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Workplan 2020/2021 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Contents
Foreword from President and CEO ................................................................................. 5
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7
2 From Early Warning to Early Action .......................................................................... 9
3 Gender ......................................................................................................................... 10
4 Africa ........................................................................................................................... 11
4.1 Horn of Africa .................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Central Africa ..................................................................................................... 13
4.3 West Africa ......................................................................................................... 15
4.4 Sahel ................................................................................................................... 16
4.5 Southern Africa .................................................................................................. 16
5 Asia .............................................................................................................................. 18
5.1 South Asia .......................................................................................................... 19
5.2 South East Asia .................................................................................................. 20
5.3 North East Asia .................................................................................................. 22
6 Europe and Central Asia ............................................................................................. 24
6.1 Russia ................................................................................................................. 24
6.2 Ukraine ............................................................................................................... 25
6.3 Turkey/Eastern Mediterranean ......................................................................... 25
6.4 Balkans ............................................................................................................... 26
6.5 South Caucasus .................................................................................................. 26
7 Latin America and Caribbean ..................................................................................... 28
7.1 Andes .................................................................................................................. 29
7.2 Central America ................................................................................................. 30
8 Middle East and North Africa ..................................................................................... 32
8.1 Eastern Mediterranean ...................................................................................... 33
8.2 Gulf and Arabian Peninsula ............................................................................... 34
8.3 North Africa........................................................................................................ 36
9 United States ............................................................................................................... 38
10 Future of Conflict ........................................................................................................ 39
10.1 Economics of Conflict ........................................................................................ 39
10.2 Climate Change and Conflict ............................................................................. 40
10.3 Technology and War .......................................................................................... 40Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 4
11 Jihad and Modern Conflict ......................................................................................... 42
12 Multilateralism............................................................................................................ 43
12.1 The United Nations ............................................................................................ 43
12.2 The European Union .......................................................................................... 44
12.3 The African Union .............................................................................................. 44
13 Advocacy ..................................................................................................................... 46
14 Communications ......................................................................................................... 48
15 Dialogue ...................................................................................................................... 49
16 Monitoring and Evaluation......................................................................................... 50
17 Partnerships ................................................................................................................ 51
Annexe 1: Crisis Group’s Coverage Worldwide ................................................................ 52Foreword from President and CEO COVID-19 has changed everything, and yet so much has stayed the same. There is a pre-pandemic and a post-pandemic world, and this evolution inevitably will be reflected in Crisis Group’s work. COVID-19’s reach, its impact on global public health, the economic downturn it will precipitate, the social disruptions and unrest it will leave in its wake – all of this will shape the conflicts and crises we cover. The brunt will be felt especially by women, children, refugees, the internally displaced and citizens of countries suffering from mismanagement, foreign sanctions or both. International conflict prevention and reso- lution mechanisms will likely suffer, too. Governments may well have less time, money and attention to devote to outside crises, feeling compelled to look inward and address their nations’ own economic woes at the expense of foreign assistance or diplomatic engagement. Travel restrictions will impede diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, relief efforts and, more broadly, access to war zones. The pandemic may also trigger greater scapegoating, as leaders look to distract the public or blame others for problems to absolve themselves of culpability. One result, already, is heightened tension between the U.S. and China, making great-power cooperation in tackling deadly conflicts all the harder. For all these reasons, COVID-19 looks set to cast a long shadow over our work. First, it will shape our research and advocacy agendas. We will build on our work thus far and continue to analyse the pandemic’s potentially destabilising effects, how policymakers can cope and how they can seize any peacemaking opportunities that may arise. We will do this both by looking at broad trends and by zeroing in on specific cases, from Pakistan to Iraq, from Central America to Africa. Beyond that, the pandemic and the side effects of measures taken to stem its spread are likely to permeate even work that is not specific to COVID-19. It will be difficult to cover potential Afghan or Yemeni peace talks, the perilous U.S.-Iran stand- off, the Ethiopian and Sudanese transitions, the bloodshed spreading across the Sahel or Venezuela’s worsening crisis, for example, without factoring in the coronavirus. Secondly, COVID-19 is forcing us to adjust not only what we work on, but how we work. Lockdowns hinder the field research on which our publications and advocacy rest, and we will need to find ways to adapt. Finally, we know, too, that the pandemic may well affect our fundraising, as some supporters face the combination of fewer resources and greater compet- ing demands. Crisis Group will do its utmost to be as valuable a partner as possible, responding to the requirements of its consumers. Yet, even amid such dramatic transformations, much remains unchanged. Our mission, first and foremost, remains as relevant as ever. Indeed, if anything, the pandemic injects new urgency into efforts to shine a spotlight on conflicts that risk being ignored as the world turns its gaze elsewhere. Attention and resources devoted to these crises may diminish, but the importance of resolving them will not. COVID-19 may overshadow all else, but other aspects of politics – and warfare – go on. Even as Crisis Group probes COVID-19’s impact, it will not
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 6 lose its focus on the conflicts that both preceded and will outlast the pandemic. We will continue to expend our energy coming up with creative and realistic ways to resolve those conflicts, mitigate their impact or prevent them from erupting in the first place. Nor will we sacrifice the methodology that has built our reputation. Our experts will draw on established relationships and their own credibility to canvass remotely the main protagonists of conflicts and those affected by violence. In some cases, we will switch planned work around, bringing forward research that is feasible and pushing back that which is not. In par- allel, we will maintain our focus on reaching out to policymakers and opinion shapers, using virtual means to preserve and, where possible, expand both our access and our ability to share our analyses and recommendations more widely. To that end, and to ensure that our reach is truly worldwide, we have created a new position of Global Advocacy Director. In the same spirit, we will accelerate our efforts to modernise our communications, with greater use of graphics, data and visualisation. More than ever, under these circumstances, you should see the workplan before you as a liv- ing document. The pace at which conflicts evolve and our emphasis on early warning – iden- tifying signs of trouble before trouble erupts – means that our yearly planning is always somewhat tentative. This is especially true today, given the uncertainty about the pandemic’s health, economic and political effects and how it might restrict our own activities. The work we outline this year is indicative: we expect in many places it will change to keep pace with COVID-19 even as we ensure continued coverage of priority conflicts. We are enormously grateful for the understanding and generosity that our partners have shown as we have adapted thus far. Something else has not changed, alas, and that is China’s continued arbitrary and unjust de- tention of our colleague, Michael Kovrig. But nor has our determination to secure his prompt release. Michael has now been formally charged, a political judgment masquerading as a legal one that fools no one. Each of his now over 600 days spent in a prison cell is a stain on China’s reputation, unbefitting a nation aspiring to a broader global role. Together with his family, loved ones, friends, colleagues and supporters around the world, we are resolved to do all that we can to bring him back home. Robert Malley President & CEO
1 Introduction This workplan describes what Crisis Group plans to do between 1 July 2020 and 30 June 2021. The workplan’s next two sections (Sections 2 and 3) lay out how early warning/early action and gender cut across our work. Our regional programs and CrisisWatch, our monthly track- er that monitors 70-80 conflicts and crises worldwide, will seek to alert policymakers to in- stances where COVID-19 heightens risks of violence in time for them to respond. On gender, we will pair an ambitious research agenda, exploring how it interacts with conflict dynamics and peacemaking, with reinforced efforts to integrate gender analysis across our work. Sections 4-9 review the political and other relevant developments that inform the work of each of our regional programs: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and Middle East and North Africa, and the United States. Sections 10-12 lay out cross-regional work. Our Future of Conflict program (Section 10) seeks to ensure that we remain at the forefront of efforts to understand and factor in changes in the nature of war and crises, focusing on the economics of conflict (EoC), climate change and conflict, and technology and war. The program also reinforces our field research with data obtained through cutting-edge quantitative methods. Our work on the evolution of Islamist militancy and counter-terrorism (Section 11) across the world aims to promote more effective ways to counter jihadist violence, in particular by demystifying such groups and illuminat- ing how they function, as well as their local roots and transnational linkages. Our regular engagement with the UN, European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) puts us in a strong position to shore up multilateralism (Section 12) at a time when it faces its gravest challenges in decades. Sections 13 and 14 detail how we are adapting our advocacy and communications during the COVID-19 pandemic. Advocacy priorities this year include continuing to extend our reach beyond traditional advocacy centres, particularly to influence capitals in the Global South, and to contribute to policy decisions in a timely manner, using tools ranging from long-form publications to shorter targeted interventions. Our communications team will seek to main- tain in 2020-2021 the impressive growth in readership and visibility we have enjoyed since 2016. Crisis Group’s priorities for 2020-2021 Organisational priorities: 1. Identify early when the pandemic or policies aiming to curb its spread may trigger violence or, conversely, open a peacemaking window, and offer relevant policymakers ideas on how to respond.
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 8 2. Step up our advocacy, using virtual means where necessary, by expanding our access to decision-makers, reinforcing our engagement across the Global South and ensuring decision makers worldwide have our analysis and recommendations when they need them. 3. Continue to innovate with new means of communication, emphasising visuals and podcasts alongside our traditional publications. 4. Deepen our work on the future of conflict, particularly the impact of economics, climate change and technology on crises, to ensure we are on the cutting edge of thinking about tomorrow's wars. Section 15 outlines our Dialogue Initiative. This work entails facilitating frank exchanges on sensitive political issues among conflict actors, always demand-driven so as not to duplicate what others do and in partnership with organisations with relevant expertise whenever possible. The final sections detail our strong systems for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and our partnerships. In 2020/2021, we will continue to build on the solid foundation of a new M&E framework (Section 16), introduced in 2017. This framework, praised in independent evalua- tions of Crisis Group’s work over the last couple of years, helps us offer more detailed report- ing of our impact. Section 17 explains our approach partnerships, including with local groups and organisations with a focus different from ours.
2 From Early Warning to Early Action Ringing alarm bells and pushing leaders to act to reduce risks of conflict are core components of Crisis Group’s work. Averting war costs considerably less than efforts to end it or deal with its consequences. For the most part, the longer a crisis lasts, the more society is torn apart and the harder it is to mend. Conversely, the earlier we identify dangers, the broader the range of policies available to mitigate them. Early warning takes on new urgency this year, given the COVID-19 pandemic. It remains un- clear precisely how the disease and policies adopted to stop its spread will shape international politics and security. Yet in many countries, as we outlined early on in our special briefing, COVID-19: Seven Trends to Watch, it appears set to deepen the divisions, aggravate the inequality and fuel the popular anger that often underpin instability. Globally, it has further frayed U.S.-China relations and accelerated the erosion of multilateralism. As leaders con- tend with the pandemic and with several major wars already waging, the world can ill afford another big crisis. With experts monitoring much of the globe, Crisis Group sounds the alarm in different ways. A great deal of our regional programs’ work is by its nature early warning. Work on the vigi- lantes in Nigeria that are slowly replacing the country’s dysfunctional police, on Niger’s South West – potentially the Sahel’s next jihadist front – on militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka, on climate change-related dangers in the Mekong and the Amazon, on emerging conflict risks in the Balkans and on gas geopolitics in the East Mediterranean are but a few examples. CrisisWatch is also critical. Our monthly global conflict tracker, now entering its seventeenth year, remains a highly regarded early-warning bulletin among policymakers, journalists, businesspeople, civil society activists and the general public. The publication tracks some 80 conflicts, crises and fragile countries (a selected list is in Annex A). It assesses each month whether trends in each country are generally positive or negative and identifies peacemaking opportunities or potential triggers of violence. It allows us to maintain a watching brief on countries beyond our regular reporting and ramp up coverage if necessary. This project will be all the more vital this year given the COVID-19 pandemic’s uncertain impact, including in places that might appear reasonably stable. Other cross-regional publications also highlight threats. The Crisis Group president’s widely read “Ten Conflicts to Watch”, published in early January, will likely include places now off the radar where we believe things might fall apart alongside high-profile crises. Other pieces target specific institutions, such as those on priorities for the UN, AU and EU.
3 Gender This year, the 20th anniversary of the UN Security Council’s landmark Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, we will redouble our efforts to ensure that diverse perspectives, including those of women, inform all aspects of our work. In keeping with our Strategic Framework 2019-2024, Crisis Group experts will build gender dynamics into report plan- ning, field research, policy development, media outreach and advocacy. We will continue to practice a gender-sensitive methodology, identifying if and how gender interacts with par- ticular conflict dynamics, seeking as close to parity of research interlocutors as possible, fea- turing gender-disaggregated data when possible and building an analytical gender lens into our reports. We will enhance our training of program staff on gender-sensitive methodology tailored to fit organisational needs. We have also reinforced our gender team. Beyond the integration of gender as integral to Crisis Group’s methodology, this year we will expand our work examining the interplay between gender and conflict. Social identity and inequality can both inflect or fuel conflict and inform its resolution. The differentiated roles of women and men powerfully shape political transitions, insurgencies and conflicts driven by competition for resources. Without understanding how state abuses and failures in providing security and education drive women’s participation in groups like Boko Haram or Al-Shabaab, for example, it is impossible to ensure that policies will address the grievances that allow such movements to recruit. Charting these dynamics will provide policymakers with a rigorous, realistic and field-based view of how to pursue gender-sensitive conflict pre- vention strategies and implement their commitments with respect to Resolution 1325. In 2020/2021, many of our publications will feature analysis and recommendations along these lines. To mark the 20th anniversary of UN Resolution 1325, we will publish and promote a briefing that seeks to assess the Women, Peace and Security agenda’s evolution and contribute fresh thinking on a potentially troubling trend in its implementation. The piece will focus on the sprawl of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism policies in the women, peace and security sphere, which could jeopardise Resolution 1325’s pillars. .
4 Africa Africa has much to worry about in the year ahead. Before COVID-19, leaders meeting at the annual African Union summit declared the theme for the year was “Silencing the Guns”, reflecting the continental body’s earlier aspirations to end conflicts and prevent mass atroci- ties in Africa by 2020. The pandemic has thrown that agenda off course. African leaders are focused fully on limiting the virus’s health and economic impact – and rightly so. The World Health Organization’s scenarios suggest that the disease could cost many Africans their lives. How much COVID-19 will unsettle Africa’s peace and security remains uncertain. The pan- demic is testing Africa’s more stable economies (Nigeria and South Africa) but is proving a particular threat to countries facing political turbulence. In places undergoing delicate transi- tions, especially in the Horn, the coronavirus could derail elections or cause other political fallout, while the economic crunch or spread of the disease could trigger unrest. Countries blighted by conflict are especially vulnerable. Authorities would struggle to stem the virus’s spread if it took root in militant-controlled areas. The continent’s major transitions, notably those of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, will be significant preoccupations. Delayed elections due to the pandemic have already raised the temperature in Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed instituted a state of emergency and has postponed the polls indefinitely, provoking opposition complaints that he is using the pandemic to cling to power. Tensions are simmering in Somalia, due to hold a presidential election in 2021. In Sudan, time will tell whether a new $1.8 billion donor support package will shore up the civilian-military cohabitation that should shepherd the transition to elections in 2022. Forthcoming polls in Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Tanzania and Uganda are all likely to be compromised to some degree by the pandemic. It is critical that incumbent leaders consult widely and aim to build consensus, including among their rivals, on their response to the pandemic, and refrain from using emergency powers to entrench their own grip on power. External actors should encourage them in these directions. Jihadist militancy remains a menace, particularly in the Sahel. A disproportionate emphasis by Sahelien governments and outside actors on military solutions has gone hand in hand with the worsening security situation. Subcontracting counter-insurgency efforts to “self-defence” groups or armed civilians has often fuelled intercommunal violence, which now exacts a higher toll than jihadist attacks. With COVID-19 spreading, Sahelian governments will need communities’ cooperation to keep the disease at bay and stem jihadist influence. Overall, Africa’s leaders and their international partners should rethink their response. It will be important to develop national solutions that include efforts to calm intercommunal conflicts, improve relations between the authorities and the inhabitants of affected areas and engage militants. Malian authorities have now come around to the need to talk to militant leaders, at least some of them, and at least in principle. Lessons from the Sahel might be relevant to the Lake Chad basin and even Mozambique, where an Islamist insurgency is mushrooming in gas-rich Cabo Delgado – also the epicentre of the country’s coronavirus outbreak.
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 12 The pandemic may also deter outside involvement in Africa. A major worry is that some partners will lack the bandwidth, funds or appetite to focus on the continent, given the depth of their own crises brought about by COVID-19. The interest of some, particularly the U.S., was already waning. The EU will craft a new strategy for its Africa policy and European states are likely to remain deeply involved in areas where they perceive core interests at play, but on the whole, Europe may well become even more inward-looking. China’s engagement will likely intensify. Gulf states’ interest will grow but remain specific to areas that align with their security concerns. Divisions in the UN Security Council will reduce its influence in resolving crises, though it is likely to continue to reach consensus on African matters. The African Union, along with sub-regional groups such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), thus have critical and potentially leading roles to play. Ideally, they would quickly agree on broad steps to tackle the pandemic and thus step up efforts to address the continent’s worse crises. By assuming more regularly the role of guarantor for peace processes or mediator among warring parties, they could consoli- date their heft on the continent. Much of Crisis Group’s advocacy on the continent this year will concentrate on African institutions, which have an opportunity to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic stronger than before, notwithstanding its debilitating effects. 4.1 Horn of Africa 4.1.1 Somalia Somalia faces national elections tentatively scheduled for 2021 amid fractured relations between the federal government and regions, meddling from neighbours and further afield (notably the Gulf), an emboldened Al-Shabaab insurgency and the impending drawdown of AMISOM, the pivotal AU counter-insurgency mission. While COVID-19’s impact thus far has been limited, its eventual spread in Somalia could further strain voting timelines and proce- dures and make cooperation between the federal and regional authorities all the more criti- cal. How Al-Shabaab would respond remains unclear. In 2020/2021, we will seek to shed light on how to get to peaceful and timely elections, a transition of power if necessary, and reconciliation between Mogadishu and the regions, thus contributing to progress on state building and security. Ahead of the elections, we will offer policymakers and the media regular analysis of political dynamics. Importantly, this year we will explore alternatives to the long-running war with Al-Shabaab, potentially including engagement with the movement and how that might happen. 4.1.2 Ethiopia Elections, which were set for 29 August but have been delayed by COVID-19, will present a major challenge for Ethiopia’s volatile transition. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s new Pros- perity Party faces competition from an ethno-nationalist opposition in his home region of Oromia, as well as from parties elsewhere. One risk is that the incumbent seeks to prevail at the ballot box through repression that triggers protests. Another is that the Prosperity Party forges ahead unilaterally with plans for fundamental changes to Ethiopia’s system of ethnic federalism, which grants power and resources to regions but which many in Abiy’s camp per- ceive as divisive. A non-consultative approach to changing the system would draw stiff resistance. At the same time, Addis Ababa plans to proceed with the construction and filling
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 13 of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – a cause of major concern for Egypt, given that the parties have been unable to reach an agreement on the dam’s filling and operation. 4.1.3 South Sudan South Sudan swore in a unity government in February 2020 as part of a bid to end the six- year civil war and now enters a transitional period in the run-up to elections scheduled for 2023. Despite progress, the ceasefire and peace deal remain fragile. Parts of the country are regularly on the brink of famine, the economy has collapsed and there is no foreseeable end to local communal violence. Past peace attempts in South Sudan have floundered, and little can be expected from this government beyond preventing a renewed outbreak of countrywide civil war by retaining an elite-level pact. In 2020/2021, we will propose a clearer long-term path to a stable political settlement in South Sudan, as well as shed light on long-simmering conflicts that predate the civil war and on the financial reform agenda in the peace deal. We will offer analysis to policymakers and the media on issues related to the peace process, control and governance. We may also sug- gest ways to strengthen the IGAD regional mediation structure, which will likely continue to shape South Sudan’s future in the years ahead. 4.1.4 Sudan Sudan continues to stumble forward in its transition away from the 30-year rule of Omar al- Bashir’s National Congress Party and toward elections scheduled for 2022. Even with the $1.8 billion aid package recently pledged by donors, the economy still runs the risk of col- lapse, which would precipitate social unrest and strong pressure on the fragile political dis- pensation. It could afford military actors an opportunity to return to the fore. Peace talks in Juba between the government and rebels from across the country have progressed well, but recently slowed over issues related to funding for the peripheries and allocation of positions in the transitional government. Spillover from the region – namely conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Libya, emerging unrest in Ethiopia and prospective back- sliding on South Sudan’s peace agreement – could also imperil Sudan’s stability. Conversely, further turmoil in Sudan itself could endanger the region. In 2020/2021, we will seek to shed light on pathways to reform, achieving economic recovery and implementing the Juba peace agreement. We will also offer analysis of ways to respond to evolving conflict dynamics in the CAR-Chad-Sudan tri-border area. 4.2 Central Africa 4.2.1 DR Congo (DRC) The Democratic Republic of Congo’s political transition is facing many challenges. President Félix Tshisekedi’s room for manoeuvre and ability to reduce violence across the country are impeded by his uneasy alliance with former president Joseph Kabila, complicating his hope of making his “2020 year of action” a success. The COVID-19 outbreak, which has mainly afflicted the country’s capital Kinshasa but is increasingly spreading to the volatile east, could pose further challenges. The government’s confinement measures could fuel social tensions, especially in light of higher food prices due to the worldwide economic slowdown, and stabi- lising the east could become harder if authorities need to simultaneously stop the corona-
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 14 virus’s spread. Tensions among the DRC’s neighbours (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda) feed into security challenges, especially in the east. In 2020/2021, we will examine political developments and security challenges, working on both tensions in Kinshasa and conflict in the east. We will offer policymakers and the media regular analysis of ways for the Tshisekedi government to consolidate power and initiate or support local dialogues, mediations and other non-military responses to curtail armed groups’ activities. 4.2.2 Cameroon Cameroon faces a protracted insurgency in the English-speaking North West and South West regions, and jihadist militancy is undergoing a small revival in the Far North region. Gov- ernment plans for special status for the Anglophone regions enjoy little support in those areas, and separatists show no sign of moderating their calls for independence. Cameroon also faces a lingering political crisis after the disputed October 2018 presidential vote won by incum- bent Paul Biya and an opposition boycott of legislative and municipal elections in February 2020 that produced overwhelming ruling-party majorities. Ethnic cleavages are widening amid positioning to replace the ageing president. In 2020/2021, we will shed light on ways to defuse nationwide ethnic and political tensions and draw on our unparalleled previous coverage of the Anglophone insurgency to advise on how to de-escalate violence in affected areas. We will offer policymakers and the media ana- lysis of the role of women in conflict resolution in Anglophone areas, and ways to promote talks or shuttle diplomacy with Anglophone leaders in the separatist and federalist move- ments. We will provide fresh perspectives on the central political crisis and how to calm ethnically charged rhetoric, particularly on social media. 4.2.3 Central African Republic (CAR) The Central African Republic is gearing up for presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2020, amid rising tensions between the opposition and the government and clash- es both among armed groups and between them and UN peacekeepers and national security forces. Without a reduction of violence and a minimum consensus on election procedures be- tween the opposition and the government, the vote could be a flashpoint or fail to occur at all. Meanwhile, the agreements between the government and armed groups brokered by AU-led mediation have had scant impact on the ground, where armed groups have little incentive to change their predatory behaviour. Implementation of the latest deal, signed in February 2019, has been dogged by disputes. In 2020/2021, we will explore how to manage tensions and contribute to improved condi- tions for the December elections. We will promote the 2019 peace agreement’s implementa- tion and push for improved local peace initiatives. 4.2.4 Chad Chad faces both internal and external threats. All its borders are unstable: the armed opposi- tion based in southern Libya could launch attacks; Chadian militias could cross the frontier to the east; the CAR crisis could destabilise southern Chad; and Boko Haram factions remain a menace around Lake Chad. There are other challenges, too. In 2019, intercommunal vio- lence, especially in eastern Chad, led to hundreds of casualties. Social unrest is growing due
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 15 to a disastrous economic downturn. Parliamentary elections now scheduled for early 2021 could be a flashpoint if civil society is able to channel discontent and protest movements grow. Perhaps most importantly, rumours about President Idriss Déby’s declining health are generating considerable public concern. Should Déby relinquish power, tensions could rise within the ruling elites and splits could even emerge within the security apparatus. In 2020/2021, we will seek to shed light on poorly understood dynamics within ruling elites and the army, and thus contribute to reducing conflict risks during a future transition. We will offer policymakers and the media regular analysis of political and security developments, as well as ideas about ways to prevent violence should there be a transition in coming years. 4.3 West Africa 4.3.1 Boko Haram Islamist militancy remains a persistent menace around Lake Chad. In 2019, faced with a mounting threat from a Boko Haram splinter group, the Islamic State in West Africa Prov- ince (ISWAP), Nigeria abandoned large swathes of rural northern Borno state to regroup its troops in stronger “super camps”. Abuja did, however, strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – a force comprising Nigerian and neighbouring countries’ forces – and increase its use of airpower against militants. In February 2020, it recaptured the strategic city of Baga, by Lake Chad, ISWAP’s seizure of which had been a powerful symbol of its prowess in 2017-2018. ISWAP itself suffered internal division but showed resilience, hitting the army from northern Borno while defending its strongholds around the lake. Another Boko Haram faction, under the control of Abubakar Shekau, continued to ravage other areas. A third Boko Haram offshoot on the northern part of Lake Chad, the so-called Bakura group, harassed villagers and clashed with both ISWAP and security forces in Niger, Chad and Cam- eroon. Nigeria’s neighbours largely kept Boko Haram at bay, as has been their policy, though they face strains on their resources due to other security challenges. Crisis Group is the only organisation of its type present in all four countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. In 2020/2021, we will shed light on the militant rank and file, their attitude toward the conflict and the prospects for their negotiated exit. We will also offer poli- cymakers and the media analysis of relations between Boko Haram and the Islamic State (ISIS) core in the Middle East. 4.3.2 Côte d’Ivoire Although President Alassane Ouattara helped defuse a potential crisis by formally withdraw- ing from the presidential contest in March, tensions remain high ahead of the vote scheduled for September or October 2020. The legal framework is a bone of contention among parties, with some questioning its legitimacy. The return of former President Laurent Gbagbo, acquit- ted of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court, is likely to raise tensions. An attempt to arrest him would probably spark turmoil in his bastions in the West and Great West regions and Yopougon, the capital Abidjan’s most populated district. The exclusion of Guillaume Soro, a self-declared candidate who is now in exile after being sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in absentia, may trigger violent protests by his supporters, including within the security apparatus. The issues of nationality and citizenship, which triggered eth- nic tension in the 1990s and early 2000s, remain controversial. All this is taking place in a
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 16 country where the security forces are divided, many people have weapons and Islamist mili- tants appear to be making inroads from the Sahel. In 2020/2021, we will aim to promote a peaceful political transition, more conciliatory poli- tics and a credible election in which the losing candidate accepts the results. We will offer policymakers and the media regular analysis of ways to achieve more consensus around elec- tion preparations. 4.3.3 Nigeria Beyond the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria faces several security challenges, including a herder-farmer conflict that has transformed into widespread banditry in the north west, per- sistent violence between herders and farmers in the Middle Belt and the south, criminality in the Niger Delta targeting the oil and gas industry that endangers the mainstay of an already flat economy, and widespread insecurity across much of the country that is driving the prolif- eration of vigilantism. In 2020/2021, we will focus in particular on herder-farmer and vigilante violence. We will shed light on ways to better implement the ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan. We will offer policymakers and the media analysis of constitutional, policy and administra- tive reforms that can enable better vigilante management and policing. 4.4 Sahel Despite several military operations launched to curb jihadist rebellions across the Sahel, vio- lence has spread and become deadlier. Intercommunal bloodshed has risen, with numerous massacres of civilians reported in central Mali and northern and eastern Burkina Faso – where “self-defence” communal militias, jihadist groups and government forces have all been accused of perpetrating mass killings. Niger and Burkina Faso both have potentially conten- tious elections looming. The COVID-19 pandemic, though it has not yet hit Sahelian countries hard, could trigger unrest and hinder international and regional military operations. In 2020/2021, we will continue to promote an approach in the Sahel that better balances mil- itary operations with a political strategy that seeks to calm intercommunal bloodshed, im- prove relations between the different states and inhabitants of the region and explore talks with militant leaders. We will look at the situation in south-western Niger, the role of armed civilian groups in counter-insurgency operations there and prospects for engaging militants in peace talks. We will also offer policymakers and the media analysis of gender dynamics, violence and dialogue in northern Mali, and expand our advocacy for political dialogue with armed groups. 4.5 Southern Africa 4.5.1 Mozambique Increasingly bold attacks by Islamist militants in the gas-rich province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique have raised the spectre of yet another jihadist insurgency taking root in Africa. Attacks have been concentrated in the coastal belt and the northern interior, though the group has recently moved beyond rural areas to strike cities. Insurgents are reportedly spreading south toward the liquefied natural gas hub of Pemba and perpetrating attacks in
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 17 southern Tanzania, where they may also be recruiting. Though militants nominally fight under ISIS’s banner, the conflict is rooted in local politics and grievances. Most insurgents were initially believed to be from the Mwani tribe, a coastal minority, who consider them- selves neglected by Maputo and local authorities. Security forces have beefed up their presence in the region, erecting checkpoints, and have allegedly perpetrated abuses that risk further inflaming tensions. In 2020/2021, we will seek to shed a light on this poorly understood insurgency. We will offer policymakers and the media analysis of ways to reduce violence by subordinating military action to a political strategy. We will also explore women’s and children’s involvement in the conflict and its impact on them. 4.5.2 Zimbabwe The “reform and re-engagement” strategy of President Emmerson Mnangagwa is veering off track. The government’s austerity program, introduced in late 2018, has resulted in enormous hardship. The value of earnings and savings continues to fall dramatically amid a currency crisis, soaring inflation and import shortages. Over half of Zimbabweans are food-insecure, with their plight compounded by the impact of COVID-19. Disquiet is growing not only among opposition quarters but also within the civil service and security forces. At the same time, the country is more polarised than ever, with the main opposition party boycotting a political dialogue the government launched in February 2019.
5 Asia Mounting geopolitical rivalries shape conflict risks across much of Asia. The combination of growing Chinese assertiveness and rising U.S. hostility toward Beijing are factors that touch on nearly all of our Asia work. The increasing temperature of China-U.S. competition is exacerbating conflict dynamics (eg, between India and Pakistan, and in connection with the South China Sea) and potentially limiting opportunities for cooperation in conflict resolution (eg, in Afghanistan and on the Korean peninsula). The persistently fraught China-India relationship – besides containing its own conflict potential – plays into conflict dynamics in Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, in Afghanistan, and perhaps also into conflict risks in other parts of Asia as the U.S. pushes forward its Indo-Pacific concept and India implements its “Act East” policy. Specific conflict drivers throughout Asia are diverse. They include jihadism (Afghanistan, Pa- kistan, Philippines), use of militant proxies (Pakistan), ethnic and sectarian marginalisation (Myanmar, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan), geopolitical tension, persistent consequences of his- torical conflict (eg, the Korean War, partition of the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lankan civil war), and poor governance and authoritarianism (the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand, for example). There are cross-border dynamics – such as the triangular intersection among Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and the spillover of Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis into Bang- ladesh. Islamist militancy and transnational terrorism continue to be concerns, especially in Pakistan and the southern Philippines, and will feature in debates over how best to end the Afghan war in light of worries that a U.S. military withdrawal and Taliban ascendance might lead to a resurgence of groups using the country to plot attacks abroad. The dangers nuclear weapons pose weigh on our work in South Asia and North East Asia. Pakistan’s and India’s status as nuclear powers amplify the magnitude of risk of conflict between them. North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile technology capabilities keep the possibility of conflict on the Korean peninsula or between the U.S. and North Korea at the forefront of our agenda. More recently, growing tension between India and China along their Line of Actual Control in the disputed border areas of the Himalayas takes on greater signif- icance because it involves two nuclear powers. Although the probability of nuclear weapons use is low, the potential consequences are extraordinary, meaning that friction among nuclear powers in Asia seeps into the broader picture of conflict risk in the region. Our recently expanded coverage of South East Asia has enabled us not only to introduce analysis of conflicts within the Philippines but also to focus more closely on developments af- fecting multiple countries in the region, including in the South China Sea and in the Mekong River basin. Exploring these latter two subjects enables us to introduce climate change and economics of conflict themes into our work. We also aim to contribute to studying the rising relevance of online activity in conflicts, particularly in Myanmar, and possibly India.
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 19 5.1 South Asia 5.1.1 Afghanistan The Afghan war is the world’s deadliest, at least if measured by the number of people killed in fighting, with more than 10,000 civilian deaths in 2019. Fighting between the Afghan army and the Taliban is tearing apart many rural areas. While the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement offers the best hope in eighteen years to resolve the conflict and should pave the way for intra-Afghan talks, flawed power-sharing arrangements after a disputed presidential election, widespread corruption and fragmentation along ethnic, tribal and regional lines pose major obstacles to a settlement. Taliban positions on key topics – from Afghan state institutions to power sharing and the army’s future – are not yet clear and may also pose challenges. Afghans are bracing for COVID-19’s potentially devastating effects, on not just public health but also food security, the economy and intra-Afghan talks. In 2020/2021, we will seek to shed light on the interests, policy preferences and “red lines” of the Taliban and prominent Afghan factions as they relate to a potential settlement and thus contribute to improved prospects of compromise by all parties. We will offer policymakers and the media regular analysis of threats to talks and Afghanistan’s security more broadly. 5.1.2 Indian-administered Kashmir New Delhi’s policies, including its 5 August 2019 revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s con- stitutional status, its targeting of political opponents and its forcible suppression of dissent, are primarily responsible for unrest in Indian-administered Kashmir. With these policies, India has created opportunities for Islamist militants, Kashmiri and Pakistani, to recruit locals to their cause. Skirmishes between militants and Indian security forces in Kashmir already occur regularly, and another major militant attack could result in a higher-intensity conflict between India and Pakistan. In 2020/2021, we will seek to help stakeholders mitigate conflict risks in Jammu and Kash- mir, and more broadly between India and Pakistan, through analysis of India’s new policies in the region. We will also seek to engage key national, regional and international parties as appropriate. 5.1.3 Pakistan Midway through its term, Pakistan’s civilian government, lacking a stable parliamentary majority, remains overly dependent on the military’s support for its political survival. The military, which retains control of internal security and foreign policy, particularly toward India and Afghanistan, now supports an Afghan peace deal that it believes would benefit its Taliban allies. Yet it appears disinclined to end longstanding support for anti-India jihadist proxies, which perpetuates conflict risks with India. Pakistan’s selective counter-terrorism policies also have implications for women, long targeted by militants with an overt agenda of gender-based repression. Women are demanding a voice and a role in counter-insurgency strategies that affect their lives and livelihoods. Within Pakistan, COVID-19-related costs – economic disruption and social tensions, as well as the disease itself – could further strain an already fragile polity.
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 20 In 2020/2021, we will seek to help relevant national stakeholders and Pakistan’s international partners mitigate conflict risks, through new analysis of militancy and the impact of security responses. We will aim to identify effective strategies for countering political instability and jihadist violence in the region, including through new work on Islamabad’s role in support- ing Afghanistan’s nascent peace process. We will explore the challenges and opportunities for women in contributing to peacebuilding, including counter-insurgency policies and strate- gies. Lastly, we will look at COVID-19’s impact to inform policymakers. 5.1.4 Sri Lanka Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s decisive victory in the 2019 presidential election has radically altered political dynamics and opens the possibility of lasting changes to Sri Lanka’s longstanding ethno-religious conflicts. Already, the Gotabaya presidency – almost certain to be supported by a new parliamentary majority once suspended elections happen later in 2020 – has an- nounced an almost complete abandonment of the previous government’s reconciliation and transitional justice programming and a more combative approach at the UN Human Rights Council. The government has given a major role to current and former military officers through presidential appointments and in its emergency responses to COVID-19. The Rajapaksa family’s return to power threatens a deeper institutionalisation of authoritarian Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism and the more complete subjugation of Tamil and Muslim minorities. In 2020/2021, we will seek to improve understanding of the dynamics of anti-Muslim senti- ment and growing tensions among other religious groups in order to build support for policy changes that can reduce the risk of renewed violence. Notably, we will shed light on sources of support for Sinhala Buddhist nationalism to allow for better tailored domestic and interna- tional efforts to protect some of the limited governance reforms of 2015-2019. We will also examine ways to mitigate conflict risks associated to COVID-19. 5.2 South East Asia 5.2.1 Myanmar Despite its ineffectiveness, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) remains popular with the ethnic-majority Burman electorate and is likely to be re-elected in the November 2020 polls. The powerful military continues to call the shots in many critical areas, as the NLD’s efforts to reduce its prerogatives through constitutional change have come to naught. The country is still struggling to end 70 years of civil conflict, and the peace process with armed ethnic groups started in 2011 is moribund. Fighting has escalated sharply in Rakhine State between the military and the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army, threatening the stability of that state and potentially the country as a whole, and creating a further barrier to Rohingya refugees’ repatriation from Bangladesh. Beyond the COVID-19 potential public health consequences, an economic shock is inevitable, given likely downturns in the garment export industry, tourism and border trade, as well as a collapse in remittances from Myanmar workers abroad. Yet none of this is likely to change the elections’ outcome. In 2020/2021, we will seek to shed light on overlooked issues that drive armed conflict to help advance the peace process and mitigate risks, including ahead of the November elections.
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 21 5.2.2 Mekong The Mekong River, which is 4,900km long, originates on China’s Tibetan plateau and passes through or borders every state in mainland South East Asia: Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Some 65 million people in the lower Mekong basin depend on the river and its tributaries for their livelihoods. China has built eleven dams on its stretch of the Mekong and plans another eight, while lower riparian countries have constructed at least 40 in the river basin, with twice that number on the drawing board. The proliferation of dams and other activities, such as sand harvesting, diversion for irrigation and navigation “im- provement” schemes, combined with the effects of climate change, are causing growing environmental harm in the lower Mekong basin, with alarming implications for water and food security. While international tensions over the Mekong’s management are prevalent and may intensify, the asymmetry of power between China and the lower Mekong countries serves to lower the likelihood of violent inter-state conflict. More immediate is the prospect of intra-state conflicts driven by the effects of environmental degradation on communities that depend on the river’s existing ecosystem for food and livelihoods. Such conflict would pit local people against state authorities and the private sector. In 2020/2021, we will seek to improve national and regional governance mechanisms to manage the deleterious impact of hydropower development and environmental change along the Mekong. We will aim to serve an early-warning function by raising understanding about risks to peace and security in the Mekong region at domestic and international levels. We will also seek to influence decisions by governments of the Mekong region states, donor countries, civil society groups and international organisations. 5.2.3 Philippines The Philippines faces two primary internal conflicts: violence in the newly established Bang- samoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and the decades-old communist rebellion of the National People’s Army (NPA) in various parts of the country. President Rodrigo Duterte played a crucial role in establishing the BARMM in early 2019 and is com- mitted to supporting the interim government during the transition period until the 2022 elections. While the transition is so far on track, challenges are beginning to pile up. In some areas, violence is caused by clan feuds, and in others, by insurgency or instability in the Sulu Sea. The danger of Islamist militancy remains. Political positioning and alliance building by both the ex-rebels and the powerful clans who dominate the region’s provinces is expected to increase as the elections approach and could turn violent. Regarding the communist rebel- lion, many officials in Manila are sceptical about finding a peaceful resolution and fighting between rebels and the security forces severely harms the civilian population. In 2020/2021, we will seek to support the Bangsamoro peace process by highlighting issues that tend to be neglected in discourse about the transition. These include the precarious situ- ation of Marawi, a town held by Islamist militants for several months in 2017 and which still has a substantial displaced population, as well as conflict risks in Bangsamoro related to clan dynamics, jihadist militancy and criminality. Given the murkiness of almost all aspects of the communist insurgency, we will also help shed light on conflict dynamics, gaps and potential ways to restart the peace process.
Crisis Group Workplan 2020-2021 22 5.2.4 South China Sea More than one third of global trade passes through the South China Sea, a strategic waterway linking the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific. China asserts its sovereignty over most of the sea, leading to overlapping claims and deadlock disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philip- pines, Vietnam and Taiwan. There also are broader tensions over what kind of regional order will emerge as U.S. influence wanes and Chinese economic and military power expands in South East Asia. Beijing’s completion of partially militarised man-made islands in the Paracel and Spratly chains has shifted the balance of power in its favour, as it can now sustain naval, coast guard and maritime militia operations far from the mainland. In recent years, Beijing has also been more assertive in enforcing its South China Sea claims, often through manoeu- vres that drive up risks of confrontation, escalation and accidents at sea. In response, Wash- ington has increased the pace of U.S. naval operations, which challenge Beijing’s territorial claims within the nine-dash line (Beijing’s self-proclaimed demarcation line) and aim to up- hold “freedom of the seas”. Of the South East Asian claimants, the Philippines and Vietnam are most directly affected by China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. In 2020/2021, we will seek to influence policymaking by relevant decision-makers in the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as in the U.S., ASEAN member states, Australia and other con- cerned countries. More broadly, we hope to raise awareness about risks in the South China Sea. 5.2.5 Thailand The March 2019 general election brought a formal end to five years of military rule, but Thai- land’s protracted interregnum continues. The junta retained power by transforming itself into a political party. It has grown increasingly unpopular, due to both its alleged inefficiency and its systematic targeting of opposition members popular with the youth. Meanwhile, the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the southernmost provinces has abated over the past five years, but militants show a stubborn capacity to recruit, train and stage attacks. While the main group – Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – entered into formal dialogue with Thai government representatives in January 2020, the process is hampered by ambivalence among some officials in Bangkok and within the BRN’s military wing. The pandemic could also disrupt it, as travel restrictions imply an indefinite hiatus for talks. In 2020/2021, we will seek to support a negotiated end to the separatist insurgency based on political decentralisation and the preservation of Thailand’s territorial integrity. We will con- tinue to raise awareness about the conflict, introduce constructive proposals into public and private discussions, and discreetly push for their adoption by concerned parties. 5.3 North East Asia 5.3.1 Korean Peninsula U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks have been stuck since the March 2019 Hanoi summit. Despite President Donald Trump and leader Kim Jong-un having agreed to launch working-level ne- gotiations after their sudden June meeting in the demilitarised zone, Pyongyang has refused to return to the table. Envoys from the two sides met in Stockholm, Sweden, in October 2019 but the talks ended abruptly, and Pyongyang said that it would not resume them until Wash- ington meets its demands to lift key UN Security Council sanctions on sectors of its economy that produce hard currency and end U.S.-South Korea combined military drills, in exchange
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