The Ultimate High Ground - Marine Corps Association
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IDEAS & ISSUES (SPACE OPERATIONS)
The Ultimate
High Ground
Space considerations for the tactical fight
by Capt Adam M. Fountain
final coordination and then mount up,
“Only with support from space will it be possible for get accountability, and cross the line of
departure. As you walk to your com-
the Armed Forces to reach maximum effectiveness ... mand and control (C2) vehicle, you
The Russian President has repeatedly stressed that hear the comm guys yelling back and
forth at each other, “We can’t get any-
our army and navy must not only meet the require- one beyond line-of-sight!” You attempt
ments of today, but to [sic] be prepared for tomorrow’s to use your Iridium satellite phone to
contact higher—no joy. Your nav man
means of conducting armed struggle. The solution tells you that there is something wrong
with everyone’s GPSs. They are either
of this problem doubtlessly depends directly on the jammed or giving current position grids
availability of a modern orbital constellation of mili- hundreds of miles away. Your OpsO
tells you that the first flights running
tary satellites.” your shaping actions are returning and
—Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, some of them bombed the wrong loca-
tions because of GPS issues. The flights
6 March 2018 that were able to make it to the objective
are returning battle damage assessments
ellite collection. Your intelligence sec- (BDA), indicating that almost all the
T
he intent of this article is to tion could not get up-to-date imagery targets were missed. You realize that the
inform commanders and staff because of increased SATCOM interfer- only other option is FAC-A self-lasing
about the opportunities that ence over the past few days. The UAVs and dumb ordnance, which will put
space planning can provide in that were feeding you footage from the your aircraft at greater risk of enemy
support of their schemes of maneuver objective area and avenues of approach air defenses. Now you send the word to
and dispose of any preconceived notions have either gone offline or cannot pen- get your staff together because it time
that space support is out of the realm of etrate the jamming environment. You to make a decision—go forward with
tactical-level planning considerations. have nevertheless decided to move for- the attack or hunker down and hold
ward with the operation because higher position until the fog of war lifts? Before
Scenario headquarters has already started plan- you can assemble everyone, explosions
You are the commander of a task ning the next series of actions, and begin hammering your position. There
force built around an infantry unit and they are expecting a positive outcome is total chaos unfolding in your assem-
you are preparing to go on the assault. from your attack very soon. You try to bly area. Enemy ordnance is precise and
You have been busy planning your at- call home, but none of the phones are deadly accurate. They seem to be hitting
tack for days and things have not been working and the internet is down. You everything that is essential as if they are
going as well as you had expected. Your begin to wonder why, but it is time to running down a target list. Your unit
intelligence section has not been able to start getting everyone assembled to do is decisively engaged. The sergeant of
give your planning staff a clear picture
of the enemy situation and the intelli-
gence that you had to go forward with >Capt Fountain enlisted in the Marine Corps as an Infantryman in 2003 and com-
was inconclusive and somewhat ques- missioned in 2011 as an Intelligence Officer. He is now an Information Operations
tionable. The hyper-spectral imagery Planner and Space Operations Staff Officer for II MEF Information Group, FMF,
you wanted was not available because Atlantic.
your RFIs did not make the cut for sat-
Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 67
Ideas & Issues (Space Operations)
the guard runs over to you and tells you hind when you moved your command day and night for the next ten days.
that the watch officer reports two large post two days ago are under attack, but As you button up your C2 vehicle for
formations of enemy vehicles closing in the fires are mostly ineffective, and the the close-in fight, you think to yourself,
on your position. One from the East air defense systems are engaging en- “War has changed a lot since I was a
and one from the North. You and your emy aircraft with success—they have lieutenant. I’m glad I didn’t kick the
OpsO both realize you are the victim taken the bait. You are spearheading space guy out.”
of a spoiling attack. What now, com- the main effort. Satellite imagery, less
mander? than four hours old, enabled very precise
“Maneuver warfare is
“And the fog of war will not easily clear in that fight, a warfighting philoso-
because future adversaries will employ new tools phy that seeks to shat-
as well, exploiting any cyber and space vulnerabili- ter the enemy’s cohe-
ties they can find and try to negate our advantages in sion through a variety
those domains.” of rapid, focused, and
—ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr. Vice Chairman, unexpected actions
Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2013 which create a turbu-
lent and rapidly dete-
riorating situation with
Now, imagine this scenario reversed. final coordination and confirmed exact
It is the enemy that is experiencing locations of enemy C2 nodes, aircraft, which the enemy can-
these effects, and meanwhile, you are
ruthlessly exploiting the initiative and
anti-aircraft, and artillery positions
showed the enemy beginning to build
not cope.”
maneuvering on their forces. Days ago, up forces in their assembly area. UAVs —MCDP 1, Warfighting
your amphibious landing went fairly are returning live feeds of the destruc-
well, having fought through relatively tion unfolding on enemy positions, and
light shoreline defenses to take your first the BDAs are coming back with great New Vectors for Warfare
objective. You established a beachhead effects and no targets requiring reattack During the past two decades fight-
and strong foothold from which to fight at this time. Communications with your ing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we
from. You and your staff evaluated the units, adjacent units, and higher are have enjoyed a vast technological edge
enemy and determined that their critical seamless and unfettered. Space-based against our enemies. We have enjoyed
vulnerability was their over-extended METOC assessments show optimum air supremacy, unfettered communica-
communications infrastructure and weather for continued operations both tions, precision strike capabilities, and
reliance on SATCOM. You planned
early for your own space support and
the space planner was able to get space
support requests through in time for
this operation. Through good prior
planning and nesting of your actions
with operational and strategic-level,
space-based collections and targeting
actions, you were able to get the timing
for this operation perfect for enabling
space support. As your staff was finaliz-
ing planning, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) indicated that
the enemy was preparing to go on the at-
tack. Last minute adjustments are made
to the shaping series, and you give the
order to execute. Shortly after crossing
the LD, your rear area gives reports that
the fake C2 nodes, tents, and inflatable Capt Fountain navigates to the drop zone while in freefall during Multi-Mission Parachute
aircraft and vehicles that you left be- Course in Coolidge, AZ, 2018. (Photo by author.)
68 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021live ISR feeds showing us in realtime
what our ill-equipped adversaries have
been up to. The freedom of action we
have had for so long is quickly going
away. The tides of war are shifting and
while our focus has been elsewhere, ad-
versary nation-states have been schem-
ing against us and developing capabili-
ties to contest our interests and threaten
our security at home and abroad. They
have been working diligently to develop
ways to avoid our strengths and exploit
our weaknesses—to avoid our surfaces
and target our gaps. Now that we are
shifting our focus from the counter-
insurgency fight and taking a serious
look at our peer and near-peer adver-
saries, we have begun to realize that
we are vulnerable in ways that we had
not anticipated—particularly in the
information environment (IE). It is Marines with Alpha Battery, Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 11th MEU, bivouac at Colonel Er-
important to understand that in this nesto Ravina Air Base, Philippines, during Exercise KAMANDAG 3, 16 October 2019. (Photo by SSgt
new fight, warfare is being waged in Donald Holbert.)
realms beyond the physical. These new
vectors for waging conflict span from ISR from information transmitted via the
space to the electromagnetic spectrum, For tactical-level planning, one of GPS satellite constellation from a mini-
to cyberspace, and even to the minds the greatest capabilities that we bring mum of four different satellites—three
of individual human beings. If we to bear is space-based ISR. We have the or more satellites for position triangu-
continue to think and plan only in the means to pull high-resolution targeting- lation and one satellite to synchronize
physical realm and try to solve all of our quality products for any location in the timing. This constellation provides two
problems with ordnance, we are ceding world for use in time-sensitive mission position services. One is a standard po-
this maneuver space to our enemies and planning, positive identification, dy- sitioning service that is broadcast over
providing them opportunities to out- namic re-tasking of assets, and BDA. an unencrypted signal to any user with
flank us. We must adjust our way of Intelligence collection efforts can be a GPS receiver. The other is a precise
thinking, include these attack vectors prioritized and sequenced to incorporate position service that is broadcast over
in our planning, and evolve how we space-based assets which provides both two encrypted frequencies—used pri-
fight in this new age of warfare. redundancy and allows for the cueing of marily by the DOD.2 The modern op-
other collection assets in order to gain erational environment demands that we
Our Dependency on Space “multi-INT” correlation for targeting enforce discipline when it comes to the
In modern warfare, space-based purposes. This works much the same types of navigation tools that we use.
support is critical to tactical success. way as would a HUMINT team that Many of the commercial navigation
It enables us to detect the enemy first, receives information about a new enemy tools on the market today can easily
understand them first, take action first, communications node that is confirmed compromise or disrupt our operations
and permits quick and decisive target- both by SIGINT and EO sensor collec- and can ultimately lead to entire units
ing to finish them. It provides redun- tion. This enables a much faster target- being killed if we are not careful and
dancy in communications, ISR, and ing cycle because of the information disciplined. The unencrypted standard
early warning in support of force protec- having been confirmed and correlated positioning frequency used by these de-
tion. If we were to only rely on organic across multiple collection platforms. vices is a low-power signal that is more
Marine Corps assets (the Marine Corps vulnerable to environmental conditions
does not own any satellites), we would Position, Navigation, and Timing and can easily be jammed or spoofed
be allowing an enemy with space sup- (PNT) by our adversaries. This can create ad-
port capability to quickly out-pace our Commonly referred to as GPS, PNT ditional friction that could easily be
decision-making cycle, giving them a provides us with everything from cur- avoided by using the encrypted precise
position from which to plan and execute rent locations, to precision weapons position frequencies, which are both
against us first. So far, we have not al- guidance, and the timing that allows harder for our adversaries to target and
lowed for that to happen. We depend our communications systems to work. more reliable in adverse weather condi-
on space support in several ways. Location and timing data are derived tions. In terms of precision-guided mu-
Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 69Ideas & Issues (Space Operations)
nitions, high accuracy in PNT equates Persistent Infrared satellites that use in- weather in any clime and place is abso-
to highly effective kinetic strikes, mini- frared sensors to detect heat. Though lutely essential for us as a Navy/Marine
mal collateral damage, and reduces it is primarily discussed at the strategic Corps team. In the middle of the open
the need for reattack—which makes level in regard to intercontinental bal- ocean or in remote areas of the world
us more decisive, saves ammunition, listic missiles, it can inform tactical-level where no ground weather stations exist,
and enables us to strike more targets defensive measures in the event of an environmental monitoring satellites are
faster. Considering that we are now enemy missile launch. Missile warning the primary observers. With the effects
bringing new HIMARS, ATACMS, proves helpful in force protection discus- that weather has on both friendly and
and GMLRS capabilities online in sup- sions concerning freedom of navigation enemy operations, and many of the sys-
port of expeditionary advanced base operations and EABO and can drive tems that we use, our weather satellites
operations (EABO), accurate PNT will communications planning in regard to are crucial to mission success.
be essential in those long-range engage- the lines of communications required to
ments where some of our targets may be receive timely warning. Missile warning Space Domain Awareness
on the move.3 The timing part of this can also inform the targeting process For the tactical fight, space domain
equation, which is essential for naviga- by assisting in BDA and determining awareness is simply knowing when our
tion and driving our precision-guided reattack options if necessary. satellites are overhead to support us and
munitions, is also vital for establish- knowing when the adversary’s satellites
ing and maintaining communications. Environmental Monitoring are overhead to detect us. Using this
Without precise timing, our ability to In the Marine Corps, we like to say knowledge can greatly inform plan-
use frequency-hopping is degraded or that no matter what our plan is, the ning, specifically in regard to opera-
denied, and we are forced to off-ramp enemy gets a vote. If this is true, I would tional security (OPSEC) and military
onto other more easily intercepted and venture to say that no matter who is deception (MILDEC). Knowing when
jammed means of communication. voting, the weather holds veto author- enemy satellites are overhead allows us
ity. I can recall numerous times where to decide what we want them to see or
SATCOM our sniper missions were scrapped as a not to see. We can prioritize actions that
SATCOM is essential for maintain- result of dust storms shutting down our involve our essential elements of friendly
ing C2 on the modern battlefield. Far
beyond just using a radio to talk voice
to another unit or providing worldwide There are no national borders in space. There are no
connectivity from remote locations,
SATCOM provides a communications rules stopping our adversaries from flying satellites
infrastructure that is not dependent on over our country as there is none to stop ours ...
groundbased line-of-sight relays and is
the go-to means of communications
when organic communication range ca-
pabilities have been reached. As opposed ability to run CASEVAC aircraft, train- information to occur during windows
to standard tactical UHF and VHF an- ing exercises were cancelled because of when there are no enemy satellites able
tennas, some SATCOM antennas can hurricanes, and one particular occasion to detect us, which is fundamental to
be focused directionally to provide the where, after a successful mission, our OPSEC, or conversely, we can purposely
user a much lower probability of detec- entire raid force (having only packed for conduct actions designed to fool the en-
tion. This can increase the survivability a quick in and out trip) was stranded emy and project false intentions as part
of the user by denying the enemy the on the beach for several days in sub- of a MILDEC plan. Knowing when
ability to direction find our forces. This zero conditions and high winds after enemy satellites are overhead can allow
is crucial in today’s battlefield, where our amphibious ships had to pull away us to take such precautions as conceal-
to be detected is to be killed.4 SAT- due to high seas. Weather affects every ing our positions, changing or halting
COM also provides the conduit for the aspect of our mission planning. For ex- force movements, or establishing a state
Common Operational Picture, which ample, in terms of conducting amphibi- of emissions control in order to avoid or
is the primary tool used by command ous operations in support of EABO, it mitigate detection by enemy satellites.
elements to keep track of friendly and can significantly change the underwater
enemy units and maintain a shared situ- topography of the offshore staging areas The Wild West
ational awareness of the battlefield. This and beach landing zones that we intend There are no national borders in
tool significantly shortens the decision to use. It can affect the timing of our space. There are no rules stopping our
cycles of commanders and enables the logistical support and change avenues of adversaries from flying satellites over our
swift actions of their subordinates. approach for maneuver. It can ground country as there are none to stop ours
aircraft and render ships incapable of from flying over theirs. The days of spy
Missile Warning launching or receiving shore connec- planes and the political ramifications
Missile warning is done by Overhead tors. Having the capability to forecast of them being shot down over enemy
70 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021territory have all but disappeared. The position to launch kinetic kill vehicles infrastructure—either the satellite,
satellite flying in space can be likened (think “bullets”) and destroy them. the ground station that controls it, or
to a ship travelling in the international This is essentially armed reconnais- the link between them. Cyberspace
waters of the open ocean. There are no sance in space. Currently, both Russia weapons can be used to deny, degrade,
borders, and all nations hold the right and China have these types of satellites deceive, disrupt, and destroy any sat-
to traverse it freely. This makes space- on orbit with the intent to put more ellite or ground station that can be
based ISR, SATCOM, and PNT more in orbit in the near future. Iran and communicated with and hacked into.
responsive and accessible to adversary North Korea currently have the launch Currently, China and Russia are de-
territory than via airborne or ground- vehicles to pursue this course of action veloping anti-satellite cyberspace ca-
based means. With this in mind, na- but do not appear to actively be doing pabilities.9
tions have begun to realize that a large so at this time.6
portion of their national security relies For Sale: Military-Grade Space Support
upon access to or denial of space capa- Though it would be ideal to our na-
bilities. To this end, there is an ongo- tional security if the United States and
ing race to develop both ground and If you have a clear view our allies held a monopoly on space ca-
on-orbit space infrastructure as well as of the sky, its best to pabilities, it is important to note that the
the means to counter these abilities. same capabilities addressed in this ar-
assume that adversary ticle are available for purchase through
Adversary Counterspace Capabilities ISR has a clear view of commercial satellite constellations. This
While we have been occupied with implies that, with a bit of funding, any
the counterinsurgency fight, our peer you ... adversary nation, criminal organization,
and near-peer adversaries have watched or terror group could potentially en-
very closely how we rely upon and use joy the same cutting-edge spacebased
space capabilities to support our opera- technological capabilities as the world’s
tions. They have analyzed our methods 3. Electronic Warfare: Electronic war- finest military force.
and identified numerous ways to deny, fare in this context refers to the ability
disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy our to deny, degrade, or disrupt either the Recommendations from the Space
space capabilities. They have devised signal uplink (target the satellite) or Planner
their plans and have been working dili- the signal downlink (target the user). 1. Use the Space Planner to assist with
gently to develop the means to mitigate This affects both SATCOM and GPS. fires planning with regard to PNT ac-
or remove our dominance in the space Currently, all our adversaries possess, curacy assessments (also referred to as
domain. Here are a few ways that they at the very least, the ability to jam Dilution of Precision) and coordination
are planning to do this: commercial grade GPS downlink sig- for PNT signal power increase requests
1. Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Weap- nals. China and Russia both main- to make GPS-guided munitions more
ons (ASATs): Direct Ascent ASATs tain significant capabilities to deny, accurate during times when kinetic
are groundbased, sub-launched, ship- degrade, and disrupt our use of space strikes are to take place.
launched, or air-launched missiles that support within the electromagnetic 2. Use the Space Planner to assist in OP-
are designed to target satellites. They spectrum to target both uplink and SEC, SIGMAN, and MILDEC plan-
are not designed to reach and maintain downlink.7 ning, specifically in regard to adversary
a particular orbit, but rather to inter- 4. Directed Energy Weapons (DEW): ISR overflight schedules.
cept and kill a satellite much the same DEWs are systems that use laser en- 3. Be aware of your signature both
way a surface-to-air missile would be ergy, high-power microwaves, and physically and in the electromagnetic
used against an aircraft. At this time, other types of radiofrequencies at vari- spectrum. Our adversaries have their
both Russia and China have the ca- ous power levels to achieve effects on own ISR satellites or have access to high
pability to use Direct Ascent ASATs target satellites that can range from quality ISR products from commercial
to engage U.S. imagery and weather temporary disruption of the sensor to satellites. Do your best to blend into the
satellites in low-earth orbit. Iran and destruction of the satellite itself. Cur- natural environment. Do not disturb
North Korea currently have the mis- rently, China and Russia have ground- the baseline if at all possible. If you
sile technology to pursue this course of based DEW capability that can affect have a clear view of the sky, its best to
action if they choose to do so.5 our satellites in low-earth orbit.8 assume that adversary ISR has a clear
2. Co-Orbital ASATs: Co-Orbital 5. Cyberspace: The use of satellites view of you and can sense whatever EM
ASATs are satellite weapon systems inherently involves the use of both spectrum emissions are emanating from
that are put into orbit with the intent cyberspace and the electromagnetic your position. Make their job of finding
to engage other satellites at the time spectrum. In this context, cyberspace you and tracking you as hard as pos-
and place of their choosing. Once in refers to software programs that are sible. Do not present target indicators
orbit, these systems can identify target weaponized to attack a computer to them. Here are a few tips to help
satellites and then move to a firing system within a part of the satellite with this:
Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 71Ideas & Issues (Space Operations)
a. Do not set up tents and COCs in that they stay integrated throughout remain relevant in a world where the
the open. the planning process. Don’t put them means by which we conduct warfare is
b. Hide your forces in the tree line in a room down the hall to plan in a quickly changing. We share a respon-
where there is no clear view of the vacuum while the “real” planning is sibility to try and bridge this gap in
sky. Where there are no tree lines or going on elsewhere. There should be no understanding. We must think through
overhead cover to conceal your posi- such thing as separate OPTs for Infor- the lens of the infantryman, decide how
tion, use cammie netting and other mation Warfare and Fires. All capabili- our particular skillset can best support
materials that resist/deny hyperspec- ties should be considered for input to them, and develop the language skills
tral imaging and SAR collection. achieve an all-inclusive whole-of-effects necessary to clearly and concisely con-
c. Do not set up your tents or park approach to fires. vey to everyone at the planning table
your vehicles in rows or any other type what can seem like new and strange
of pattern. When it comes to tactical concepts. If and when we finally achieve
operations, establishing a pattern cre- this planning synergy, we will be ready
ates a target indicator. Patterns rarely “If you can’t explain it to fight and win the wars of today and
occur in nature and can easily be iden- tomorrow. Though the nature of war
tified by an enemy imagery analyst. simply, you don’t under- is unchanging, the character of war is
d. Use directional SATCOM anten- stand it well enough.” not; thus, it is existential imperative that
nas whenever possible. If directional we adjust to the changing character by
SATCOM is not an option, the next —Albert Einstein which we wage war.
best thing is a directional HF antenna
because of how it is focused on one on
particular azimuth and has to bounce Notes
off of the ionosphere to reach over the Conclusion 1. Dave English, “How Multi-INT Enables
horizon. Our adversaries have the abil- No matter what MOS you hold in Deciphering the Indecipherable,” C4ISRNET,
ity to direction find our transmissions, the Marine Corps, we all either directly (April 2015), available at https://www.c4isrnet.
so using something that only emits in or indirectly support the infantry. Until com.
one direction makes sense. a new main effort is designated, the tip
4. Do not let Marines to use commercial of the spear will continue to be those 2. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Op-
erations, (Washington, DC: April 2018).
GPS devices (Garmin, Magellan, etc). young hard-charging 0311s, and we
Only use military issued devices using must do everything within our power 3. “The Marines Have Their Very Own Anti-
military encrypted frequencies. They as supporting units to ensure that they Ship Rockets,” National Interest, (October
are harder to spoof and harder to jam. are crossing the line of departure with 2019), available at https://nationalinterest.org.
5. If you experience jamming or spoof- the absolute best support that we can
ing, report it immediately. User feed- provide. The infantry values simplicity 4. Gen Robert D. Neller, CMC Message to the
back often serves as the first indication and directness, and has little patience Force 2017: Seize the Initiative, (Washington,
of space assets being targeted. Use the for things that seem outside of the scope DC: February 2017).
reporting criteria located in CJCSM of the mission. Unfortunately, many
3320.02, Joint Spectrum Interference of the new concepts and capabilities 5. Staff, Challenges to Security in Space, (Wash-
Resolution (JSIR) Procedures. coming online for the Marine Corps ington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, Janu-
ary 2019).
6. Whether conducting training or de- fall outside the realm of kinetic capabili-
ployed in real-world operations, do not ties and can come across as somewhat 6. Ibid.
allow Marines to use personal electronic irrelevant to someone whose mission
devices or wear smart watches or fit- is to locate, close with, and destroy the 7. Ibid.
ness trackers that talk to the internet enemy by fire and maneuver.11 To be
or to satellites. Its best to consider all fair, this can be said for most other 8. Ibid.
commercial electronics that emit sig- MOS’s that are not inoculated to work-
nals compromised. The enemy has the ing with and through the IE. The other 9. Ibid.
ability to sense and target these users side of this coin is that some of us as
through the electromagnetic spectrum information warfare professionals do 10. Staff, “The Strava Heat Map and the End
of Secrets,” Wired, (January 2018), available at
or cyberspace. Marines never travel not know how to effectively commu-
https://www.wired.com.
alone, so if they can sense and locate nicate—sometimes very technical IE
one or two of our devices, they can eas- planning considerations—to someone 11. Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps
ily assume other key elements to enable that has been trained to solve problems Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-10A.4i, Marine
them to effectively target us.10 with ordnance. This language barrier is Rifle Squad, (Washington, DC: June 2019).
7. Include the Space Planners, and other one of the major obstacles that we must
Operations in the Information Environ- overcome if we are to fully integrate our
ment Planners, early on and make sure lethal and non-lethal capabilities and
72 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021You can also read
