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FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
Comparison of stances of right-
wing populist politicians
towards the withdrawal from
the European Union: discourse
analysis of Tomio Okamura
and Nigel Farage’s speeches
Master's Thesis
BC. ANNA LAŠTOVIČKOVÁ
Supervisor: Mgr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Ph.D.
Department of International Relations
and European Studies
International Relations
Brno 2021COMPARISON OF STANCES OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST POLITICIANS
TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS OF TOMIO OKAMURA AND NIGEL FARAGE’S SPEECHES
Bibliographic Record
Author: Bc. Anna Laštovičková
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University
Department of International Relations and
European Studies
Title of Thesis: Comparison of stances of right-wing populist
politicians towards the withdrawal from the
European Union: discourse analysis of Tomio
Okamura and Nigel Farage’s speeches
Degree Programme: International Relations
Supervisor: Mgr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Ph.D.
Academic Year: 2021
Number of Pages: 74
Keywords: right-wing populism, European Union,
withdrawal from the European Union, Tomio
Okamura, Nigel Farage, critical discourse
analysis, discourse-historical approachCOMPARISON OF STANCES OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST POLITICIANS TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF TOMIO OKAMURA AND NIGEL FARAGE’S SPEECHES Abstract This diploma thesis aims to analyse and compare the discourses of selected Czech and British right-wing populist politicians, focusing on their stances towards the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union. To do so, it utilizes discourse analysis of speeches of Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage, two prominent figures of right-wing populism and, in the examined period, chairmen of the right-wing populist parties Dawn of Direct Democracy, Freedom and Direct Democracy, and UK Independence Party. The thesis employs Ruth Wodak’s approach to critical discourse analysis, through which it examines the main discourse topics of selected speeches, as well as specific discursive strategies and linguistic means and realizations.
COMPARISON OF STANCES OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST POLITICIANS
TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS OF TOMIO OKAMURA AND NIGEL FARAGE’S SPEECHES
Statutory Declaration
I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Master's Thesis
concerning the topic of Comparison of stances of right-wing populist
politicians towards the withdrawal from the European Union:
discourse analysis of Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage’s speeches
independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this
thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the
Bibliography.
In Brno, 9 May 2021
.......................................
Bc. Anna LaštovičkováCOMPARISON OF STANCES OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST POLITICIANS
TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS OF TOMIO OKAMURA AND NIGEL FARAGE’S SPEECHES
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Mgr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová,
Ph.D., for her continuous encouragement and valuable advice.TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
List of Tables 7
List of Terms and Acronyms 8
1 Introduction 9
2 Literature Review 11
3 Theoretical Framework 13
3.1 Social Constructivism ............................................................................... 13
3.2 Right-wing Populism ................................................................................ 14
4 Methodology 18
4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) ....................................................... 18
4.2 Case Selection.............................................................................................. 21
4.3 Sample Selection ........................................................................................ 25
5 Analysis 30
5.1 Discourse-Historical Analysis of Tomio Okamura’s Selected
Speeches ................................................................................................... 30
5.2 Discourse-Historical Analysis of Nigel Farage’s Selected
Speeches ................................................................................................... 45
6 Conclusion and Discussion 60
Bibliography 63
Appendix A Selected list of discursive strategies in right-wing
populist discourse 73
Appendix B Selected list of content-related topoi in right-wing
populist discourse 74
6LIST OF TABLES
List of Tables
Table 1. Analysed speeches of Tomio Okamura. By author.
Table 2. Analysed speeches of Nigel Farage. By author.
7LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
List of Terms and Acronyms
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
CDA – critical discourse analysis
CL – critical linguistics
DHA – discourse-historical approach
EP – European Parliament
EU – European Union
GDPR – General Data Protection Regulation
MEP – Member of the European Parliament
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODS – Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic
Party)
SPD – Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and Direct
Democracy)
UK – United Kingdom
UKIP – UK Independence Party
ÚPD – Úsvit přímé demokracie (Dawn of Direct
Democracy)
US; USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
8INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
This thesis analyses the discourses of two right-wing populist politicians,
Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage, focusing on their stances towards the
withdrawal of their countries, that is, the Czech Republic and the United
Kingdom, from the European Union. There are several reasons as to why
these specific countries and these specific politicians were selected for
the analysis; these reasons are elaborated on below as well as further
on in the thesis.
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European
Union, becoming the first member state of the EU to do so, and thus
sending shockwaves through the world. The country’s decision
to withdraw from the EU immediately became a focal point of numerous
analyses assessing the future of both the UK and the EU, as well as the
reasons behind the vote. Among the most important factors which had
contributed to the way the British voted was the strength of the nation’s
Eurosceptic sentiments, as in the years and decades preceding the 2016
referendum, Euroscepticism had “defined the public and media debate”
regarding the UK’s membership in the EU (Oliver 2018, chap. 2; Clarke,
Goodwin and Whiteley 2017, 160). Gradually, Nigel Farage, the leader
of the right-wing populist UK Independence Party, had become one of the
most visible faces of the British Eurosceptic scene and, in the months
leading up to the British plebiscite, an important figure in the Leave
campaign as well (Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley 2017, 28–32).
Given the fact that the Czech Republic, too, belongs to the most
Eurosceptic member states of the EU (European Parliament 2018, Stone
2019), the British decision renewed a debate at the time about the future
of the Czech membership in the Union. It was especially Tomio Okamura
and his right-wing populist party Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom
and Direct Democracy, SPD), vocal critics of the Czech Republic’s
membership in the EU, who welcomed the UK’s decision and have since
continued to frequently request that such a referendum be held in the
Czech Republic as well (Kaniok and Hloušek 2018, 520). Even though the
scenario of “Czexit” still seems rather unlikely at the moment (Stone
2019), it is important to bear in mind that this can change depending
on the current political situation in the country.
Furthermore, another motivation for choosing this particular topic
is the fact that in recent years, “right-wing populist parties have moved
9INTRODUCTION
away from the margins” and “have become mainstream parties and
movements” (Wodak 2015, x). The parties’ leaders and their rhetoric
have played a substantial role in this process. Therefore, to understand
the messages and the electoral success of right-wing populists,
it is essential to take their discourse into account (Wodak 2015, xi).
Against this background, the objective of this thesis is to analyse and
compare the discourses of the two mentioned right-wing populist
politicians, Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage, focusing on their stances
towards the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union. The
research question that the thesis seeks to answer is:
To what extent do the discourses of Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage
regarding the EU withdrawal of the Czech Republic and the United
Kingdom, respectively, resemble and differ from each other?
In order to answer the question, the thesis employs Ruth Wodak’s
(2001, 2009, 2015) discourse-historical approach to critical discourse
analysis through which it examines selected speeches of Okamura and
Farage. This method will enable the main discourse topics to
be determined, along with specific discursive strategies and linguistic
means and realizations utilized by both politicians to convey their
respective messages.
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides
a brief overview of the published literature covering the topics of the
right-wing populist discourse on the EU, and the EU-related discourses
of Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage. Furthermore, it explains how this
thesis connects to the pre-existing research. Chapter 3 presents the
theoretical basis of the thesis, i.e., the social constructivism theory as well
as the ideology of right-wing populism. In the methodology-focused
Chapter 4, critical discourse analysis and discourse-historical approach
are introduced, accompanied by sections dedicated to the processes of
selecting specific cases and samples. Chapter 5 is devoted to the analysis
of Okamura’s and Farage’s speeches, with each of their sections divided
into three parts. These cover the most frequently recurring discourse
topics, discursive strategies, and linguistic means and realizations, that
is, the three dimensions of the discourse-historical approach, as
proposed by Wodak. The last part of the thesis, Chapter 6, then
summarises the most prominent findings and provides a few concluding
remarks.
10LITERATURE REVIEW
2 Literature Review
Although there is a plethora of both academic and non-academic
publications concerning right-wing populism and its manifestations in
Europe as well as in other parts of the world (such as Abromeit et al.
2016; Baier 2016; Greven 2016; Mudde 2016; Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser 2012; Sandrin 2020; Swank and Betz 2003), the coverage of
the topic of the right-wing populist discourse in the European Union is
not as extensive. One of the few comprehensive overviews of the topic is
provided by the 2013 publication Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics
and Discourse (Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral 2013) which presents an
overview of right-wing populist movements across Europe focusing on
their policies and rhetoric. Hameleers (2019) delves into the subject of
the content and effects of right-wing populist discourse in online Dutch
media during and after the 2015 European refugee crisis. The topics of
populist discourse as such and its impact on the future of the EU
institutions are contemplated by Graeff (2017); Güler (2019) then
analyses the ways in which members of the right-wing political groups
in the European Parliament use discourses as “a means of controlling
public discourse, and hence the public mind” regarding the topic of
immigration.
In the case of Tomio Okamura, discourse analyses relating to his
stances towards the EU are even rarer to come across. Nevertheless,
there are multiple relevant works worth mentioning, for instance Kim’s
(2020) article which presents a discourse-analytic account of competing
populisms in the Czech Republic, or the analysis of the performative
aspects of Okamura’s rhetorical style by Jan Chovanec (2020).
Furthermore, Císař and Kubát (2021) explore, among other phenomena,
the discourse of Okamura’s party SPD on the EU at the time of the Covid-
19.
The discourse of Nigel Farage has been given significantly more
attention, with researchers conducting numerous analyses of both his
speeches and his social media presence. Catherine MacMillan (2016), for
example, studies the ways in which Farage and his UK Independence
Party depict the EU in dystopian and totalitarian terms; she also offers
a comparison of such narratives in the discourse of UKIP and the French
party Front National (MacMillan 2017). In the work by Brusenbauch
Meislová and Buckledee (2019), the discourse of populist sovereignism
11LITERATURE REVIEW
is investigated, focusing on Farage as well as three other right-wing hard
Eurosceptic populist politicians. Regarding Farage’s online presence in
particular, his use of the social network Twitter is of interest to Breeze
(2020) who conducts a corpus-assisted study of Farage’s tweets in
comparison to those of other prominent British politicians. Similarly,
Albu (2016) discusses the linguistic strategies employed by the UKIP
candidates in tweets sent during the 2014 European elections. In
addition, the analysis by Ekström, Patrona and Thornborrow (2018) too
deserves mentioning as it presents rhetorical devices utilized by Farage
and other right-wing populist politicians to further emphasize their
performative styles, and thus help them convey their messages.
In contrast to the extensive literature on both Nigel Farage’s
discourse and right-wing populism as such, there are only few analyses
aiming to compare discourses of right-wing populist politicians from the
regions of Central and Western Europe in relation to the EU;1
correspondingly, even less research has been done focusing on such
politicians’ stances towards potential withdrawal of their countries from
the Union. It is thus the ambition of this thesis to contribute to filling
these research gaps. In order to do so, it examines and compares the
stances of Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage concerning the potential
withdrawal of the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom from the
European Union.
1 Such as the above-mentioned article by Brusenbauch Meislová and Buckledee (2021).
12THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Social Constructivism
This thesis is largely based on the premises of the social constructivism
theory2 and its relation to discourse. Fundamental to this approach is the
proposition that “human beings are social beings, and we would not be
human but for our social relations” (Onuf 2013, 3). This essentially
means that social relations “make or construct people – ourselves – into
the kind of beings that we are” (ibid., 4). Hence, social constructivism is
a belief that social reality is constructed by human agents and
reproduced through their daily practices (Risse 2009, 145). The process
of social construction, however, is not unidirectional: social
constructivists believe that social structures and agents are mutually
codetermined, and “insist on the mutual consitutiveness of (social)
structures and agents” (ibid.). In other words, “people make society, and
society makes people” (Onuf 2013, 4).
Social constructivism reached the field of international relations
studies in the 1980s and gained particular popularity with the end of the
Cold War and the related “earthshaking changes, such as the decline of
sovereignty, the growing social and economic importance of knowledge,
globalization, the Internet, and changes in the natural environment”
(Adler 2013, 118). Nevertheless, the previously dominant paradigms of
neorealism and neoliberalism “had almost nothing to say about the scale
of change” or about another newly emerging issues of interest, such as
national identity (Onuf 2013, 31). Social constructivism, in contrast, was
able to offer an explanation for these phenomena.
Consequently, social constructivism entered the European
integration studies in the 1990s. According to Risse (2009, 144), there
has been “considerable confusion” in the field as to what precisely
2 According to some scholars, describing social constructivism as a theory is not entirely
accurate. “Constructivism is not a theory as such. It does not offer general explanations
for what people do, why societies differ, how the world changes” (Onuf 2013, 3).
Instead, Onuf (ibid.) suggests thinking of constructivism as a way of studying social
relations: “[w]hile it draws from a variety of other ways of studying such a broad and
complex subject, it stands on its own as a system of concepts and propositions.”
13THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
distinguishes this theory from other approaches to the topic. Such lack of
clarity might be caused by the fact that social constructivism, unlike its
predecessors, did not make any substantive claims about European
integration, its key actors or the Union’s future development (ibid.;
Kratochvíl 2008, 181). Instead, constructivism introduced a brand new
way of understanding the EU, its bodies, as well as its member states.
Since these were all created by human society, they are social constructs,
and can therefore change or even get replaced by different forms of social
order (Kratochvíl 2008, 179). Rather than on the actors themselves,
social constructivism thus focuses on those “norms, patterns of
behaviour and shared ideas which shape and shift the actors’ identities,
mutual interactions and formations of their collective identities” (ibid.).
One of the most important and characteristic features of social
constructivism is its emphasis on communicative and discursive
practices. It is through them that “agents make sense of the world and
attribute meaning to their activities” (Risse 2009, 149). Moreover, as
Foucault stresses, discursive practices establish power relationships
since they make us “understand certain problems in certain ways, and
pose questions accordingly” (Foucault 1991 quoted in Risse 2009, 149).
Discourse as such is vital in the constructivist way of perceiving the
world. As Drulák (2006, 501) claims: “[o]f paramount importance here is
the idea that language is not only a simple mirror of social reality, but
a medium of its own, which contributes to the very constitution of social
reality.” On that account, the study of political discourse tells us a lot
about social structures and institutions, and hence about politics (ibid.).
3.2 Right-wing Populism
Apart from social constructivism, right-wing populism too serves as this
thesis’ theoretical cornerstone. According to Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser (2017, 6), populism as such can be defined as
“a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should
be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”
Contrary to “thick-centered” or “full” ideologies (e.g., fascism, liberalism,
socialism), “thin-centered” ideologies are usually attached to other
“ideological elements” (ibid.). As a result, “by itself populism can offer
14THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political questions
that modern societies generate”; it can however “take very different
shapes,” based on the concepts and ideologies it attaches itself to (ibid.).
These can be and often are contradictory, giving populism a chance to
appeal to various societies.
This definition of populism has three core concepts: the people, the
elite, and the general will, which can be explained as follows. “The
people” is usually understood as a combination of some or all these three
meanings: (1) the people as sovereign (i.e., “the ultimate source of
political power”); (2) “the common people” (a broader concept derived
from socioeconomic status, specific cultural traditions, and popular
values); and (3) the people as the nation (that is, “national community,
defined either in civic or in ethnic terms”). In all these cases, the concept
of “the people” represents a group which is morally pure. Conversely,
“the elite” is frequently portrayed as a corrupt group working against the
interests of “the people”; it is mostly defined in reference to power, but
in many cases “populists will combine different interpretations of the
elite,” such as class or ethnicity. The notion of “the general will” describes
common interests of “the people” that populists claim to be advancing,
since power should be taken from the political establishment of
representative government and restored to “the people” instead (Mudde
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 9–19).
As mentioned above, “the idea of populism as a basic antagonism
between ‘the people’ and an elite group is a unifying thread in the
literature” (Ron and Nadesan 2020, 5). On the contrary, there are “heated
debates” over whether generalizations can be made about “the nature of
those people, the characteristics of their grievances, and the relative
importance of particular economic and political circumstances” (ibid.).
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017, 9) themselves note that both “the
people” and “the elite” are distinguished and defined in quite a vague
manner, often simply ex negativo and on the basis of morality only
(similarly also Mudde 2017, under “An Ideational Approach to
Populism”). However, this vagueness is one of the factors which enable
populists to appear and potentially succeed “in many different places and
times but also in different forms” (Taggart 2000, 5). As Laclau (2005
quoted in Howarth 2015, 13) explains, this is because such “empty
signifiers” as “the people” are able to unite a variety of social grievances
and easily serve as points of subjective identification. As a result,
populism occurs as somewhat of a chameleonic concept which gets
15THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
“taken, slightly reshaped, refashioned and polished so that its sheen
reflects much better the specifics [of the context it finds itself in]”
(Taggart 2000, 6).
Despite the term’s recent popularity, populism is not a newly
emerged trend. It can be “traced back to the Chartists in early Victorian
Britain, the People’s Party in the US, [and] Narodnik revolutionaries in
late nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia”; other examples of populism
include Fascist movements in the interwar decades or Peronism in
Argentina (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 3–4). The “third and current”
wave of populism started at the end of the 20th century, with the term
“populism” becoming the buzzword of the following decades. This is, in
part, a “consequence of its conceptual confusion”: since the early 21st
century, the term has often been used, together with “nativism” and
“authoritarianism,” to describe many different groups, though mostly the
radical right ones (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, chap. 2; Mudde
2019, chap. 2). Radical right parties, like populist ones, have since
become “mainstreamed and increasingly normalized,” while extreme
right sentiments have emerged and are “openly flirted with in the media
and politics” (Mudde 2019, chap. 3). As Mudde (2019, chap. 2) suggests,
the two groups can be distinguished based on their different positions on
democracy. “Whereas the extreme right rejects the essence of democracy
. . . , the (populist) radical right supports democracy, at least in theory,
but fundamentally challenges key institutions and values of liberal
democracy, including minority rights, rule of law, and separation of
powers.” Other authors see the distinction between the two in their
willingness to tailor their appeals “in opportunistic ways to maximize the
leader’s chances of capturing the government”: while more populist
right-wingers are able to do so quite easily, rightist extremist usually
cling to their ideology even at the cost of losing potential voters
(Weyland 2017, under “‘Precising’ the Strategic Definition to Specify the
Extension of European Populism”). Despite these definitions, it can still
be challenging to categorize a specific actor simply as a “populist radical
right” or an “extreme right” one; there is now a plethora of alternative
related terms, such as “far right” and “alt-right,” all of which are parts of
the mainstream, and are often used interchangeably (Norris and
Inglehart 2019, 215).
Similarly, determining where a political actor belongs in terms of
the traditional left–right political spectrum can prove to be a demanding
task, especially in case of populism. Programmatic appeals of populist
16THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
parties and leaders are sometimes ambiguous (possibly intentionally
so); and even if they are not, it “does not mean that [they] signify the
position of [all] leadership factions, activists, and grassroot members”
(ibid., 221) Furthermore, in recent decades, the left–right division has
become defined in socio-cultural terms rather than in the previously
preferred terms of socio-economic policies. As a result, right now stands
for “either authoritarianism (versus the left’s libertarianism) or
nationalism (versus the left’s internationalism)” (Mudde 2019, under
“Introduction”). In this thesis, the use of the term “right-wing populism”
is based on this premise, together with Mudde’s above-mentioned
definition of radical right, which he perceives as a preceding form of the
more current concept of right-wing populism.
The relationship between (right-wing) populism and discourse can
be understood in two ways. On the one hand, populism is perceived by
some as a “style of rhetoric reflecting first-order principles about who
should rule, claiming that legitimate power rests with ‘the people’”
(Norris and Inglehart 2019, 4). On the other hand, discourse is seen as
a tool used by populists and other politicians to convey their messages
to public. This thesis aims to analyse this tool, i.e., the linguistic strategies
that “keep right-wing populism alive and kicking”: “the most important
discursive strategies, rhetorical tropes and pragmatic devices as well as
argumentation schemes employed to express and realize both form and
content of right-wing populist ideologies” (Wodak 2015, 47) are all
discussed in the following chapters of the thesis.
17METHODOLOGY
4 Methodology
4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
As to the method of analysis, this thesis employs critical discourse
analysis (CDA). CDA can be described as “an interdisciplinary approach
to textual study that aims to explicate abuses of power promoted by
those texts, by analyzing linguistic/semiotic details in light of the larger
social and political contexts in which those texts circulate” (Huckin,
Andrus and Clary-Lemon 2012, 107). It emerged in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as a practice of discourse studies developed by Norman
Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, Theo van Leeuwen and Gunther
Kress, and has since become one of the most influential and visible
branches of the field (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000, 447).
As Wodak (2001, 5) explains, CDA’s predecessor, i.e., critical
linguistics (CL), appeared in the 1970s as “a form of discourse and text
analysis that recognized the role of language in structuring power
relations in society.” Until then, linguistic research was focused on
“formal aspects of language which constituted the linguistic competence
of speakers” (ibid.), and thus did not regard the circumstances in which
language was being used. Similarly, sociolinguistic research at the time
concentrated on “language variation, language change and the structures
of interaction, with limited attention to issues of social hierarchy and
power” (ibid.). Even in cases when the pragmatic approach was utilized
and “where the relation between language and text was considered, . . .
sentences and components of sentences were still regarded as the basic
units” (ibid.). Given these circumstances, the emergence of CL appeared
truly innovative, as it aimed to uncover social processes such as
manipulation, discrimination, demagogy, and propaganda. Through
context examination, its’ goal is also to understand how and why reality
is structured in certain way, and possibly react with starting social
changes for the better (Wodak 1989, xiv–xv).
CDA, which “evolved beyond CL by incorporating more social,
cognitive and rhetorical theory, thus broadening the scope of analysis,”
is built on the premise that “the way we use language is purposeful,
regardless of whether discursive choices are conscious or unconscious”
(Huckin, Andrus and Clary-Lemon 2012, 108; Mullet 2018, 116).
18METHODOLOGY
Discursive practices, through which texts are produced and consumed,
contribute to the constitution of the social world including social
identities and social relations. The aim of CDA is to “shed light on the
linguistic-discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena and
processes of change in late modernity” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 61),
taking a particular interest in the relation between language and power
(Wodak 2001, 1–2). Research conducted using CDA has therefore
covered topics such as mass communication, democracy, politics, racism,
nationalism, and identity, as well as the spread of market practices, or
pedagogy (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 61).
Apart from the plethora of themes that CDA discusses, it also
presents a diverse picture on a methodological level. 3 Nevertheless, even
within this diversity, all approaches to CDA share a few “landmarks,” the
main one being the aim to “make transparent the discursive aspects of
societal disparities and inequalities” (Meyer 2001, 30). What precisely is
discourse then? The term is often given different meanings, even within
CDA itself. It can describe (a) language as an element of the social
process; (b) the language associated with a particular social field; or
(c) a way of characterizing aspects associated a particular social
perspective (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 81). In this thesis, Norman
Fairclough’s (2001, 16) definition is being utilized, which essentially
describes discourse as using “language as a form of social practice” in
both speech and writing.4 This definition implies that there is
a “relationship between a particular discursive event and situation(s),
institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event
is shaped by them, but it also shapes them” (Wodak 1996 quoted in
Titscher et al. 2000, 26). Considering the influence that discourse can
have on social status quo, it may also have major power and ideological
effects, such as producing and consolidating unequal power relations
between different social groups (e.g., men and women, social groups and
classes, or national, ethnic, religious, sexual, political, cultural and
3 As Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000, 450) mention, “the use of systemic-functional
linguistics is prominent, but categories and concepts have also been borrowed from
more mainstream discourse analysis and text linguistics, stylistics, social semiotics,
social cognition, rhetoric, and, more recently, conversation analysis.”
4 Policies, narratives, letters, textbooks, conversations, speeches, meetings or classroom
lessons, nonverbal communication, visual images, multimedia, and film ‒ all of these
are examples of forms and genres discourse can take (Mullet 2018, 119).
19METHODOLOGY
subcultural majorities and minorities (Titscher et al. 2000, 164; Wodak
et al. 1999, 8).
4.1.1 Discursive-Histocial Approach (DHA)
As mentioned above, CDA offers a variety of approaches to use when
conducting critical sociolinguistic research. With an eye on this thesis’
research question, the discourse-historical approach (DHA)
as presented by one of its pioneers, Ruth Wodak, was selected and will
be used to analyse speeches of Tomio Okamura and Nigel Farage.
DHA is one of the most prominent critical approaches to the study
of discourse, based on interdisciplinarity, multi-method research and on
using a variety of different empirical data as well as background
information (Reisigl 2018, 44; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 35). Depending
on the respective object of investigation, DHA attempts to include the
historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimension in the
analysis of a specific discursive occasion (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 35).
The approach “distinguishes between three dimensions which constitute
textual meanings and structures” (Wodak 2009, 38). Firstly, it
establishes the contents or topics which are spoken or written about, i.e.,
analyses the macro-topics of a discursive event (ibid.; Reisigl and Wodak
2001, 44). The aim of this level of analysis is to map out the contents and
then to assign them to particular discourses. For this purpose, discourse
topics are used as analytical categories to summarize the text and specify
its most important information (Van Dijk 1991 quoted in Wodak 2015,
50–51). Secondly, the discursive strategies employed (both consciously
or subconsciously) are investigated. The strategies refer to plans of
practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological,
or linguistic goal; such plans may be “more or less accurate and more or
less intentional” (Wodak 2009, 40). Variations of the Aristotelian
concept of topos are employed to realize specific strategies and produce
successful speeches; Kienpointer (2011, 265) describes topoi as “search
formulas which tell [one] how and where to look for arguments. At the
same time, topoi are warrants which guarantee the transition from
argument to conclusion.” However, these warrants can also become
fallacious and manipulative when used in wrong contexts (Wodak 2015,
52). Thirdly, DHA examines the linguistic means (i.e., tokens) and the
specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (also called types) used
20METHODOLOGY
in specific discourse to realize both topics and strategies (Reisigl and
Wodak 2001, 44).
The interdisciplinarity of DHA and its attention to context5 were the
reasons for selecting this approach as the main method of analysis in this
thesis as they allow going beyond the samples’ utterances as such by
contextualizing them. In fact, contextualization is what the label
“historical” rather describes, since not all analyses carried out within the
framework of the DHA show a clear historical orientation (Reisigl 2018,
44), but they do generally view the findings in terms of their situatedness
(Wodak 2015, 51). Accordingly, this thesis includes short contextualizing
chapters dedicated to right-wing populism, to the introduction of the
selected politicians and their programmes, as well as to the positions of
the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom in the EU.
4.2 Case Selection
The topic and the research question of this thesis are based on the
discussions of whether or not more withdrawals from the European
Union might be expected after Brexit, especially in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. Bearing in mind the recent withdrawal of
the UK from the EU, this thesis aims to compare the discourses of
right-wing populist politicians in the United Kingdom and the Czech
Republic, focusing on their views of their countries’ memberships and
then-/potential withdrawal from the organisation. As elaborated on
below, the selection of these particular countries has been motivated
chiefly by their shared unenthusiastic relationship with the EU.
Generally, the attitudes of individual member states towards the EU
differ and are determined by their history, political establishments,
socio-economic factors, current events, and other aspects. However,
between 2008 and 2018, “political parties [across the EU] opposed to EU
5 DHA distinguishes among four dimensions of context: (1) the immediate, language
internal co-text and co-discourse (e.g., connotations and presuppositions); (2) the
intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres etc.; (3)
social factors and institutional frames of a specific context of situation, such as degree
of formality, place, time, addressees, interactive and political roles, level of education,
ethnic identities; and (4) the broader socio-political and historical context (Reisigl
2018, 53).
21METHODOLOGY
integration have almost doubled their votes. The general opinion of the
EU has also deteriorated, revealing a growing number of people who
distrust the Union” (Dijkstra, Poelman and Rodríguez-Pose 2018, under
“Executive Summary”). This trend has been reflected in the case of the
Czech Republic, which entered the EU in 2004 intending to “become
a full-fledged member of the Union,” to “accede as quickly as possible to
the Schengen area and the eurozone, and to get rid of limitations on the
free movement of workers” (Bartovic 2016, 45–46). The country has
since benefited from the membership both economically and politically;
nevertheless, it is still “among those [countries] that are lukewarm
towards European integration” (ibid., 45). After 15 years of its
membership, the Czech Republic exhibited the highest level of support
for leaving the organisation among the EU countries (apart from the UK),
with 34 per cent being more inclined to leaving the EU (Stone 2019). As
Hloušek and Kaniok (2020, 1–2) explain, “‘new’ EU members with
a post-communist background . . . often adopt a rather critical approach
to various important EU policies and activities, such as the Euro currency
and migration.” The authors also warn that “Euroscepticism has
generally become bolder in the party systems of the ‘new’ member
states” (ibid., 2).6
Even though the United Kingdom does not belong to the group of the
newer member states of the EU, the reserved relations with the
European Union are something that the country shares with the Czech
Republic. The UK joined the union’s predecessor, the European
Economic Community in 1973, and later earned the label of “an awkward
partner” – not only due to its later arrival, but mainly because of its
hesitant and transactional approach to membership, numerous opt-out
requests, public and media debate defined by Euroscepticism, or its
commitment to a “special relationship” with the US (Oliver 2018, chap.
2). After all, a referendum was held in Britain in 1975 asking voters
whether they wanted to stay in the European Community. Although the
people voted to stay and “public support for EC membership seemed
commanding, it is important to keep it in perspective”: the support was
6 It is important to note that simultaneously, Euroscepticism is considered to be “closely
related” with populism (Rooduijn and van Kessel 2021, under “Summary”), as populist
organisations and parties traditionally voice their opposition both to the EU and the
broader process of European integration on the basis of “a composite series of
arguments” (Pirro and Taggart 2018, 254).
22METHODOLOGY
“unequivocal but it was also unenthusiastic” (Clarke, Goodwin and
Whiteley 2017, 1; Butler and Kitzinger 1996, 280). This lack of
enthusiasm came to light in 2016 when the British voted in another
referendum that the UK should leave the European Union, making it the
first member state in history to withdraw from the organisation.
Regarding the criteria for the selection of specific politicians, Tomio
Okamura and Nigel Farage were picked for their right-wing populist
inclinations and for being some of the most visible and vocal critics of the
European Union, as well as advocates of the EU withdrawal, in their
respective countries. Furthermore, both politicians are or were, at some
points, the most prominent figures of their parties and they were also
involved in establishing them.
The political career of Tomio Okamura began in 2012 with his
candidacy to the Czech Senate. The entrepreneur’s campaign was built
upon dissatisfaction with the current political situation and upon
anti-establishment appeals (Svačinová 2018a, 149). Okamura was
elected in the second round but announced his intention to run for
president in the first direct presidential election only a month later.
Nevertheless, his presidential bid was declared invalid by the Czech
Ministry of the Interior, which was interpreted by Okamura as an
intervention of a corrupt political system against the will of the people
(ibid., 150). Okamura’s subsequent fight against the decision
significantly raised his profile and might have inspired his decision to
establish his first political party, Úsvit přímé demokracie7 (Dawn of Direct
Democracy, ÚPD) in 2013. ÚPD “gradually began to adopt extreme right
rhetoric, particularly with respect to immigrants and Roma; nonetheless,
the party has been relatively vague on a broad range of topics” (Mareš
and Havlík 2016, 328). After an internal divide, which occurred shortly
after the party entered the Chamber of Deputies and which Okamura
describes as “a political coup” (Tomio.cz 2020), Okamura left ÚPD and
co-founded a new party, Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and
Direct Democracy, SPD) in 2015.
As the names of both his parties suggest, the catchwords put
forward by Okamura are mainly related to democracy. The politician
believes that a “weak and corrupt representative democracy should be
replaced with a direct democracy: the people shall take decisions in
7 Initially named Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury, the founder’s name was later
dropped from the name of the party.
23METHODOLOGY
referenda, politicians have to be directly responsible to the people, i.e.,
the people shall have the right to recall politicians (Brunclík and Kubát
2014, 172). Okamura’s calls for referenda also manifest themselves in
the program of the party, together with “pronounced Euroscepticism”
(Svačinová 2018b, 201–202). In contrast to ÚPD, SPD campaigns for
referenda on “every transfer of state sovereignty to the EU institutions
and on leaving the EU” (SPD.cz 2020). Amplified by the party’s strong
opposition to immigration, these calls became particularly vocal with the
2015 outbreak of the so-called refugee crisis, which was, according to
SPD, mishandled and in part caused by the EU.
Okamura is very active on multiple online platforms where he
shares his opinions about current events and communicates with his
supporters. At the time of writing this thesis, Okamura’s Facebook page
had almost 270,000 fans, making him the most popular Czech politician
on the social network; the SPD leader also frequently uses Twitter,
YouTube, and Instagram, and occasionally posts on his personal blog.
Nigel Farage entered politics in his teenage years when he became
a member of the Conservative Party. Yet, he left the party in 1992 in
protest at the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (D’Arcy 2019) and became
a member of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) instead.
Formed as the Anti-Federalist League in 1991 and renamed in 1993, the
party’s founders “felt intensely anxious about Britain’s integration into
the EU – or what many saw as an undemocratic superstate that posed
a fundamental threat to British sovereignty” (Goodwin and Milazzo
2015, 2). After several intra-party conflicts and an initial lack of success,
UKIP managed to secure three seats in the 1999 European Parliament
elections, one of them for Farage, who then remained a member of the
EP for more than two decades (Ford and Goodwin 2014, chap. 1). Despite
the accomplishment, it still took several more years before UKIP started
receiving more widespread attention. This happened once Farage was
elected leader of the party in 2006 and then re-elected again in 2010.
It was also to UKIP’s advantage that it moved from being a single-issue
party and started campaigning against government plans to develop
wind turbines, legalize same-sex marriage, and ban smoking in pubs, and
in favour of a significant increase in spending on defense and the British
armed forces (Oliver 2018, chap. 3; Flamini 2013, 36). All these factors
broadened UKIP’s appeal – but the party’s anti-EU position remained its
biggest selling point (Flamini 2013, 37).
24METHODOLOGY
UKIP’s “forthright Euroscepticism, anti-immigration line,
commitment to more traditional political values, and mix of British and
English nationalism” attracted a number of Conservative voters, which
manifested itself in the 2014 European Parliament elections where UKIP
earned more seats than any other British party (Oliver 2018, chap. 3). Its
threat to steal more Eurosceptic voters “emboldened the Conservative
Party’s anti-European wing” and pushed David Cameron, the leader of
the party, to promise a nationwide referendum on Britain’s EU
membership (Kirchick 2017, 155). Leading up to the vote, Nigel Farage
lent his support to one of the alternative Leave groups, the Leave.EU.
Reflecting its UKIP connections, “Leave.EU played heavily on
immigration and a message that Britain should ‘take back control’ of both
its laws and borders” (Oliver 2018, chap. 3).
Shortly after the Brexit plebiscite, Farage resigned from his position
as the UKIP leader, stating that after his country, he now wanted his life
back (BBC 2016). Two years later, he left the party altogether as its
leadership had become “pretty obsessed with the issue of Islam, not just
Islamic extremism, but Islam, and UKIP wasn’t founded to be a party
fighting a religious crusade” (BBC 2018). A new political project of
Farage’s, the Brexit Party, was launched in 2019; upon the UK finally
leaving the EU, the party was re-registered as Reform UK. In March 2021,
Nigel Farage announced he was quitting politics, but planned to continue
with his media career (Stubley 2021). He is currently active on Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, YouTube,8 and his blog where he comments on
current affairs. 9
4.3 Sample Selection
This thesis analyses 20 speeches made by Tomio Okamura and Nigel
Farage each, that is, 40 speeches altogether. For each of the politicians,
the selected speeches come from a different period: in Okamura’s case,
8 As of February and March 2021, the Twitter account of Nigel Farage is the fourth most
followed political account in the UK, while his Facebook page comes second in number
of likes in the same category (Clark 2021; Tankovska 2021). On his personal YouTube
channel, Farage now has over 268,000 subscribers.
9 In the past, Farage also hosted a radio talk show and a podcast; he has been
contributing to the American television network Fox News since 2017 as well.
25METHODOLOGY
years 2015 (foundation of the Svoboda a přímá demokracie party) to
2021 (time of writing this thesis) were chosen due to his increased focus
on the topics of the European Union and the withdrawal of the Czech
Republic from it. Nigel Farage’s selected speeches come from years 2010
(Farage’s re-election as the leader of UKIP) to 2016 (announcement of
the United Kingdom EU membership referendum). These particular
timespans were also selected with the intention of them covering equally
long time periods in each of the politicians’ cases.
Video recordings of Tomio Okamura’s speeches were obtained from
his official Facebook profile and YouTube channel, as well as from his
second YouTube channel which was created after the original one was
deleted.10 When selecting Nigel Farage’s speeches, UKIP’s official channel
as well as alternative YouTube channels such as “voteleavemedia” or
“Brexit Party MEPs” were used since Farage has only been active on his
official personal channel since April 2019. Additionally, one of the
selected videos is published on a media outlet website. Neither of the
politicians publishes any additional speeches on their official websites.
The main criterion used in the sample selection was the relevancy of the
discussed topics. For the purposes of this thesis, only those speeches
which were dedicated, at least partially, to the European Union were
considered relevant. Additionally, EU-related keywords and topics such
as the following were sought: membership in the EU, liabilities of EU
membership, withdrawal from the EU (Brexit, Czexit), EU’s
shortcomings, Brussels, the European Commission, the Schengen Area,
the eurozone etc.
Two to four speeches were analysed per politician per year. An
effort was made to cover the examined periods evenly, ideally finding
three relevant samples per year per person (i.e., one sample per four
10 In July 2020, YouTube deleted Okamura’s original official YouTube channel.
According to the politician, the social network did so because he “repeatedly published
videos which showed violent and criminal acts of migrants in Western Europe, and of
‘fighters against racism’ of the Black Lives Matter movement in the USA” (Augusta
2020). Okamura described the step as an act of censorship and an “attack on freedom
of speech, attack on basic civil liberties given by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and [as] a violation of the free competition of political parties given by the
constitutional order of the Czech Republic” (ibid.). Two months after Okamura
appealed and created a new channel, YouTube recovered the deleted one, and returned
it to the politician, except for two deleted videos which broke the rules of the network
(Klímová and Endrštová 2020).
26METHODOLOGY
months per person); however, given the fact that relevant recordings
were often published in an irregular manner, this was not always
possible. Thus, intervals between the publication dates of the videos
analysed in this thesis vary slightly (see Tables 1 and 2).
27METHODOLOGY
Table 1. Analysed speeches of Tomio Okamura
Tomio Okamura
Date of publication Title Source(s) Length Reference
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V
2015-06-05 Konec Evropy začíná 2:43 2015a
3ZU0beR9Ms
Tomio Okamura: Evropská unie https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i
2015-08-10 1:37 2015b
zase perlí Q-7V2y70_4
Tomio Okamura: Drzost Evropské https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E
2015-09-10 3:53 2015c
komise nezná mezí IXrQCwTNUM
Tomio Okamura: Projev na
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P
2016-01-29 konferenci v Miláně s Marine Le 5:15 2016a
s_tXn7nnzc
Pen a Geertem Wildersem
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e
2016-03-21 Tomio Okamura: Evropské lži 4:26 2016b
4HPjMd4LSw
Tomio Okamura: Kulisy spadly,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0
2016-04-07 žádáme okamžité vystoupení ČR z 5:27 2016c
SUkXaJCh8c
Evropské unie
Tomio Okamura: Hrozba https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a
2016-12-31 1:23 2016d
islámského teroru kfAn5rcpVA
Tomio Okamura: Odkladiště https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j
2017-03-08 1:43 2017a
nekvalitních potravin gL-8iHI9Sk
Tomio Okamura: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v
2017-03-13 2:02 2017b
Protidemokratický styl diktátu EU u7JUGDhf98
Tomio Okamura: Vydírání není https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v
2017-12-27 1:15 2017c
dialog J3VpKUA11c
Tomio Okamura: NE dotačnímu https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I
2018-01-22 1:16 2018a
přerozdělování p3V19UYMm0
Tomio Okamura: Šikana slušných https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
2018-05-25 1:28 2018b
lidí WGtbY4zVJxc
Tomio Okamura: EU je https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e
2018-09-06 0:59 2018c
nereformovatelná Q0lHxbRpLA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6
2019-01-03 Tomio Okamura: ODS je pro EU 3:46 2019a
lPPUqBlg74
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v
2019-10-28 Náš Den nezávislosti 3:02 2019b
=534459927123725
Velká Británie se stane od zítra
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v
2020-01-31 znovu svobodnou a suverénní 3:13 2020a
=197880154692567
zemí
SPD navrhlo referendum o https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v
2020-04-21 5:18 2020b
vystoupení z EU =581165226088735
EU chce omezit myslivce, střelce a https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v
2020-06-03 6:11 2020c
další legální držitele zbraní =594016291218281
Tomio Okamura: Dnešní aktuality https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9
2021-01-04 9:55 2021a
4.1.2021 1qvMoo6tlg
Tomio Okamura: Dnešní aktuality https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
2021-02-10 16:32 2021b
10.2.2021 C8hOPZ6CRo
Source: Table by the author.
28METHODOLOGY
Table 2. Analysed speeches of Nigel Farage
Nigel Farage
Date of
Title Source(s) Length Reference
publication
Illegal bailouts and treaty change lead to
2010-12-15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jcDOslLJwp8 2:52 2010a
referendums - Nigel Farage
2011-01-03 An Evening with Nigel Farage (PART 1 of 3); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KhXkeC-gN6g
(speech took 27:38
An Evening with Nigel Farage (PART 2 of 3); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Za1hI4OyD3A 2010b
place in Dec in total
2010)
An Evening with Nigel Farage (PART 3 of 3) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlKSUYg8LjU
UKIP Nigel Farage - European Union and
2011-01-19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uS9BG42fNU0 1:27 2011a
Soviet Union are one of the same - Jan 2011
UKIP Nigel Farage - Spring Conference 2011 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tYqjTn_cOG8
2011-03-06 14:34 2011b
speech
Nigel Farage in Eastbourne Part 1;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47lAnNiUdmA 16:45 in
2011-09-10 Nigel Farage keynote speech, Eastbourne Pt 2011c
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1EMOIXgsHg total
2
UKIP leader Nigel Farage - EU Titanic has hit
2012-05-10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNeiRvoGac0 3:01 2012a
the iceberg May 2012
UKIP Nigel Farage - Break up the euro and
2012-05-23 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3fi6w1C7uMs 4:45 2012b
restore human dignity - 22nd May 2012
UKIP Conference 2012 - NIGEL FARAGE
2012-09-23 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOONG_9mUoE 18:32 2012c
leader Full Conference Speech
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TW64w9nLrq
2012-12-30 UKIP - Nigel Farage New Year Message 2013 6:14 2012d
A
UKIP Nigel Farage - Democracy and Self-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RrEIXaf-Um0
2013-01-16 Government now Staging a Fightback - Jan 3:04 2013a
2013
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bAR0bOdY1m
Nigel Farage addresss the UKIP 2013 Spring
2013-03-24 U 24:49 2013b
Conference in Exeter
Nigel Farage: Europe Hijacked by the EU
2013-05-08 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oB__xRA0hJs 5:41 2013c
Project
UKIP Nigel Farage, The hand that rocked the
2014-01-16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQDIl0RfCgs 2:35 2014a
cradle of democracy - Jan 2014
Nigel Farage MEP, the UKIP Leader at a
2014-03-05 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cH8FmnveiOc 23:37 2014b
packed public meeting in Torquay
Nigel Farage: The European Dream is
2014-03-12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4FdbIVa2j0 03:47 2014c
Crumbling
UKIP Nigel Farage - Treating democracy
2014-07-15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQzC5Y8Duzk 5:39 2014d
with deliberate contempt July 2014
UKIP leader Nigel Farage's full speech to https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-
2015-09-25 27:19 2015a
conference 34361111
Nigel Farage attacks EU project and Angela https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1RhpBZpTU
2015-10-10 3:45 2015b
Merkel 07 Oct 15 k
UKIP Leader Nigel Farage - People power https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axARoaVWod
2016-02-07 4:42 2016a
will win Referendum, Feb 2016 w
2016-02-27 Nigel Farage - Llandudno 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pehGu7dp1tw 29:01 2016b
Source: Table by the author.
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