From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
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doi:10.5477/cis/reis.177.127
From Deviant Microbehavior
to Political Corruption in Spain
De las microconductas desviadas a la corrupción política en España
Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo
Key words Abstract
Social Capital Political corruption in Spain is considered a social problem. The aim of
• Institutional Trust this study is to analyze how cultural factors influence the construction of
• Political Corruption its perception. The main hypothesis is that a relationship exists between
• Deviance the perception of deviant microbehaviors and that of political corruption
• Public Ethics influenced by a low level of social capital. A quantitative methodology
based on a source of secondary data has been used, based on the
CIS study no. 2826, making descriptive and inferential analyses. After
controlling for the effect of low social capital in Spanish society by
means of linear regression, the existence of an asymmetric positive
relationship is verified in which the perception of deviant microbehavior
affects the perception of political corruption.
Palabras clave Resumen
Capital social La corrupción política es percibida como un problema social
• Confianza en España. El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar cómo
institucional influye el factor cultural en la construcción de su percepción. La
• Corrupción política hipótesis principal es que existe una relación entre la percepción de
• Desviación microconductas desviadas y la percepción de la corrupción política
• Ética pública con influencia de un nivel bajo de capital social. Se ha usado una
metodología cuantitativa basada en una fuente de datos secundarios
a través del estudio n.º 2826 del CIS, realizando análisis descriptivos
e inferenciales. Tras controlar el efecto del bajo nivel de capital
social en la sociedad española mediante regresión lineal simple, se
verifica la existencia de una relación positiva asimétrica, en la cual, la
percepción de microconductas desviadas infiere en la percepción de
la corrupción política.
Citation
Ruiz-Lorenzo, Valeria (2022). “From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain”. Revista
Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 177: 127-142. (doi: 10.5477/cis/reis.177.127)
Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo: Universidad de Málaga | v_de_l@hotmail.com
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142128 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
Power tends to corrupt and absolute power cording to study no. 3221 of the CIS (2018),
corrupts absolutely. 22.4% of the country’s citizens believe that:
Lord Acton, 1887. the main reason why people hide their as-
sets or income from the Public Treasury is
Introduction “a lack of honesty and civic awareness”.
Andersson and Heywood (2009: 7) stated
Over the past decade, Spain has experi- that “this is important because the percep-
enced the greatest uncovering of political tions may significantly influence behavior:
corruption in its history. According to fig- for example, if we believe that there are
ures from the General Council of the Judi- people around us behaving corruptly, this
ciary Branch (CGPJ), between September may make us more likely to adopt these be-
2015 and March 2019, hearings were held haviors ourselves”. This macrophenomenon
for 1,835 individuals accused of commit- should not be treated and interpreted from
ting crimes of corruption. Given the criminal only a legal perspective. It is a cross-cut-
nature of these crimes, it is virtually impos- ting issue involving numerous aspects: so-
sible to establish their true magnitude. Only cial, economic, political and cultural ones.
estimates have been made, most of which There is an underlying cultural foundation
are likely to underestimate the true impact in its origin and expansion that may be in-
of these crimes. fluenced by pre-modern economic ethics
Political corruption is not only a local is- and interpersonal and institutional distrust
sue, as concluded by the 2004 Global Re- (Lamo, 1997).
port of Transparency International on cor- This article focuses on the Spanish pop-
ruption, which stated that “no country in the ulation’s tolerance for corruption and the
world is immune to political corruption. The cultural patterns that may influence the per-
problem consists of numerous acts com- ception of the same. In other words, how
mitted by political leaders before, during the perception of mildly punished deviant
or after leaving their position”. It creates a microbehavior —such as regulatory sanc-
substantial burden on the economic and tions— influence the perception of large-
social development of the global society scale political corruption: Does a direct re-
(Yong, President of the World Bank, 2016). lationship exist?
According to the Spanish Center for Socio-
logical Research (CIS) barometer from May
2019 (study no. 3247), 8.2% of the Span- Theoretical framework
ish population perceives corruption and
fraud as being the number one problem in Conceptualization of key concepts in the
this country. According to 17.9% of the sur- multi-dimensionality of corruption
veyed individuals, it is the country’s second
largest problem. Politicians are perceived Huntington (1972: 63) defined corruption
the worst of all groups with regard to this is- as “a behavioral deviation carried out by
sue, at 93.0% (study no. 3143, 2016). They a public official that diverges from the es-
are considered to be the least trustworthy tablished rules in order to serve private in-
of the distinct groups/institutions proposed, terests”. From this definition, it may be de-
receiving an average score of 3.19 out of 10 duced that in order for corrupt behavior to
points. exist, it is necessary for a prior legal frame-
Corruption as a deep-rooted problem in work to exist which establishes its limits. All
society appears to be vox populi: the pop- legal frameworks are made up of rules and
ulation is well aware of its existence. Ac- social values, either written or not, which
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 129
guide their structuring. Therefore, it is logi- According to past studies, the concept of
cal to consider that culture and jurisdiction “social capital” (reviewed by Putnam, 1995:
are congruent. Ultimately, the law is a re- 67) is inversely related to the levels of cor-
flection of society’s values and therefore, ruption, defined as “the characteristics of the
distinct rules govern distinct countries. “Po- social organization, such as networks, rules
litical corruption is, above all, an issue of and trust, which facilitate coordination and
social ethics” (Jiménez, 1997: 139) and the cooperation for a mutual benefit”.
citizens’ tolerance of the same may be bi- The internalization of rules to support co-
ased by the distinct scopes of its context: existence, networks, horizontal orientation
social, political, legal and economic, as well and relationships based on interpersonal
as by their own experiences. The combina- trust and reciprocity facilitates cohesion and
tion of these factors is referred to as “cul- results in social and democratic improve-
ture” (Cameron et al., 2005). For this sociol- ment. A society having a strong social capi-
ogy-based analysis, we focus on an intrinsic tal will be more fair and just, less individualis-
approach: cultural-relational. tic and, therefore, less tolerant of crimes that
From the previous definitions, a variety endanger the common wellbeing. On the
of common elements characterizing corrup- other hand, a society with a weaker social
tion may be established: deviant behaviors capital, with a higher level of corruption, will
serving specific interests based on a posi- be more individualist and will have a weaker
tion that is subject to the possession of a collective consciousness due to its weak-
public power spectrum that directly affects ened ties, decreased interpersonal trust and
society and goes against social morality —a poorer social cohesion. Fukuyama (1998: 43)
process of civic behaviors between the in- defined “trust” as an expectation arising in a
dividual and society that is applied to the community with honest, orderly and coop-
duty to manage the public through distinct eration-based behavior that is founded on
agents and institutions serving the same, rules shared by all of its members.
directed at the common good and collec-
Since institutional trust is strongly re-
tive interest—. The social morality existing
lated to interpersonal trust and both of
in the public sector is known as “public eth-
these variables are related to corruption, it
ics”: “the science considering the morality
is logical that a positive correlation will exist
of human acts as carried out by public offi-
between low levels of intersubjective trust
cials” (Rodríguez-Arana, 1998: 6).
and the perception of corruption. Thus, low
So, what is this so-called “deviation”? It is levels of trust between citizens –a trait that
an attitude that may be considered criminal, has been evident in Spain ever since this
given society’s response to it. It is not only variable has been measured- may clearly
a quality but also a process involving the re- affect the perception of corruption and vice
sponse of others. It depends on both the spe- versa (Villoria, 2015).
cific moment when it is perpetrated as well
as the individual carrying it out. Ultimately,
whether or not an act is considered deviant Nature and types. From the individual to
depends on its nature and the response of the cultural approach
others (Becker, 2014). Given the high percep-
tion of political corruption in Spain, corrupt After generically defining and conceptualiz-
behaviors in this area are, without a doubt, ing the previous concepts, we will now con-
identified as deviant. But does a permissive sider how acts of corruption are considered
culture exist for other everyday microbehav- de facto. Laporta (1997) created an outline
iors that can be defined as deviant? of the main corruption practices:
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142130 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
CHART 1. Corruption practices
Arrangements: A pub-
Private collusion in The use of privi-
lic official makes a
public tenders or leged information
public decision that
Bribery Extortion competitions: estab- to make private
favors a private citizen
lishing minimum bid economic or social
in exchange for some
levels. decisions.
sort of compensation.
Fraudulent alterations of the market: the
Bias in the application
Financial specu- public official responsible for certain areas
Fraud and em- of rules, administra-
lation with pub- of the market uses his/her position to the
bezzlement tion or any type of de-
lic funds harm or benefit of a third party, with no ob-
liberate decision.
jective foundation.
Source: Laporta (1997).
Upon reviewing the existing bibliography cused on the psychosocial aspects of the
on this area, it is evident that most of the individual and his/her environment, based
theory is based on an individualist concept on the concept of “willingness to be cor-
based on a legal or economic approach: rupted”, which is influenced by the “oppor-
the individual, on his/her own or for his/her tunities for corruption”. In other words, he
own reasons, diverts, as homo economicus used the theory of rational choice to give
and in a rational manner, seeking personal meaning to moral cost, leading to the indi-
gain within the limits, gaps or voids permit- vidual’s corrupt action. To some extent, this
ted by the law or jurisdiction. However, they moral cost is determined by the existing
are anchored within this legal context. From peer rules, more than by society’s laws.
this, Klitgaard’s “corruption formula” (1994) According to this idea, in a society of
has been created, appearing repeatedly in equal justice, in which costs-sanctions are
the analysis of this social reality: identical for all, a citizen who has the abil-
ity and/or opportunity to engage in corrupt
C=M+D–A behavior will do so. However, Fisman and
Miguel challenged this hypothesis in their
*Corruption (C) is equal to the monopoly of the decision (M)
plus discretion (D) minus accountability (A).
work, Evidence from Diplomatic Parking
Tickets (2007), whose results established
that the tendency to engage in non-regu-
latory acts with mild punishment, the so-
This logic, in the form of a mathemati-
called “deviant microbehaviors”, is cultural
cal equation, does not consider the entire
and has a strong association with the lev-
foundation of corruption, but rather, it offers
els of corruption existing in the country of
a pragmatic explanation of the individual’s origin. Sutherland (1999) examined this cul-
behavior based on a series of factors aris- turist line in his “Theory of Differential Asso-
ing within his/her scope of action. It helps ciation”, postulating that criminal attitudes
to explain why individual X in position Y are not innate, but rather, are learned. In his
may act corruptly if complying with certain studies on white-collar crime, he suggested
conditions and assumptions. But, how to that an organization could promote fraud,
we get from X to Y? converting it into a structural and cultural el-
In this individualist scope, Pizzorno ement, which would become deeply rooted
(1992) considered political corruption –al- if the organization was situated in a permis-
though in a sociological analysis. He fo- sive social, political and legal environment.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 131
It can be deduced that corrupt acts and in the Public Administrations or other pub-
practices depend not only on the individual lic services. Its conception of corruption fo-
and his/her opportunity, but also on cul- cuses mainly on the political sphere: 80% of
tural patterns, which influence the decision the Spanish population believes that corrup-
to engage (or not) in illegal behavior. Politi- tion is widespread in the political parties. On
cal corruption is not isolated from society the other hand, according to data from the
and its values. The corruption curve follows CPI of Transparency International (2017), the
the curve of ethical-social values; its scope trend for an increased perception of corrup-
depends, in part, on the assessment of cor- tion is on the rise in Spain: in a global ranking
ruption of public officials. In other words, a consisting of 180 countries, Spain is the Eu-
relationship exists between corruption and ropean country that has worsened the most,
social ethics: the transformations of social lowering by 12 positions since 2012, to be
ethics transform the perception of corrup- situated at number 42 (with only 57 points)
tion, both legal, sanctioned by the law, as in the last index, together with Cyprus. In the
well as moral, sanctioned by social ethics EU28 ranking, Spain was situated at posi-
(Soriano, 2011). tion 18-20. Interestingly enough, and in ac-
cordance with data obtained from the Eu-
robarometer, although a high percentage of
The perception of corruption in Spain corruption exists at a macro level, when ask-
ing the citizens if they have ever resorted to
Currently, with the uncovering of numerous bribery in the public services, Spanish data
cases of political corruption, as mentioned are quite similar to those of Germany, Swit-
in the introduction, it may be affirmed that zerland, Norway and even Finland: less than
certain political sectors have operated like a 2% of the surveyed individuals recognized
criminal organization, operating with illegal having made such payments. In Romania,
rules, disseminating, issuing and reproduc- on the other hand, the percentage was as
ing their latent practices, and thereby re- high as 17% and, in Greece, it reached 22%.
ducing their costs and maximizing their per- This low victimization is a measure of the
sonal profits (Della Porta, 1996). Therefore, corruption of the public officials and appar-
within said scenarios, a degree of political ently, the Spanish situation is similar to that
distrust is created, which ultimately erodes of the world’s least corrupt countries.
the social capital and discredits the powers, These surveys are clearly necessary in
leading to opportunist behaviors (Villoria, order to measure and control the percep-
Jiménez and Revuelta, 2014). tion of corruption, which is essential in or-
In order to understand the perceived level der to overcome this problem, since per-
of corruption existing in Spain, two distinct ception ultimately influences actions. At the
international sources have been used: the same time, this perception serves to ex-
Eurobarometer and the Corruption Percep- plain the subsequent behavior when tack-
tions Index (CPI). According to data from the ling moral dilemmas such as those pro-
special Eurobarometer 470 (2017) on cor- posing corruption (Villoria, Jiménez and
ruption, 94% of all Spaniards believe that Revuelta, 2014: 13). Furthermore, many au-
the problem of corruption in our country is thors have criticized these surveys for a va-
common. Paradoxically, in terms of the aver- riety of reasons: they are composite indices
age of the EU28, Spain has a lower percep- based on distinct sources of data (Anders-
tion of the practice of certain types of cor- son and Heywood, 2009), the difficulty in
ruption, such as: gifting money, giving gifts quantifying real corruption through percep-
and doing favors in exchange for a benefit tion, its influence on the creation of indica-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142132 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
tors and on subjective biases (Malito, 2014) 3. There is a low level of social capital that
and problems related to reification and con- is associated with the perception of co-
tent validity, due to the multi-dimensional rruption.
and conceptual nature of corruption (Villoria 4. There is a positive asymmetric relation-
and Jiménez, 2012). ship between the perception of deviant
Throughout this review and from the microbehavior and the perception of po-
data extracted on Spain in the surveys on litically corrupt behavior.
experience and perception, a recurrent par-
adox arises: there is a low level of victimi-
zation in the Spanish population, but a high Methods and source of data
perception of political corruption, as sug-
gested by Villoria, Jiménez and Revuelta This study is based on a quantitative ap-
(2014: 7). This perceived corruption refers proach, to ensure its reliability and validity,
not only to bribes but also to a type of poli- using a secondary data source: CIS (2009),
tics that is based on the constant intrusion study number 2826: “Public ethics and
of private interests in political decision mak- corruption” —this is the most recent da-
ing and vice versa. tabase measuring the variables necessary
for the study objective—. The study pop-
ulation includes individuals of both sexes,
of legal age, with Spanish nationality. A
Methods structured questionnaire was used, admin-
Objectives istered via personal interview, to a sample
of 2,478 individuals in a multi-stage pro-
General objective: The objective of this cedure, stratified by conglomerates. The
study is to identify the relationship between confidence level was 95.5% and real error
the perception of deviant microbehaviors was ±2.0%.
and the perception of political corruption in
Spanish society.
Data analysis
Specific objective: Our general objective
can be divided into distinct disjunctive, yet For the processing of data and statistical
related aspects: 1) to measure the percep- operations, the IBM SPSS Statistics v.19
tion of political corruption; 2) to establish the program was used. The main study thesis is
level of tolerance for distinct deviant behav- based on the cultural factors influencing the
iors; 3) to measure the impact of the social perception of political corruption. Therefore,
capital on the perception of political corrup- first, a descriptive analysis was carried out
tion; 4) to analyze the relationship between to provide a global view of the perception
the perception of deviant microbehaviors of political corruption. Second, to exam-
and the perception of political corruption. ine the tolerance of deviant behavior, both
microbehaviors and political corruption,
central tendency, dispersion, frequency ta-
Hypothesis ble and contingency statistics were used.
Because the objective was not to analyze
1. There is a high perception of political co-
individual actions, but rather, to consider
rruption.
the set of actions associated culturally that
2. There is a low tolerance for deviant be- serve as an indicator, the next step was to
havior. use factorial analysis as a means of statisti-
cal approximation to the theoretical dimen-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 133
sions, to offer a significant reference for the Results
group.
Descriptive analysis
This step was used to confirm whether
an association exists and if certain varia- As an initial consideration of the available
bles make up a factor, facilitating the abil- data, a descriptive analysis was performed
ity to construct two indicators related to: on the frequencies of the perception of cor-
1) politically corrupt behavior; 2) deviant ruption in the political class as well as the
microbehavior; the use of the most rel- frequencies of justification of deviant mi-
evant items for pragmatic operationaliza- crobehaviors and politically corrupt behav-
tion. iors. This permits a global view of the be-
Next, a correlation analysis was per- havior of individuals, while also permitting
formed on the variables of interest and a the observation of measures of central ten-
simple linear regression model was applied dency and dispersion, such as the mean
to verify whether or not an association ex- and standard deviation which, in general,
isted between both dimensions, what type serve as a clarifying map for the results of
and to what extent; the use of this tech- the subsequent inferential analysis.
nique is justified given its predictive nature
Perception of political corruption
and ability to provide asymmetric roles to
these variables. For this variable we used question P22.3:
“I would like for you to tell me if you believe
— An indicator of the perception of politi- that corruption is very extensive, somewhat
cally corrupt behaviors will be created extensive, a little or not at all extensive in/
as a dependent variable. amongst…”, selecting the category Poli-
— An indicator of the perception of deviant ticians”, with an ordinal measure ranging
microbehaviors will be created as an in- from: 1. “Very extensive” to 6. “There is no
dependent variable. corruption”. As seen in the table below, the
perception exists that political corruption
Finally, an indicator of social capital will is considerable and very extensive, with an
be created using the following variables: in- accumulated percentage of almost 80%, a
terpersonal trust, confidence in the central mean score of 2.18 and a standard devia-
government and satisfaction with democ- tion of 1.673. This would verify our first hy-
racy- to analyze its impact as a control vari- pothesis: there is a strong perception of po-
able in the previous linear regression. litical corruption.
Table 1. Frequencies, mean and standard deviation of the perception of political corruption
Very Quite Somewhat Not very Not There is no Don’t No
Total
Perception of extended extended extended extended extended corruption know response
corruption in:
Politicians Frequency 957 1,005 217 143 17 1 128 10 2,478
Percentage 38.6% 40.6% 8.8% 5.8% 0.7% 0.0% 5.2% 0.4% 100,0%
Note: Mean: 2.180. Standard dev: 1.673.
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142134 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
Deviant microbehavior and politically corrupt the personal income tax declaration (IRPF)”
behaviors variable. This corrupt attitude against fiscal
morality, despite being considered unjus-
The selection of the following variables
tifiable, has a high collective standard de-
grouped together in two distinct sets: deviant
viation. Most of the responses are very uni-
microbehaviors and politically corrupt be-
form: they are concentrated in categories
haviors, both in this initial descriptive plan as
0-1, with a completely unjustifiable position.
well as in inferential ones, is justified by the
The mean of the responses is very low, with
factorial analysis and correlations detailed in
a value ofValeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 135
Table 3. Frequencies, mean and standard deviation for perception of politically corrupt behavior
It is clearly I think it is an act I think it isn’t an It clearly isn’t
Standard
an act of of corruption but act of corruption an act of Mean
dev.
corruption I am not sure but I am not sure corruption
That a politician hires family
members and/or friends to work
76.4% 17.6% 4.8% 1.2% 1.31 0.615
in public administrations, despite
their preparation.
That a politician, public official or
public employee accepts money
90.8% 7.7% 1.2% 0.3% 1.11 0.374
from a company in exchange for
favoring it.
That a politician, public official or
public employee receives money 92.3% 6.9% 0.6% 0.3% 1.09 0.330
for reclassifying land.
That a public administration em-
ployee request that a citizen pay
87.1% 11.1% 1.4% 0.4% 1.15 0.422
a quantity of money to speed up
proceedings.
That a politician uses his/her of-
56.4% 23.3% 14.2% 6.0% 1.70 0.926
ficial car for private use.
That land protected by the
Coastal Law is reclassified to 79.6% 14.1% 5.0% 1.3% 1.28 0.619
create wealth in a municipality.
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Table 4. Contingency table: Not declaring all income on the personal income tax declaration (IRPF)
That land protected by the Coastal Law is reclassified to create
wealth in a municipality
Clearly this Total
I think it is an act I think it isn’t an Clearly this is
is an act of of corruption but act of corruption not an act of
corruption I am not sure but I am not sure corruption
Totally un-
46.0% 6.80% 1.9% 0.6% 55.2%
justifiable
Not declaring 1 16.4% 3.60% 1.2% 0.1% 21.4%
all income on
the personal 2 7.7% 1.60% 0.9% 0.3% 10.6%
income tax 3 6.3% 1.60% 0.9% 0.2% 9.1%
declaration 4 1.6% 0.21% 0.1% 0.0% 2.0%
(IRPF)
Totally justi-
1.4% 0.10% 0.1% 0.1% 1.8%
fiable
Total 79.5% 14.00% 5.2% 1.4% 100.0%
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142136 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
The variables from this contingency ta- of the “Cronbach’s alpha” and “KMO” sta-
ble have been selected since they have the tistics. Using the Varimax factorial rotation
highest correlation between one another. It method, a model with 47 elements was cre-
may be verified that the majority of the re- ated. These elements were grouped together
sponses are found in the extreme position: into seven factors which explained the vari-
“clearly it is an act of corruption * totally un- ance of 62.27%, with a “Cronbach’s alpha”
justifiable”. The Chi-squared statistic has value of 0.897 and a “KMO” of 0.945.
been used as the contingency coefficient to These factors measure the following di-
verify whether these variables are independ- mensions: 1) Perception of corruption of
ent of one another, but the H0 was rejected: distinct social participants; 2) Justification
based on the following results, we can af- of deviant microbehaviors; 3) Assessment
firm that both variables are related to one of groups of professionals; 4) Trust in gov-
another. There is a relationship between the ernmental institutions; 5) Perception of cor-
level of tolerance of deviant microbehaviors
ruption in political behavior; 6) Perception
and politically corrupt behaviors.
of corruption of distinct organisms; 7) Cor-
Asymptotic g.l = 15 α = 0,05 Value χ² = rupt behavior of public officials.
sig. = 0.000 52,014 The second and fifth factors, dimensions
χ²g.l; α = 1,75 of interest for this study, have been used to
create the previously mentioned indicators.
Factorial analysis These dimensions have been recalculated
as new variables, not including all of those
As mentioned previously, a factorial analy- collected for the factor, since the items cor-
sis was performed for an initial considera- related with distinct values. Therefore, they
tion of the data: to see, in a general manner, have been reduced, maintaining the most
how the variables behaved between one an- significant ones, and thus improving the ex-
other, how they were grouped together and planatory regression model. Finally, the in-
which dimensions stood out. The reduction dicators have been created based on the
criterion was based on an exhaustive control following variables:
CHART 2. Indicators of macro-corruption and micro-delinquency
Indicator of politically corrupt behaviors Indicator of deviant microbehaviors
That a politician hires his/her own family and/or friends to work in the
Double parking a car.
public administration despite their preparation.
That a politician, public official or public employee accepts money Throwing out trash or waste in a public
from a company in exchange for favors. place.
That a politician, public official or public employee receives money for Not declaring all income on the personal
reclassifying land. income tax declaration (IRPF).
That an employee of the public administration asks that a citizen pay Faking an illness to get temporary leave
money to speed up proceedings. from work.
Using a pensioner’s prescriptions to get
That a politician uses his/her official car for private use.
free medications.
That land protected by the Coastal Law is reclassified to create
—
wealth in a municipality.
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 137
Inferential analysis To verify our third hypothesis, taking
into account the ordinal nature of the “cor-
The objective of this analysis is to verify if a
relationship exists and, if so, to what extent, ruption of politicians” variable, we have
between the distinct variables proposed in used the Spearman correlation coefficient,
the hypothesis. As the literature reveals, low which has corroborated its association
social capital is a key factor in understanding with a p value of 0.245 at a significance
the perception of political corruption. There- level of 0.01. Therefore, the hypothesis is
fore, this indicator has been created based on accepted. This indicator of social capital is
interpersonal trust, trust in the central govern- associated with our indicator of perception
ment and satisfaction with democracy, to ver- of politically corrupt behavior through the
ify its impact with the study objective. Pearson’s correlation coefficient having a
We can corroborate a low level of social p value of 0.286 at a significance level of
capital in the Spanish society based on the 0.01, justifying its use as a control variable
results of the value of this central tendency in the simple linear regression carried out
statistic, X̄ = 4,3, on a scale of 0-10. in the next step.
Table 5. Correlation indicator of social capital-perception of corruption in politicians
Corruption in:
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Politicians
Correlation coefficient 1.000 0.245
SOCIAL CAPITAL Sig. (bilateral) — 0.000
N 2,478 2,478
Spearman’s Rho
Correlation coefficient 0.245 1.000
Corruption in: Sig. (bilateral) 0.000 —
Politicians
N 2,478 2,478
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Before the final step, prior to applying ent variable, which is the prism upon which
the simple linear regression between the the study is based. In this case:
indicators of study (deviant microbehav-
— Dependent variable: Indicator of percep-
ior and politically corrupt behavior), a Pear-
tion of politically corrupt behavior.
son’s correlation was carried out, as seen
in the table below. This correlation was per- — Independent variable: Indicator of justifi-
formed to determine the level of associa- cation of deviant microbehavior.
tion. The resulting p value of 0.412 corrobo- As seen in Table 7, the model functions
rates the relationship existing between the with an explanatory capacity of 16.9%. Be-
indicators. cause an indicator based on only five vari-
Unlike the previous statistical technique, ables of social perception was used, without
the linear regression offers a dimension of including sociodemographic adjustment vari-
asymmetry. There is no effect of bi-direc- ables, this percentage is considered appropri-
tionality per se, but rather, the influence of ate, although its scope is limited given the fact
the independent variables on the depend- that the social phenomena are transversal.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142138 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
Table 6. Correlation between indicators of perception of deviant microbehavior-politically corrupt behavior
Deviant microbehavior Politically corrupt
indicator behavior indicator
Pearson’s correlation 1.000 0.412
Deviant microbehavior Sig. (bilateral) 0.000
indicator
N 2,478 2,478
Pearson’s correlation 0.412 1.000
Politically corrupt behavior Sig. (bilateral) 0.000
indicator
N 2,478 2,478
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Table 7. Linear regression deviant microbehavior indicator-politically corrupt behavior indicator
Model R R squared Corrected R squared Standard error of the estimate Durbin-Watson
1 0.412 0.170 0.169 5.77141 1.823
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is ac- tistic, confirming the lack of a correlation
cepted: “there is a positive asymmetric re- with a value of 1.82, very close to 2.
lationship between the indicator measur- Finally, our regression model included a
ing the perception of deviant microbehavior control variable associated with social cap-
and the indicator of the perception of po- ital, since according to the bibliography,
litically corrupt behavior, with the former in- this may be a dimension of impact (Villoria,
fluencing the latter”. At the same time, the 2015). Furthermore, this choice was justified
independence of the residuals has been given that the indicator correlates with our
corroborated with the Durbin-Watson sta- dependent variable, with a p value of 0.286.
Table 8. Linear regression with social capital as a control variable
R
Standard
Regression Corrected R
R squared error of the
model SOCIAL CAPITAL 5.00 squared
estimate
(Selected) (Not selected)
1 0.647 0.399 0.418 0.415 4.93598
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from the CIS (Study no. 2826).
Controlling for the impact of low levels an R squared value of 0.415. Once again,
of social capital —with a criterionValeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 139
Discussion of the results and This low tolerance of deviant behav-
conclusions ior may be associated with the data ob-
tained on low victimization. The calculation
Political corruption is a cross-cutting and of ideas extracted from these data may be
multi-dimensional phenomenon. It is impos- related with Sutherland’s theory on white-
sible to consider all of its possible causes collar criminality. This suggests that cor-
and factors in a single article. Clearly, there ruption is not extended across the public
are other variables, which have not been administrations, nor does it exist in all lay-
examined in this analysis, which affect its ers of society. Rather, it appears to operate
perception. The literature suggests that in relational spheres that are restricted to
multiple alternative research lines may exist, privileged power groups (Della Porta, 1996).
which can be contrasted using other data These groups have benefited from this low
sources. social capital with a respective lack of pub-
The objective of this study is to verify lic ethics. This is not accessible to the ma-
whether or not a relationship exists between jority of the population and the behavior
the perception of certain mildly deviant be- extends beyond the measures of the ex-
haviors with the perception of politically perience surveys (Villoria, Jiménez and Re-
corrupt behavior. The study also attempts vuelta, 2014).
to measure the level of perception of po- Future studies may consider access-
litical corruption, the tolerance for distinct ing updated data with new measurement
deviant behaviors and the impact created variables, both of perception and of expe-
by social capital. No other study has yet to rience. This would facilitate distinct analy-
examine these relationships in the Span- ses, the results of which may be more be-
ish population. In fact, it has been quite dif- havioral and less perspective, permitting
ficult to operationalize some of these con- the empirical contrasting of the relationship
cepts given the lack of past research in the of low victimization with the high percep-
area. But, as suggested by empirical stud- tion of corruption, and the quantification of
ies conducted during the research, the re- not only tolerance for deviant microbehav-
lationships between these variables are im- ior but also the degree of compliance with
portant and affect one another. It has been these rules.
found that the perception of wide scale po- Given the results obtained, it is evident
litically corrupt behavior is influenced by the that the only way to eradicate corruption,
level of tolerance of mildly deviant behavior. and thereby improve its perception, is to
Although the literature and our data sug- invest in social morality and public eth-
gests that social capital and institutional ics. It is also necessary to promote po-
trust in Spain is low (Putnam, 1995; Villo- litical and civic interest and participation
ria, 2015), due to the high levels of percep- through a cultural transformation that im-
tion of political corruption, it is interesting proves the levels of social capital —trust in
to note that a low tolerance of deviant and/ institutions, interpersonal trust, democratic
or criminal behavior exists in Spain. In this and governmental satisfaction—. This re-
study, instead of using an indicator of insti- quires developing a more deeply rooted
tutional trust (commonly used in other stud- civic and democratic culture, as opposed
ies on corruption) as the control variable for to the application of punitive demagogy
the proposed regression, the social capital that promotes the application of harsher
indicator was used. This was due to its in- laws, since criminology has demonstrated
creased impact in our model, improving its that these strategies are useless with re-
predictive capacity. spect to prevention.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142140 From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
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RECEPTION: February 18, 2020
REVIEW: October 14, 2020
ACCEPTANCE: January 21, 2021
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, January - March 2022, pp. 127-142doi:10.5477/cis/reis.177.127
De las microconductas desviadas
a la corrupción política en España
From Deviant Microbehavior to Political Corruption in Spain
Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo
Palabras clave Resumen
Capital social La corrupción política es percibida como un problema social
• Confianza en España. El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar cómo
institucional influye el factor cultural en la construcción de su percepción. La
• Corrupción política hipótesis principal es que existe una relación entre la percepción de
• Desviación microconductas desviadas y la percepción de la corrupción política
• Ética pública con influencia de un nivel bajo de capital social. Se ha usado una
metodología cuantitativa basada en una fuente de datos secundarios
a través del estudio n.º 2826 del CIS, realizando análisis descriptivos
e inferenciales. Tras controlar el efecto del bajo nivel de capital
social en la sociedad española mediante regresión lineal simple, se
verifica la existencia de una relación positiva asimétrica, en la cual la
percepción de microconductas desviadas infiere en la percepción de
la corrupción política.
Key words Abstract
Social Capital Political corruption in Spain is considered a social problem. The aim of
• Institutional Trust this study is to analyze how cultural factors influence the construction of
• Political Corruption its perception. The main hypothesis is that a relationship exists between
• Deviance the perception of deviant microbehaviors and that of political corruption
• Public Ethics influenced by a low level of social capital. A quantitative methodology
based on a source of secondary data has been used, based on the
CIS study no. 2826, making descriptive and inferential analyses. After
controlling for the effect of low social capital in Spanish society by
means of linear regression, the existence of an asymmetric positive
relationship is verified in which the perception of deviant microbehavior
affects the perception of political corruption.
Cómo citar
Ruiz-Lorenzo, Valeria (2022). «De las microconductas desviadas a la corrupción política en
España». Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 177: 127-142. (doi: 10.5477/cis/
reis.177.127)
La versión en inglés de este artículo puede consultarse en http://reis.cis.es
Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo: Universidad de Málaga | v_de_l@hotmail.com
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, Enero - Marzo 2022, pp. 127-142128 De las microconductas desviadas a la corrupción política en España
Power tends to corrupt and absolute power percepciones pueden influir en el compor-
corrupts absolutely. tamiento de manera significativa: por ejem-
Lord Acton, 1887. plo, si creemos que a nuestro alrededor hay
personas que tienen un comportamiento
corrupto, eso puede hacernos más propen-
Introducción sos a adoptar esas prácticas nosotros mis-
mos». Este macrofenómeno no puede ser
En la última década se ha procedido al mayor tratado e interpretado solo desde una pers-
destape de corrupción política en la historia pectiva jurídica, es un asunto transversal
de España: según las cifras del CGPJ, solo que abarca múltiples aspectos: social, eco-
desde septiembre de 2015 a marzo de 2019 nómico, político y cultural. En su origen y
se ha aperturado juicio oral a 1.835 acusados expansión existe un sustrato cultural previo
procesados por delitos de corrupción. Por su que puede verse influido por una ética eco-
propia naturaleza delictiva, conocer su mag- nómica premoderna y una desconfianza in-
nitud real es inabarcable, solo existen ciertas terpersonal e institucional (Lamo, 1997).
cifras negras estimadas que, frecuentemente, Este artículo se va a centrar en la toleran-
suelen infravalorar la realidad. cia de la población española hacia la corrup-
La corrupción política no es un problema ción y en las pautas culturales que pueden
local. El Informe Global de Transparencia In- influir en su percepción, es decir, cómo la
ternacional sobre corrupción de 2004 con- percepción de microconductas desviadas de
cluye que «ningún país en el mundo es in- bajo nivel punitivo —tales como sanciones
mune a la corrupción política. El problema normativas— influyen en la percepción de
abarca una variedad de actos cometidos por conductas a gran escala de corrupción polí-
líderes políticos antes, durante o después de tica al uso: «¿Existe una relación directa?».
dejar el cargo». Es un lastre para el desarrollo
económico y social de la sociedad mundial,
como señaló Jim Yong Kim, presidente del Marco teórico
Banco Mundial (2016). Según el barómetro
Conceptualización de conceptos claves en
del CIS de mayo de 2019 (Estudio n.º 3247),
la multidimensionalidad de la corrupción
el 8,2% de la población percibe la corrupción
y el fraude como primer problema de España; Huntington (1972: 63), define la «corrupción»
el 17,9% como el segundo. Entre los colecti- como «una desviación de la conducta de un
vos, el peor situado es el de los políticos con funcionario público, que se aparta de las nor-
un 93,0% (Estudio nº 3143, 2016), cuya con- mas establecidas para ponerse al servicio de
fianza, a su vez, es la más baja entre los dis- intereses privados». Se deduce de este sig-
tintos grupos/instituciones que se proponen, nificado que, para la existencia de una con-
donde la media se sitúa en una puntuación ducta corrupta, es conditio sine qua non, una
de 3,19 sobre 10 puntos. norma jurídica previa que establezca sus lí-
Esta idea de la corrupción como arraigo mites. Todo marco jurídico viene dado por
cultural parece ser vox populi: la sociedad es unas normas y unos valores sociales —escri-
consciente de ella. Según el estudio n.º 3221 tos o no— que guían su ordenamiento, por lo
del CIS (2018) el 22,4% de la población cree tanto, es lógico pensar que cultura y jurisdic-
que la principal razón por la cual las perso- ción son congruentes; es decir, en última ins-
nas ocultan sus bienes o sus ingresos a Ha- tancia, la ley es un reflejo de los valores de
cienda es «la falta de honradez y conciencia nuestra sociedad —ahí radican las diferen-
ciudadana». Según Andersson y Heywood cias normativas entre países—. En otras pala-
(2009: 7), «esto es importante porque las bras, «la corrupción política es, ante todo, un
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, Enero - Marzo 2022, pp. 127-142Valeria Ruiz-Lorenzo 129
asunto de ética social» (Jiménez, 1997: 139) y características de la organización social,
la tolerancia de los ciudadanos está sesgada tales como las redes, las normas y la con-
por los diferentes ámbitos de su contexto: so- fianza, que facilitan la coordinación y la
cial, político, jurídico y económico, así como cooperación para un beneficio mutuo».
por sus propias experiencias, y la suma de La interiorización de las normas como
estos factores se denomina «cultura» (Came- sustento de la convivencia, las redes, la
ron et al., 2005). Para este análisis que surge orientación horizontal y las relaciones basa-
desde la sociología, nos centraremos en un das en confianza interpersonal y reciproci-
enfoque intrínseco: cultural-relacional. dad facilitan la cohesión y repercuten en una
De las definiciones anteriores podemos mejora social y democrática. Una sociedad
extraer varios elementos comunes que carac- con un gran capital social será mucho más
terizan a la corrupción: conductas desviadas justa y equitativa, menos individualista y,
que sirven a intereses particulares basadas por ende, menos tolerante con las acciones
en una posición que está sujeta a la posesión delictivas que ponen en peligro el bienestar
de un espectro de poder dentro de la esfera común. En contrapartida, una sociedad con
pública que afecta directamente a la sociedad bajo capital social, con una alta percepción
y va contra la moral social —proceso de con- de corrupción, será una sociedad más indivi-
ductas cívicas entre el individuo y la sociedad dualista, con una conciencia colectiva debili-
aplicado al deber hacer en la gestión de lo tada basada en lazos débiles, con una baja
público a través de los distintos actores e ins- confianza interpersonal y menos cohesión
tituciones al servicio de este, dirigiéndose así social. Fukuyama (1998: 43), define la «con-
hacia el bien común y el interés colectivo—. A fianza» como una expectativa que surge en
la moral social ejercida en el sector público se una comunidad con un comportamiento or-
le denomina «ética pública»: «La ciencia que denado, honrado y de cooperación, basán-
trata la moralidad de los actos humanos en dose en normas compartidas por todos los
cuanto que son realizados por funcionarios miembros que la integran.
públicos» (Rodríguez-Arana, 1998: 6). Si tenemos en cuenta que la confianza
Pero, entonces, ¿a qué denominamos institucional tiene una fuerte relación con
«desviación»? A la actitud que podría ser con- la confianza interpersonal y ambas con la
siderada como delictiva, en función de cómo corrupción, parece lógico que exista co-
la sociedad reaccione ante ella, siendo esta rrelación positiva entre los bajos niveles de
no únicamente una cualidad, sino un proceso confianza intersubjetiva y la percepción de
que involucra la respuesta de los otros. Tam- corrupción, de forma que ese bajo nivel de
bién depende del momento determinado y de confianza entre los ciudadanos —rasgo con-
quién lo comete; en definitiva, un acto es des- solidado en España desde que se mide esta
viado según la naturaleza del acto en sí y de variable— podría afectar a la percepción de
la respuesta de los demás (Becker, 2014). Sin la corrupción y viceversa (Villoria, 2015).
duda, por la alta percepción de corrupción
política en nuestro país, las conductas corrup-
Naturaleza y tipologías. Del enfoque
tas en este ámbito son identificadas como
individualista al culturalista
desviadas, pero ¿existe una cultura permisiva
hacia otro tipo de microconductas cotidianas Tras definir y conceptualizar de forma gené-
que podrían definirse como desviadas? rica los conceptos anteriores, deberíamos
Según la literatura, el «capital social» plantearnos: ¿qué entendemos de facto por
(revisado por Putnam, 1995: 67), es un con- actos de corrupción? Laporta (1997) diseñó
cepto inversamente relacionado con los ni- un esquema de las principales prácticas
veles de corrupción; se define como «las corruptas:
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 177, Enero - Marzo 2022, pp. 127-142You can also read
