to be able to re-
The Russian way of making war is to avoid con-
spond to ambiguity.
frontation – why use military means if you can
achieve your objectives by non-military ones?
This article discusses some measures that
NATO could consider taking up to adapt to The Russian strategy is to use all elements
ambiguous threats so that decision-making of national power including political, military,
is not so challenging and political and mili- economic, and propaganda and information
tary responses are at the right level and at operations below the military confrontational
the right time with more options. These threshold. The Russian Gerasimov Doctrine
measures are: Support to building Allies and tells us that Russia will likely fight undeclared
Partners national resiliencies as a first line wars through a strategy that is constituted of
of defense; improving intelligence sharing four non-military parts and a military one. The
and analysis for early indications; building a aim is achieving Russian strategic objectives
wider security network with civilian and mili- without overt confrontation. A major element
tary partners; developing a more substan- of the non-military part of the Russian strat-
tive NATO cyber defensive capability; putting egy as laid out in the Doctrine is made up of
Strategic Communication (STRATCOM) at the propaganda, misinformation, psychological
heart of NATO response and developing strat- manipulation, and use of social media. Howev-
egies for responding to propaganda; review- er, there are other aspects of the plan that in-
ing NATO nuclear deterrence policy; and us- clude undermining governance, subverting a
ing these measures by calibrating a response nation’s economy, fomenting dissent amongst
to ambiguous threats through a carefully de- Russian speaking peoples and generally over-
signed comprehensive approach of political, time disrupting stability through non-military
non-military and military responses. means. These tactics are ambiguous by na-
ture – and designed to be that way.
Before examining each of these measures in
more detail, it is worth reminding of NATO’s The first line of defense to combat these non-
central plan to be more ready and responsive. military and ambiguous tactics is organically
This plan is RAP, which is the basic platform by the targeted nation. Nations are in the best
from which NATO will respond to ambiguous position to understand when Russia is under-
threats as well as to conventional threats. RAP mining their national stability and to instigate
includes the Enhanced NATO Response Force effective counter measures early on. However,
(NRF) with its spearhead the Very High Readi- national resilience to Russian non-military
ness Joint Task Force (VJTF). These newly hybrid measures is better when supported by
adapted military response capabilities will en- international organizations such as the Euro-
able NATO to respond to conventional threats pean Union (EU) and NATO. The EU can help
and to deter ambiguity. However, in deterring funnel the right level of economic support
ambiguous threats, it is expected that NATO and opportunity to help a country in its effort
will want to do more. Along with RAP adap- to build resilience. (Countries with economic
tation, NATO also has to ensure that it has a challenges are almost always more vulner-
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience15
able to outside manipulation and aggression). knows when the governance structures of his
NATO can show support and solidarity with an country are being slowly eroded; a policeman
Ally who counters hybrid aggression through knows when the rule of law is compromised
assurance measures, exercises, joint training, or the criminal elements of a country are or-
presence and NATO high level visits. NATO can ganized and complicit in a hybrid strategy of
also help nations develop Advanced Plans in aggression; and an activist in the civil society
order to make them ready to militarily respond has an opinion when the country’s values and
to an aggressor – with a built in element of the democratic institutions are under threat. So,
plan being NATO support. This demonstration we must use academics and practitioners who
of support must last in the long term as long normally do not contribute to military intel-
as the aggression continues. One of the ways ligence. We must use social media and open
to continue supporting is through good intel- sources and collaborate with civilian organiza-
ligence and information sharing as it informs tions. Sometimes, we must tap into unorthodox
about the shape, size and feel of that aggres- sources. NATO’s writ does recognize the impor-
sion – and how ambiguous it is. tance of being able to cast a wider net amongst
civilian communities in intelligence gathering
Without early indicators and warning there is and to build an analysis capability that can fuse
no trigger to tell us an ambiguous attack is a far wider range of civilian and military data.
underway. So now we must do it and nations must support
us. Traditional sources of military intelligence
Building a strong intelligence gathering are no longer enough. We cannot
sharing network complacently reach “new normals” and accept
or ignore these new levels of ambiguous attack
Over time, good intelligence is critical to track-
or worse still reach the new normal without
ing and overcoming ambiguous hybrid warfare
realizing it – we must have strong intelligence
strategies waged by an adversary. Building the
that builds a substantive picture over time
history, the picture, and the patterns of a hybrid
(sometimes over a long time) and that explic-
strategy used by an adversary helps overcome
itly warns us when hybrid strategies are reach-
ambiguity. Hybrid strategies tend to create a
ing new thresholds and allows to attribute our
“new normal” whereby we become inured to
intelligence by showing a build up of patterns
the effects overtime of a hybrid warfare strat-
over time. This will take out a lot of the ambigu-
egy and thereby contribute to the intent of our
ity in hybrid warfare and will allow coalitions to
adversary to make their strategy ambiguous.
more quickly make important decisions when
The adage of putting a frog in cold water and
they need to about responding to hybrid war-
slowly building the heat over time so that the
fare attacks. In widening its intelligence net-
frog doesn’t notice is the best way to describe
work, NATO should certainly benefit from the
this. Good early intelligence that builds a pic-
open source knowledge of its Partners.
ture overtime will tell us about rising water
temperatures and when it is reaching the boil-
A security network of Partners
ing point – and indeed if the frog is about to boil!
But the special challenge with ambiguity is that, NATO recognizes the role that our Partners
intelligence must be gathered from civilian play in developing a security network that of-
sources as well as from military ones because fers much in terms of military capability. The
of the non-military component of this type of additional value of Partners is their local and
warfare. Arguably, the civilian or non-military regional knowledge and the contribution they
intelligence sources are more important to make, not just to better the understanding of
build a long term well informed picture. For ex- regional geo-strategic politics but also of real
ample, an experienced economist of a country life activities on the ground. Their view is im-
knows best when the economic prosperity and portant and counts for much. In the current en-
well-being of his nation is being compromised vironment and beyond the NATO Summit to be
by underhand actions; a government official held in Warsaw in 2016 much emphasis is and
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 1116
will be placed by NATO on the role that Partners ries on social media. This type of grass roots
can play in helping to bring additional capabili- response to propaganda is based on volunteer-
ties in strategies to counter ambiguous threats ism and open source information and could be
– including their regional knowledge. replicated in other countries where propaganda
is being used. We should also pay attention to
The very fact that NATO is an Alliance of civilian scholars and practitioners who are de-
twenty-eight nations but that can extend out veloping thought in this area and especially en-
to many more nations in a security partner- courage and reward young innovative thinkers.
ship network is of great deterrence value. This For instance, one of the most forward leaning
value is in terms of building a picture of threat young thinkers in this area is Ivana Smole-
and local knowledge. NATO can now develop nova who delved deeply into the Russian use
the mechanisms to wisely use that knowledge. of propaganda. Her work is just beginning and
with support she will develop a body of under-
STRATCOM as the central element of standing and expertise that we sorely need into
operational planning the future. There are also think tanks working
in this area. One example is Legatum Institute’s
Russia annexed Crimea by using clever propa-
series Beyond Propaganda. This was designed
ganda or, as the West says, a clever strategic
to help us all be better equipped against “media
communications strategy (SRATCOM). Both
manipulation across the world, and will inform
Russians and IS use propaganda as a weapon of
the work of policy-makers looking for innova-
war. Modern hybrid warfare is arguably made
tive ways to win the ‘information war’.” Also, a
of the old ways of waging war but with more
notable thinker associated with this subject is
intensity in the use of information and modern
Peter Pomerantsev, who is Senior Fellow to
technology to spread a message. This is ex-
the Legatum Institute’s Transitions Forum. His
ploited as a deliberate deception or propaganda
book “Nothing is True; Everything is Possible”
in order to change people’s view of the world.
is widely regarded by many in the hybrid war-
Russia was able to boldly invade and annex
fare business as fascinating revelations about
Crimea almost entirely through propaganda,
misinformation. Military Institutions do not
affecting people’s opinions through information
naturally develop quick thinking in the realm of
and strategic messaging - without firing a shot.
propaganda – it is not what they train for and it is
Using information as a key weapon in a war
not in their DNA. But if an adversary uses prop-
strategy is difficult to attribute. This strategy of
aganda as a central element of its war strategy,
ambiguity is widely used by Russia. Arguably it
the Western military and defense institutions
is what they are best at. Keeping a strategy be-
will need to adapt to respond. They will need to
low NATO Article V threshold through primarily
reach out to innovative civilian thinkers such as
non-military means offers Russia far greater
the ones mentioned above and embrace their
options over time to achieve its strategic goals.
work. The military may also have to seriously
Propaganda and use of social media is a central
consider putting STRATCOM as a central ele-
element of this approach and the most difficult
ment of their operational art of war rather than
ambiguous threat to attribute and respond to.
as an “also ran” or distant second to military
Putting aside Russia TV, which is widely used,
planning in fire power and maneuver.
and fairly obviously Russian propaganda, the
most difficult propaganda to respond to is the
Building Cyber Defense capability
widespread and informal use of social media.
How does a nation respond when it is under Hybrid warfare is as old as the Trojan Horse
an attack from propaganda that is deliberately with some new twists. One of those twists
misleading or wrong and designed to misin- is in the cyber domain and in the increasing
form and change people’s opinion of events threat of ambiguous cyber attacks. NATO
and motives? Ukrainian organization StopFake. must continue developing its Cyber defense
com is a good example of an organic response policy and capabilities so that a cyber attack
by civil society to directly refute or debunk sto- can be quickly attributed. This is a challenge
No 11 Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience17
in an Alliance of 28 nations all with different local resiliencies. Military strength alone will
national cyber policies and practices. It also not work. Fragmentation and inconsistency
requires close cooperation with the corpo- will not work either. Lack of strategic patience
rate world - something the military doesn’t will not help at all. NATO and the West tend
naturally do. In the cyber domain, where the to get impatient with the notion of strategic
chances of an ambiguous threat are ever pre- patience. Their ability to pull together a vari-
sent, all of these challenges will have to be ety of measures in unity of effort consistently
overcome to enable NATO to make quick at- overtime is subject to all sorts of influences
tribution of cyber attacks and thus quick po- including national politics that debunk the
litical decisions on how to respond. intent. If we want to overcome ambiguity, we
will have to become very adept and clever at
Reviewing Nuclear Deterrence using military and non-military strengths in
Capability an overtime consistent integrated design that
has a core immunity to influences. The great-
In 1967, under U.S. leadership, the Alliance for-
est strength that the Alliance has is unity and
mulated the doctrine of “flexible response”. Ac-
comprehensive action with the “28” as well as
cording to this doctrine, NATO would use what-
with Partners and civilian organizations such
ever means necessary to deter or repel a Soviet
as the EU. However, NATO must use it con-
attack. Conventional forces would be initially
structively and comprehensively. According
engaged, but the United States pledged that it
to Peter Pomerantsev, “the 21st century will
would use its strategic nuclear arsenal if con-
be remembered as the century of the “con-
ventional forces failed in the defense of western
tactless” war, where perception is everything
Europe. Use of nuclear weapons is not ambigu-
and maskirovka—military strategy of decep-
ous but the threat of using them is - and over
tion—rules.” (Legatum Institute, 2015) This
the past two years Russia has made- hints and
means that there are two important strengths
even brazen threats about their willingness to
to develop as we move into the 21st century,
use nuclear weapons early in the fight. If NATO
namely military strength, and flexibility and
had an updated nuclear deterrence policy, this
responsiveness that credibly deters ambigu-
might go some way to deterring ambiguous at-
ous threats and the ability to overlay thematic
tacks including the strategic messaging plan
military deterrence with a very strong capabil-
that goes along with it. But will the same idea of
ity of partnering with non-military capabili-
“flexible response” work this time around? Can
ties. The challenge for military Land Forces is
we achieve the same levels of deterrence with
that they naturally are very good at the mili-
conventional weapons? And how do we know if
tary response part of this but not at linking
the Russians are using propaganda once more
it with the non-military part. So, they have to
to fragment and confuse the decision-making
branch out and be creative and unorthodox in
process in the West rather than seriously mak-
developing compatibility with the non-military
ing threats? The key is to review our nuclear
elements of a counter ambiguous warfare
deterrence policy soon and ensure that it is
plan. Will they do it? All the indications are
agreed and able to respond to the Russian new
that they will eventually do it but it will take
nuclear policy. And then we must train and ex-
patience, understanding and an open mind.
ercise that response.
Many of the recommendations in overcoming
ambiguity are about mind shifts and break-
Conclusion
ing paradigms not about the actual mechan-
The approach to ambiguity and to overcoming ics. A mind shift to move beyond conventional
ambiguity must be a calibrated comprehensive military responses into an area of non-military
approach to thwarting ambiguity. This should partnerships, strategic messaging, resilience
include all the above tools working together in building, non-military intelligence gathering
a carefully calibrated, consistent design to de- – areas soldiers are not so comfortable in, -
ter through swift strong military response, de- more than anything will be our greatest chal-
bunk propaganda, attribute threats and build lenge in overcoming ambiguity.
Hybrid Threats: Overcoming Ambiguity, Building Resilience No 1118
Hybrid threats on energy
infrastructures and supply lines
Mr. Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, Strategic Research Institute of the Military School, France
The views expressed here are solely those of the author.
They do not necessarily reflect the views of the IRSEM or any other organization.
T
oday, European countries, more spe- Secondly, among the EU and NATO member
cifically the members of the European states, more and more countries, such as
Union (EU) and the European members Germany, Italy and Belgium, are giving up
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization their nuclear industries, because of the strong
(NATO), are being confronted to five key energy position of anti-nuclear public opinions, leav-
challenges. Firstly, emerging countries are ing the path to hydrocarbon forms of energy
more and more taking a major part in the world such as coal, oil and gas. Therefore, the end
energy balance, limiting developed countries’ of many European nuclear industries will
market power (such as the one of the United mean more external energy dependencies
States), to impact world energy prices. for an increasing number of European coun-
tries. It will also increase the number of pos-
Today, European countries, more specifically sible hybrid threats on long distance energy
the members of the European Union (EU) and supply lines and on key producing areas such
the European members of the North Atlantic as the Middle East or Russia where most of
Treaty Organization (NATO), are being con- the energy imports come from. Thirdly, Euro-
fronted to five key energy challenges. Firstly, pean countries should think twice when clos-
emerging countries are more and more tak- ing some of their key energy infrastructures
ing a major part in the world energy balance, because many energy producers are located
limiting developed countries’ market power in instable areas, although the recent devel-
(such as the one of the United States), to im- opment of shale gas in Northern America, of
pact world energy prices. offshore oil in Brazil, and of offshore gas in
Mr. Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, Strategic Research Institute of the Military School, Paris
Christophe-Alexandre Paillard is Research Director in charge of armaments and defence economics at the Stra-
tegic Research Institute of the Military School, (IRSEM)1, French Ministry of Defence. Previously, he was Deputy
Director at the Strategic Affairs Directorate (DAS) of the French Ministry of Defence; Head of the international,
technological and legal departments at the French data-protection independent authority (CNIL); Senior Adviser
in the cabinet’s office of the European Affairs State Secretary (SEAE) of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For
several years, he has specifically worked on topics such as energy supplies, strategic and critical minerals, key
defence technologies, industrial and economic risks that could have consequences for national, European, and
North-Atlantic security. He has developed specific competencies on Latin American and Spanish economies. He is
a senior lecturer in economics. He is the author of books and articles on oil, minerals, smart grids, gas supplies,
coal industries or defence issues.
1
Strategic Research Institute of the Military School, (IRSEM) is a French research centre with the status of national service attached to the General Directorate for Stra-
tegic and International Relations, French Military of Defence (DGRIS). Its goal is to support and to promote research in the area of defence and security. Its production is
focused on international defence and security. It is openly accessible worldwide. Publications cover Armament and Defence economics, Defence studies, Strategic studies,
and Defence and Society. It provides academic and financial support to young researchers, following doctoral and post-doctoral studies. It is responsible for steering and
facilitating the approach to forecasting and strategic research. Refer to: http//:www.defense.gouv.fr/irsem
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