12 THE NARRE WARREN AND UPPER FERNTREE GULLY FIRES
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THE NARRE WARREN AND 12
UPPER FERNTREE GULLY FIRES
Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
12 THE Narre Warren and
Upper Ferntree Gully FIRES
On 7 February 2009 a number of small fires burned at the rural–urban interface in Melbourne’s south-east; among
them were three fires in Narre Warren (one at Harkaway and two at Lynbrook) and one in Upper Ferntree Gully.
The fires burned in grass reserves and scrubland, on residential streets, and in homes and gardens.
Each of the fires might have resulted in far greater and more widespread destruction than eventuated. In particular,
the Harkaway and Upper Ferntree Gully fires could have caused severe damage, the latter having had the potential
to run into the Dandenong Ranges. In total, seven houses were destroyed.
Figures 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3 show the extent of the fires.
Image 12.1
Source: Courtesy of the Herald & Weekly Times.
182
The Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully fires
Figure 12.1 The Harkaway fire
Final fire perimeter
Rivers/creeks
Roads
Harkaway
N
1 Kilometres
HA RK AWAY
RO AD
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0.4
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HF
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183
MO
Source: Exhibit 994 – Harkaway Fire – Final Fire Perimeter.1�
Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
Figure 12.2 The Lynbrook—Coral Drive fire
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0 100 200 400 600 800 Metres N Final fire perimeter
184 Roads
Rivers/creeks
Source: Exhibit 994 – Lynbrook Fire – Final Fire Perimeter.2�
Reservoi
Flagstaf
The Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully fires
Bendigo
14:15
GREAT LAKE ROAD
Figure 12.3 The Upper Ferntree Gully fire
DAWSON
STREET
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Final fire perimeter
EN UE
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Rivers/creeks
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185
FO RE ST
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Source: Exhibit 994 – Upper Ferntree Gully Fire – Final Fire Perimeter.3
Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully 7 February
The following time line summarises events associated with the Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully
fires. For the most part, the times given are approximate. Further details about the events are provided
in the accompanying narrative.
15:42
11:41 Upper The Coral
Harkaway Ferntree Drive fire in
Harkaway fire initially Gully fire Air support Lynbrook
fire starts contained starts requested ignites
7 February 11:32 11:37 15:32 15:55 16:05 16:48 17:00
First tanker Harkaway fire Alert message 16:30 An air crane
arrives on scene re-ignites for Upper Urgent threat diverted to
Ferntree Gully message Harkaway fire
fire issued issued for
15:33 Upper Ferntree
First tanker Gully fire
arrives on scene
186
The Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully fires
18:15
Control of
Harkaway fire
transferred to
Belgrave ICC
17:10
Downgrade
message issued 18:10
for Upper Ferntree Mr Glass takes 19:09
Gully fire over as Incident Upper Ferntree
Controller for both Gully fire reported
17:42 Lynbrook fires under control
First appliances Wind change
arrive on scene pushes Coral
at Golf Club Drive fire towards Upper Ferntree Lynbrook fires Urgent threat
Road fire in Langbourne Gully fire reported under message issued Harkaway fire
Lynbrook Drive contained control for Harkaway fire contained
17:08 17:45 18:00 18:50 19:01 20:29 21:40 21:50
17:27 Wind change 18:44 19:15 Downgrade
Red flag pushes Harkaway First alert Strike team message released
warning issued fire towards message issued redeployed from for Harkaway fire
to firefighters at Dandenong for Harkaway fire Lynbrook to
Upper Ferntree Ranges Harkaway fire
Gully
18:50
Harkaway
fire crosses
Harkaway Road
187
Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
12.1 Narre Warren
Overview
Cause Harkaway: accidental.4
Lynbrook: not determined.5
Fatalities No fatalities.6
Houses destroyed Seven houses.7
Overall area burnt Harkaway: 147 hectares.8
Lynbrook: 12 hectares.9
Firefighting resources On 7 February, 294 CFA, 16 MFB and 12 NEO personnel attended the fires.
They were supported by 63 CFA appliances, 4 MFB appliances, 7 NEO appliances
and 2 aircraft.10
12.1.1 Sequence of Events
Preparation
In the lead-up to 7 February, Country Fire Authority brigades in Region 8 attended other incidents, including the
Delburn fires, and planning and preparations were advanced in anticipation of fire escaping Bunyip State Park.11
This meant that some brigades were already fatigued before 7 February.
Mr Trevor Owen, Region 8 CFA Operations Manager, prepared level 3 incident control centres at Pakenham and
Moorooduc, and incident management teams were in position on the morning of 7 February. At that time Mr Owen
supervised the move of MFB appliances to Dandenong, Springvale, Hallam, Frankston and Patterson River; this
released CFA resources in those stations to respond to the Bunyip fire. Later in the day some of the MFB crews
responded to fires in Narre Warren.12
From 08:00 on 7 February the Regional Emergency Coordination Centre was running at full capacity.13
The Harkaway fire
The fire at Harkaway began at about 11:32 at a home in Garden View Court. It is suspected the fire was caused by
someone using an angle grinder: Victoria Police has charged a man with using a power tool in breach of regulations
on a total fire ban day.14
The Narre Warren North tanker was the first to arrive at the Harkaway fire, arriving at 11:37. A number of CFA
appliances subsequently attended, including brigades from Dandenong and Hallam. The fire was initially managed by
the Narre Warren North CFA Brigade at the local level. The Incident Controller was Mr Shaun Trotter, captain of Narre
Warren North Brigade. Both the Moorooduc and Belgrave Incident Control Centres monitored the fire during the early
part of its run.15
The fire initially ran to the south-east. It was contained at 11:41 and stopped at 12:23. At 15:32, however, the fire re-
ignited on the Robinsons Road side of Crawley Road when a resident cut down a smoking branch, causing burning
embers to hit dry fuel on the ground. Once re-ignited, the fire ran towards the south-east under the influence of
strong north-westerly winds, crossing Robinsons Road. The fire was again attended by local CFA brigades. Shortly
after, additional resources were sought, including from Upper Beaconsfield, Berwick and Cranbourne. Crews worked
quickly, and at 16:05 air support was requested. Initially, the Regional Emergency Coordination Centre was unable to
secure air resources, but at about 17:00 an air crane en route to the Upper Ferntree Gully fire was diverted to assist.16
188
The Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully fires Mr Owen, the RECC Coordinator, feared that the Harkaway fire could have ‘followed a similar path of destruction to that of Ash Wednesday’. He adopted a ‘triage’ approach and focused on developing priorities for the various fires in the area and identifying where the available firefighting resources would best be deployed.17 The usual Municipal Emergency Response Coordinator for the area was on leave, and no formal arrangement had been made for anyone to fill his position during his absence. Sergeant Sheree Moore performed the duties of the MERC on 7 February, although she had neither been formally appointed to that position nor been trained for the role.18 As the afternoon unfolded Sergeant Moore established roadblocks in the Narre Warren area to control the flow of traffic near the fires. She did this without the benefit of information from the ICC. Later in the day she was able to speak to the Deputy Incident Controller, but her experience was not satisfactory and in her opinion the police had not received adequate information. The lack of information from the ICC made it difficult to situate roadblocks safely— both for residents of the area and for police staffing the roadblocks. From 16:00 Victoria Police set up roadblocks as full road closures; these roadblocks had to be moved a number of times during the ensuing hour because of the speed of the fire.19 The south-westerly wind change arrived at 17:45 and pushed the fire towards the Dandenong Ranges.20 At about 18:15 the fire was formally escalated to the control of the Belgrave ICC. Mr Colin Brown, a CFA operations officer, became the Incident Controller.21 Initially, warnings for the Harkaway fire were handled by the Regional Emergency Coordination Centre. The first warning issued was an alert message at 18:44; it referred to a fire burning in a north-easterly direction between King Road, A’Beckett Road, Harkaway Road and Narre Warren North Road. Mr Brown stated that at the time the alert message was sent the fire was already ‘burning out to the Harkaway Road area’. The alert warning was thus too late and of little use to residents.22 The fire crossed Harkaway Road at 18:50 and burnt the area between Helleur and King Roads.23 At 20:29 the Belgrave ICC released an urgent threat message for Harkaway, Narre Warren North and Beaconsfield Upper. Mr Brown explained that the message was issued ‘because of the wind change that had come through and was driving the fire in a north-easterly direction and threatening those areas at that stage’. But the wind change had occurred two hours before, and Mr Brown was unable to explain why the message was not issued earlier.24 Subsequently, at 21:40, a downgrade message was released for the Harkaway fire.25 By 21:50 the fire was contained.26 An alert message was issued at 23:11, saying fire activity was continuing. At 01:25 on 8 February a downgrade message was authorised: it advised that the communities of Harkaway, Narre Warren North and Beaconsfield Upper no longer needed to be on alert.27 Overall, the Harkaway fire burnt 147 hectares and destroyed and damaged a number of homes, sheds, garages and outbuildings.28 The Lynbrook fires The Coral Drive fire in Lynbrook started at 16:48 in a grassy area along Coral Drive in Narre Warren South. The grassy area appears to have acted as a corridor, assisting the fire’s spread to the boundaries of properties on Langbourne Drive. The cause of the fire has not been determined. Having initially run along the grassy reserve beside Coral Drive, it then headed north-east and crossed Ormond Road.29 At about 16:52 Mr Arthur Haynes, a CFA operations officer from the Moorooduc ICC attended the Narre Warren North CFA Control Centre to help the local Incident Controller, Mr Trotter. At 17:40 Mr Haynes became the Incident Controller for the Coral Drive fire and appointed Mr Trotter as his operations officer. Together they divided the fire into sectors and deployed resources accordingly. The strategy was to contain the fire and stop its spread into the 189 Dandenong Ranges.30
Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
Mr David Beards, captain of the Narre Warren Brigade, arrived at the Coral Drive fire at 16:55, some seven
minutes after ignition. At 17:10 he was advised that a strike team was on its way but that no further resources
were immediately available. Subsequently, a number of appliances attended the fire, among them MFB crews and
appliances that were covering CFA stations in Dandenong, Hallam and Pakenham.31
Another fire, at Golf Club Road in Lynbrook, was first reported at 17:08, when a member of the public telephoned
the Cranbourne fire station. The fire’s point of origin was in grassland on the western side of the South Gippsland
Highway, about 300 metres north of Golf Club Road. The cause of the fire has not been determined.32
At 17:08 appliances, including MFB resources, started arriving at the fire. A strike team arrived at 17:30, and from
17:40 onwards a number of additional appliances attended.33
Shortly after the fire started it crossed the South Gippsland Highway and entered grassland, threatening a landscaping
business where quantities of LPG, petrol, diesel and other chemicals were stored, and damaging a shed.34
After the wind changed from south to south-westerly at 17:42, the Coral Drive fire headed to Langbourne Drive and
into the transmission line reserve. It then spotted back onto the other side of Ormond Road. With the assistance of
firefighting crews, residents of Langbourne Drive tried to defend their properties with buckets and wheelie bins full
of water. A number of houses were destroyed. Those burnt on Langbourne Drive were relatively new houses built on
suburban-sized blocks and positioned very close together. The land was mainly flat, and there was limited vegetation
along the roads.35
Mr Beards stated that one of the features of the Coral Drive fire was ‘that the residents banded together to help
protect their properties … with buckets, hoses, anything that could carry water to assist in the fire fight’. One house
that had a swimming pool was able to be saved because of the availability of water from the pool.36
The two Lynbrook fires were initially managed separately. At 18:10, however, Mr Ian Glass, a fire officer with the
Cranbourne Brigade, took over the role of Incident Controller for both fires. By 19:01 both fires were reported as
being under control. At about 19:15 the strike team was redeployed to the Harkaway fire.37
At some time between 19:00 and 19:30 Sergeant Moore received a phone call from Senior Sergeant Hengel
(the officer normally assigned to be the Municipal Emergency Response Coordinator), who told her she should
activate the Municipal Emergency Control Centre. Shortly thereafter the MECC was opened in Vesper Drive, Casey.38
Sergeant Moore agreed that, considering the impact of the Coral Drive fire on the houses on Langbourne Drive, it
would have been prudent to establish the MECC earlier, when the damage occurred. She also acknowledged that
more formal arrangements about who would fill the role in the absence of the usual MERC would have been helpful.
The Commission was advised that since 7 February steps have been taken to improve the relevant police service
areas’ preparedness for fire.39
No formal warnings appear to have been issued for the Lynbrook fires, which burnt 12 hectares and destroyed homes.40
12.1.2 Conclusions
Residents of Narre Warren and police in the Casey Police Service Area were surprised by the outbreak of fire in an
urban area. In its subsequent research into the three fires, the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre found that very
few residents expected to be affected by bushfire.41
The initial attack efforts devoted to each of the fires were successful, and the cooperative arrangements between
the MFB and the CFA worked well. Effective managing, resourcing and firefighting on the ground—noting the limited
availability of resources in the region from 14:30—averted possible widespread damage to the Dandenong Ranges.42
The Commission considers that some of the delays and confusion in communications relating to this fire, and the lack
of information flowing to Victoria Police, might have been avoided by earlier escalation of incident management to the
Belgrave ICC.
190 A delay of about two hours in issuing warning messages for any fire is not acceptable. It is unlikely, however, that
the delay caused any major detriment to residents, who were apparently alerted to the fires by smoke or information
received from friends, family and neighbours.43The Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully fires
12.2 Upper Ferntree Gully
Overview
Cause Unknown.44
Fatalities No fatalities.45
Houses destroyed No houses destroyed.46
Overall area burnt 4 hectares.47
12.2.1 Sequence of Events
The Upper Ferntree Gully fire started at about 15:42, near the Burwood Highway and Quarry Road. It was difficult
for firefighters to gain access to the fire because there was a railway line nearby. The cause of the fire is not known.48
The fire initially spread south-east through scrubland between the Burwood Highway and Quarry Road. It was
spotting in various places along the edge of the Burwood Highway.49
From 15:42 onwards a number of brigades were dispatched to the fire. Mr Todd Small, the Ferntree Gully CFA
captain, attended the scene and at 15:47 asked for five tankers and then a further three. He established an
operations point behind 1140 Burwood Highway at about 16:00.50
Prompt warnings were issued for the fire. An alert message for Ferntree Gully and Upper Ferntree Gully was authorised
at 15:55. At 16:30 an urgent threat message was sent to the integrated Emergency Coordination Centre for the
residents of Quarry Road and the communities of Upper Ferntree Gully, Ferntree Gully and Tremont. The message
was downgraded at 17:10.51
Mr Colin Brown, CFA Incident Controller at the Belgrave ICC, was informed at 16:37 that the State Duty Officer was
sending an air crane to the fire. The air support was diverted, however, to protect assets at Harkaway. At 17:04 a
Helitack on its way to Moorabbin for refuelling made a number of rapid drops on the fire, obtaining water from a
nearby disused quarry. The Helitack’s assistance was vital. Mr Brown explained that when the aircraft arrived the
fire had begun to spread to the northern side of Quarry Road and was heading towards residential properties.52
The Helitack made a single drop and caught the fire right on the cusp of a wind change from the south-west:
By pulling that fire up they prevented the fire possibly spreading … into the Tremont – Ferny Creek area.
We estimate probably within 10 to 15 minutes … [it] would have been impacting on those houses up
there and this would have been a significant event.53
At 17:14 Mr Brown received advice that the wind change had reached Moorabbin airport, and a red flag warning was
issued by radio to all vehicles in the area at 17:27.54
After the south-west wind change the fire spread between homes on the northern side of Quarry Road and headed
towards Ferntree Gully National Park. At this time there were wind gusts of up to 90 kilometres an hour.55
By 17:30 there were eight tankers, three slip-ons and three pumpers on the ground. The Helitack was still working
over the fire as it burned towards Lady’s Walk and the Boulevard.56
The fire was contained by 18:00, and by 19:09 it was declared under control. Four hectares were burnt, but no
houses were lost.57
12.2.2 Conclusions
The Commission notes the opportune arrival of the Helitack and commends the efforts of firefighters. This averted
possible widespread damage to the Ferny Creek area and the Dandenong Ranges which posed a very significant
191
potential threat to human life.Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
1 Exhibit 994 – Harkaway Fire – Final Fire Perimeter (CFA.600.006.0002)
2 Exhibit 994 – Lynbrook Fire – Final Fire Perimeter (CFA.600.006.0001)
3 Exhibit 994 – Upper Ferntree Gully Fire – Final Fire Perimeter (CFA.600.006.0003)
4 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [22]–[23], [37]–[38], Annexure 9 (WIT.3004.029.0171) at 0171; Brown
T13050:16–T13050:24; Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore, Annexure 4 (WIT.3010.007.0274) at 0274
5 Exhibit 602 – CFA Incident Report (CFA.001.025.0223); Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards (WIT.3004.029.0056) [14]–[15], Annexure 3
(WIT.3004.029.0074); Exhibit 606 – Statement of Booth, Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.029.0006) at 0011–0012; Exhibit 602 – Bushfire CRC
Supplementary Report (CRC.301.001.0001) at 0092; Exhibit 602 – Victoria Police Incident Fact Sheet (CORR.0910.0033)
6 Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0110, 0114
7 Exhibit 980 – Correspondence – Houses Destroyed – Breakdown by Fire (CORR.1003.0048_R) at 0048_R
8 Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.4]
9 Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.7]
10 Exhibit 939 – Details Regarding Emergency Response (CFA.600.005.0195) at 0195, 0198; Exhibit 939 – MFB Response (MFB.001.001.0040)
at 0040; Exhibit 939 – Day by Day Breakdown – Narre Warren (DSE.HDD.0048.0545_20); Exhibit 939 – Aircraft Data 0809
(DSE.HDD.0048.0544_20) at 0544_25
11 Exhibit 595 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0001) [33], [39]
12 Exhibit 595 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0001) [21]–[25], [66]–[67], [123], [134]; Brown T13052:27–T13053:7
13 Exhibit 595 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0001) [115]
14 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [22]–[23], [37]–[38], Annexure 9 (WIT.3004.029.0171) at 0171;
Brown T13050:16–T13050:24; Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore, Annexure 4 (WIT.3010.007.0274) at 0274
15 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [39]–[45], [55]; Brown T13053:8–T13053:28
16 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [46]–[47], [49]–[53], [64]; Brown T13051:8–T13051:23; Graystone T6034:3–T6034:16,
T6073:9–T6073:17
17 Exhibit 595 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0001) [150], [156], [161]; Owen T12936:11–T12936:16
18 Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore (WIT.3010.007.0206) [23]; Moore T13079:16–T13079:27
19 Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore (WIT.3010.007.0206) [36]–[40]; Moore T13081:14–T13081:28, T13082:7–T13084:12, T13085:16–T13085:30
20 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [71]; Brown T13054:8–T13054:24
21 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [71]; Brown T13054:8–T13054:24
22 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [75], Annexure 11 (WIT.3004.029.0204); Brown T13056:28–T13056:31,
T13057:4–T13057:7
23 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [66], [77]–[79], [97], Annexure 4 (WIT.3004.029.0142_R) at 0142_R; Brown
T13051:29–T13051:31
24 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [90], Annexure 13 (WIT.3004.029.0209); Brown T13057:22–T13057:31,
T13058:3–T13058:10
25 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [95], [99], [107], Annexure 14 (WIT.3004.029.0212), Annexure 15 (WIT.3004.029.0215),
Annexure 19 (WIT.3004.029.0239)
26 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [66], [77]–[79], [97], Annexure 4 (WIT.3004.029.0142_R) at 0142_R; Brown
T13051:29–T13051:31
27 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [95], [99], [107], Annexure 14 (WIT.3004.029.0212), Annexure 15 (WIT.3004.029.0215),
Annexure 19 (WIT.3004.029.0239)
28 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [23], Annexure 3 (WIT.3004.029.0140) at 0140, Annexure 4 (WIT.3004.029.0142_R)
at 0142_R; Exhibit 606 – Statement of Booth, Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.029.0006) at 0010–0011, 0016–0026; Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow
(WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.4]
29 Exhibit 602 – CFA Incident Report (CFA.001.025.0223); Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards (WIT.3004.029.0056) [14]–[16], Annexure 3
(WIT.3004.029.0074); Exhibit 606 – Statement of Booth, Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.029.0006) at 0011–0012; Exhibit 602 – Bushfire CRC
Supplementary Report (CRC.301.001.0001) at 0092
30 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [55], [57]–[58], [63]
31 Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards (WIT.3004.029.0056) [29]–[30], [34], Annexure 5 (WIT.3004.029.0105) at 0106; Beards T13075:3–T13075:18;
Exhibit 576 – Supplementary Statement of Murphy (WIT.3006.001.0263) [12]; Murphy T12588:23–T12589:5
32 Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards (WIT.3004.029.0056) [45], Annexure 6 (WIT.3004.029.0110) at 0110; Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore,
Annexure 5 (WIT.3010.007.0277) at 0278; Exhibit 602 – Victoria Police Incident Fact Sheet (CORR.0910.0033)
33 Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards (WIT.3004.029.0056) [45]–[46], [48]–[49], [53]–[64]
34 Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore, Annexure 5 (WIT.3010.007.0277) at 0277; Exhibit 602 – Victoria Police Incident Fact Sheet
(CORR.0910.0033); Beards T13072:29–T13073:18
35 Exhibit 602 – Bushfire CRC Supplementary Report (CRC.301.001.0001) at 0086, 0094–0102; Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards
192 (WIT.3004.029.0056) [17], [32]; Murphy T12596:18–T12596:28The Narre Warren and Upper Ferntree Gully fires
36 Exhibit 605 – Statement of Beards (WIT.3004.029.0056) [38]–[39]; Beards T13069:11–T13069:13, T13069:21–T13069:28;
Exhibit 606 – Statement of Booth, Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.029.0006) at 0011, 0016–0026; Exhibit 602 – Bushfire CRC Supplementary Report
(CRC.301.001.0001) at 0091
37 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0056) [55], [58], [66]–[68], Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.029.0006) at 0011, 0016–0026; Exhibit 604
– Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [66]; Beards T13069:11–T13069:13
38 Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore (WIT.3010.007.0206) [52]–[55]; Moore T13084:13–T13084:21
39 Exhibit 608 – Statement of Moore (WIT.3010.007.0206) [48], [76], [88]; Moore T13086:11–T13086:18, T13085:4–T13085:11
40 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [23], Annexure 3 (WIT.3004.029.0140) at 0140, Annexure 4 (WIT.3004.029.0142_R)
at 0142_R; Exhibit 606 – Statement of Booth, Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.029.0006) at 0010–0011, 0016–0026; Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow
(WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.7]
41 Exhibit 602 – Bushfire CRC Supplementary Report (CRC.301.001.0001) at 0090
42 Exhibit 595 – Statement of Owen (WIT.3004.031.0001) [144], [147]
43 Exhibit 602 – Bushfire CRC Supplementary Report (CRC.301.001.0001) at 0090–0091
44 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [25], [114], Annexure 5 (WIT.3004.029.0144), Annexure 22 (WIT.3004.029.0248)
at 0248; Brown T13061:27–T13061:28
45 Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0112
46 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [28]
47 Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.11]
48 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [25], [114], Annexure 5 (WIT.3004.029.0144), Annexure 22 (WIT.3004.029.0248)
at 0248; Brown T13061:27–T13061:28
49 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [27]; Brown T13063:3–T13063:4
50 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [115]–[121], [124]
51 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [125], Annexure 23 (WIT.3004.029.0255), Annexure 24 (WIT.3004.029.0258) at 0258,
Annexure 27 (WIT.3004.029.0274)
52 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [64], [74], [77], [127], [130]; Brown T13062:1–T13062:17, T13063:18–T13063:25
53 Brown T13062:11–T13062:17
54 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [133], Annexure 6 (WIT.3004.029.0146_R) at 0146_R; Brown T13063:29–T13064:2
55 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [27]; Brown T13063:12–T13063:14
56 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [136]–[137]
57 Exhibit 604 – Statement of Brown (WIT.3004.029.0112) [28], [138], [144], Annexure 29 (WIT.3004.029.0278)
193Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
Source: Courtesy of the Herald & Weekly Times.
Source: Courtesy of the Herald & Weekly Times.
194THE BENDIGO FIRE 13
Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
13 THE Bendigo FIRE
The City of Greater Bendigo is about 150 kilometres north-west of Melbourne. The city itself, centrally located
in the municipality, is one of Victoria’s main regional centres.
The Bendigo fire started shortly after 16:00 on 7 February 2009 in Maiden Gully, 8 kilometres north-west of the
central business district. It burned through gently rolling country bordering the city’s western suburbs, where
there are numerous former gold diggings that are now public open space interspersed between suburban blocks.
The fire burned for six hours in the late afternoon and evening, running for about 5.5 kilometres to the south-east
before the wind changed at about 18:45 and pushed the flames to the north-east, further into suburban Bendigo.
About half of the area burnt was public land. One fatality occurred, a number of people were injured, and 58 houses
were destroyed. Figure 13.1 shows the extent of the fire.
Overview
Maximum temperature The maximum temperature recorded was 45.4°C at Bendigo automatic
weather station.1
Minimum relative humidity The minimum relative humidity recorded was 6 per cent at Bendigo AWS at 13:16.2
Wind The maximum winds recorded before the wind change were north-westerly at
41 kilometres an hour at 17:01.3
The wind change was recorded by the Bendigo AWS at 18:45 at 35 kilometres
an hour.4
The maximum winds recorded after the wind change were south-westerly at
35 kilometres an hour at 18:45.5
Fire danger index The maximum Grassland Fire Danger Index was 129 at Bendigo AWS at 13:31.6
Cause Suspicious.7
Fatalities One fatality.8
Casualties Forty-one casualties.9
Houses destroyed Fifty-eight houses.10
Overall area burnt 341 hectares.11
Firefighting resources On 7 February, 152 CFA and 111 NEO personnel attended the fire. They were
supported by 30 CFA appliances, 31 NEO appliances and 3 aircraft.12
196AV
AD ER
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California Gully Bendigo
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Figure 13.1 The Bendigo fire
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Source: Exhibit 994 – Maiden Gully Fire – Fire Spread Map.13
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Kilometres N Fire-affected area–18:30 Fire origin
Final fire perimeter Spot fire
Roads Rivers/creeks
The Bendigo fire
197Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
Bendigo 7 February – 9 February
The following time line summarises events associated with the Bendigo fire. For the most part, the times
given are approximate. Further details about the events are provided in the accompanying narrative.
18:00
Spot fire in
16:20 Lilac Street
16:50
Fire starts in extinguished
Police arrive,
Maiden Gully by residents
start directing
Residents 16:30 traffic and 17:00 Embers
try, without Eaglehawk CFA evacuations Eaglehawk Leisure extinguished
success, to Brigade notified and establish Centre opened as several kilometres
call 000 of fire roadblocks emergency relief centre south of fire
7 February 16:20 16:30 16:50 17:00 18:04
16:40 17:14 17:30 18:04
First CFA tanker Fire sectorised Fire jumps Information
arrives on scene Maiden Gully officer arrives
Road at Adam Street
Eaglehawk CFA 17:17 ICC
captain assumes Awareness
role of Incident message
Controller at fire posted to CFA
ground website
16:45
Adam Street
ICC Incident
Controller
appointed
198The Bendigo fire
18:45
Wind change
extends fire to
north-east
18:42 19:10
ABC Bendigo Operations officer 21:30
begins regular sent from Redesdale; Endorsed level 3 Incident
fire-related establishes operations Controller takes control
broadcasts point at fire ground of the IMT
18:30 18:45 19:00 9 February
18:30 19:00 21:00 21:52 03:00
Adam Street ICC Team arrives from Operations officer Fire declared Fire
makes first contact Epsom ICC; Deputy arrives at Adam contained declared
with the fire ground Incident Controller Street ICC; briefs safe
appointed the IMT
Endorsed level 3
Incident Controller
arrives at Adam Street
ICC to assist
MECC becomes fully
operational
Information officer tries
to distribute first urgent
threat message
199Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
13.1 Sequence of events
13.1.1 Preparation
Bendigo is in the same CFA region as Redesdale, so preparations for Bendigo were the same as those for Redesdale
(see Chapter 11). On 6 February Mr John Deering, Operations Manager of CFA Region 14, and Department of
Sustainability and Environment acting Area Land and Fire Manager, Mr Andrew Matthews, set up a joint level 3
incident management team at the Epsom Incident Control Centre, for a ‘hot start’ the following day. Many of the
IMT members selected for the hot start were at the ICC on 6 February and used that day to test and confirm ground
observer arrangements and begin fire behaviour prediction work. Those present also participated in a practice
scenario involving a multi-agency response to a level 3 fire.14
A fully staffed IMT was at the Epsom ICC on the morning of 7 February. Mr Deering was there from 08:30 and shared
the leadership role with Mr James Dalton, DSE Assistant Manager, Fire and Emergency Management. Both men were
accredited level 3 Incident Controllers.15
What was not contemplated in the detailed preparations at the Epsom ICC was the possibility that a second level 3
fire would demand further incident management resources. The possibility became reality, and the Epsom IMT felt
unable to manage two complex fires that were about 40 kilometres apart.16
The Municipal Emergency Resource Officer had confirmed on 6 February the availability of council staff for emergency
response and recovery and placed the council’s seven water tankers and six graders on standby.17
Table 13.1 summarises the state of preparedness for the Bendigo fire.
Table 13.1 The Bendigo fire – IMT preparedness
Pre-designated level 3 ICC No18
Pre-formed IMT at ICC No19
Pre-identified level 3 IC No20
Pre-identified IMT members No21
Time fire started Approximately 16:2022
Full IMT in place by Approximately 21:3023
Safety adviser appointed No24
13.1.2 7 February
Origin and cause
Ms Kirsty Tinker-Casson of Bracewell Street, Maiden Gully, was home alone on the afternoon of 7 February when
at about 16:20 she noticed flames coming from the edge of the creek near her home. She tried to ring 000, without
success at first; by the time she did get through, the fire was racing alongside the creek.25
Police investigations determined the cause of the Bendigo fire to be suspicious. In order not to prejudice criminal
investigations and proceedings, limited evidence was presented to the Commission concerning the cause of the fire.26
Fire run, response and management
Mr Eric Smith, captain of the Eaglehawk CFA brigade, was at the Eaglehawk fire station on 7 February when, at
about 16:30, two private cars arrived and the drivers told him there was a fire in Bracewell Street that was ‘going
200 pretty well’. The Eaglehawk pumper turned out immediately, and Mr Smith notified VicFire of the fire. As the
Eaglehawk pumper travelled towards the fire Mr Smith could see the growing smoke column and made a series
of requests for tankers to be dispatched.27The Bendigo fire
The fire initially travelled south-east and quickly built into a ferocious fire, crowning in trees less than 20 metres from
the area of its origin.28
Mr Smith and the Eaglehawk pumper arrived on the scene at about 16:40 and were soon joined by the Bendigo tanker.
Together they were able to extinguish the edge of the fire near the point of origin, protecting nearby houses. As other
tankers arrived Mr Smith directed them to work along both flanks of the fire, concentrating on the eastern edge.29
At about 16:45 the Adam Street ICC was assigned to manage the Bendigo fire. This facility was a level 2 CFA
incident control centre; it had been staffed in preparation for the day as a group coordination centre. It became the
ICC for the Bendigo fire because by this time the Epsom ICC was already fully engaged responding to the Redesdale
fire (see Chapter 11), which had begun more than an hour before the Bendigo fire. The Redesdale Incident Controller
did not think his team had the capacity to manage a second complex fire at the same time.30
CFA Group Officer Mr Peter Rogasch had been at Adam Street since morning and assumed the role of Incident
Controller. Although he was an experienced firefighter, at the time he had no qualifications or experience as a level 3
Incident Controller.31
From the beginning, the Adam Street ICC was hampered in its efforts by poor radio and telephone communications.
Repeated attempts to use the telephones, both landline and mobile, met with little success. In addition, the ICC had
no access to the CFA’s Incident Management System from either of its two computers.32
The first alert for the Bendigo fire, in the form of an unofficial verbal awareness message, was broadcast on ABC
Bendigo at 16:52; this was done from the information unit at the Epsom ICC because there was no information officer
at the Adam Street ICC during the initial stages of the fire. The first official fire information release was broadcast on
ABC Bendigo at 17:10, informing listeners of a fire near Bracewell Street, Eaglehawk. An urgent threat message, also
prepared by the Epsom ICC, was posted to the CFA website.33
At about 17:00 Senior Sergeant Grant Morris, the Municipal Emergency Response Coordinator, asked Mr Alexanda
Malone, the Municipal Emergency Resource Officer for Greater Bendigo Council, to open an emergency relief centre
for residents evacuating from Bracewell Street: the Eaglehawk Leisure Centre was opened.34
As first officer on the scene, Mr Smith had assumed the role of Incident Controller and had established a control
point at Bracewell Street. He was unaware of the Adam Street ICC until much later in the day. At about 17:14 he
made contact with Mr Greg Stead on Bendigo Pumper 1, and together they divided the fire ground into two sectors.
Mr Smith continued as sector commander of the north and Mr Stead became sector commander of the south.35
Within 35 to 40 minutes of being reported the fire was approaching Maiden Gully Road, near Bonazza Road. Despite
appliances having responded to the southern end of the fire, it crossed Maiden Gully Road near Albert Street at about
17:30 and was so intense it melted the asphalt. By this time there were already three spot fires about 2 kilometres to
the south-east of the main fire.36
Mr Peter Beaton, a communications officer employed by DSE at its Epsom office, was rostered to work as an
information officer at the Epsom ICC from 17:00 on 7 February. Not long after 17:30 he was directed to go to the
Adam Street ICC to fill the position of information officer.37
The fire continued with high intensity, crowning in small patches of forest on both sides of Albert Street. The fire’s
initial south-eastern run was halted at an area of forested Crown land known as the Dai Gum San diggings, where
a fuel-reduction burn had been conducted the previous spring. This restricted the width of the firefront moving into
suburban Bendigo by about 40 per cent and, the Commission was advised, limited the fire’s impact at that time.38
DSE slip-on units arrived near Victoria Hill diggings, where they directly attacked the fire. A DSE crew arrived with a
bobcat, and staff were directed to cut firebreaks in grassland at the intersection of Marong Road (the Calder Highway)
and Eaglehawk Road. The strategy was to contain the fire at Upper California Gully Road and to extinguish any spot
fires that started to the east of that line. Consistent with this, resources were directed to work in the Upper California
201
Gully Road – Eaglehawk Road – Victoria Street area, extinguishing any spot fires and cutting breaks along the
northern flank of the fire.39Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
The fire continued to crown, causing spotting that carried it over some areas of low fuel and into grasslands and
backyards in the areas of Daniel Street, Walker Street and Cunneen Street. At about 17:30 a resident lost his life
after being overcome by flames outside his home in Daniel Street.40 The circumstances surrounding his death are
considered in Chapter 19.
Crowning continued to carry the fire into the Watkins Street and Happy Valley Road areas, and spot fires were
occurring several kilometres downwind. Among the spot fires was one near the intersection of Lily Street and
Chum Street, which threatened Fortuna Villa (a heritage-listed 19th century villa estate) and St John of God Hospital.
This fire was brought under control within about 15 minutes.41
As the fire progressed further south-east it burned through an area that had been subject to fuel-reduction burning
in 2006. The Commission was advised that the reduced fuel load again diminished the intensity of the fire, even as
it travelled uphill.42
Mr Mike Wassing, an endorsed level 3 Incident Controller, was at home on 7 February and, after learning of the
Redesdale fire, went to the Bendigo Regional Emergency Coordination Centre to offer his assistance. He arrived
at 17:40 and quickly realised that the Adam Street ICC needed more resources. At about 18:00 he telephoned
Mr Pat O’Brien, CFA General Manager for the North West Area, and informed him of the Bendigo fire and discussed
resources. Mr O’Brien asked Mr Wassing to go to the Adam Street ICC to help Mr Rogasch. Mr Wassing did so,
arriving at 18:30.43
Box 13.1 Evacuation and roadblocks
Sergeant Craig Gaffee became aware of the fire in the Maiden Gully area at 16:44 and assumed the role of
Forward Commander for the fire. From the time he was able to assess the fire as it approached Maiden Gully
and Bonazza Roads, one of his priorities was to warn people of the danger and to tell them to either leave or
put their fire plan into operation.44
Initially Sergeant Gaffee had three police units available; more units arrived during the afternoon. Traffic
management was also a priority, but Sergeant Gaffee tried to keep himself and two other units free of roadblocks
so they could warn people being threatened by fire to evacuate if that was their plan. He found that an effective
way of gaining attention was to drive along a street using the police vehicle’s siren and public address system
to alert residents to the fact that the fire was approaching. Where possible, he and other police also went door
to door.45
Evacuation of residents in areas under threat was carried out at Sergeant Gaffee’s initiative in the face of a crisis,
not at the request or direction of the CFA as control agency for the fire. During the early hours of the fire he had
limited information about the fire’s movement and extent. The knowledge he did have was gained by his own
direct observations and those of other police, as relayed through the police communications network, D24.46
With the resources that were available initially, police were able to warn only a limited number of residents.47
It would, however, have been impossible in conditions as extreme as those experienced on 7 February to
ensure that all individuals were warned by police.
Sergeant Gaffee’s other priority in responding to the Bendigo fire was traffic management. Starting at 16:50,
when he arrived at Bonazza Road, he directed the available police units to establish roadblocks at strategic
points in order to restrict traffic from entering the fire area. During the next three hours he monitored the
movement of the fire as best he could and deployed units as they became available to crucial intersections,
keeping ahead of the fire. He observed that, because of limited resources and poor communication, it was
initially difficult to establish enough roadblocks. Additionally, the Bendigo fire was burning in a built-up area,
so people were able to avoid roadblocks by taking back roads.48 The Commission commends the efforts of
Victoria Police to warn residents and ensure their safety on the roads.
202The Bendigo fire
At 17:55 Senior Sergeant Morris telephoned Mr Malone to ask him to activate the Municipal Emergency Coordination
Centre. Mr Malone called the relevant council staff, two of whom were not able to respond because they were directly
involved with the fire themselves. Mr Malone and the council’s Chief Executive Officer, Craig Neiman, opened the
MECC at Bendigo Town Hall. It was fully operational by about 18:30.49
In the meantime, Senior Sergeant Morris had been alerted to the fact that the expected wind change would push the
fire towards Eaglehawk, placing the emergency relief centre at risk. He asked Mr Malone to relocate the relief centre.
Accordingly, the emergency relief centre was moved to the Kangaroo Flat Senior Citizens Centre. People who had
gone to the Eaglehawk Leisure Centre were transferred to Kangaroo Flat.50
At about 18:00 residents were extinguishing embers in Breen Street, several kilometres south of the main fire.
Another spot fire, in Lilac Street, was discovered by residents and put out at about this time. By 18:30 the fire was
5.5 kilometres long and had almost reached the Calder Highway, between Happy Valley Road and Dare Street.
The head of the fire was only 2 kilometres from Bendigo’s central business district, and there was a spot fire three
blocks from the Bendigo police station.51
Image 13.1
Source: Courtesy of the Herald & Weekly Times.
203Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
Mr Beaton, the information officer from the Epsom ICC, arrived at Adam Street at 18:04. He immediately set about
gathering information about the fire, with the intention of issuing an urgent threat message as soon as possible.
When he did try to issue the message, however, he encountered a series of technical problems that resulted in
many emails not reaching the intended recipients. The problems Mr Beaton experienced with the official channels
for issuing warnings might explain why no urgent threat messages for the Bendigo fire appeared on the CFA website
between 17:17 and 21:37 and no further urgent threat messages were broadcast on 774 ABC radio until 22:52.52
When Mr Beaton discovered that the urgent threat messages were not being distributed he contacted local radio
stations directly, asking them to send out the messages. This was effective: ABC Bendigo broadcast updated fire
information at 18:42, 18:58 and 19:17.53
No-one from the Adam Street ICC was able to make contact with Mr Smith on the fire ground until some time
between 18:10 and 18:30. Until then, he acted as the Incident Controller with no knowledge that the Adam Street
IMT had been established.54
Mr Jeff Wilkie, Assistant Fire Management Officer with DSE, was on standby for air operations at Bendigo airport.
The operations officer at the Epsom ICC asked him to help coordinate the DSE resources responding to the Bendigo
fire. Mr Wilkie was similarly unaware of the existence of the Adam Street IMT and until 20:20 provided situation
reports only to the Epsom ICC.55
The wind, which had been tending from north-west to west, swung to the south-west at about 18:30. After this the
fire was pushed initially to the east and then to the north-east. It made major runs into the back areas of homes along
Eaglehawk Road and threatened others along Upper California Gully Road. Spot fires occurred on the eastern side
of these roads and north of the Eaglehawk rubbish tip. When the fire entered the tip its impact was considerably
diminished, although, because of the fire’s intensity, it did spot over the tip.56
After discussion with Mr Deering at about 18:30, Mr Mark Gilmore, an operations manager with the CFA, agreed to
leave the Epsom ICC and help the field commanders at the Bendigo fire. He arrived at the head of the fire, near the
Calder Highway, as the wind was changing and assumed the role of divisional commander.57
Having spoken with Mr Wassing, Mr O’Brien alerted Mr Russell Manning, DSE District Manager for the Mallee,
to the need to send additional resources to the Adam Street ICC to assist with management of the Bendigo fire.
After discussion with Mr Deering and other DSE managers, it was decided that Mr Manning would take a number of
people with him from the Epsom ICC to help out at Adam Street. They arrived at 19:00, at which point Mr Manning
was assigned the role of Deputy Incident Controller.58
Mr Gilmore also had problems with radio communication and was unable to make radio contact with the field
commanders. At 18:30, Mr Gilmore left the Adam Street ICC to help field commanders at the fire. Just prior to 19:00,
he drove to Bracewell Street in an attempt to locate the control point. At 19:10 he found Mr Smith in Upper California
Gully Road, and together they went to the intersection of Eaglehawk Road and Upper California Gully Road, where
they established an operations point. At about 19:15 Mr Gilmore held a briefing at the operations point, using the
bonnet of his vehicle on which to formulate a strategy for containing and re-sectorising the fire.59
The first official advice to the public about the location of an emergency relief centre came in an urgent threat
message issued at 19:00; it identified the Eaglehawk Leisure Centre. Even though that centre had been closed,
this advice was repeated until 21:30, when the Kangaroo Flat Senior Citizens Centre was named the emergency
relief centre.60
By 19:22 the winds had subsided somewhat and it was possible to use air support. A helicopter was directed to
provide fire-bombing support on the running edge of the fire, where there were no tankers. Once ground crews
arrived, the fire-bomber moved to the western side of the fire to protect some of the more remote dwellings.61
Back at the Adam Street ICC Mr Wassing’s skill and experience as a level 3 Incident Controller quickly became
204 apparent. At about 19:30 he and Mr Rogasch agreed that Mr Wassing should take over as Incident Controller,
although he did not formally assume the role until 21:30. Mr Wassing’s presence, together with the arrival ofThe Bendigo fire
a number of personnel from the Epsom ICC, and improved information flows from the fire ground, meant the
Adam Street IMT became more functional. By the time of the briefing for the night-shift IMT at about 21:30,
Mr Wassing was able to concentrate on pressing matters such as liaison with the Municipal Emergency Coordination
Centre, traffic management, and safety concerns arising from gas leaks and fallen power lines. The Bendigo fire
was by this time largely under control, having been contained in the area of Happy Valley Road and Marong Road
(the Calder Highway) by 19:47.62
At about 19:45 Mr Gilmore eventually made contact with the Adam Street ICC when Mr Rogasch telephoned him,
telling him that the ICC was operating, that he was the Incident Controller, and that Mr Gilmore should work through
him. Mr Rogasch asked Mr Gilmore to come to the ICC to provide a briefing on the status of the fire. Mr Gilmore
arrived at the ICC at about 21:00 and shortly afterwards gave a full briefing to the IMT.63
At 20:00 the southerly wind had dropped further, and the fire behaviour moderated. The fire was contained at 21:52
on 7 February and was declared safe at 03:00 on Monday 9 February.64
The fire caused one death, 41 casualties and destroyed 58 houses as it burned along the fringe of Bendigo, covering
341 hectares. A total of 47 tankers responded during the course of the fire.65
The Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre remained operational and staffed until 17:45 on Sunday 8 February.
It closed that night but was then open during business hours from Monday 9 February until Monday 16 February.
The emergency relief centre at Kangaroo Flat was closed on 9 February, when the Eaglehawk Senior Citizens Centre
was opened as a recovery centre. The Red Cross registered 345 people at the Kangaroo Flat emergency relief centre
on 7 and 8 February, about 100 of them staying on the Saturday night.66
13.2 Conclusions
Although planning and pre-positioning of staff at the Epsom ICC were effective, management in CFA Region 2 did
not plan adequately for the possibility of more than one major fire in the region. When the second fire did break out
on the outskirts of Bendigo, facilities and the personnel available to manage the incident were inadequate. Qualified
staff were concentrated at the Epsom ICC and the Adam Street ICC facilities were unsatisfactory. The latter ICC
was largely disconnected from the Bendigo fire response, particularly in the crucial hours before and immediately
after the wind change.
Despite this, credit is due to the firefighters who responded to the Bendigo fire: they were able to respond operationally
to fighting the fire, establish a working incident management structure, and deploy resources effectively. They did this
in circumstances in which radio communications were poor, which could explain why many people at the fire ground
were unaware of the Adam Street ICC until so late in the day.
The almost total breakdown in radio communication between the fire ground and the Adam Street ICC was an
important feature of the Bendigo fire. Mr Gilmore gave evidence of repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the
CFA field commanders using the CFA radio. By all accounts, his radio appeared to be functioning since he was able
to talk with other people and could hear radio traffic. Mr Wilkie of DSE experienced similar radio communication
problems from the fire ground, which suggests that it was not only the CFA’s radio system that was struggling.
Witnesses attributed these problems to a number of causes, among them heat and smoke and the inadequate
facilities at the Adam Street ICC.67 Communication issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of Volume II.
Additionally, the lack of a pre-positioned information officer and basic computer facilities at the Adam Street ICC
impeded the provision of prompt warnings and advice to the public.
There was confusion about the location of the emergency relief centre, and the public received poor advice about
suitable venues for people who were evacuating. This confusion might have been avoided had there been better
communication between the Adam Street ICC and the Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre—in particular,
with earlier attendance by a CFA liaison officer.68
205Volume I: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths
An inter-agency initiative that did work well, though, was the allocation of a police member to each of the sector
commanders for the Bendigo fire. This was arranged through the MECC during the evening of 7 February.
The arrangement proved mutually beneficial: the police were able to help the sector commanders deal with small
concerns before they became big problems, and their presence in the sector commanders’ vehicles meant they
had access to good information about the fire situation.69
1 Exhibit 22 – Statement of Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0101
2 Exhibit 22 – Statement of Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0089
3 Exhibit 557 – Meteorological Aspects of the Maiden Gully Fire (BOM.901.0096) at 0109
4 Exhibit 557 – Meteorological Aspects of the Maiden Gully Fire (BOM.901.0096) at 0109
5 Exhibit 557 – Meteorological Aspects of the Maiden Gully Fire (BOM.901.0096) at 0109
6 Exhibit 22 – Statement of Williams, Annexure 1 (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0089
7 Exhibit 214 – Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.001.0338) [64]
8 Exhibit 215 – Supplementary statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.003.0287_R) [19]
9 Exhibit 215 – Supplementary Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.003.0287_R) [19]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [42]
10 Exhibit 980 – Correspondence – Houses Destroyed – Breakdown by Fire (CORR.1003.0048_R) at 0048_R
11 Exhibit 786 – Statement of Clow (WIT.3004.034.0004) [19.9]
12 Exhibit 939 – Details Regarding Emergency Response (CFA.600.005.0195) at 0195, 0198; Exhibit 939 – Day by Day Breakdown – Bendigo
(DSE.HDD.0048.0545_17); Exhibit 939 – Aircraft Data 0809 (DSE.HDD.0048.0544_20) at 0544_20
13 Exhibit 994 – Maiden Gully Fire – Fire Spread Map (CFA.600.006.0010)
14 Exhibit 452 – Statement of Deering (WIT.3004.019.0192) [25], [29], Annexure 6 (WIT.3004.019.0272) at 0272; Exhibit 460 – Statement
of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [21]; Exhibit 466 – Statement of Vearing (WIT.3024.004.0215) [15]; Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore
(WIT.3004.019.0001) [12]
15 Exhibit 452 – Statement of Deering (WIT.3004.019.0192) [5], [32]; Exhibit 466 – Statement of Vearing, Annexure 4 (DSE.HDD.0052.0651)
at 0687, 0707
16 Deering T10162:30–T10163:8; Cutting T10323:14–T10323:29
17 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [52]–[53]
18 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [12]–[13], [17]; Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56];
Cutting T10323:30–T10324:12; Rogasch T10245:8–T10245:29, T10247:17–T10247:26
19 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [18]
20 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [13], [18]
21 Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [12]–[13], [17]; Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56];
Cutting T10323:30–T10324:12; Rogasch T10245:8–T10245:29, T10247:17–T10247:26
22 Gilmore T10130:7–T10130:12
23 Exhibit 470 – Statement of Manning (WIT.3024.004.0233) [44]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [26];
Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore (WIT.3004.019.0001) [74]; Rogasch T10255:4–T10255:22; Gilmore T10307:28–T10308:7
24 Exhibit 548 – Correspondence – Safety Advisors (CORR.0911.0107_R)
25 Exhibit 462 – Statement of Tinker-Casson (SUMM.044.002.3976_R) at 3976_R–3977_R
26 Exhibit 214 – Statement of Hollowood (WIT.3010.001.0338) [64]
27 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [16]–[18]; Smith T10229:19–T10229:29, T10230:31–T10231:9
28 Gilmore T10130:27–T10131:4
29 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [19]–[21]; Smith T10232:2–T10232:21
30 Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [12]–[13], [17];
Deering T10162:30–T10163:8; Cutting T10323:14–T10323:29
31 Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [56]; Exhibit 457 – Statement of Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [2]–[3], [12]–[13],
[17], Annexure 1 (WIT.3004.019.0372), Annexure 2 (WIT.3004.019.0375); Rogasch T10244:7–T10244:20, T10245:8–T10245:29,
T10247:17–T10247:26; Cutting T10323:30–T10324:12
32 Exhibit 460 – Statement of Cutting (WIT.3004.020.0001) [57]; Rogasch T10248:15–T10248:24, T10249:5–T10249:20
33 Exhibit 469 – Statement of Downes (WIT.3004.020.0314) [28]–[29]; Exhibit 144 – ABC Local Radio – Disc 1 (TEN.052.001.0001);
Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0565
34 Exhibit 465 – Statement of Malone (WIT.4010.001.0001) [2], [60]–[62]; Exhibit 464 – Statement of Morris (WIT.3010.007.0298) [2]
206 35 Exhibit 456 – Statement of Smith (WIT.3004.020.0219) [19], [22]–[23], [27]; Rogasch T10249:28–T10249:30; Exhibit 457 – Statement of
Rogasch (WIT.3004.019.0362) [19]–[20]; Smith T10231:16–T10231:17, T10232:31–T10233:16
36 Exhibit 458 – Statement of Gilmore, Annexure 8 (WIT.3004.019.0147) at 0157–0161; Gilmore T10131:29–T10132:12You can also read
