Vol.95, No.9, 2023 DPRK's Feb. 8 Military Parade - Bomi Kim
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Vol.95, No. 9, 2023
DPRK’s Feb. 8 Military Parade
Bomi Kim
(Research Fellow, INSS)
Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023
Abstract
Commemorating the 75th founding anniversary of the Korean
People’s Army (KPA), North Korea conducted a military
parade on February 8 at Kim Il Sung Square. Marking the
13th military parade since Kim Jong Un came to power, Kim
attended the late-night event with his family but did not
deliver an official speech. The military showcase featured
North Korea’s strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons
highlighting the country’s nuclear developments. A record
number of ICBMs appeared in the parade, and the Tactical
Nuclear Operations Unit, first mentioned in the media last
September, joined the military procession. Even without
Kim’s speech, the propaganda-filled parade of nuclear
arsenals seems to have conveyed a tacit warning from
Pyongyang, expressing its firm will to counter the military
buildups of Washington and Seoul.
Keywords
North Korea, Military Parade, Kim Jong Un, ICBM, Tactical Nuclear
Operations Unit
Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 01
Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 DPRK’s Feb. 8 Military Parade Bomi Kim (Research Fellow, INSS) On February 8, North Korea held a nighttime military parade at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang to mark the 75th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Overseas commercial satellite imagery showed several strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including super-large ICBMs, KN-23s, super-large rocket launchers, and cruise missiles. Chairman Kim Jong Un, who has attended almost all military parades since taking power, also appeared at Kim Il Sung Square. Chairman Kim, however, did not deliver a speech during the parade. Despite the absence of a meaningful message against antagonist states from Kim, this paper examines some of the key features displayed at the military parade marking the 75th anniversary of KPA’s establishment. The Fifth Nighttime Military Parade The military procession celebrating the 75th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was the 13th military parade since Kim Jong Un took office and the fifth late-night parade. During his rule, Kim has reportedly attended all of the military Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 02
parades except for one occasion. Beginning with the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) on October 10, 2020, Pyongyang started holding military parades at night. Although North Korea has not officially revealed the reason behind the change from daytime to nighttime parades, the time shift seems to be aimed at maximizing the visual effects of the event with fireworks and light displays. With 2023 marking the 75th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), it was highly predictable that Pyongyang would conduct a large-scale military parade. After its 70th anniversary in 2018, this was the second military parade commemorating KPA’s establishment since Kim Jong Un took power in December 2011. Founded on February 8, 1948, KPA’s anniversary was celebrated until 1977. However, from 1978 to 2017, Pyongyang commemorated April 25 as the founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA), North Korea’s anti-Japanese guerilla army. On January 23, 2018, the Political Bureau of the KWP Central Commission declared KPA as North Korea’s regular army and reinstated February 8 as the date of its establishment. Meanwhile, April 25 was designated as a national holiday and celebrated as the founding anniversary of KPRA. Grand Showcase of Large-Scale Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons The military parade was a grand display of large-scale strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. During the second half of the procession, Pyongyang showcased an array of weapons systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads, mainly featuring KN-23s, cruise missiles, super-large multiple rocket launchers, and Hwasong-17s. North Korea claims to have successfully test-launched the world’s largest ICBM, Hwasong-17, last year in Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 03
November. At least 11 of Hwasong-17 ICBMs were rolled out at Kim Il Sung Square, more than North Korea ever has at a military parade. Hwasong-17s also appeared in parades commemorating the 90th founding anniversary of KPRA on April 25, 2022, and the 75th anniversary of KWP on October 10, 2020. The military procession ended with five smaller, previously unseen canisterized ICBMs believed to be early versions of a solid-fueled ICBM. This new weapon system may undergo a series of tests in the future in a slightly modified form after improving its technical defects. The “Tactical Nuclear Operations Unit,” mainly targeting the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, was also introduced at the military parade. The unit is well known for Kim Jong Un’s command of the drills from September 25 to October 9, 2022, launching several armed provocations against the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises. On February 9, the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper described the Tactical Nuclear Operations Unit as possessing “strong war deterrence and counterattack capabilities.” Although much information is still lacking, the Tactical Nuclear Operations Unit seems to be part of the new organizations created in tandem with the rapid expansion of Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Moreover, at the enlarged meeting of the KWP Central Military Commission on February 6, 2023, a flag inscribed as the “Missile General Bureau,” was unveiled, confirming the establishment of a new organization in charge of missile forces. On February 13, 2023, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that “many units of services and arms of the KPA have been expanded and reorganized, major operational combat duties assigned to them” in accordance with new security situations and changed strategic and tactical missions. Kim Jong Un’s Implicit Message to the U.S. and South Korea Since his accession to power, Kim Jong Un has delivered five Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 04
military parade speeches. For the recent KPA anniversary event, however, Kim opted to skip his official address. Kim’s speech, usually comprised of bellicose rhetoric against the U.S. or South Korea, was likely omitted because there has been no significant change to Kim’s message since the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the KWP. Kim Jong Un articulated the firm principles of DPRK-U.S. relations and the direction of the struggle against South Korea at the Plenary Session while requesting KPA to strengthen combat training and increase war readiness at the enlarged meeting of the 8th KWP Central Military Commission on February 6. Thus, Pyongyang seems to have calculated it was unnecessary to consecutively send out belligerent messages with no substantial change in its hostile policies toward South Korea and the U.S. Even so, actions speak louder than words, and the unprecedented number of ICBMs showcased during the parade seems to have conveyed Pyongyang’s contentious stance, signaling it has enough nuclear forces to deter nuclear threats by the U.S. Public Appearances of Kim’s Daughter Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also made a public appearance at her first military parade. Previously, she was noticed alongside her father at the lodging quarters of KPA generals on February 7 at a banquet celebrating KPA’s 75th founding anniversary. If Pyongyang is pushing to raise her profile as a symbolic figure of the country’s future, her appearance at the military parade can be interpreted as a message of assurance to North Koreans, that its powerful military will protect the lives and safety of the next generation. On the other hand, after her public debut at an ICBM launch site in November 2022, there has been widespread speculation that Kim Jong Un was setting the stage for her as the heir apparent. However, it is too early to judge whether she has been appointed as Kim’s successor, given Kim Ju Ae’s casual manner displayed during the military parade Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 05
which lacks the restrained attitude required of North Korea’s future leader. Possible North Korean Provocations in the Near Future Considering North Korea has regularly conducted military parades once or twice a year under Kim Jong Un, it appears for the remainder of this year, none or one more military parade is scheduled. The additional parade will likely be held on July 27 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Victory Day (Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War) or September 9 to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the regime’s establishment. Apart from parades, North Korea is predicted to conduct armed demonstrations in March before and after the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises. 2023 marks the third year of North Korea’s five-year plan for weapon systems and defense science development, and the ROK-U.S. joint drills would provide a good excuse for Pyongyang to execute several weapon tests to achieve milestones. In particular, intensifying international risks, such as the U.S.-China competition and the Russia-Ukraine war, make it more difficult to enforce additional economic sanctions on North Korea, and thus Pyongyang might not hesitate to carry out high-intensity provocations, including short-range ballistic missiles and solid-fueled ICBMs. Therefore, it is hard to rule out the possibility of North Korea conducting test launches of military projects proposed in its top five priority tasks or tests of its recently unveiled 600mm Multiple Launch Rocket System. Despite the absence of an external message from Kim Jong Un during the recent military parade, Pyongyang expressed its firm will, refusing to succumb to the military powers of South Korea and the U.S., by showcasing a large number of strategic and tactical weapons. Seoul needs to focus on enhancing peacetime Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 06
crisis management capabilities to prevent the escalation of military threats by Pyongyang. South Korea and the U.S. should thoroughly prepare for contingencies through scheduled joint drills while developing a tailored deterrence strategy to strengthen solidarity and fortify the ROK-U.S. alliance. At the same time, it is necessary to continuously emphasize that Pyongyang needs to send out a positive signal of its willingness to limit its nuclear capabilities to initiate diplomatic engagements with the international community. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position of INSS. Issue Brief Vol.95, No.9, 2023 07
You can also read
