The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
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The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
Edited by:
Damir Marusic Kinga Brudzinska, PhD
Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Policy Director, Centre for
the Atlantic Council Global Europe, GLOBSEC
June 2021
***
Centre for Global Europe at the GLOBSEC Policy Institute provides constructive ideas and promotes innovative policy
recommendation to ensure that the European Union remains an attractive, successful and viable project that is setting
global norms and defining international system.
The Europe Center at the Atlantic Council conducts research to guide the actions and strategy of key transatlantic
decision makers on the issues that will shape the future of the transatlantic relationship.
***
The GLOBSEC Policy Institute is a policy-oriented think-tank analyzing policy and the international environment. The
Institute wants to make an impact so that the values of the GLOBSEC organization – liberal and democratic order in
the transatlantic world – are deeply embedded in the agenda of governments.
The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in inter-
national affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting today’s global challenges.
Disclaimers
All of the views expressed in this piece are of the authors and thus do not necessary represent the official position of
GLOBSEC, the Atlantic Council or the institutions that the co-authors represent. The authors are solely responsible for
its analysis and recommendations.
© GLOBSEC
GLOBSEC Policy Institute
Vajnorská 100/B
831 04 Bratislava
Slovakia
www.globsec.orgThe EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 3
About the Authors
Piotr Arak Aleš Chmelař Jan Havránek
is the Director at the currently serves as Deputy currently acts as the Deputy
Polish Economic Institute. Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister of Defense of
He previously worked at at the Ministry of Foreign the Czech Republic. He
Deloitte, the Polityka Insight Affairs of the Czech previously worked as the
think-tank, the United Republic. He was previously policy adviser at the Policy
Nations Development the State Secretary for Planning Unit of the Office of
Programme, the Ministry European Affairs and the NATO Secretary General
of Administration and the EU Sherpa to Prime in Brussels. He was also the
Digitisation, and the Minister Bohuslav Sobotka head of the defense section
Chancellery of the Prime and Prime Minister Andrej at the Czech Republic’s
Minister. He completed his Babiš. He worked as the Permanent Representation
degree in social policy from chief EU analyst at the to NATO in Brussels
the University of Warsaw, Czech Government Office (2014-2017), Assistant
and continued his studies and as a researcher at the First Deputy Minister of
in business, completing Centre for European Policy Defense (2013-2014), and
an MBA at the Warsaw Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. foreign policy advisor to
School of Economics and He completed his degree in the Minister of Defense
the Université du Québec Political Economy of Europe (2010-2012). He completed
à Montréal. He is writing a from Science Po Paris his M.A. in International
PhD on public policy at the and the London School of Security Studies at the
University of Warsaw. Economics in 2011. Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University.
Kinga Brudzinska Benjamin Haddad Alena Kudzko
is a Policy Director at the is currently the Director of is Director of the GLOBSEC
Centre for Global Europe the Europe Center at the Policy Institute think
at the GLOBSEC Policy Atlantic Council. Prior to this tank in Bratislava where
Institute. Prior to this she he was a fellow at Hudson she oversees policy
worked at the Polish Institute Institute in Washington, development, research, and
of International Affairs DC. He has been published programming in the areas
(PISM) and the Permanent in several notable news of defence and security, the
Representation of Poland media outlets, is a frequent future of Europe, technology
to the OECD. Her main guest on television news and society, and economy.
research interests lie in programs, and authored the Before joining GLOBSEC,
the fields of EU Common book Paradise Lost: Europe she worked at various NGOs
Foreign and Security in the World of Trump. and academic institutions
Policy and EU institutional He completed his M.A. in in Belarus, Estonia, and
architecture. Kinga holds International Affairs and Hungary, specializing in the
a PhD from the University HEC in financial economics area of foreign relations,
of Warsaw and Diploma in at Sciences Po Paris where democratization, and
Latin American Studies from he has since returned to community development.
TEC Monterrey in Mexico. lecture on the topic. She completed her M.A. in
International Relations and
European Studies at Central
European University.4 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
Damir Marusic Žiga Turk Jakub Wisniewski
is a Resident Senior Fellow is a Professor in currently serves as a Vice-
at the Atlantic Council’s Construction Informatics President of GLOBSEC. He is
Europe Center where he at the Faculty of Civil and a former Polish Ambassador
specifically works on the Geodetic Engineering at to the OECD (2014-2016) and
Council’s #BalkansForward the University of Ljubljana, director of the Department
Initiative. He is also co- Slovenia. He previously of Foreign Policy Strategy at
founder of Wisdom of acted as Minister for Growth the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Crowds, an online debate in the Government of Affairs (2010-2014). He has
platform and podcast Slovenia (2007 and 2008), written several publications
based in Washington DC. Minister for Education, and articles on the EU and
Previously, he was Executive Science, Culture and authored a book. He acted
Editor of The American Sports in the Government as a speechwriter for former
Interest, a foreign and of Slovenia (February 2012 Minister of Foreign Affairs
domestic policy magazine to March 2013) and as Radek Sikorski. He holds
that sought “to explain Secretary General of the a PhD in Arts of Political
America to the world, and Felipe Gonzalez’s Reflection Science, Faculty of Political
the world to America.” He Group on the Future of Science and Journalism from
has written extensively Europe. He completed his the University of Warsaw.
about U.S. politics, foreign PhD in Technical Sciences at
policy, and European affairs. the University of Ljubljana.
He completed his M.A. in
International Relations at
Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced
International Studies.
Elena Poptodorova Tomáš Valášek Michael Žantovský
is a founding member of the is currently a Member of is the former spokesman
Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, Parliament of the National for President Václav Havel
where she is currently the Council of the Slovak and Ambassador of the
Vice-President, Director Republic. Previously he Czech Republic to the
for Euro-Atlantic Affairs was the Ambassador of the United States, Israel and
and Project Manager of Slovak Republic to NATO the United Kingdom. After
the Three Seas National (2013-2017) and worked serving as a diplomat, he
Program. She previously at the Slovak Ministry of authored Havel: A Life,
served as the Ambassador Defense (2006-2007). He a biography of Václav
of the Republic of Bulgaria also has vast experience Havel that was immensely
to the United States working in think tanks, popular in both Czech and
(2002-2008/2010-2016). previously acting as the English. He completed his
Elena worked at Bulgaria’s Director of Carnegie Europe, M.A. in psychology in 1973
Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Central European at Charles University. He
(1975 -1990) and was Policy Institute (CEPI) in currently serves as the
subsequently elected to Bratislava and at the Centre Executive Director of the
the national legislature. for European Reform in Václav Havel Library and
She completed her M.A. at London. He completed his a member of the Global
Sofia University “St. Kliment M.A. in International Affairs Commission on the Post-
Ohridski” in English and at George Washington Pandemic Future.
Italian linguistic and literary University.
studies.The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 5 Contents About the Authors.................................................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary................................................................................................................................................ 6 Thinking Clearly on Strategic Autonomy............................................................................................................ 9 Elena Poptodorova, Amb. Ret, Vice President of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria Europe in a Stronger West...................................................................................................................................13 Michael Žantovský, Amb. Ret, Executive Director, Václav Havel Library The EU in the Face of the New Cold War between China and America........................................................17 Jakub Wiśneiwski, PhD, Amb. Ret, Vice-President for Strategy, GLOBSEC In Select Areas the Case for Strategic Autonomy is Strong for CEE.............................................................22 Tomáš Valášek, Member of Parliament, National Council of the Slovak Republic Czech Perspective on European Strategic Autonomy: Towards NATO-EU Cooperation...........................25 Jan Havránek, Deputy Minister for Defence Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic How are New Technologies Changing the Way We Think About Europe’s Place in the World? ..............29 Žiga Turk, PhD, the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia The Vision and Realities of Europe’s Drive for Technological and Digital Sovereignty.............................32 Alena Kudzko, Research Director, GLOBSEC The Covid-19 Wake-Up Call and the Great European Naïveté: Navigating EU’s Economic Interests Between Openness and Protectionism Into the 21st Century ......................................................39 Aleš Chmelař, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Caught Between Free Trade and Protectionism: The CEE Perspective on Economic Strategic Autonomy .....................................................................................................................42 Piotr Arak, Director, Polish Economic Institute Concluding Remarks............................................................................................................................................45 Endnotes................................................................................................................................................................46
6 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
Executive Summary
The past two years have been voices are making their well-worn mains, a security-related objective.
marked by crisis. The global pan- arguments. Less prominent, until Strategic autonomy, however, has
demic has been transformational. now, has been the perspective of increasingly gained an economic
Its challenge comes on the heels Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)3 underpinning, a foundation that has,
of broader geopolitical changes states. paradoxically, been deepened by
already afoot. Against this back- pandemic-related challenges. And
drop, the European Union (EU) is This report explores ongoing while calling for European econom-
now rethinking how best to bolster debates about strategic autonomy ic autonomy must not be taken to
its position on the global stage. transpiring in CEE across a number autarkic extremes, adoption of a
Even though the EU remains one of fields, including defense, trade, strategic approach could potentially
of the world’s three largest econo- and digital. It looks to ground EU increase Europe’s economic power,
mies and a center for global trade, foreign policy in a “stronger West,” both by developing new produc-
research, and development, its as a response to intensifying con- tion and know-how capacities
international clout has waned. frontation between China and the and, perhaps more importantly, by
United States. The report, which enhancing its role in the globalized
Even before COVID hit, Europeans is a joint endeavor of the Atlantic economy so that it can render its
had already started discussing Council and GLOBSEC, brings trade and investment ties more
“strategic autonomy,” a vision for Eu- together contributions from nine predictable and enforceable.
rope in the world that is to enable distinguished practitioners, experts,
the continent to decide its own and policymakers from the region. Third, CEE is taking a cautious
future without overly depending approach towards defining the
on others. French President Em- Here are a few of the top-line take- degree of strategic autonomy it
manuel Macron, in his much-cited aways from this exercise. envisions to be ideal and feasible
Sorbonne speech, invited a broader without entirely opposing the
First, Central and Eastern Europe
discussion on what all this could concept. In short, CEE will not resist
is neither ignorant nor indifferent
mean. The freedom to act should strategic autonomy at all costs.
to geopolitics. The challenges
not merely be thought of in reactive These countries are cognizant of
faced by CEE largely map onto
and defensive terms. It could give the fact that Europe remains de-
those faced by the broader EU,
the bloc the ability to engage and pendent on outside powers in ways
but in a microcosm. Or, looked
cooperate with its preferred actors. that are undesirable. But the devil
at another way, many of the risks
lies in the details. It is generally
Academic research has shown facing the entire EU are even more
agreed that decoupling should be
that EU member states agree pronounced in the CEE context.
measured, and above all eschew
in principle to the notion of an CEE countries are both allies of the
isolationism. Strategic autonomy,
interest-driven Union capable of United States and members of the
moreover, should not become syn-
defending its economic and political European Union, two geopolitical
onymous with applying double stan-
interest abroad11. But years later, poles that constitute the region’s
dards within the common market,
the concept of strategic autonomy major points of reference. While
nor should it be used as a tool to
remains vaguely defined and lacks it is understood that strategic
justify protectionism. For example, a
necessary public buy-in. Instead of autonomy’s success will depend on
Franco-German consensus on fos-
defining its content and discussing Europe securing a wide and diverse
tering an environment conducive to
constructive ideas and solutions, range of partnerships, its pursuit
the creation of “European Cham-
many European leaders have either must at the same time not weaken
pions” big enough to be globally
focused on semantics and termi- the transatlantic bond. Any discus-
competitive has stirred suspicions
nology (‘European sovereignty’ vs. sions that call into question the
about protectionism and distrust
‘collective sovereignty’ vs. ‘strategic role of NATO and the United States
among Central Europeans.
responsibility’ vs. ‘open strategic in the region make CEE countries
autonomy’),2 or have sought to apprehensive. Strategic autonomy is not an im-
silence the discussion tout court. possible lift, but before things get
Second, CEE recognizes that
off the ground, some fundamental
With President Joe Biden in the the concept of strategic auton-
questions need to be answered.
White House, the debate is heating omy is evolving. It was originally
What is clear, at least for now, is
up again. But once again, the same conceived of, and primarily re-
that complete autonomy will makeThe EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 7
Central Europeans nervous; if “full” formal and informal institutions than
become the goal, debate in Brus- their Western counterparts. There
sels will be tense and progress slow. is a certain void to be filled in terms
of fostering shared constructive
Finally, CEE doesn’t buy into cen- regional views and communicating
tral planning. Central and Eastern them effectively.
European countries recognize
that innovation cannot be central-
ly planned or spurred merely be
regulation. The region has learned European Strategic
from the past that slogans, five-year
plans, and development directed
autonomy of
from above are no way to catch up some sort seems
or lead the way. Europe needs to unavoidable in
restore its old recipes of success.
This includes an openness to ideas the emerging world of
from abroad and a willingness to the 21st
experiment with different concepts
century. The challenge is
in different regions and learn from
what works. to shape
it into something that
The concept of strategic autono-
my has traditionally conveyed the has maximum
impression that the bloc is curtailing positive impact on the
its ambitions by focusing solely on
security and, consequently, under- region going
scores a failure on the part of the forward.
EU to implement its global vision as
a contemporary, postmodern, and
transformative power. This need
not be the case. It is understood in European Strategic autonomy of
the region that, properly articulated, some sort seems unavoidable in
strategic autonomy holds tremen- the emerging world of the 21st
dous promise. But to be realized, century. The challenge is to shape
the EU must first clarify the types of it into something that has maximum
standards and capabilities it needs positive impact on the region going
and its readiness to use them. forward. This report, we hope, is a
good first step in that direction.
As for Central and Eastern Europe-
an countries, they will need to do a
better job at articulating their own
positions, including on strategic
autonomy, and converting them into
policy. CEE is a vast and diverse
region, and it is understandable that
avoiding cacophony is a challeng-
ing task. Additionally, CEE diplomats
and negotiators are less networked
and less embedded in European
* For this exercise, we identify “Central and Eastern European” countries as EU member states that acceded to the Union in 2004 or later and are
former members of the Eastern Bloc: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. The Visegrad Four (V4) states are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.8 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives Introduction
The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 9
Thinking Clearly
on Strategic Autonomy
Elena Poptodorova, Amb. Ret, Vice President of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
Almost 65 years after the Treaty crisis of 2008, the 2015 migrant
of Rome, the European Union (EU) crisis, and having just gone through
managed to create a remarkable an extremely difficult divorce with
political environment where almost the UK, the EU is now further being
two thirds of its citizens are now challenged by the devastating
used to viewing Europe as a region effects and implications of the
“European strategic
of peace and stability in an increas- COVID-19 pandemic. In parallel, autonomy concept,
ingly restless and dangerous world. President Trump’s election in 2016
For the populations of Central and put the transatlantic bond to an first introduced in
Eastern Europe (CEE), EU member- existential test, which raised in an
ship was a dream come true. The unprecedented way the perennial
the 2016 Global
accession of former communist issue of self-sustainable European Strategy of the
countries to a political order de- defense and security. More (un)
fined by freedom, democracy, and predictable crises are likely to arise EU, is a nice
solidarity brought about incalcula- in the future, impacting other critical
ble positives, granting new mem- areas. More lurches towards disin-
catchphrase,
bers equal status with the most tegration are not to be excluded. not unlike ‘America
advanced and developed countries The above events provoked a
(and economies) in the world. soul-searching reaction within the First’ or ‘Made in
The pursuit of a Europe whole and EU. The Union was already looking China 2025.’”
free has been a continuous work for a bigger role for itself on the
in progress. Many years of growth, international stage, aspiring to
prosperity, and calm have, however, become a more geopolitical, global
been interrupted rather abruptly. player. These ambitions surfaced
Having survived the global financial European strategic autonomy
What is your opinion on a Common Foreign Policy of the Member States
of the EU? (% -EU)
80
73
70 69
70 68 67 68 68 66 66
66 65 65
64 64
62
60
50
40
30
25 26 25 26
22 20 23
20 21 20 21 20
20 17 17 16
10
15 16 16 18 15 13 11 11 12 10 10 11
9 9
0 7
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
For Against Don't Know/Refusal
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 94, May 20214610 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
How much trust do you have in the EU? (in %)
70
63
60
49
50
46
42
40
2013 2015 2018 2020
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 94, May 202147
concept, first introduced in the 2016 from the region are no longer “new used as part of a strategy to firmly
Global Strategy of the EU. It is a Europe”. They have “graduated” establish itself as a driver of Eu-
nice catchphrase, not unlike “Amer- and have no excuse for lesser com- ropean security affairs. For similar
ica First” or “Made in China 2025.” pliance, engagement, or contribu- reasons, the Black Sea needs to be
But what does it mean in practice? tion. The worrisome tendency has acknowledged as a top priority in
The concept is too general and been that CEE/SEE countries — as the common defense and security
needs further clarification and a whole but to a differing extent policy of the EU.
precision. individually — tend to lag behind
and slow down the overall fast- The challenge for Europe is that it
Getting it right demands the strong er advancement of the Union in is only too obvious that its east-
engagement of both governments practically all critical areas: indus- ern external border can only be
and citizens. EU citizens, however, trial policies, energy policies, new properly secured by NATO in even
are growing increasingly alienated technologies, digital, and research the medium term. The EU is simply
from, and frustrated with, EU institu- and development. Investments in not up to becoming autonomous in
tions. Perhaps worse still, collective the region have been well below providing security at this moment.
foreign policy is showing itself to be average, and in some cases non-ex- The Libya operation of 2011 remains
weaker than the individual foreign istent. As a result, the gap between a painful reminder of some basic
policy preferences of member Western and Eastern Europe has realities. It is no accident that Ger-
states. Bulgaria is but the most been growing wider. many has vocally and continuously
recent example, with its stubborn insisted on the inviolability of the
position on blocking the start of the The situation in the region has been transatlantic bond. Anything else
accession process for the Republic further aggravated by an increas- would mean that Germany and
of North Macedonia. ingly aggressive Russia and an France would have to shoulder the
advancing China. Both competitors common security burden, given
This is a daunting context within of the EU have sought to exploit the frailty of other member states.
which “strategic autonomy” is the region, in part because of the Europe has no adequate military
expected to get traction. It is not an vulnerabilities and weaknesses of capabilities, intelligence, command
impossible lift, but before things get the individual countries, but also and control systems, high-precision
off the ground, some fundamental because of insufficiently forceful weapons, or communications and
questions need to be answered. engagement by Brussels. While logistical capabilities to secure its
Autonomy: vis-à-vis whom? Autono- the China challenge could be own perimeter, and will not likely
my: complete or in specific sectors handled with the right regulations be up to the task in the foreseeable
only? Which ones? Autonomy: and enforcement, the Russia threat future either. Permanent Structured
when? demands urgent action practically Cooperation (PESCO) is important
on all fronts. in its own niche and in a com-
The answers to these questions
plementary role, but it cannot be
differ from country to country, and The Western Balkans are a region viewed as an alternative.
from region to region, sometimes where Russia sees itself success-
dramatically so. Both CEE, and fully fighting the West. Moscow That does not mean that the status
Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) has employed practically every quo is sustainable either, though.
have important lessons to teach, possible tool and weapon — the Indeed, the conversation on EU’s
given their geopolitical, securi- control of gas supplies, trade bans, strategic autonomy is complex and
ty, economic, and technological disinformation campaigns, cyber-at- is only just beginning. There are
realities. Today, with over fifteen tacks, paramilitary groups covertly several basic arguments we need
years as EU members, the countries deployed for subversion — all to keep in mind:The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 11
● We live in an era of interdepen- of “hybrid” autonomy would be a The media environment in the
dence and we cannot reverse realistic outcome. region is deplorable. Independent
or change that. Strategic journalism is struggling harder and
Autonomy, therefore, should One might envision the task of harder with disinformation fueled
not be an illusionary search crafting a workable strategic by pro-Kremlin and oligarchic
for European independence autonomy concept as something outlets. Populism and anti-European
but rather an effort at strategic akin to creating an Excel table. The and anti-Western forces have not
and sensible management of columns on the table would have gone away. An independent critical
interdependence. headings such as “Autonomy in perspective of the EU and NATO is
what?” (national policies, EU’s sec- needed and should be supported.
● While the negative effects of toral policies, and/or other policy
globalization were not effec- areas); “Autonomy from whom?” (a As a practical goal, it needs to be
tively addressed by national country, a region, an industry, a mul- pursued collectively in a finely
governments, the EU has also tinational); “Internal EU compensa-
failed to present itself as a tion?” (Yes/No); “Time-span”. Filling
solution to the objections to out such a matrix, buttressed by
globalization. There is an uphill opinion polling and other methods
battle to be waged with public for public input, would be helpful “A stronger Europe in
opinion in member states. for delineating a new strategic the world is no longer
approach for Europe.
● Expectations management is just the dream of the
also critical, especially when We should not rush things, however. founding fathers of the
it comes to domestic divisions A shared strategic culture needs to
and populism in shaping the be patiently cultivated, especially EU. It has become a
national dynamics. Far too of- given the kinds of divergences in necessity — a condition
ten, the EU is either presented perspective among member states of the successful survival
as the source of the prob- that I have already alluded to above.
lems or is sold to the national of its populations in a
While this strategic reassessment is
audience through its generous highly competitive and
proceeding, several more tradition-
funding programs. While trust
in the EU as an institution is
al, existing avenues of effort need increasingly unsecure
to be pursued:
markedly up according to the world.”
latest Eurobarometer polling ● EU and NATO enlargement
data, the boost may not last needs to proceed. All the
if the recovery packages are countries from the Western
seen as insufficient. Balkans should be brought
into the Western institutions as crafted balance between national
● Strategic autonomy might
soon as possible. Any lack of instincts and the Union’s strengths
never happen if EU foreign,
willingness or commitment by and benefits. The achievement of
security, and defense policies
member states will only amplify this goal can only happen when
remain intergovernmental in
the sense of resignation and the economic, technological and
character.
abandonment already festering cultural gap between the western
The biggest problem for Strategic among the citizens of these and the eastern halves of Europe
Autonomy is a lack of common nations, stirring up already is eventually narrowed through a
assessment of risks and threats by plentiful reservoirs of anti-West- common and focused effort. Failure
member states. While the catch- ern sentiment. Neglecting this to achieve this outcome will doom
phrase is indeed “catchy” and will furthermore only embolden Europe to a regionalization that
a majority of European citizens the Kremlin and its proxies to may even burst into hostilities
may be superficially attracted to it, take even bolder destabilizing occasionally. Such an unfortunate
when probed in depth it provokes steps. development might put an end to
divergent reactions. Poles, Baltic the great project of United Europe.
● Democracy and the rule of law We, the citizens of Europe, must
countries, and Romanians are
must be further encouraged prevent such an eventuality from
the leeriest if the concept implies
and supported, both among happening at all costs.
decoupling from the United States
aspirant nations in the periph-
and NATO. That said, overlaps in
ery, and among member states.
threat perceptions could be used
This is the best way to build
to bring together subgroups of
resilience of the systems of
member states to address specific
governance in the region.
challenges of particular concern to
them. Call it “coalitions of the will-
ing” within the EU. This may happen
in areas beyond hard security, such
as in the re-shoring of critical supply
chains or in industrial policies. It
is not to be excluded that a kind12 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives A Stronger Europe in the World
The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 13
Europe in a Stronger
West
Michael Žantovský, Amb. Ret, Executive Director, Václav Havel Library
Setting oneself an ambitious goal
can be motivating. It often leads Share of Global Population
to a mobilization of energies and
resources. To set oneself an im-
26
possible goal, however, is self-de-
24
feating, because it can only lead
to frustration and finger-pointing. 22
The question is to which of these 20
two categories the goal of “build- 18
ing a stronger Europe in the world” 16
belongs. Judging by contemporary
14
trends and developments, a dose
12
of realism seems to be in order.
10
It is a sobering but inescapable 8
fact that by any objective measure, 6
Europe’s strength and power has
4
peaked in the recent past, and that
it is unrealistic that it can notably
18.5%
2
4.2%
5.7%
4.3%
19.%
25%
25%
22%
13%
11%
6%
strengthen itself in the immediate 0 6%
future. The European Union’s share 1900 1960 2015 2020
of the global population is currently
EU 27 USA China
at around 6 percent and is expect-
ed to decrease by a third by the
end of this century. Source: GLOBSEC compilation2
Share of Global GDP
“For Central and Eastern
European countries, “the
West” is not some kind 28
26
of geographic label.
24
Rather, it represents 22
an idea of solidarity 20
among a community 18
16
of liberal democracies 14
that share a set of 12
values and pool their 10
8
resources for collective
6
security. Any weakening 4
or fragmentation of 2
26%
28%
22%
24%
15%
15%
16%
18%
5%
this community, CEE 0
2004 2015 2020
countries understand,
will inevitably make EU27 USA China
Europe weaker.”
Source: GLOBSEC compilation314 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
Demographic Outlook for the European Union 2021
EU-27 and the global population Fertility rate (births per woman)
(%) (1960=100 %)
400 6
2020
350 5.5
5
300
4.5
250
(%)
4
200
3.5
150 3
100 2.5
2
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
1960=100
1.5
World
1
EU-27
0.5
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
World European Union Replacement fertility rate
EU-27 population (number of women and men by age group)
for 2001 and 2019 for 2020 and 2050
85+ 85+
80-84 80-84
75-79 75-79
70-74 70-74
65-69 65-69
60-64 60-64
55-59 55-59
50-54 50-54
45-49 45-49
40-44 40-44
35-39 35-39
30-34 30-34
25-29 25-29
20-24 20-24
15-19 15-19
10-14 10-14
5-9 5-9The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 15
that they are not insulated from only had the EU playing the role of declarations. It was left up to the
the effects of the Chinese global a junior partner, and would have individual countries of Central and
ascendancy. been impossible without the latent Eastern Europe, standing alongside
threat of U.S., and possible Israeli, the United States, to show solidarity
While CEE economic and political military intervention. and determination in the face of a
interests are increasingly inter- clear Russian aggression.
twined with the EU, the region looks In 2021, Europe is consumed with
for its security to a larger geopoliti- prevailing over the COVID-19 pan- In the latest eruption of the conflict
cal context. Although institutionally demic and setting forth ever-more between Israel and the Palestin-
this has often meant NATO, CEE ambitious goals for a carbon-free ians, the EU has also been unable
countries look beyond the North future. Its foreign policy ambitions to speak with a single voice. While
Atlantic alliance to what sometimes are conspicuously muted, and the President of the Commis-
seems to Western Europeans like worse, are being poorly coordi- sion unequivocally condemned
an outmoded concept: “the West”. nated. Its two recent diplomatic the “indiscriminate missile attacks
For CEE countries, “the West” is overtures to Moscow and Istanbul by Hamas on Israel”6, the High
not some kind of geographic label. have both ended up as embarrass- Representative called for a stop in
Rather, it represents an idea of soli- ments. These failures have shown “the grave escalation in Israel and
darity among a community of liberal that there is no single foreign policy the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
democracies that share a set of source of authority in the EU. The including the major upsurge in vio-
values and pool their resources for President of the Commission, the lence in and around Gaza” although
collective security. Any weakening President of the Council, and the he added that Hamas attacks are
or fragmentation of this community, High Representative for Foreign “unacceptable.”7 It’s hard to imagine
CEE countries understand, will inev- Affairs and Security Policy are all vy- that even a temporary solution to
itably make Europe weaker. Rather ing for the role as the single foreign the never-ending tragedy of the
than strive for a “Stronger Europe in policy source of authority. Henry Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be
the World” we should be striving for Kissinger once bemoaned the crafted with important input from
a “Europe in a Stronger West.”5 fact that there wasn’t a telephone Brussels.
number which he could dial in order
To get there, Europe needs a stra- to contact the EU. Today, he has So what should a coherent strategic
tegic concept. The last time it had more than he ever bargained for: If concept look like? If Europe is to
anything resembling such a thing we add the ever-louder attempts of regain some of its global influence,
was in the early 2000s, when the the European Parliament to play a it must both revisit some of its geo-
“soft superpower” idea, based on foreign policy role, the EU now has political assumptions and reframe
the writings of Joseph Nye, and de- four telephone numbers one can its ambitions and goals in a larger
veloped by Robert Cooper, former call. context.
Director-General for External and
Politico-Military Affairs at the Gener- The idea of “strategic autonomy” is
al Secretariat of the Council of the very much in vogue in many Euro-
European Union, was ascendant. “The recent pean capitals these days, but the
At the time, this concept may have truth is that in focusing on autono-
developments have mous action, it amounts to wishful
looked like a winner, especially in
contrast with the United States’ en- shown that there is no thinking. Europe is too enfeebled
tanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan. and disorganized to get there from
single foreign policy
But its weaknesses became appar- here. Václav Havel famously said
ent in the last decade when the US, source of authority that “Europe should finally abandon
under the Obama administration, in the EU (…). In fact, the feeling that it is duty-bound
adopted a version of the soft power to export itself into the remainder
instead of one, the EU of the world, and replace it with a
strategy for itself. It soon became all
too obvious that without hard pow- now has four telephone more modest, but more demanding
er underpinnings, the leverage of numbers one can call.” intention: to start the quest for a
soft power is insufficient to achieve reform of the world with itself.”8 To
foreign policy goals — or to prevent achieve this vision, a refashioning
opponents from achieving theirs. of European project itself needs to
take place.
Europe’s less-than-successful And yet none of them are particular-
attempts to contribute to the Middle ly effective. This is hardly surprising,
East peace process, its inability to considering that appointments to
mitigate the migration crisis, and these EU high offices are decid-
its failure to deter Russia from its ed based on political balancing
adventurism in Ukraine are a tes- between groups in the European
tament to the idea’s shortcomings. Parliament rather than on foreign
Even the Joint Comprehensive Plan policy expertise. During the recent
of Action of 2015, which temporar- diplomatic crisis between the Czech
ily imposed restrictions on Iran’s Republic and Russia, for example,
civilian nuclear enrichment program, the EU has limited itself to verbal16 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
which would be then adopted decisive and coordinated actions to
by the European Council and the push back the Russian intelligence
“Europe should finally European Parliament. The concept and cyber activities in Europe and
abandon the feeling that should explicitly list the main strate- to identify and make accountable
gic risks and threats to Europe and their domestic collaborators.9
it is duty-bound to export devise the measures and policies to
itself into the remainder of cope with them.
the world, and replace it More pragmatically, in day-to-day
with a more modest, but politics, the EU should strive to
coordinate its policies within the
more demanding intention:
strategic triangle of Europe, North
to start the quest for a America, and the United Kingdom,
reform of the world with aiming for political cooperation,
close trade and investment ties, and
itself”. a NATO-led military and intelligence
alliance. This triangle should in turn
Václav Havel cooperate with like-minded Asian
and Pacific countries to create a
treaty-based “Democratic Alliance”
But while there is value to thinking to counter global threats to liberty
in such lofty terms, we should not and democracy.
paralyze ourselves until we have
figured it out. There are several Finally, NATO, with EU support,
things the EU ought to undertake should reestablish a credible de-
now to start the process of thinking terrence against possible future ag-
through these issues. Parallel with gressive actions by Moscow. Russia
the Conference on the Future of represents the most credible near-
Europe, the EU should convene an term threat to the European vision,
expert Conference on the Security and it must be countered. The EU
of Europe to propose a European in general, and the countries of the
Strategic Concept 2022-2030, CEE in particular, should undertake
Recommendations:
● Parallel with the Conference on the Future of Europe, the EU should convene an expert
Conference on the Security of Europe to propose a European Strategic Concept 2022-
2030 which would be then adopted by the European Council and the European Parlia-
ment. The concept should explicitly list the main strategic risks and threats to Europe
and devise the measures and policies to cope with them.
● The EU should coordinate its policies within the strategic triangle of Europe, North
America and the United Kingdom, aiming for political cooperation, close trade and in-
vestment ties, and NATO-led military and intelligence alliance.
● This triangle should further cooperate with like-minded Asian and Pacific countries to
create a treaty-based “Democratic Alliance” to counter global threats to liberty and
democracy.
● NATO, with EU support, should reestablish a credible deterrence against possible future
aggressive actions by Russia.
● The EU in general, and the countries of the CEE in particular, should undertake decisive
and coordinated actions to push back the Russian intelligence and cyber activities in
Europe and to identify and make accountable their domestic collaborators.The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 17
The EU in the Face
of the New Cold War
between China and
America
Jakub Wiśneiwski, PhD, Amb. Ret, Vice-President for Strategy, GLOBSEC
In their search for strategic auton-
omy, Europeans are trying to find
a proper place for the European Share of Global GDP based on
Union in an intensifying confronta- purchasing power-in-parity
tion between China and the United
States. The challenge is to forge
28%
new policy towards China, without 28
forsaking the position of a steadfast
ally of America. Given its unique 26%
character and identity, the EU is 26
well placed to help to avert the
worst-case scenario of full-blown 24%
24
Cold War between China and the
United States or — if a Cold War is
not avoidable — mitigate the fallout 22%
22
and de-escalate tensions. It is in
the interests of America to have
a friendly third force balancing 20
between the two poles, ultimate-
ly reinforcing the position of the 18%
18
whole West.
China is posing serious national 16%
16
security concerns to the whole fami- 15%
15%
ly of democratic nations. Both the
United States and the EU cannot 14
ignore endless transgressions of
human rights at home and its ag-
gressive posturing abroad, includ- 12
ing its diplomatic bullying of smaller
countries. At the same time China is
10
not the Soviet Union from the Cold
War. The Chinese economy is much
larger and more significant for the
8
world economy (accounting for 18
percent of the world’s GDP) for ties
to be simply severed.10 6
5%
4
Source: Statista11
2
0
EU27 USA China
2004 2015 2020
Source: Statista1118 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
In contrast to the 1980s, the world of building 5G networks in Western while China believes that the prin-
economy today is much more countries poses the risk of spying ciple of national sovereignty trumps
globalized, and nobody serious can by Chinese security services, as any concerns over human rights. It
consider a full-scale detachment well as creates dependencies on perceives democratization as an
of economic links between the Chinese technology products. As attempt by the West to preserve its
West and China. This means that Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic advantage and retain its global in-
hard choices will have to be made, Speaker of the House of Repre- fluence. These kinds of ideological
striking a delicate balance between sentatives, said in 2020, “Allowing disputes have flared up concerning
economic necessities and geopo- the Sinification of 5G would be to the fate of Hong-Kong, Myanmar,
litical imperatives. This balance will choose autocracy over democra- and Xinjiang province in China.
have to be fine-tuned on a case-by- cy.”12 China has been heavily criticized by
case basis. The EU will necessarily the United States for cracking down
approach things differently than the Second, there is a diplomatic effort at home, and for the aggressive
United States. on the Chinese side to counter expansion of its influence abroad.
American influence in international
organizations (and among devel- All this sets up a formidable set of
oping countries in Africa, Asia, and challenges for European policy-
Areas of strategic even Latin America). The system of makers seeking to position the
confrontation between rules that has been the backbone continent in this confusing new
the US and China of global commerce is teetering. global reality. The EU ought to be
The need for cooperation on issues prepared to side with America on
like climate change, public health, some, but not all, areas of engage-
and migration has never been ment mentioned above. Wherever
greater. In this multilateral system, Europeans and Americans do not
America has lately disregarded the speak with one voice, however, the
position of the EU, taking unilateral allies should agree not to take uni-
Security dimension, including
actions against China, by imposing lateral steps versus China — steps
trade in sensitive industries
tariffs, banning technology exports, that could catch the other side by
and temporarily leaving the World surprise.
Health Organization. China, for its
part, has tried to cement its own On hard security cooperation,
position in the vacuum that America NATO is the best choice for coor-
has created in disregarding these dinating responses. The EU’s own
Diplomatic efforts in multilat- institutions. record on security and defense is
eral organizations patchy at best, as Brussels relies
Third, there is a question of the on American tanks and troops for
global economy. A rapidly rising defending its own territory. Tech-
China has already outgrown Amer- nological aspects of security policy,
ica in terms of absolute GDP. The however, do need coordination,
spirit of confrontation and distrust and the EU needs to be seen as an
Global economy is palpable — the average tariff important partner in these matters.
on Chinese-American trade is 20 The borders between civilian and
percent. World financial markets are military technologies are often
still based on the American dollar, blurry, and European capacities in
though China has ambitions to areas such as cyber need to be de-
elevate the role of its own currency, veloped in tandem with the United
the yuan. The tech industry is splin- States.
Ideological battle
tering: some countries, especially
emerging economies, embrace Chi- Second and third, regarding multi-
nese technologies (of which Huawei lateralism and the global economy,
is a potent symbol) while the United the EU needs to be prepared to
There are several areas of strategic
States penalizes the company and defend its own interests, which
confrontation between the United
all its suppliers, preventing Ameri- might require a little bit of dis-
States and China. First, there is se-
can-made hardware and software to tancing from America. The EU is a
curity competition, where two nucle-
be part of Huawei’s supply chains. market of 450 million people and
ar-armed superpowers are involved
The logic of disengagement and is thus a formidable force in setting
in a stand-off in the South China
bans cannot, however, be applied standards on consumer products,
Sea, over Taiwan, and in the Pacific
to all aspects of trade between the or shaping the world’s response
more broadly. This also applies to
two giants, as the two countries’ to worldwide problems, such as
trade in sensitive defense-oriented
economies are inextricably tied up COVID-19 or climate change. On
industries — artificial intelligence,
as a result of decades of globaliza- trade, the EU should be able to
web-based data, quantum com-
tion. make its own choices — how to
puting, and many other emerging
do business with a giant vibrant
technologies that have a military
Fourth, America portrays itself as economy without compromising on
use. The participation of Chinese
a global champion of democracy democratic standards and national
companies like Huawei in a processThe EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives ( 19
security. Flashpoints such as the the EU and the United States joined among many stakeholders. The
case of Huawei, where America and forces in March 2021 by launching United Nations has never been
the EU should be speaking with targeted sanctions against Chi- in the position to fulfil its promise
one voice, represent a small subset nese officials involved in clamping of bringing forth a harmonious
of trade flows with China. It is ob- down on the Uyghur minority. This multilateral environment on the
vious that Europe and America are should serve as a template for global stage. Hence there has been
competitors, and the United States further discussions of developing a need for other actors to step
wants to keep its competitive edge the necessary framework for future up, such as the OECD and other
over Europeans in areas such as cooperation. EU-led efforts. Climate change is
cloud computing. It is also natural accelerating. Income disparities
for Europeans to resist and look for In short, if the Chinese challenge between global South and North
its ways to compete against both is to be taken seriously in Amer- are mounting to unprecedented
America and China. ica and Europe, the transatlantic levels. The EU, with its expertise
link needs to be revived after a of development aid, its ability
Still, there is much to be gained particularly turbulent four years, to interact meaningfully with its
from cooperation. To illustrate my and even reinforced in some areas. neighborhood, and its multi-faceted
point, let’s look at events surround- America needs to understand that approach to global crises, is often
ing the EU’s ill-fated investment the unipolar moment has passed, a more trusted partner of countries
pact with China. Though it was and that American supremacy does and communities worldwide than
negotiated successfully in Decem- not mean that European partners the two other superpower “national”
ber of last year, its ratification was can be treated as junior policy-tak- actors.
suspended after a tit-for-tat ers. The EU, for its part, needs not
exchange of travel bans following consider itself a junior partner in the There is still lack of consensus
the EU’s criticism of China’s policy transatlantic partnership. The con- about the EU’s detailed policy on
in the Xinjiang province towards its frontation between China and the China, but its broad parameters
Uyghur minority. Meanwhile, the United States is an old-fashioned were established in a 2019 strategy
United States has negotiated a very one, in the sense that it involves document where China was called
similar pact that is still in force. All two powerful states — one on the a partner, a competitor, but also a
this suggests that it would be better rise and the other in relative decline “systemic rival”. Clearly there are
if the United States and the EU — locked in diplomatic, trade, mili- divergences within the European
could coordinate on questions of tary, political, and even ideological family on how best to tackle the
trade and investment where rivalry. Other countries are either challenge presented by China, with
possible, especially on the creation bystanders or allies of one of the some countries more economically
of common standards of open two superpowers. European coun- exposed than others. Germany, for
governance among Chinese tries fall into the category of allies of example, annually exports €96
companies present in the West. the United States. billion worth of goods to China,
Together, America and Europe amounting to half of the EU-China
account for over half of world’s At the same time, most European exports.
GDP; China can’t ignore the countries are part of the EU, which
concerns of such a bloc on issues is far more than just a sum of its
of regulation, labor rights, and parts. It is an entity with suprana-
intellectual property. tional authority in areas such as “For Central Europeans,
trade. The EU was created at the just like for the EU
time of disillusion with nationalism,
as it was the rivalry between the as a whole, there is
“When it comes to human nation states in Europe that had a need for striking a
rights and democracy, led to disastrous two world wars.
balance. We must be
Ever since the European Economic
Europeans should be able to differentiate
Community was founded in the
on the same page with 1950s “the European way” involved between political
Americans: values are the gradual pooling of national sov-
ereignty and the cautious and slow confrontation against
non-negotiable.” honing of its global actions. The China, competition, and
EU’s diversity is both a weakness
cooperation.”
and a strength. The EU is slow to
Finally, on the question of human act, often undecided. At the same
rights and democracy, Europeans time its actions have legitimacy and
should be on the same page with carry moral weight that no other na- The challenge for Central and
Americans: values are non-negotia- tional actor could possibly acquire. Eastern European (CEE) countries is
ble. Nevertheless, there needs to largely that of the broader EU, but
be a common coherent framework The world can hardly afford an old- in microcosm. CEE countries are
for human rights so that officials style clash of global superpowers. both allies of America and mem-
and entities involved in abuse are It therefore helps that the EU is bers of the EU, and these two geo-
sanctioned. Supply chains should “post-national”. Europe’s strengths political poles constitute the major
be screened. It’s commendable that lie in its ability to forge a consensus points of reference. For Central20 ) The EU Strategic Autonomy: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
Europeans, just like for the EU as a human rights, and the promotion change, fight against pandemics).
whole, there is a need for striking a of democracy), competition (trade), Given the scale of China, confron-
balance. We must be able to differ- and cooperation (working through tation — when it is necessary and
entiate between political confronta- a multilateral system pertaining to inevitable — will also require coordi-
tion against China (national security, global public goods such as climate nating with the United States.
Superpowers – strategic partners
Which of the following countries are the most important strategic partners of your country today? Pick max. 2. (respondents could
choose from a randomised selection of 6 countries including the US, Russia, China, Germany, France and the UK)
8%
Poland 54%
8%
8%
Lithuania 53%
4%
21%
Estonia 49%
6%
13%
Romania 47%
10%
27%
Latvia 36%
10%
45%
Bulgaria 27%
8%
14%
Czechia 25%
10%
47%
Slovakia 17%
12%
35%
Hungary 13%
30%
The US Russia China
Source: GLOBSEC Trends, GLOBSEC, June 202113.
For some decision-makers in CEE third countries (Japan, Indonesia,
countries, divisions of competence Russia) but, most notably, the EU.
between national and European The EU is not a neutral bystander in
levels are often perceived as a ze- the emerging world of great-power
ro-sum game. It shouldn’t be; this is politics. Europe’s and America’s “Central Europeans do
a dangerous pose. The 17+1 format fortunes and objectives are deeply
of negotiating with Beijing, where intertwined. At the same time, the not stand a chance
smaller CEE countries are trying to EU wants to be able to shape its to forge their own
attract Chinese investments on a policies independently, sometimes
policy towards China.
separate track from other European diverging from America. Of course,
institutions, is a mistake. Central with rights there comes responsibil- Instead of undermining
Europeans do not stand a chance ity: Europeans striving for a place at European, and
to forge their own policy towards a big table will need to prove that
China. All they will do is undermine they have a one long-term vision transatlantic, solidarity,
European, and transatlantic, solidar- rather than collage of 27 self-in- they should help to
ity. The difference of demographic compatible ad-hoc plans. Time will
shape a distinctive
and economic potential is simply tell whether the European ambition
too big. Instead they should help of strategic autonomy was a pipe European multi-faceted
to shape a distinctive European dream or awakening of the third strategy.”
multi-faceted strategy. giant.
The Cold War between the United
States and China, with its stifling
atmosphere of animosity pervading
all areas of interaction, is still just
a dark scenario, one of many. How
this bipolar relationship unfolds is
dependent on other actors, such asYou can also read
