Phishing attack NOBELIUM hackers' Microsoft 365 from the - www.microsoft365managerplus.com

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Phishing attack NOBELIUM hackers' Microsoft 365 from the - www.microsoft365managerplus.com
How to protect
Microsoft 365 from the
NOBELIUM hackers'
phishing attack

                 www.microsoft365managerplus.com
Phishing attack NOBELIUM hackers' Microsoft 365 from the - www.microsoft365managerplus.com
Table of contents

             What is NOBELIUM                                1

             Spear phishing email campaign by NOBELIUM       1

             Delivery techniques adopted by NOBELIUM         2
                  Technique 1:                               2
                  Technique 2:                               2
                  Technique 3:                               2
                  Technique 4:                               3

             Evolved delivery technique                      3

             Mitigation techniques                           5
                  Find the unmanaged devices                 5
                  Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA)   6
                  Create content search profiles             6
                  Enable auditing and create alerts          6

             Conclusion                                      7

             Indicators of Compromise                        7

www.microsoft365managerplus.com
What is NOBELIUM?
                                  NOBELIUM is the threat actor behind a devastating supply chain
                                  cyberattack in December 2020, Sunburst backdoor, Teardrop malware,
                                  GoldMax malware, and other ongoing threats. Often called by a variety
                                  of names, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has named it
                                  NOBELIUM.

                                  NOBELIUM's malwares historically targeted government organizations,
                                  non-government organizations, think tanks, military, IT service
                                  providers, health technology and research, and telecommunications
                                  providers. NOBELIUM'S latest email attack, impacted approximately
                                  3,000 individual accounts across more than 150 organizations.

                                  Spear phishing email
                                  campaign by NOBELIUM
                                  The NOBELIUM email campaign differed significantly from the
                                  NOBELIUM operations that ran from September 2019 until January 2021.

                                  Previously known for facilitating the GoldMax, Sibot, and GoldFinder
                                  malwares, NOBELIUM's email campaign was completely different from
                                  its previous modus operandi. This malicious email campaign was
                                  uncovered by MSTIC in January 2021. The campaign reached its peak as
                                  NOBELIUM leveraged the legitimate mass-mailing service Constant
                                  Contact to masquerade as a United States-based development
                                  organization and distribute malicious URLs to a wide variety of
                                  organizations.

                                  In this e-book we cover attacker motives, malicious behavior, and best
                                  practices to protect against this spear phishing email campaign.

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                            1
Delivery techniques adopted
  by NOBELIUM
  MSTIC discovered a wave of phishing emails that leveraged the Google Firebase platform to stage an
  ISO file containing malicious content, and security organization also recorded attributes of those who
  accessed the URL. The threat actor kept changing their delivery techniques making it difficult to detect
  them.

      Technique 1
  NOBELIUM attempted to compromise systems with an HTML attachment that, when opened, wrote an
  ISO hosted in Firebase file in the hard disk and encouraged the target to open it. The opened ISO file was
  mounted like a network drive and this allowed a shortcut file LNK to execute a DLL embedded within the
  ISO which, in turn, executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon.

                  Spear phishing mail     html attachment      .iso file          Malicious LNK       Cobalt Strike
                                                                                                        Beacon

      Technique 2
  Instead of hosting the ISO file in Firebase, it was encoded within the HTML file. The rest of the steps
  remained the same as the previous technique.

      Technique 3
  In this technique, the HTML file redirected the target to an ISO file which contained an RTF document
  encoded with Cobalt Strike Beacon.

                       .html attachment        Redirected to     .iso file with RTF          Malicious
                                                                    document          Cobalt Strike Beacon DLL

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                                       2
Technique 4
  In this final experiment, there was no HTML file. Instead, all the phishing emails came with a URL which
  redirected the targets to a spoof website where the ISO files were distributed.

                                                                 Moreover, in more than one of the waves, no
                                                                 ISO payloads were delivered. Instead, a
                                                                 malicious URL was shared in the email which,
       ImageURL       Website spoofing    Malicious ISO          when clicked, ensured device profiling was
                                                                 performed by an threat actor-controlled web
                                                                 server.

  Evolved delivery technique
  In April 2021, the threat actor abandoned Firebase for ISO file hosting and victim tracking. They encoded
  the ISO within the HTML document, which helped to store the target details on a remote server using the
  api.ipify.org service.

  On May 25, the NOBELIUM campaign reached its peak when it started to leverage the legitimate mass
  mailing service Constant Contact. It targeted around 3,000 individual accounts across more than 150
  organizations. The emails appeared to originate from USAID , and a Reply-To
  address of  was observed. One of the alert emails sent as a part of the campaign is
  shown below.

                                     Figure 1: One of the emails from the campaign

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                                 3
The URL in the email directs the target to the legitimate Constant Contact service, which follows this
  pattern:

                                          1. https://r20.rs6[.]net/tn.jsp?f=

  The user is then redirected to NOBELIUM-controlled infrastructure, with a URL following this pattern:

                         1. https://usaid.theyardservice[.]com/d/

  A malicious ISO file is then delivered to the system. Within this ISO file are the following files that are
  saved in the %USER%\AppData\Local\Temp\\ path:
      A shortcut, such as Reports.lnk, that executes a custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loader
      A decoy document, such as ica-declass.pdf, that is displayed to the target
      A DLL, such as Document.dll, that is a custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loader dubbed NativeZone by
      Microsoft

                          Figure 2. ISO file contents. The “Documents.dll” is a hidden file.

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                                 4
The end result, when detonating the LNK file, is the
                                                      execution    of    “C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe
                                                      Documents.dll,Open”.
                                                      The successful deployment of these payloads enables
                                                      NOBELIUM      to   achieve    persistent     access   to
                                                      compromised systems. Then, the successful execution
                                                      of these malicious payloads could enable NOBELIUM to
                                                      conduct     action-on   objectives,   such   as   lateral
                                                      movement, data exfiltration, and delivery of additional
                                                      malware.

  Figure 3. Shortcut which executes the hidden DLL file.

  Mitigation techniques
  Defending against the NOBELIUM isn't easy, but it can be accomplished efficiently if you utilize a
  proactive monitoring, securing, managing, auditing, alerting, and reporting solution.

                    Find the unmanaged devices
                    Keep an eye on all the devices in your network. Identify the unmanaged devices and
                    take necessary actions.

                         How we can help:
                         No need to choose the networks to monitor and the devices to probe. With
                         ManageEngine M365 Manager Plus, once the tenants are configured, these
                         details are readily available in the form of reports. Device-related reports
                         provided by M365 Manager Plus include Azure AD Registered Devices,
                         Recently Created Devices, Registered Device vs Owners, Mobile Devices, and
                         30 more.

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                                   5
Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA)
                   To mitigate compromised credentials MSTIC strongly recommends organizations
                   enable MFA for all user accounts.

                       How we can help:
                       Using the native Microsoft 365 tools allows you to enable MFA for user
                       accounts in bulk. But when it comes to choosing the mode of verification, each
                       user account has to be configured individually. With M365 Manager Plus,
                       enable and configure all the MFA settings for multiple user account in a single
                       session.

                  Create content search profiles
                   The Content Search module in M365 Manager Plus helps you identify emails with
                   malicious links and personally identifiable information.

                       How we can help:
                       The Content Search module scans emails received by the organization for
                       malicious links, specific keywords, senders, email subjects, and other email
                       attributes. For example, refer to the Indicators of Compromise (IoC) table
                       below. Emails sent by the attack group appear to be arriving from the
                       mentioned email addresses. With M365 Manager Plus, scan and receive a near
                       real-time email alert for emails from those senders.

                  Enable auditing and create alerts
                   Enable auditing for all critical user activities like nonowner mailbox accesses, failed
                   password attempts, file accesses after business hours, permission changes, and other
                   suspicious activities.

                       How we can help:
                       M365 Manager Plus comes with more than 500 built-in reports that can be
                       viewed in a single click and exported to various formats. In addition, custom
                       audit profiles can be created and delegated to technicians. Near real-time
                       email alerts can be configured for the user actions to enable instant
                       remediation.

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                              6   6
Conclusion
  Becoming and staying informed about an attacker's motive and techniques helps us take proactive
  actions to safeguard our organization. Choosing the best tool to harden security requires that you
  purchase the Microsoft 365 Premium edition with all available features to make use of the benefits
  provided by them. An affordable alternative is a comprehensive tool like M365 Manager Plus which
  helps manage and protect your Microsoft 365 setup. Learn more about M365 Manager Plus here.

  Indicators of Compromise
    Indicator                                Type             Description

    ashainfo@usaid.gov                       Email            Spoofed email account

    mhillary@usaid.gov                       Email            Spoofed email account

    2523f94bd4fba4af76f4411fe61084a7e7d      SHA-256          Malicious ISO file (container)
    80dec163c9ccba9226c80b8b31252

    d035d394a82ae1e44b25e273f99eae8e2        SHA-256          Malicious ISO file (container)
    369da828d6b6fdb95076fd3eb5de142

    94786066a64c0eb260a28a2959fcd31d6        SHA-256          Malicious ISO file (container)
    3d175ade8b05ae682d3f6f9b2a5a916

    48b5fb3fa3ea67c2bc0086c41ec755c39d       SHA-256          Malicious shortcut (LNK)
    748a7100d71b81f618e82bf1c479f0

    ee44c0692fd2ab2f01d17ca4b58ca6c7f7       SHA-256          Cobalt Strike Beacon malware
    9388cbc681f885bb17ec946514088c

    ee42ddacbd202008bcc1312e548e1d9ac        SHA-256          Cobalt Strike Beacon malware
    670dd3d86c999606a3a01d464a2a330

    usaid.theyardservice[.]com               Domain           Subdomain used to distribute ISO file

    worldhomeoutlet[.]com                    Domain           Subdomain in Cobalt Strike C2

    dataplane.theyardservice[.]com           Domain           Subdomain used to distribute ISO file

    cdn.theyardservice[.]com                 Domain           Subdomain used to distribute ISO file

www.microsoft365managerplus.com                                                                        7
static.theyardservice[.]com               Domain           Subdomain used to distribute ISO file

  192[.]99[.]221[.]77                       IP address       IP resolved to worldhomeoutlet[.]com

  83[.]171[.]237[.]173                      IP address       IP resolved to *theyardservice[.]com

  theyardservice[.]com                      Domain           Actor controlled domain

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