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INSIDE | UK to Increase Cap on Nuclear Warhead Stockpile
Volume 51 | Number 3
APRIL 2021
The Arduous Path to Restoring
The Iran Nuclear Deal
By Naysan Rafati
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Vo l u m e 51 • N u m b e r 3 • A p r i l 2 0 21
6 Features
3 Focus 6
The Arduous Path to Restoring the
The UK's Nuclear U-Turn Iran Nuclear Deal
By Daryl G. Kimball y Naysan Rafati
B
Nearly three years after the United States exited the 2015
Iran nuclear deal, Washington and Tehran now agree on
4 In Brief
the need to restore mutual compliance, but they remain in
Notable Quotable a stalement about how exactly to do so.
By the Numbers
On the Calendar 12 Apes on a Treadmill in Space
15 Years Ago By David A. Koplow
In all three of the leading spacefaring countries, bellicose
rhetoric has escalated alongside rising military space
35 In Memoriam
expenditures.
Michael S. Elleman (1958–2021)
By Mark Fitzpatrick
12
12
Cover photo: The stage in Vienna where negotiators announced the conclusion of talks that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015.
(Photo: U.S. Department of State)
ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 1
News and Analysis
18 UK to Increase Cap on 26 Syrian Chemicals Arms Control
Nuclear Warhead
Stockpile
Stockpile Declaration
Still Incomplete
TODAY
Volume 51, Number 3
A new defense policy review CWC states-parties may
April 2021
results in raising warhead consider steps to hold Syria
A Publication of the Arms Control Association
ceiling by 44 percent. accountable for use of chemical
weapons in violation of the 1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1175
Washington, DC 20036
19 Efforts to Restore Iran treaty.
PHONE: 202-463-8270
Deal Remain Stalled
FAX: 202-463-8273
Iran says a meeting is 27 U.S. Sanctions Russia for
E-MAIL
unnecessary for a return to Chemical Weapons Use act@armscontrol.org
compliance with the accord. Poisoning of Kremlin-critic WEBSITE
with Novichok nerve agent www.armscontrol.org
20 IAEA Backs Off Iran prompts censure.
Resolution Publisher and Executive Director
A European resolution to 28 New Work Underway at Daryl G. Kimball
censure Iran was withdrawn Israeli Nuclear Site
out of concern it could upset Satellite imagery shows Acting Editor Chief Operating Officer
efforts to restore compliance construction at facility near Daryl G. Kimball Kathy Crandall
Robinson
with the JCPOA. Dimona. Design and
Production Editor Senior Fellow on
Allen Harris Conventional Arms
22 Pentagon Reviews 29 U.S. Largest Seller in Control and Transfers
Director for Jeff Abramson
Nuclear Budget Flat Arms Market Nonproliferation Policy
Under evaluation are lower- Report finds U.S. accounted Kelsey Davenport Visiting
Senior Fellow
yield nuclear weapons, and for 37 percent of global arms Director for Michael T. Klare
select command, control and transfers from 2011–2015. Disarmament and
Threat Reduction Policy Scoville Peace Fellow
communications.
Kingston Reif Sang-Min Kim
31 U.S. Advocates for
23 U.S. Nuclear Warhead Binding Rules on Research Associate
Shannon Bugos
Finance Officer
Merle Newkirk
Costs Surge Behavior In Space
Research Associate Administrative and
Existing plans call for a 29 In response to UNGA Member Relations
Julia Masterson
percent increase in funds to resolution, U.S. plans to Assistant
Director of Rachel Paik
sustain and modernize U.S. forward proposals for a Communications
nuclear warheads. multilateral agreement. and Operations Interns
Tony Fleming Chelsie Boodoo
24 North Korea Rebuffs 32 State Reviews Plans for Nicholas Smith
Adamopoulos
U.S. Outreach New Tech Bureau
Pyongyang unmoved by early New administration seeks to Board of Directors
Biden administration overtures promote shared norms and Thomas Countryman Paul Walker
for resumed talks designed to new agreements on emerging Chairman Vice-Chairman
“reduce the risk of escalation.” technologies and cyberspace. Michael T. Klare Christine Wing
Secretary Treasurer
25 Biden Fills Key Lilly Adams Angela Kane
Arms Control Posts Matthew Bunn Laura Kennedy
Some positions are filled but Susan Burk Maryann Cusimano Love
slow pace of appointments Leland Cogliani Zia Mian
could begin to delay William R. “Russ” Colvin Randy Rydell
Philip Coyle Rachel Stohl
administration decisions on
Deborah Fikes Greg Thielmann
some nuclear policy issues. Deborah C. Gordon Andrew Weber
Bonnie Jenkins
33 News In Brief The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a
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China Flight-Tests Missile Interceptors policies. Through its media and public education programs
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UK Finalizes New Safeguards public with authoritative information and analyses on
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Pentagon Moves On New Missile Interceptors
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2 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021
FOCUS By Daryl G. Kimball
Executive Director
The UK’s Nuclear U-Turn
I
n recent years, the United Kingdom has touted itself as one of nuclear weapons” in U.S. national security strategy. Biden
of the most transparent of the five nuclear-armed states has also recently said the United States “does not need new
recognized by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and nuclear weapons.”
its leaders leaned heavily on the fact that it was reducing the size The UK government is headed in the opposite direction on
of its nuclear force. new nuclear weapons too. The government, which claims it
But in a major reversal that will complicate efforts to strengthen has an “independent” nuclear arsenal even though it depends
the NPT and exacerbate tensions with other nuclear-armed states, heavily on U.S. support for its nuclear weapons program, is
the UK announced on March 16 that it will move to increase its lobbying the U.S. Congress to appropriate U.S. taxpayer funds
total nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling by 44 percent, to 260, and for a newly designed submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
reduce transparency about its nuclear arsenal. warhead, dubbed the W93.
At the 2010 and 2015 NPT review conferences, UK officials This warhead, which the Trump administration proposed as a
said they would reduce their force to no more than 180 warheads third type of SLBM warhead, is not only costly but unnecessary,
on their four Vanguard-class strategic missile submarines. Open given that the United States already has two SLBM warheads
source estimates put the current size of the UK arsenal at 195 and has recently invested billions on refurbishment programs to
warheads. They described this decision as a contribution toward extend their service lives. The W93 warhead is also unnecessary
Article VI of the treaty, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on for the British nuclear force, which does not need a newly
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race designed U.S. warhead to maintain its sea-based nuclear force.
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Pursuit of the W93 also violates the
So, why the change? Prime Minister Boris Tensions between Obama administration’s 2010 policy,
Johnson’s integrated review of security, the major powers are which stated that the United States “will
defense, development, and foreign policy certainly high, but it not develop new nuclear warheads. Life
attributes increasing the warhead ceiling is irresponsible to Extension Programs will use only nuclear
to “the evolving security environment, react by engaging in components based on previously tested
including the developing range of designs and will not support new military
nuclear arms racing.
technological and doctrinal threats.” missions or provide for new military
But the review fails explain how adding 80 warheads to the capabilities." Although a decade old, this remains the right policy
arsenal will enhance deterrence against these ill-defined threats, for security and nonproliferation reasons.
nor can UK diplomats explain how the increase strengthens The best way for the White House and members of Congress
the NPT. The UK now joins China and perhaps Russia as NPT- to support their allies in London is to remind them that nuclear
recognized nuclear-armed states planning to increase the size buildups and new nuclear weapons are unnecessary strategically
of their warhead stockpiles. and unhealthy for international security and U.S.-UK relations.
Tensions between the major powers are certainly high, but The new UK nuclear policy will also complicate Biden
it is irresponsible to react by engaging in nuclear arms racing. administration efforts to pursue further bilateral arms control
Truly “responsible” nuclear-armed states seek to reduce tensions and reduction measures with Russia, which wants future
and increase stability by advancing serious arms control, risk arrangements to take into account the arsenals of the other
reduction, and disarmament measures based on the principles nuclear-armed states, especially the UK and France. One option
of transparency and restraint. should be for China, France, and the UK to agree to cap their
Making matters worse, the UK also announced that it will arsenals and provide more transparency regarding their nuclear
“no longer give public figures for [its] operational stockpile, stockpiles and doctrines, as Washington and Moscow move
deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers.” forward on further nuclear cuts.
Like the United States, the past UK commitment to transparency The approaching 10th NPT review conference was already
about its nuclear forces has set it apart from other nuclear- going to be difficult without the UK adding itself to the list of
armed states. Both have rightly criticized China for its excessive states acting inconsistently with its treaty commitments. The
nuclear secrecy. Such opacity is irresponsible and unworthy of United States, along with other responsible nations, will need to
a democracy. redouble efforts to secure consensus on a meaningful action plan
The new UK policy direction not only violates its NPT that holds the UK and the other nuclear-weapon states, plus the
disarmament obligations, but it is completely out of step with other parties to the NPT, accountable to their disarmament and
U.S. President Joe Biden’s pledge to “take steps to reduce the role nonproliferation obligations. ACT
ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 3
InBRIEF
April 2021
Notable Quotable
“Renewing Trident nuclear weapons was already a shameful and
regressive decision, however, increasing the cap on the number of
Trident weapons the UK can stockpile by more than 40 percent
is nothing short of abhorrent. It speaks volumes of the Tory
government's spending priorities that it is intent on increasing its
collection of weapons of mass destruction—which will sit and
gather dust unless the UK has plans to indiscriminately wipe out
entire populations—rather than address the serious challenges
and inequalities in our society that have been further exposed by
the pandemic.”
—Scottish National Party defence spokesman Stewart McDonald, March
16 on the United Kingdom’s decision to increase its nuclear stockpile
NUMBERS
BY THE
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Arsenal 1952–2025
The U.K. conducted its first nuclear weapon test explosion in Western Australia in 1952 and went on to amass a
stockpile of some 500 nuclear weapons by the mid-1970s. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.K. has reduced its
stockpile and in 2010 it pledged to reduce it to no more than 180 warheads on its four strategic submarines by the
mid-2020s. The U.K. announced in March 2021 that it would increase that ceiling to 260 warheads.
500
450
400
NUCLEAR WARHEADS
350
300
Integrated Review Plan
250
200
Previous Plan
150
100
50
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, Federation of American Scientists.
4 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021
CALENDAR
ON THE
Apr. 12–15 Meeting of States-Parties of the Biological July 12 25th Anniversary of the Wassenaar
Weapons Convention (Rescheduled) Arrangement
Apr. 19–23 First session, Group of Governmental Experts July 19 30th Anniversary of South Africa joining the
on Nuclear Disarmament Verification NPT after voluntarily dismantling its nuclear
weapons
Apr. 20–22 Conference of States-Parties to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, pt. II, The Hague July 26–Sept. 10 Third session Conference on Disarmament,
Geneva
Apr. 28–29 20th Regular Meeting, Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Aug. 2–27 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Vienna Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (tentative)
May 10–June 25 Second Session of the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva Aug. 25–Sept. 3 64th Session of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
May 21 25th Anniversary of Ukraine becoming a
nuclear weapons-free state Aug. 29 International Day against Nuclear Tests
May 25–28 Arms Trade Treaty Working Group Meetings Aug. 30–Sept. 3 Seventh Conference of States-Parties to the
& Second Preparatory Meetings for the Arms Trade Treaty (CSP7), Geneva
Conference of States-Parties
Sept. 8 15th Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty
June 7–11 IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna of Semipalatinsk, Central Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone
June 21–22 56th session of the CTBT Preparatory
Commission, Vienna Sept. 13–17 IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna
June 22–24 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Sept. 20–24 IAEA 65th General Conference, Vienna
Conference (virtual)
Sept. 24 25th Anniversary of the opening for signature
July 6–9 97th Session of the OPCW Executive of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Council, The Hague
Sept. 26 International Day for the Total Elimination of
July 8 25th Anniversary of the International Court of Nuclear Weapons
Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons
15 Years Ago in ACT
If it Ain't Broke: The Already Reliable U.S. Nuclear Arsenal
“Rather than funding a new and costly weapons program, lawmakers would be better served if they
confronted the need to end an irrational nuclear targeting doctrine a decade and a half after the end
of the Cold War.”
—Robert W. Nelson, April 2006
ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 5
By Naysan Rafati
The Arduous Path to Restoring
The Iran Nuclear Deal
A
change in U.S. administrations brought more recent global COVID-19 pandemic
and its impact on energy markets, as a
with it something rare in the often- “triple shock” on the country’s economy.2
If the Trump administration had hoped
acrimonious relationship between Tehran would bend to its will, however,
it was mistaken. In mid-2019, Tehran
Washington and Tehran: a point of agreement. launched a counterstrategy, dubbed
“maximum resistance.” Rather than
Nearly three years after President Donald Trump concede to the administration’s demands
and to demonstrate that what it viewed
unilaterally exited the 2015 Joint Comprehensive as tantamount to an economic siege
would not go unanswered, Iran retaliated
Plan of Action (JCPOA), both sides concur on against the United States and its regional
allies directly and through local proxies
the need to restore core elements of the deal that in places such as Iraq and the Persian
Gulf. It also methodically breached its
have been sorely tested since: strict restrictions own obligations under the JCPOA on
the contention that the evaporation
on and rigorous monitoring of Iran’s nuclear of the financial benefits the deal had
promised justified a reduction in its own
program in exchange for sanctions relief. Yet, compliance.
the shared strategic imperative of full mutual The cumulative impact of Iran’s JCPOA
violations, which have escalated in line
compliance remains out of reach so long as a with a law the Iranian Parliament passed
in December 2020 after the killing of a
tactical deadlock continues on how to achieve it. top nuclear scientist, allegedly by Israel,
has been to substantially erode the
An explanation of the convergence of deployment of unilateral sanctions and a agreement’s nonproliferation provisions
U.S. and Iranian interest in reviving the broad set of accompanying demands on in three different respects. The first relates
2015 agreement begins with a stocktaking further restricting Iran’s nuclear activity, to an expansion of uranium enrichment
of the state of play inherited by President halting its ballistic missile development, that cuts the timeline for producing one
Joe Biden in January 2021. Under and containing its regional influence.1 bomb’s worth of fissile material from a
Trump, the United States abandoned The financial impact on Iran has been year to approximately three months; the
the JCPOA in favor of a “maximum substantial, with the World Bank most recent International Atomic Energy
pressure” strategy defined by a sweeping describing U.S. sanctions, along with the Agency (IAEA) quarterly report pegs
Naysan Rafati is the Senior Iran Analyst at International Crisis Group.
6 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (L) and European High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell give a
press conference ahead of their meeting at the EU headquarters in Brussels, March 24. (Photo by Olivier Hoslet/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
Tehran’s enriched uranium stockpile at 14 research and development activities as U.S. regional allies, on how to proceed.
times the JCPOA cap of 202.8 kilograms on advanced centrifuges and uranium- Importantly, the administration affirmed
and at an upper enrichment rate of 20 metal production that deliver, as the that, as a matter of priority, negotiations
percent uranium-235 instead of the 3.67 three European JCPOA parties note, would focus on restoring the JCPOA as a
percent permitted under the deal.3 “irreversible knowledge gain.”5 sine qua non for any wider negotiations
The second concerns the verification with Tehran.
and monitoring authorities of the IAEA, Much Activity, Little Movement Despite these actions, Tehran
which under the nuclear deal is afforded Biden came into office critical of the demurred on a EU offer in February to
JCPOA-specific transparency accesses, maximum-pressure strategy, pointing convene an informal meeting of JCPOA
as well as access under the additional to Iran’s increased nuclear activity and parties and the United States, to which
protocol to Iran’s comprehensive to heightened regional tensions as Washington had already agreed. Iran’s
safeguards agreement. Iran suspended evidence of “a dangerous failure” by rejection was rooted not in what steps
these authorities in February, although his predecessor.6 His administration the Biden administration has taken,
IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi took several symbolic steps to put the but those which it had not and, in its
negotiated a three-month “bilateral prospect of diplomatic reengagement view, should as a precondition for talks,
technical understanding” to maintain on more stable footing, easing Trump- namely, facilitating significant sanctions
key oversight capabilities.4 The agency era restrictions on the movement of reprieve, such as easing conditions for
is also set to press Iran on outstanding New York-based Iranian diplomats and the release of billions in Iranian assets
questions relating to past work at withdrawing a 2020 claim to have pre- frozen abroad or implicit assent to an
undeclared sites during technical JCPOA sanctions successfully restored at International Monetary Fund emergency
discussions scheduled for this month. the United Nations. Senior U.S. diplomats loan Tehran requested at the outset of
Finally, although the expansion of and officials, whose ranks now include the pandemic. From Iran’s perspective,
uranium enrichment can be undone and several veterans of JCPOA negotiations, the onus of a meaningful opening
IAEA access fully restored, the third area engaged early and often in consultations concession falls on the United States for
of concern involves ongoing nuclear with the deal’s other participants, as well having left the JCPOA in the first place.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 7
No talks, even informal ones, can ensue
so long as the architecture of maximum Washington and Tehran are
pressure remains intact, despite Biden’s
denigration of it. in a peculiar position of
Yet, Washington is reluctant to make
such a substantial move, likely for several agreeing to the end point
reasons. A unilateral step allowing Iranian
access to funds would be seen as akin
of a diplomatic process—
to making a down payment toward mutual JCPOA compliance—
negotiations and, although all but certain
to invite attack from domestic critics but they are in a stalemate
who regard the JCPOA as irredeemable,
would also risk the ire of those who at the start of it.
may be persuaded to give engaging
Tehran a chance so long as it prompts production of uranium metal or uranium him provide a degree of continuity in
tangible Iranian concessions. Moreover, enrichment to 20 percent U-235.8 In the Iranian system, who sits at the table
Washington views an uptick in regional turn, such an initial understanding does matter in complex negotiations.
tensions, including a spate of rocket would lay the groundwork for informally It is better then at least to initiate
attacks against U.S. and allied facilities convening the United States, Iran, the diplomatic process and give it
in Iraq, and increased drone and missile and other JCPOA participants for momentum with Rouhani and his team
strikes against Saudi Arabia by Iran’s negotiations to stop further escalations still in place, rather than start from
Houthi allies in Yemen as suggesting and develop a timetable that sees Tehran scratch with a successor hailing from
that Tehran is not restraining its local and Washington unwind their nuclear a more conservative or even hard-line
partners at best and orchestrating violent breaches and sanctions, respectively, on camp, which have been consistently
provocations by them at worst. the path toward mutual compliance.9 critical of the JCPOA. Both arguments
As a result, Washington and Tehran Even if such a sequence finds traction, are reasonable and not necessarily in
are in a peculiar position of agreeing to it is likely to encounter a number of contradiction; it could well be the case
the end point of a diplomatic process— obstacles. Iran holds presidential elections that an agreement on JCPOA compliance
mutual JCPOA compliance—but they are in June, which President Hassan Rouhani, would be easier to strike with the
in a stalemate at the start of it. Discreet whose administration negotiated the Rouhani administration and that failure
bilateral contacts or mediation efforts JCPOA and has put considerable political do so would not necessarily shut the
from a third party such as the European capital into efforts to salvage it, cannot door on Rouhani’s successor pursuing
Union could prove crucial in breaking contest, having served the legally a similar deal. As the election season
the impasse. permissible two terms. Rouhani has begins in earnest in coming weeks, the
already hinted that election dynamics are contours of the importance of the nuclear
Triage, Then Surgery limiting his room for maneuver, referring negotiations will become more apparent.
If neither the United States nor Iran is to a “minority who seek to obstruct” the The dynamics are complicated on
willing to make the first substantive lifting of sanctions.10 If true, it could be the U.S. side as well. Secretary of State
move, one potential solution would be an indication that other elements within Antony Blinken has said that an Iranian
to identify initial steps that each can the Iranian system are reluctant to hand return to JCPOA compliance would
take in parallel, thereby sidestepping the departing administration a political trigger “some sanctions relief.”11 Much
the question of unilateral concessions in victory that could bolster the centrist may hinge on what “some” constitutes:
favor of mutual, reciprocal action. For camp’s electoral prospects. the Trump administration levied more
example, the United States could work Looking further ahead, Western officials than 1,500 designations against Iranian
with South Korea on the partial release hold divergent views on how significant individuals and entities, and Tehran
of frozen Iranian assets, which might the outcome of the presidential race contends that U.S. JCPOA compliance
in turn be earmarked for purchases of will prove for nuclear talks. One school means rolling them back entirely.12 That
COVID vaccines and other medical goods of thought posits that whereas Iran’s is a maximalist demand unlikely to
through the Swiss humanitarian channel decision-making ultimately resides with be realized, particularly as it concerns
set up in coordination with the Trump Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, designations related to issues clearly well
administration to allow satisfactory due not the executive branch, a change in its removed from the nuclear question, such
diligence on disbursement.7 Such a step elected leadership will not meaningfully as human rights or electoral interference.
would not require the formal revocation alter Tehran’s strategic calculus. As a Yet, a tricky balancing act may lie in wait
of existing U.S. sanctions and would logical extension, the election should regarding cases such as Iran’s central
ensure a degree of transparency on where not be viewed as a hard deadline for a bank and other financial entities, which
the funds land. In return, Tehran could diplomatic breakthrough. are subject to multiple layers of U.S.
end one of its more worrisome nuclear An alternative view is that although sanctions, including some relating to
breaches, such as the recently initiated the supreme leader and the circle around counterterrorism.13
8 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021Former Trump administration officials right or wrong, lingers that the Obama JCPOA’s restrictions are phased out over
have acknowledged that, technically administration fell short on keeping them the next few years, while concerns about
speaking, “any president has the right to abreast of its discussions with Tehran Iran’s ballistic missile development and
reverse an executive action…. Whether and that the resulting agreement left key regional power projection point to the
it is politically possible is a different concerns such as Iran’s ballistic missile need for follow-on negotiations. It is a list
question.”14 The Biden administration development and support for local allies of priorities not too dissimilar to what the
could conceivably make a case for lifting unaddressed or even exacerbated them Trump administration posited, with the
such designations in the context of by lifting sanctions. It will have been critical distinction that its successor views
restoring the JCPOA, but what may be little surprise, therefore, that the main the JCPOA as a sturdy foundation to be
necessary for diplomacy to succeed will international endorsements of Trump’s built on rather than razed so that a new
almost certainly meet with domestic maximum-pressure strategy came from structure can take its place.
political blowback.15 As such, a proposal countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, Indeed, if there is one lesson to be
of sanctions relief sufficient to meet which would prefer a Biden policy that learned from the JCPOA negotiations, it is
Iran’s minimal threshold of acceptability looks more like a Trump second term that although the nuclear file has enough
is likely to encounter deep skepticism than an Obama third term. complexities of its own, the success
or outright opposition, among not just of an agreement cannot be divorced
congressional Republicans but some key Beyond the Nuclear File from wider policy considerations if it
Democrats as well. The Biden administration’s approach to is to be sustainable and Washington’s
Furthermore, Washington’s Middle these concerns is to view the JCPOA as regional allies are to come to view it
Eastern allies already view tentative U.S. a necessary but insufficient diplomatic as something other than a zero-sum
steps toward reengagement with Tehran initiative. Blinken and other U.S. officials proposition. An effort at deescalation in
with deep apprehension. Israel and some describe a “longer and stronger” nuclear the Gulf may be the most feasible starting
Gulf Arab states saw the negotiations that deal, to be constructed on top of a fully point. Constructive U.S. and Iranian
culminated in the JCPOA as problematic reinstated JCPOA. The imperative for engagement on Yemen, for example,
in form and substance. The perception, such a new deal increases as some of the which is a secondary theater for Tehran
The head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi (L), meeting with the visiting Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi (R), in Tehran. In response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran
has accelerated its nuclear activities. The most recent IAEA report finds that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is 14 times above
the JCPOA limit and it is not enriching uranium to 20 percent instead of the 3.67 percent permitted under the deal.
(Photo: POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 96. Joe Biden, “There’s a Smarter Way to Be
Tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2021,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/13/opinions/
smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joe-biden/
The Biden administration’s index.html.
approach to these concerns 7. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “United
States and Switzerland Finalize the Swiss
is to view the JCPOA as a Humanitarian Trade Arrangement,” February
27, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/
necessary but insufficient press-releases/sm919.
diplomatic initiative. 8. UK Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Office, “Iran’s Production
of Uranium Metal in Violation of the
JCPOA: E3 Statement,” February 12, 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
e3-statement-on-the-jcpoa-12-february-2021.
but a primary worry for Riyadh, could especially against the backdrop of a fluid
bolster international efforts to reach a political situation in Tehran, a skeptical 9. “Restoring the JCPOA’s Nuclear Limits,”
Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, February
ceasefire and establish a modicum of political environment in Washington,
2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/
cooperation. and simmering tensions in the region.
default/files/files/Reports/ACA_JCPOA-
The Iranians could press their Houthi A sense that the alternative is worse for
DealViolations_FactSheet2021.pdf.
allies against continued drone and missile both sides—a growing nonproliferation
strikes into Saudi territory in exchange headache for the West, worsening penury 10. “Dr. Rouhani After the Cabinet’s Last
Meeting of the Year,” President of the Islamic
for a halt in Saudi airstrikes against for Iran—could be the incentive that
Republic of Iran, March 17, 2021, http://
populated areas in Yemen and support breaks the deadlock.
president.ir/en/120219.
UN-led, U.S.-backed efforts toward a
negotiated settlement. In turn, such a 11. “Secretary of State Antony Blinken on
move could run parallel to efforts toward the Biden Administration’s Foreign Policy
ENDNOTES Priorities,” PBS, March 3, 2021, https://www.
a wider, inclusive dialogue between Iran
1. “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” pbs.org/newshour/show/secretary-of-state-
and Gulf Arab states, supported by the
The Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018, antony-blinken-on-the-biden-administrations-
UN and Western powers, tackling issues
https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/ foreign-policy-priorities.
of common interest, such as maritime
after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy. 12. “What It Will Take to Break the U.S.-Iran
security and public health, and perhaps
2. The World Bank, “Iran Economic Monitor: Impasse: A Q&A With Iranian Foreign Minister
broader security issues in due course.
Weathering the Triple-Shock,” Fall 2020, Javad Zarif,” Politico, March 17, 2021, https://
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/03/17/
Conclusion
en/287811608721990695/pdf/Iran-Economic- iran-nuclear-deal-javad-zarif-qa-476588.
Washington and Tehran have each said
Monitor-Weathering-the-Triple-Shock.pdf. 13. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury
they are committed to restoring the
3. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Sanctions Iran’s Central Bank and National
JCPOA, but the Biden administration’s
Board of Directors, “Verification and Monitoring Development Fund,” September 20, 2019,
early days illustrate the challenge of
in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
moving from agreement in principle to
United Nations Security Council Resolution sm780.
practice. With neither side willing to
2231 (2015): Report by the Director-General,” 14. “Former Special Representative for Iran and
take the first step, each maintains what
GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021. Venezuela Elliott Abrams: Media Roundtable
it sees as leverage and the other views as
4. “Joint Statement by the Vice-President With Israeli Journalists,” U.S. Embassy in Israel,
lack of seriousness in a negotiation: Iran
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of November 9, 2020, https://il.usembassy.gov/
continuing to deepen its JCPOA breaches
the AEOI and the Director General of the special-representative-for-iran-and-venezuela-
and flexing its muscles in the Middle East
IAEA,” IAEA, February 21, 2021, https:// elliott-abrams/.
and the United States maintaining the
www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/ 15. For example, see Kenneth Katzman,
attritional sanctions regime it inherited
joint-statement-by-the-vice-president-of-the- “Analyzing Terrorism Sanctions on Iran and
from Trump. islamic-republic-of-iran-and-head-of-the-aeoi- the Path Forward,” Atlantic Council, February
Even if the stalemate can be broken and-the-director-general-of-the-iaea. 11, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
on an initial exchange of positive
5. For example, see UK Mission to the UN in blogs/iransource/analyzing-terrorism-sanctions-
gestures, pitfalls abound on the steps on-iran-and-the-path-forward/; Matthew
Vienna, “E3 Statement to the IAEA Board of
toward mutual compliance, let alone Zweig, Alireza Nader, and Richard Goldberg,
Governors on Verification and Monitoring
the prospects of a follow-on accord. in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” March 4, “Biden Administration Should Not Provide
Sequencing and verifying Iran’s nuclear 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ Sanctions Relief for Terrorism,” Foundation for
reversals and identifying the suitable e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors- Defense of Democracies, February 22, 2021,
parameters of commensurate sanctions on-verification-and-monitoring-in-the-islamic- https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/02/22/
relief are themselves no small task, republic-of-iran-march-2021. biden-should-not-provide-sanctions-relief/.
10 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021Have a Good Idea?
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ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 11By David A. Koplow
Apes on a Treadmill in Space
I
n 1975, Paul Warnke published a celebrated in December 2020 inched beyond its
previous tepid resolutions by expressing
article entitled “Apes on a Treadmill,” in the desire that member states “reach a
common understanding of how best to
which he criticized the wastefulness and act to reduce threats to space systems
in order to maintain outer space as a
the danger of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear arms peaceful, safe, stable and sustainable
environment.”3 Even the U.S. Space
race.1 Warnke likened the two superpowers to Command has recognized the need for
advancing arms control in space, with
simian imitators who slavishly copy each other’s Major General DeAnna Burt calling for
the articulation of additional, legally
weapons deployments, endlessly pursuing binding international restraints on
threatening space behaviors.
and endlessly denying to the adversary any These calls for action to reduce threats
to space systems require prompt follow-
meaningful strategic superiority. through. The growing competition
involving the United States, Russia, and
Shortly thereafter, Warnke became joined the original two apes in another China demands a more nuanced and
President Jimmy Carter’s chief negotiator hazardous, expensive arms race, all going comprehensive approach from leaders
for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks nowhere, this time at rocket speed. in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
(SALT) II treaty, director of the U.S. Arms Jolted by the surging security that takes into account Warnke’s original
Control and Disarmament Agency (and dangers in space, the United States, its insights, which are now more than 45
this author’s first professional boss). rivals, and its allies are devoting more years old. The security environment in
Warnke advanced the effort to cap and attention at last to the sustainability space today has become dangerously
then reduce global nuclear arsenals, which of their vital spacecraft, on which unstable, as all three leading states
he regarded as absurdly overdeveloped and so much of the world’s economy, develop and test new iterations of space
as so mutually offsetting that they could military, and civil society have come to weaponry in their mirror-image pursuit of
offer neither protagonist a significant, depend. U.S. Secretary of State Antony space control policies.
sustainable advantage. Blinken, speaking at the Conference The United States in particular needs
Today, the vision that Warnke abhorred on Disarmament in February, has to promote more fully diplomatic options
is spooling out again, in a different but called for “developing standards and that put in place effective space arms
equally futile venue: outer space, where norms of responsible behavior in outer control agreements and to provide a way
a third central character, China, has space.”2 The UN General Assembly out of the mutually reinforcing patterns
David A. Koplow is a professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center. This article is based on his essay, “Deterrence as the
MacGuffin: The Case for Arms Control in Outer Space” (2020), in the Journal of National Security Law & Policy.
12 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021The Sodium Guidestar laser at the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico is used for real-
time, high-fidelity tracking and imaging of satellites too faint for conventional adaptive optical imaging systems. (Photo: U.S. Air Force)
of military competition. Negotiated the programs of the other, so a rough with Republican and Democratic
measures of legal restraint for space could parity was sustained, simply at higher presidents bringing home a series of
be especially effective in dealing with levels overall of armaments and bilateral treaties on strategic arms
the contemporary challenges to satellites spending. Neither could gain a decisive limitation, intermediate-range nuclear
because deterrence-based concepts advantage over its equally vigilant force elimination, and strategic arms
alone are less efficacious in the space and dedicated opponent. That is the reduction, as well as multilateral nuclear
environment. titular “treadmill” aspect; there was no test ban and nonproliferation agreements.
meaningful superiority to be gained in the There were vicissitudes in the process,
Warnke’s Critique competition, and no end point at which a of course, but the U.S.-Soviet dialogue
Warnke in 1975 observed that the United winner would emerge. continued even during the darkest and
States and Soviet Union were rushing In addition, Warnke and others most crisis-marred days of the Cold War
headlong into research, development, complained that the process was not era. As a result, nuclear explosive testing
testing, and deployment of new merely frightfully expensive, with has been halted, the number of nuclear-
generations of nuclear weapons, inspired billions of dollars at the time being armed states has been limited to nine,
in large measure by their reciprocal fears. flushed toward nuclear programs, but and the operational nuclear arsenals
Each protagonist viewed with great alarm the endless escalation resulted in sharply of the two chief contestants have been
the military programs of the other, and increased danger for all. As weapons reduced by 80 to 90 percent from Cold
each ascribed the worst motivations inventories multiplied, the dangers of War highs to some 4,000 U.S. and 4,000
to its rival’s exercises. Triggered by the accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken use Russian nuclear warheads today.
other, each raced toward accumulation would rise accordingly. The world was Nuclear dangers persist in part
of greater nuclear firepower, independent unaccountably lucky during the Cold because of the failures of the two major
of any sound strategic rationale. That is War, as brinkmanship never devolved into nuclear actors to continue to engage
the “apes” aspect of the title of his piece; catastrophe. In the long run, however, and to improve on earlier successes, the
whatever one actor perceived the other luck is not a reliable national security deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations,
one doing, it would mindlessly copy or strategy or a guideline for a budget. and decisions by leaders in Moscow and
adapt for itself. The world learned something under Washington to engage in a new, costly
Warnke recognized the futility of Warnke’s tutelage. Nuclear arms control apes-on-a-treadmill cycle of nuclear
the process. Each side could offset became a staple of superpower relations, competition. President Donald Trump
ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021 13exacerbated the situation by withdrawing
from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces and Open Skies treaties, stalling on
Just as U.S. authorities
a deal to extend the 2010 New Strategic regularly refer to space as
Arms Reduction Treaty, and declaring that
U.S. missile defenses are intended in part the “ultimate high ground”
to counter Russian and Chinese offensive for future warfare, Chinese
ballistic missiles—a series of shocks that
some observers have labeled “the end of air force leaders have come
arms control.”
Yet, arms control has rebounded from
to assert that “militarization
egregious tough times before and can do of space is a ‘historic
so again. Indeed, perhaps it is during the
most tension-strewn phases that cooler
inevitability.’”
heads recognize the profound benefits
in treaty-making, confidence-building, global situational awareness and the moratorium on destructive ASAT weapons
mutual accommodation and calm exquisite accuracy of smart munitions. tests. Since that wake-up call, China has
communications. The recent rejection of It is no exaggeration to conclude that persisted in pursuing its space control
legacy treaties may prove to be simply a modern U.S. modes of intelligence capabilities, often testing devices under
hiccup in the long-term articulation of gathering and warfare would simply the guise of missile defense interceptors,
sensible nuclear restraints. not be possible without satellites; a rather than ASAT systems. Russia has
The enduring arms control relationship return to analog-era warfare capabilities experimented with covert “rendezvous
between the United States and Russia, would be crippling. and proximity operations” to refine
now triangulated with China, is Unfortunately, that phenomenally its maneuvering capability, which
maddeningly complicated. The three successful exploitation of space has could be a precursor for inspecting
protagonists will shift among the become a reliance, which has bred a and attacking other states’ spacecraft.
roles of adversaries, competitors, and dependency, and degenerated into a For its part, the United States has
collaborators in the realm of nuclear vulnerability, and other states have not pursued the development of a Counter
weapons as in everything else. Yet, failed to notice. Russia and China have Communications System for jamming
Warnke pointed toward the illogic of an persistently bolstered their programs satellite links and the maturation of the
exclusive focus on the esoteric military- toward increased anti-satellite (ASAT) mysterious X-37B spacecraft, which is
related aspects of such relationships, capacities, experimenting with a variety of a small, unmanned knockoff of a space
cautioning against “[o]verestimation technologies at a variety of altitudes that shuttle, as a long-endurance, reusable
of the practical utility and the political can hold U.S. satellites hostage. Russia platform capable of a variety of offensive
potency of our armed forces.” Smart and China may believe they are simply military applications.
diplomacy, he argued, offers a more trying to catch up with the prior and In all three of the leading spacefaring
viable alternative or complementary path ongoing U.S. programs and capabilities countries, bellicose rhetoric has
toward security. in space control, but it is clear that the escalated alongside rising military
earlier concept of space as something of space expenditures. Leadership
Deteriorating Security in Space a sanctuary from ordinary earthbound statements now emphasize the pursuit
Today’s competition has extended military rivalry is permanently imperiled. of space dominance or control, and
endlessly upward. The stakes in orbital Other countries have increasingly they categorically refer to space as just
space are enormous and growing, as space invested in satellite services too. Eleven another domain for military operations,
is a $400 billion segment of the annual countries or consortia have demonstrated stressing that even as land, sea, and
global economy. The United States now an indigenous capability for launching air have known arms races and armed
exploits satellite services for the full array objects into space, 60 or more own or conflict, space too inevitably will be
of civilian and military applications. On operate their own spacecraft, and all fully weaponized. Just as U.S. authorities
the civilian side, many communications benefit daily from satellite services. Even regularly refer to space as the “ultimate
(television, telephone, internet), with this emergent “democratization of high ground” for future warfare, Chinese
commercial activities (ATMs, credit card space,” the United States remains the air force leaders have come to assert that
purchases), transportation functions (GPS predominant player, operating more “militarization of space is a ‘historic
guidance), and remote sensing (weather satellites for more functions than any inevitability.’” The bureaucratic structures
forecasting) are satellite enabled, and the other actor and commanding by far the in each country reflect this newfound
Internet of Things will only increase the largest national space budget. belligerence: Trump’s establishment of
traffic. On the military side, satellites have The new era in space weaponization the new Space Force was sold partly as a
promoted expedited communications can be traced roughly to 2007, when necessary response to similar institutional
between headquarters and fielded forces, China abruptly shot down one of its reorganizations already implemented in
as well as greatly augmenting local and own satellites, rupturing an informal Russia and China.
14 ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2021In sum, the portrait of space security in space, but it too has run aground due conspicuous silence about mechanisms for
today bears an eerie resemblance to to its impoverished content and resistance verification of compliance.
Warnke’s description of the nuclear from the United States. The Moscow- The Conference on Disarmament, a
realm 45 years ago. There is a new cycle Beijing drafts have addressed solely UN-affiliated entity previously successful
of zealous competition among the the phenomenon of space-based ASAT at developing new international
United States, Russia, and China, with systems, which would exclude the ground- instruments for arms control, has been
each claiming to offset the provocative based systems of greatest current interest, deadlocked for two decades, especially
initiatives of the others, resulting in a and sequential U.S. administrations regarding concepts for preventing a new
nervous, diminishing security for all. have also emphasized the proposal’s arms race in space. Despite Blinken’s
Pursuit of absolute control or dominance
in space is as futile as in nuclear realm,
and it is likewise staggeringly expensive.
The Absence of Arms
Control in Space
The early years of the space age were
remarkably productive for international
law. Within only a decade after the
launch of Sputnik, leading states had
concluded the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,
the foundational instrument providing
for the peaceful, lawful exploration
and use of space, an instrument of
constitutional significance, joined by
almost all the leading space actors. The
treaty contains prescient prohibitions
against placing nuclear weapons into
orbit and institutes restrictions on the
testing of weapons or the creation of
military installations on the moon or
other celestial bodies. Three other treaties
with wide adherence followed within
another decade, quickly constructing
much of the legal infrastructure for
sustainable space operations.
Yet, the process ground virtually to a
halt thereafter, and no major space-related
treaties have been concluded since 1979.
The Carter administration engaged the
Soviet Union in three sputtering rounds
of ASAT negotiations in 1977–1979, and
a decade later, the Reagan administration
injected space security into the agenda
for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
negotiations. None of those proceedings
amounted to anything lasting.
Indeed, the two most recent,
somewhat feeble efforts at articulating
additional rules for space have collapsed.
The European Union hawked several
sequential iterations of a proposed code
of conduct, a non-legally-binding set of
modest rules for safe space operations,
A U.S. Air Force F-15A a mile high over the Pacific Ocean launches a multi-stage ASM-
but it withered due to failures in its 135 missile as part of an anti-satellite intercept test on September 13, 1985. In 1958,
substantive content and its negotiating the United States first began experimenting with ASAT weapons, beginning with
process. Russia and China have likewise air-launched ballistic missiles and later, ground-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet
Union pursued similar experiments, as well as co-orbital ASAT systems. In the late-
propounded their draft treaty on the 1970s, the United States began to develop non-nuclear, kinetic ASAT capabilities, such
prevention of the placement of weapons as the air-launched ASM-135. (Photo: U.S. Air Force)
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