VOLUME 7 PROGRAM 6 SC DRUG BUST SHOOTING
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VOLUME 7 PROGRAM 6
SC DRUG BUST SHOOTING
Backup: Media Tricks
DUTY SHEET & LESSON PLAN
Total Program Length 42:57
IN THE LINE OF DUTY is produced exclusively as an interactive sharing resource for
the law enforcement community. No commercial use or access to the public at large is
permitted without the authorization of L.O.D., Inc. This program contains actual video of
real police incidents with no reenactments or simulations. The program is protected by
copyright. Reproduction in any form is strictly prohibited without authorization from
L.O.D., Inc.
The material included in this program is designed for informational purposes only. IN
THE LINE OF DUTY makes no representation regarding the effectiveness or
appropriateness of any action or technique depicted herein. It is not intended to replace
or supersede existing training policies or guidelines of individual law enforcement
agencies.
In the Line of Duty Training videos have received POST approval for continuing
education credit for training in the following states:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, Wisconsin, WyomingOVERVIEW
This video training program deals with what was supposed to be a routine drug buy-bust
in Charleston County, South Carolina. However, the bust went bad when the subject
attempted to escape the take-down team by plowing through team members and vehicles
in his own car. Officers had to use lethal force.
In backup, we focus on learning “media tricks of the trade.” This information from a
former journalist can be useful to officers who find themselves in a situation involving
media coverage. It centers on certain methods the media use to gather information.
Some of those tactics can trick officers into providing information they may not have
intended.
THE INCIDENT (3:20)
The buy-bust was set up comparatively quickly. There was a standard ops meeting prior
to the buy. The buy-bust was set up in the parking lot of a convenience store. A
confidential informant was to make the buy. He was driven to the site by an undercover
officer. On hand for the transaction were; a surveillance van, which monitored the wire
worn by the C.I. and videotaped the transaction; a four man take-down team was the
make the arrest and “appear’ to arrest the undercover officer and C.I.; a two man marked
cruiser was to be brought in case a chase became necessary. Additionally, a supervising
lieutenant, accompanied by a sergeant, was on the lot as an observer. The subject, who
had picked the place for the buy, was accompanied by a passenger. Once the C.I. entered
the subject’s car for the transaction, the passenger left to go to the convenience store.
Once the drug purchase had been completed, the take-down team moved in along with
the market cruiser. The members of the take-down team both verbally and visually
identified themselves as officers. One of those officers opened the rear driver’s side door
and positioned himself in the apex of the car. As he did so, the driver, slammed the car
into reverse, flipping the officer aside. He also drove over another officer’s foot. He was
positioned at the passenger side door of the subject’s vehicle. The subject’s vehicle
rammed into the undercover officer’s car, then lurched forward. Officers considered that
vehicle a deadly threat and fired at the driver. He was mortally wounded. Three officers
fired 13 rounds. Three were fatal wounds. The three officers were put on 13 week
administrative leave. All were exonerated by local, state and federal investigators.
INCIDENT PERSPECTIVES (9:45)
In the Line of Duty interviewed the officers involved, including the supervising
lieutenant, his sergeant, the two members of the take-down team who fired at the subject,
the driver of the take-down vehicle, and the undercover officer who had brought the
confidential informant to the buy. Each of the officers related his perspective on the
incident depending on where he was positioned. Some officers were able to fire at the
subject. Others were not because of the crossfire danger. Their restraint in this regard
2was admirable. It was this condition which brought the lieutenant from his observer’s
position into the fray. When he recognized that crossfire was an issue and that two
officers had been injured by the subject’s car, he fired at the subject three times, twice
from point blank range. The lieutenant thought at least one of the injured officers had
been crushed by the subject’s vehicle.
INCIDENT REVIEW (3:22)
Most of the officers involved have reviewed the incident many times. They have
concluded that the mandatory ops meeting is a valuable tool in such operations. However,
because this buy-bust came down quickly, they inferred that this incident may not have
been as completely planned as they might have wanted. They also made the point that
they did not know who they were dealing with. The subject was about to become a three
time loser. They might have approached him differently had they known that. There was
some apparent uncertainty on the part of take-down offices as who exactly who was
going to do what in terms of contacting and covering the subject. They concluded that in
future, it is imperative that contact and cover assignments be clearly delineated.
TUNNEL VISION (3:36)
The officers all experienced tunnel vision to a greater or lesser degree.
Tunnel vision is a phenomenon that causes officers under extreme stress to focus on the
most immediate threat or danger to the exclusion
of other things going on around them. All officers remarked that everything seemed to
slow down during the incident. One remarked that tunnel vision presented a potential
danger because he might have fired into a crossfire situation had the target presented
himself between the shooter and another officer. Other officers said they were too
preoccupied with getting out of the way of the subject’s vehicle to consider anything else.
The undercover officer with the C.I. said that he felt firearms training on the range helped
him through the situation because he was used to the noise and found what was going on
to be more or less normal.
THE MEDIA (1:57)
In the immediate aftermath of the incident, working with the media became an issue.
Some local community groups were critical of the fact lethal force was used. The
surveillance van video helped dispel that criticism when it was clear the subject’s car
presented a threat. The Charleston County Sheriff’s Office P.I.O. made it clear that this
incident proved the need to provide a coordinated media response. In this case, the
Sheriff led the way. The P.I.O. also cautioned against violating this principle as a means
of controlling accuracy. He also advised that law enforcement agencies cultivate the
critics by working with activist groups and explaining sensitive incidents to them in a
manner likely to defuse ugly fallout.
3LESSONS LEARNED (4:51)
The lessons learned in this incident:
Preplan: Make certain you have a complete plan in place in developing any plan.
The Approach: The need to coordinate the approach in such scenarios is clear with
every person involved clear on what role he/she will be playing.
Nothing is Routine: Though this was considered a routine buy-bust, one of the type
every officer had been involved in numerous times, it proved once again that nothing is
routine.
Be Wary: Therefore, all officers are advised to be 100% wary 100% of the time and to
try and have a better understanding of who they are dealing with.
Written Statements: The shooter officers in particular was asked to give detailed
statements to assist in the investigation. Offices here felt that the amount of stress was
such in a deadly force incident, that the officers directly involved should dictate their
statements to other officers rather than be asked to write them themselves.
Counseling: All officers agreed on the need for counseling after the incident to deal with
both their emotional and legal needs.
Supervisory Support Works: After the incident, the Sheriff made it a point to support
his officers by emphasizing that the lost life was less their fault than the subject in that it
was his decision 1) sell drugs 2) break the law 3) try to get away, therefore precipitating
the gunfire.
QUESTIONS (1:53)
1. How extensively do you plan for individual “buy-busts?”
2. How do you designate assignments for “buy-busts?”
3. What steps should be taken to assure you are properly identified as a law
enforcement officer in situations such as the Charleston bust.
4. Discuss the pros and cons of this parking lot site for the bust.
5. Discuss the crossfire hazard in operations such as the Charleston incident.
6. Do you “expect the unexpected” in seemingly “routine” assignments?
7. Was there any realistic option to the use of lethal force in this incident?
8. Have you ever been involved in a lethal force incident? If so, discuss it.
9. Discuss the ops planning prior to the Charleston incident.
10. What consideration have you given to positioning yourself in the apex of a
suspect’s car?
411. Do you routinely debrief following difficult arrest scenarios and do you include
dispatchers?
12. Should counseling be mandated after lethal force incidents?
13. Discuss the timing of the take-down in this incident.
14. Have you ever experienced tunnel vision? If so, discuss it.
15. Discuss how you would react in an incident involving heavy media coverage.
EPILOG (1:05)
*Subject Kenneth “K.C.” Coaxum was not armed at the time of the incident.
*The two injured officers suffered only bruises.
*Officers were armed with 40 caliber Smith and Wesson and Glock service weapons .
*Each of the shooting officers placed on administrative leave said the stress and
uncertainty of those 13 weeks was greater than the stress of the incident itself.
*Lt. Ray Wright, the supervising officer, is now with the Isle of Palms Police
Department.
*His sergeant, Sgt. David Robinson is now with the D.E.A. Task Force in Charleston.
*All officers but the undercover officer and Lt. Wright were wearing body armor.
*The confidential informant in this case was badly shaken by events. The Charleston
S.O. says it will not likely be using him any longer.
BACKUP (10:27)
The Backup segment features a review of certain tricks reporters may use when
conducting interviews. They include;
1. Reporters will always go for the emotional comment
2. They may disarm you with friendliness.
3. They will let you stray, perhaps revealing information you had not intended
4. They may attempt the silent treatment by responding to your answer in silence,
thereby encouraging you to go beyond the point you had intended.
5. Pushing buttons by antagonizing you into losing your temper thereby creating a
more dramatic situation.
6. Be wary at interview’s end. The camera may still be rolling. Comments
believed to be private may be anything but.
5LESSON PLAN
Synopsis: This program deals with a seemingly routine buy-bust
which evolved into a lethal force incident and examines the
moments prior to, during and immediately after the
incident.
Time: 1 hour
Objectives: Upon completion of the course, officers be able to:
Obj. A Understand the need for complete planning and caution
even during “routine” operations.
Obj. B Understand tunnel vision and the dangers it can create
during a crisis.
Obj. C. Understand how to deal with the media in such incidents,
and…
Obj. D. Understand various tricks used by reporters to
gather information from unsuspecting interviewees.
INSTRUCTOR’S NOTES/ LAB GUIDE
Obj. A Understand the need for complete planning and caution
even during “routine” operations.
a. This incident was subject to a mandatory “ops meeting”
beforehand
b. It was hastily called
c. There were sufficient officers on hand to handle the
incident.
d. All were experienced in this type of operation
e. All were visually identified and identified themselves
verbally.
f. They did not know the identity of the subject.
g. Had they known he was about to become a three time
loser, they might have approached him differently.
h. Members of the take-down team took positions on both
sides of the subject’s car.
i. It is unclear as to who were the contact and who the
cover officers.
6j. Though routine, officers had not counted on the
subject’s willingness to bolt.
k. When he did move, two officers were injured by the
automobile.
l. Officers should revisit the notion of placing themselves
in the apex of the car.
m. When the subject used his car as a weapon, the officers,
feeling threatened, fired.
n. All were aware of crossfire possibilities.
o. 13 shots were fired. Three were lethal.
p. Shooting officers were placed on 13 week
administrative leave following the incident and all were
exonerated by local, state and federal investigators.
Obj. B Understand tunnel vision and the dangers it can create
during a crisis.
a. All officers experienced tunnel vision.
Tunnel vision is a phenomenon that causes officers
under extreme stress to focus on the most immediate
threat or danger to the exclusion
b. of other things going on around him/her.
c. It affect each of them differently
d. Most said everything slowed down.
e. Tunnel vision can create problems when there is the
potential for crossfire. Officers may be so focused they
become unaware of other officers around them.
f. One officer said routine trips to the firing range helped
him because he was used to the sound of gunfire.
Obj. C. Understand how to deal with the media in such incidents,
and…
a. The media was a factor in this incident because activist
groups thought police “shot first and asked questions
afterward.
b. Coordinated media response advised
c. Discourage individual officers from commenting to
control accuracy.
d. Work with activist groups to explain sensitive incidents
and reduce ugly fallout.
Obj. D. Understand various methods used by reporters to gather
information from unsuspecting interviewees.
a. There are certain tricks reporters may use to elicit
information. They are
b. Reporters will always go for the emotional comment
c. They may disarm you with friendliness.
7d. They will let you stray, perhaps revealing information
you had not intended.
e. They may attempt the silent treatment by responding
to your answer in silence, thereby encouraging you to
go beyond the point you had intended.
f. Pushing buttons by antagonizing you into losing your
temper thereby creating a more dramatic situation.
g. Be wary at interview’s end. The camera may The
camera may still be rolling. Comments believed to be
private may be anything but.
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