Dissecting Thailand's 2022 Military and Police Reshuffles: Palace Proactivity?
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ISSUE: 2022 No. 95
ISSN 2335-6677
RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS
Singapore | 23 September 2022
Dissecting Thailand’s 2022 Military and Police Reshuffles:
Palace Proactivity?
Paul Chambers*
Members of the armed forces stand with flags of Thailand outside the Grand Palace during celebrations
to mark King Maha Vajiralongkorn's 70th birthday in Bangkok on 28 July 2022.
Picture: Jack TAYLOR/AFP.
* Guest writer, Paul Chambers, is Lecturer and Special Advisor for International Affairs,
Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. In March-May 2021, he
was Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Thailand’s annual military and police reshuffles, due to take effect on 1 October 2022,
have been, as usual, greatly influenced by political considerations — including ties with
the palace, pre-cadet class membership and factionalism.
• Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and Deputy Prime Minister
Prawit Wongsuwan have appointed their favourites to senior posts in the Army and
Police.
• The Crown in turn has appointed its own favourites to command the Air Force and
Navy, again ensuring that its trusted Army commander remains in place and prepared
to appoint favourites to head the Police and Armed Forces in 2023.
• While control over the 2021 reshuffles was shared between the Army’s Burapha Phayak
faction and the Crown, in 2022, palace proactivity has enhanced royal influence over
the military and police reshuffles.
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INTRODUCTION
This year’s military and police reshuffles in Thailand, due to take effect on 1 October, saw the
enhancement of monarchical power over appointments. Decisions regarding reshuffles
represent crucial demonstrations of power — on the part of the king, of leading military, and
police personalities, or of both working together. The military has seen 765 promotions,
involving 18 female officers, while the police force saw 255 promotions, involving 10 female
officers. Among military branches, there have been appointments involving 458 generals and
307 colonels or officers at colonel-equivalent rank.1 Among the police, there have been 169
promotions involving generals and 86 involving colonels.2 This is thus another year of top-
heavy promotions to flag rank for both the Thai military and the country’s police.
CLASS AND FACTIONAL TIES IN THE RESHUFFLES
In Thailand, military promotions are inevitably based on political and personal ties. Shared
educational experiences in pre-cadet academy classes have become the most fundamental
linkage for soldiers and police due to the fact that almost all future officers attend the Armed
Forces Academies Preparatory School before enrolling in the specialised Navy, Air Force,
Police, or Chulachomklao (Army) academies. Shared experiences in a particular military unit
are another basis for factionalism. Factions connected to royalty tend also to have more power.
The oldest of these is the Wongthewan or “Divine Progeny” faction, associated with the King’s
Guard 1st Infantry Regiment. Wongthewan had enjoyed dominance over other Army factions
from 1870 until 1978, and King Vajiralongkorn is himself a member of Wongthewan. The
second most powerful Army faction is Burapha Phayak, the “Eastern Tigers”, representing the
Second Infantry (and Cavalry) Division. This division is comprised of three regiments, but it
is the 21st Infantry Regiment, known as the Thahan Suea Rachini or Queen’s Tiger Guards,
that is closest to the palace. Queen Mother Sirikit remains its honorary commandant. After
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra began to enlist allies from among members of Wongthewan
in 2003, arch-royalists used the more reliable Burapha Phayak faction to spearhead the 2006
coup, cobble together a 2008-2011 anti-Thaksin civilian government, and oust Prime Minister
Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. 3 Retired-generals-turned-cabinet-ministers Acting Prime
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, currently suspended Prime Minister and concurrent Defense
Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and Interior Minister Anupong Paochinda — “the three P’s”4 — all
hail from Burapha Phayak. Though the faction prevailed in intra-service politics in 2007-2016,
other Army factions continue to exist: not only Wongthewan, but also the Cavalry, the Special
Forces (Muak Daeng or Red Berets), and the 9th Infantry Division (Suea Dam or Black
Panthers).
Personalities also play a role in Army factionalism. This is due to the tremendous sway that
some individuals possess. First and foremost, Thailand’s current king has sought to take an
active role in military reshuffles, unlike his father and predecessor who opted for a more
indirect role. Initiatives in this area on the part of the palace have translated into the king’s
direct selection of Wongthewan faction members to serve as Army commanders, as in the cases
of General Apirat Kongsompong (2018-2022) and General Narongphan Jitkaewthae (2020-
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2022). In 2018, King Vajiralongkorn established the Kho Daeng or Red Rim clique, whose
members attend special short-term military training under royal sponsorship. Only Red Rim
officers can now rise to top Army, Air Force, or Supreme Command postings.5 Meanwhile,
though “the three Ps” have influenced military reshuffles over the last decade, growing tensions
between Prayut and Prawit6 have, in recent times, contributed to disagreements between them
over decisions relating to reshuffles. In the Police, the “Wongsuwan connection” is influential
because Prawit’s brother, retired commander Police General Patcharawat, holds sway over
senior police appointments. Prawit’s henchman Captain Thamanat Prompao, who has
promoted Prawit’s interests against those of Prayut in Parliament, has pre-cadet class
connections with newly-appointed military and police officers. Finally, individuals with some
“big” family names have, by virtue of the charisma attached to their kinship ties, succeeded in
securing palace support for senior appointments in the military and the police force.
WHAT’S NEW IN 2022?
The tables below group the 2022 leadership changes into six groups: 1) All security services,
2) The Police, 3) The Armed Forces Headquarters, 4) The Army; 5) The 1st Army Region, and
6) Additional crucial Army postings. Each table demonstrates that the year’s appointments
have tended to go to either palace favourites or followed the preferences of the Burapha
Phayak. Those preferences in turn reflect the influence of Prawit and/or Prayut. Officers from
Pre-Cadet Class 22, to which Wongthewan member and Army commander General
Narongphan Jitkaewthae belongs, have figured prominently in these appointments. Other
classes whose members have received important posts in 2022 are Pre-Cadet Classes 23-26;
selected members of these classes will lead Thailand’s military and police in future.
The Security Services as a Whole
The data in Table 1 indicate that the palace and Burapha Phayak—the latter as dominated by
Prawit—are engaged in a tug-of-war for control over postings at this highest level of authority.
The Navy and Air Force commanders are king’s men first and foremost. Incoming Navy chief
Admiral Cherngchai Chomcherngpat and Air Force commander Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn
Wannarot join their classmate Army chief General Narongphan in acting as the bulwark of
monarchical interests. Admiral Cherngchai’s royalist ties are owed to his being part of a Navy
faction connected to former Navy Chief Admiral Luechai Ruddit, brother of Privy Council
member General Kampnat Ruddit. For his part, Armed Forces chief General Chalermpol
Srisawat must walk a tightrope, as he is close both to the palace and to Burapha Phayak, the
military faction to which he belongs. Like Narongphan, Chalermpol is also a member of the
king’s Red Rim faction. Meanwhile, Prawit has ensured the appointment of one of his loyalists,
Burapha Phayak member General Sanitchanok Sangkachan as Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Defense.7 This appointment serves to increase Prawit’s influence at the ministry
— technically helmed by Prayut himself, in his capacity as defense minister.
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Table 1: Key figures in the Security Services, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new
appointments.)
Position Name Faction Pre-cadet Retirement
Class Date
Permanent General Sanitchanok Prawit Wongsuwan/ 24 2023
Secretary, Sangkachan* Burapha Phayak
Ministry of
Defense
Commander, General. Chalermpol Burapha 21 2023
Armed Srisawat Phayak/Thahan Suea
Forces Rachini/Cavalry/palace/
Red Rim
Commander, General. Narongphan palace 22 2023
Royal Thai Jitkaewthae
Army
Commander, Admiral Cherngchai palace (Narongphan) 22 2023
Royal Thai Chomcherngpatat*
Navy
Commander, Air Chief Marshal palace 22 2023
Royal Thai Alongkorn (Narongphan)/Red Rim
Air Force Wannarot*
Commander, Police Prawit and Patcharawat 22/Police 2023
Royal Thai General Damrongsak Wongsuwan Academy
Police Kittiprapas* Class 38
The Police
The annual Police reshuffle sheds light on an arena of competition between the palace and the
police clique of Prawit’s brother Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, which includes
former Police Generals Somyot Pumpanmuang and Chakthip Chaijinda. This faction was
successful in seeking the appointment of Police General Damrongsak Kittiprapas as the new
Police commander.8 At the same time, the Patcharawat-connected Damrongsak hails from the
same pre-cadet class as Wongthewan Army chief Narongphan; Prawit may have had to bargain
with the palace to ensure that Damrongsak received this posting.
Damrong’s accession to the post of Police commander could help Prawit in the upcoming
general election because the police sometimes act as vote canvassers. Two other Wongsuwan
minions who were promoted are Police Generals Kittirat Phunphet and Surachate Hakpan, each
of whom has cultivated publicity and may one day rise to the post of Police commander. Kittirat
is also a pre-cadet academy Class 25 classmate and friend of powerful Prawit minion and
influential member of parliament, Captain Thammanat Prompao.
Three other leading police officials figuring in this year’s reshuffle enjoy the favour of the
palace. One is Police General Suchart Teerasawat, an officer due to retire in 2023. In contrast,
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the other two have bright futures. General Torsak Sukvimol, the younger brother of Lord
Chamberlain of the Royal Household Air Chief Marshal Satitpong Sukvimol,9 was this year
promoted to deputy Police chief and is likely to rise to the force’s top post upon Damrongsak’s
retirement in 2023 and to serve until his own retirement in 2024. Police General Jirabhop
Bhuridej—the younger brother of General Jakrapob Bhuridej, who is a commander of the
Royal Security Command10—is likely to become Police chief in the future.
Table 2: The six senior-most Police officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new
appointments.)
Position Name Faction Pre-cadet Retirement
Class/Police Date
Academy
Class
Police Police Prawit and 22/38 2023
Commander General Damrongsak Patcharawat
Kittiprapas* Wongsuwan/
Narongphan
Deputy Police General Chinnapat Sarasin/Apirat (did not 2023
11
Commander Sarasin* attend pre-
1 cadet
academy)/40
Deputy Police General Kittirat Prawit and 25/41 2026
Commander Phunphet* Patcharawat
2 Wongsuwan
Deputy Police General Torsak palace/ (did not 2024
Commander Sukvimol* Sukvimol attend pre-
3 cadet
academy)/51
Deputy Police General Surachate Prawit and 31/47 2031
Commander Hakpan* Patcharawat
4 Wongsuwan
Deputy Police General Suchart palace (did not 2023
Commander Teerasawat attend pre-
5 cadet
academy)/36
Commander, Police General Jirabhop palace/ 34/50 2037
Central Bhuridej Bhuridej
Investigation
Bureau
The Armed Forces Headquarters
Measured by firepower, Thailand’s Armed Forces Headquarters—formerly known as the
Supreme Command—represents a weak entity relative to other security services, particularly
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the Army. Nevertheless, its leaders are symbolic in the projection of military unity, and the
palace is extremely influential in determining headquarters postings. Table 3 presents a number
of interesting data. First, the headquarters’ new chief of staff, General Thitichai Thienthong, is
a distant relative of the ageing political baron Sanoh Thienthong, a close friend of Prawit’s.12
Furthermore, General Songwit Noonpakdi—the son of a former Army commander, a long-
time Wongthewan faction member, and at the same time an officer who over the last three years
was constantly demoted—has risen to become the deputy chief of the Armed Forces, in
probable preparation to succeed Chalermpol as commander, or perhaps even to become Army
Commander, in 2023.13 Songwit’s inexplicable resurrection is likely owed to the intervention
of the king.
Table 3: The six senior-most Armed Forces Headquarters Officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks
indicate new appointments.)
Position Name Faction Pre-cadet Retirement
Class Date
Armed Forces General Burapha 21 2023
Commander Chalermpol Phayak/Thahan Suea
Srisawat Rachini/
Cavalry/Red
Rim
Deputy General Songwit Palace/Wongthewan/ 24 2025
Commander Noonpakdi* Red Rim
(Army)
Deputy General. Sirawut palace 22 2023
Commander Wongkhante*
(Army)
Deputy Admiral Sutinan palace 22 2023
Commander Samanrak*
(Navy)
Deputy Air Chief Marshal palace/Red Rim 22 2023
Commander Kongsak
(Air Force) Chantarasopa*
Chief of Staff General Tidichai Prawit 24 2023
Tienthong* Wongsuwan/Sanoh
Thienthong
The Army
The reshuffle in the Army, Thailand’s strongest security service, produced few surprises in
2022. Wongthewan Army commander Narongphan’s continued tenure overshadows the jump
by two members of the pro-Prawit Burapha Phayak faction, Generals Jaroenchai Hintao and
Suksan Nongbualuang, to become deputy and assistant Army commander, respectively. While
this year’s remaining Army appointments have little relative significance, the palace may have
a conundrum in 2023, namely the lack of a Wongthewan officer to whom to pass the Army
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commander’s torch following the retirement of Narongphan. The likelihood is that Burapha
Phayak member Jaroenchai will succeed Narongphan; (see Table 4).14
Table 4: The five senior-most Army officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new
appointments.)
Position Name Faction Pre-cadet Retirement
Class Date
Commander General Palace/Wongthewan/Red 22 2023
Narongphan Rim
Jitkaewthae
Deputy General Prawit/ 23 2024
Commander Jaroenchai Burapha Phayak/Red
Hintao* Rim
Assistant General Suksan Prawit/ 23 2025
Commander 1 Nongbualuang* Burapha Phayak/Red
Rim
Assistant General Wongthewan 22 2023
Commander 2 Kriangkrai
Srirak*
Chief of Staff General Ukrist Special Operations 24 2025
Buntanon*
The 1st Army Region
Soldiers stationed in the Army region covering Bangkok and the Central Plains are strategically
positioned to thwart coups; its command and a range of others has for that reason been an
extremely important post. In 2021, officers with a Burapha Phayak background held most
leadership postings in the 1st Army Region; but in 2022, as Table 5 indicates, the new regional
commander is General Pana Klaewplotthuk, a trusted Wongthewan officer who apparently has
a proclivity for US military hardware.15 He is a candidate for eventual appointment as Army
commander. The remaining deputy or cohort commanders in the region are all “Red Rim”
soldiers; three have Wongthewan backgrounds, while two are members of the Burapha Phayak
faction of the Army.
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Table 5: The six senior-most 1st Army Region officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new
appointments.)
Position Name Faction Pre-cadet Retirement
Class Date
1st Army General palace/Wongthewan/Red 26 2027
Region Panaplotthuk* Rim
Commander
Cohort General Prawit/Burapha 26 2027
Commander Chinupong Phayak/Red Rim
Raudsiri*
Deputy Cohort General Apirat/Wongthewan/Red 27 2028
Commander Tawatchai Rim
Thangpitakgul*
Deputy 1st General. Amrit Burapha 27 2029
Army Region Bunsuya* Phayak/Prayut/Red Rim
Commander
Deputy 1st General Apirat/Wongthewan/Red 24 2025
Army Region Kraipop Rim
Commander Chaipan*
Deputy 1st General Wongthewan/Red Rim 28 2029
Army Region Worayot
Commander Luangsuwan*
Miscellaneous Matters
Seven additional new promotions also deserve mention. In the 3rd Army Region, covering
Northern Thailand), incoming commander General Suriya Uemsuro hails from Army
commander Narongphan’s pre-cadet Class 22—as does National Security Advisor General
Supot Malaniyom. Meanwhile, in the Southern 4th Army Region, where a long-running Malay-
Muslim insurrection persists, General Santi Sakuntanak has rather surprisingly been appointed
4th Army commander. Santi is a member of pre-cadet Class 25, like Captain Thammanat
Prompao. However, it is rumoured that his appointment has come at the behest of the palace.16
Other postings have proved less surprising: the 1st and 11th Divisions, traditionally closest to
the palace, are to be commanded by palace favourites, while the 2nd Infantry Division, home
of the Burapha Phayak, will have a new chief who hails from that faction.
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Table 6: Additional important Army positions, 2022-2023. (Asterisks designate new
appointments.)
Position Name Faction Pre-cadet Class Retirement
Date
Secretary- General Supot Cavalry 22 2023
General, Malaniyom
National
Security
Council
Commander, General Surasakmontri 23 2024
Second Army Sawarat Task Force17
Region Saengpol
Commander, General Suriya Narongphan 22 2023
Third Army Uemsuro* (Wongthewan)
Region
Commander, General Santi Wongthewan/ 25 2026
Fourth Army Sakuntanak palace
Region
Commander, General Issara Special Forces 27 2028
Special Forces Damrongsak*
Warfare Center
Commander, 1st Colonel Natadej palace 28 2029
Infantry Jantharangsu*
Division
Commander, General Burapha 28 2030
2nd Infantry Sarawut Phayak
Division Chaiyasit*
(“Eastern
Tigers”)
Commander, 9th Colonel Wutiya 9th Infantry 28 2030
Infantry Janthamat* Division
Division (“Black
Panthers”)
Commander, Colonel Ekanan palace 30 2032
11th Infantry Maobutr*
Division
CONCLUSION
With a general election due no later than May 2023, guaranteeing palace-led political stability
in Thailand’s military and police is essential to the interests of the state and of the elites. These
security services must not only effectively enforce election results but also quell potential
protests and ensure effective counterinsurgency in the Deep South. The 2022 military and
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police reshuffles reflect an attempt on the part of the monarch to enhance palace proactivity in
a year that has seen differences between Prawit and Prayut grow. The Constitutional Court
temporarily forced Prayut to step down as prime minister in August, and Prawit temporarily
succeeded him until a court decision regarding Prayut’s eligibility to extend his tenure as prime
minister can be made.18 The unpopular Prayut’s political career looks to be increasingly on the
rocks; and the frail Prawit is 77 years old. Meanwhile, the palace appears to be backing new
potential Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul of the military-allied Bhumjaithai Party.
Paralleling these developments in the political arena, the king seems to have intervened in
military and police reshuffles, ensuring that arch-royalists whom he trusts assume the top
leadership positions. His initiative appears particularly clear in 1) the continued service of
Wongthewan Army commander General Narongphan; 2) the promotion of arch-royalist
offiders Admiral Cherngchai and Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn to serve as Navy and Air Force
commanders; 3) the promotion of Wongthewan General Pana to command the 1st Army
Region; 4) preparation for the likely promotion of palace-connected Police General Torsak
Sukvimol to command the police in 2023; and 5) the likely appointment of Wongthewan
General Songwit Noonpakdi as commander of the Armed Forces. The only fly in the ointment
is that the Burapha Phayak faction’s General Jaroenchai could well succeed General
Narongphan as Army commander. At the same time, the already overarching dominance of the
palace in the security realm may mean that that move would matter relatively little. If the next
election pushes “the three Ps” out of the government, then their direct influence over reshuffles
will come to an end, leaving the king to extend his sway over such appointments even further.
If, however, one or all of those three officers should continue to exert influence over reshuffles,
then the jousting match between the Burapha Phayak faction and the palace—so evident in
military appointments—is likely to continue.
One aspect of Thailand’s military and police reshuffles remains certain. Since 2008,19 these
reshuffles have remained under the control of the palace and senior security officials; elected
civilians have no legal right to influence them. This is despite the fact that civilian control over
reshuffles is necessary to enhance democracy in Thailand.
ENDNOTES
1
“ประกาศสํานักนายกรัฐมนตรี เรื2 อง ให้นายทหารรับราชการ” [ Prime Minister’s Office announcement regarding
military reshuffle], Royal Gazette, volume 139, section 2213, 10 September 2022
(http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2565/E/213/T_0001.PDF).
2
“ประกาศสํานักนายกรัฐมนตรี เรื2 อง แต่งตั=งข้าราชการตํารวจ”[Prime Minister’s Office announcement of Police
reshuffle], Royal Gazette, volume 139, section 209, 7 September 2022
(http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2565/E/209/T_0027.PDF).
3
See Supalak Ganjanakhundee, A Soldier King: Monarchy and Military in the Thailand of Rama X.
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2022).
4
Anupong’s nickname is “Big Pok”; hence his resultant status as a “P”. See Komchadluek, “พี2นอ้ ง 3ป”.
“ประวิตร” เปิ ดบ้านปั=น อนุพงษ์ - ประยุทธ์ – คมชัดลึก.” [Brothers 3P “Prawit” opens wide the house of Anupong-
Prayut], 20 October 2021 (https://www.komchadluek.net/scoop/481858).
11ISSUE: 2022 No. 95
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5
Paul Chambers, “‘Red Rim Soldiers’: The Changing Leadership of Thailand’s Military in
2020”, New Mandala, 21 September 2020 (https://www.newmandala.org/the-changing-leadership-of-
thailands-military-in-2020/).
6
Komchadleuk, “เสี2 ยงยึด ‘ประยุทธ์-ประวิตร’ ผ่าซีก พปชร. หยุดยื=อเวลา” [Take the Risk of Seizing “Prayut-Prawit”,
slicing the Democratic Party, Stopping Time”], 26 February 2022
(https://www.komchadluek.net/scoop/504341).
7
Matichon, “โปรดเกล้าฯ นายพล 765 นาย ‘บิOกหนุ่ม’ ผงาดปลัดกห. ‘บิOกจอร์จ-บิOกตุด๊ ’ ผบ.ทร.-ผบ.ทอ.” [765 Military
Appointments including “Big Num,” Permanent Secretary of Defense; “Big George-Big Thood”,
Commanders of the Navy, Air Force], 10 September 2022 (
https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_35560470.
8
Krungthep Thurakit, “ผ่าขุมกําลัง ’ประวิตร’ พยัคฆ์บูรพา ป้อแป้แต่สุดปึ= ก” [Excision of the power of “Prawit” and
Phayak Burapha, but extremely flabby], 28 August 2022
(https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/blogs/news/news_update/1023445); Krungthep Thurakit, “เคาะแล้ว
พล.ต.อ.ดํารงศักดิS กิตติประภัสร์ ผบ.ตร. คนที2 13” [Knocked, Pol. Gen. Damrongsak Kittiprapas, the 13th
Commander-in-Chief of the Police], 29 August 2022
(https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/1023600).
9
BBC Thai, “ต่อศักดิS สุ ขวิมล: ผูบ้ ญั ชาการ ตร. สอบสวนกลางคนใหม่ กับคติ ‘ทํางานในตําแหน่งที2เราได้รับให้ดีที2สุด’” [Torsak
Sukwimol: The new commander of the Central Investigative Police with the motto “Do the best job in
the position we have been given”], 25 September 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-
54239870).
10
BBC Thai, “‘ตัวW ช้าง’: เส้นทางสู่ ผบ.ตร. ของ จิรภพ ภูริเดช และ สําราญ นวลมา ในอีก 10 ปี ” [“Elephant Tickets”: the path
to the police chiefs of Jirabhop Bhuridejand Samran Nuanma in 10 years”], 3 October 2021
(https://www.bbc.com/thai/58770346).
11
Chinnapat is the son of the late politician and Police chief General Pao Sarasin and is thus a
member of one of Thailand’s most storied politico-bureaucratic families. He is also close to former
Army commander and current Royal Household Bureau vice chamberlain, General Apirat
Kongsompong.
12
The Standard, “เส้นทางชีวติ ‘พล.อ. ประวิตร วงษ์สุวรรณ’ จากนายทหารสู่ ถนนการเมือง ก่อนขยับเป็ น ‘รักษาการนายก’” [The life
path of “Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan” from military officer to political road before moving to “Acting
Prime Minister”], 24 August 24 2022 (https://thestandard.co/prawit-wongsuwan-way/).
13
Matichon, “โปรดเกล้าฯ นายพล 765 นาย ‘บิOกหนุ่ม’ ผงาดปลัดกห. ‘บิOกจอร์จ-บิOกตุด๊ ’ ผบ.ทร.-ผบ.ทอ.”.
14
Royal intervention could alternatively see deputy Armed Forces commander Gen. Songwit
Noonpakdi succeed Narongphan—despite Songwit not having obtained his military education in
Thailand, a traditional obstacle to any command appointment. A direct promotion from the Armed
Forces headquarters to Army commander is not unprecedented: palace-favoured General Surayud
Chulanond, who currently chairs the Privy Council, followed the same path in 1998.
15
Krungthep Turakit, “นับถอยหลัง สิ= นอํานาจ ’3 ป.’ “กองทัพ” เปลี2ยนขั=ว รับการเมืองใหม่” [Countdown. End of
power of “3 Ps” “Army” changes orientation, gets new politics], 12 September 2022
(https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/1026151).
16
Isranews, “‘บิOกเกรี ยง’ ผงาดผูช้ ่วย ผบ.ทบ. – ‘พล.ต.ศานติ’ ขึ=นแม่ทพั 4” [“Big Krieng” emerges as assistant
commander-in-chief of Royal Thai Army – ‘Major General Santi’ as commander of 4th Army”], 10
September 2022 ( https://www.isranews.org/article/south-news/scoop/111938-santicommander.html);
interview with retired senior army officer, 10 September 2022.
17
The Surasakmontri Task Force, created in 1978 and upgraded in 1995, is a special Army unit
charged with handling special operations such as anti-smuggling activities, in the northern part of
Thailand’s Northeastern region.
18
For a discussion on the controversy over how long Prayut is eligible to remain prime minister under
the terms of the 2017 Constitution, see Wassana Nanuam, Mongkol Bangprapa and Aekarach
12ISSUE: 2022 No. 95
ISSN 2335-6677
Sattaburuth, “PM Tenure Ruling September 30,” Bangkok Post, 15 September 2022
(https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2391730/pm-tenure-ruling-sept-30).
19
See section 25, พระราชบัญญัติ จัดระเบียบราชการกระทรวงกลาโหม [Act on the Organization of the Ministry of
Defense], Royal Gazette volume 125, part 26, q February 2008
(https://www.rtaf.mi.th/th/Documents/Law/%E0%B8%9E%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%9A%20%E0%B
8%88%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%94%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B0%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%9A%E0%
B8%B5%E0%B8%A2%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%8A%E0%B8%81%E0
%B8%B2%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B0%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%A3%E
0%B8%A7%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%B2%E0%B9%82%E0%B8%AB%
E0%B8%A1_2551.pdf).
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