BOUNDED RATIONALITY BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS - Advances in behavioral game theory and decision theory
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From June 24 to June 28, 2019
BOUNDED RATIONALITY
&
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Advances in behavioral game theory
and decision theory
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL
www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS BOUNDED RATIONALITY & BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS Advances in behavioral game theory and decision theory From June 24 to June 28, 2019 OVERVIEW Standard economics has been the subject of many critiques. Mainstream economic models and analysis rely on a level of sophistication that is hard to justify from an introspective viewpoint but also considering the large body of experimental evidence. Recent years have witnessed a flurry of alternative approaches. The programme proposes reviewing a large body of these approaches, with the goal of stimulating new research both theoretical and applied. WORKSHOP Participants will have an opportunity to submit work to be presented and discussed by fellow participants and faculty in daily workshops. PREREQUISITES Graduate in economics with solid background in economic theory, decision theory and game theory. The programme is intended primarily for PhD students but exceptions can be considered for well motivated candidates. PROFESSORS Olivier Compte is professor of economics at the Paris School of Economics. He is also Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées. He graduated from Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, and received his PhD in economics from Stanford University. His fields of interest are repeated games, bargaining, auction theory, mechanism design, bounded rationality and Economics and psychology. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, and council member of the Game Theory Society. http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/compte‐olivier/ Philippe Jehiel is professor of economics at the Paris School of Economics and at University College London. He is also Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées. He graduated from Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, and received his PhD in economics from EHESS and the European Doctoral Programme. His fields of interest are bargaining, auction theory, mechanism design, and bounded rationality. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, of the European Economic Association and of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. He is a former co‐editor of Econometrica and council member of the Econometric Society and of the Game Theory Society. http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/jehiel‐philippe/ Jean‐Marc Tallon is professor at the Paris School of Economics and a senior fellow of CNRS. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He is Director of Research of the Paris School of Economics. His research interests are in decision theory under uncertainty, risk sharing and financial economics and more generally in the questions of the foundations and consequences of alternative representations of uncertainty and beliefs. http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/tallon‐jean‐marc/ Programme Supervisor: Philippe Jehiel PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
SCHEDULE
Monday June, 24
8.30 am ‐ 8.45 am Welcome coffee
8.45 am – 10.45 am Philippe Jehiel, Bounded Rationality in Games
10.45 am ‐ 11 am Break
11 am ‐ 1 pm Jean‐Marc Tallon, Individual Decision Making
1 pm ‐ 2.30 pm Lunch
2.30 pm ‐ 4.30 pm Olivier Compte, Ignorance, Information and Sophistication
6 pm – 7 pm Gilles Saint Paul, Plenary Lecture
From 7 pm Welcome cocktail
Tuesday June, 25
9 am ‐ 10.30 am Jean‐Marc Tallon, Individual Decision Making
10.30 am ‐ 11 am Break
11 am ‐ 12.30 pm Olivier Compte, Ignorance, Information and Sophistication
12.30 pm ‐ 3 pm Lunch ‐ Workshop presentations
3 pm ‐ 3.30 pm Break
3.30 pm ‐ 5 pm Philippe Jehiel, Bounded Rationality in Games
From 6 pm Social Event
Wednesday June, 26
9 am ‐ 10.30 am Olivier Compte, Ignorance, Information and Sophistication
10.30 am ‐ 11 am Break
11 am ‐ 12.30 pm Philippe Jehiel, Bounded Rationality in Games
12.30 pm ‐ 3 pm Lunch ‐ Workshop presentations
3 pm ‐ 3.30 pm Break
3.30 pm ‐ 5 pm Jean‐Marc Tallon, Individual Decision Making
Thursday June, 27
8.45 am ‐ 10.45 am Philippe Jehiel, Bounded Rationality in Games
10.45 am ‐ 11 am Break
11 am ‐ 1 pm Jean‐Marc Tallon, Individual Decision Making
1 pm ‐ 2.30 pm Lunch
2.30 pm ‐ 4.30 pm Olivier Compte, Ignorance, Information and Sophistication
From 6 pm Social Event
Friday June, 28
8.45 am ‐ 10.45 am Jean‐Marc Tallon, Individual Decision Making
10.45 am ‐ 11 am Break
11 am ‐ 1 pm Olivier Compte, Ignorance, Information and Sophistication
1 pm ‐ 2.30 pm Lunch
2.30 pm ‐ 4.30 pm Philippe Jehiel, Bounded Rationality in Games
From 6.15 pm Social Farewell cocktail/certificates
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER RATIONALITY
BOUNDED SCHOOL 2019 & BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Bounded rationality in Games
Philippe Jehiel
This course takes place every day
OBJECTIVES
The modern approach to solution concepts in games is by a learning story. Players may have wrong expectations
(either about the opponent’s play or about the assessment of their own strategy) to start with, but as experience
accumulates expectations should get closer to the truth: if behaviors stabilize they should correspond to an equilibrium
play. However, this view (at least applied in a strict sense) seems less plausible in complex games. Think of chess.
Predicting what the opponent will do in more than a few steps ahead is impractical. Knowing or learning the value of a
board position is impossible (for most positions), even for the best chess players. Such simple considerations suggest
the need to develop models of bounded rationality, which may next be used to approach a number of economic
interactions in a new way.
The objective of the course is to stimulate new research in game theory and applications that maintains the game
theoretic tradition of high logical standards while incorporating elements of bounded rationality/behavioral economics
in the analysis. Various approaches to behavioral economics and bounded rationality are discussed in the course.
COURSE STRUCTURE and REQUIRED READINGS
1. General overview of standard approach and its introspective vs learning justification
‐ Huck Jehiel and Rutter (2011): “Learning spillover and analogy‐based expectations: A multi‐game
experiment”, Games and Economic Behavior
2. Analogy‐based expectation equilibrium
‐ Jehiel, P. (2005): “Analogy‐based Expectation Equilibrium”, Journal of Economic Theory
‐ Jehiel, P. and F. Koessler (2008): “Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy‐based
Expectations”, Games and Economic Behavior
3. Equilibrium with subjective prior and self‐confirming equilibrium
‐ Dekel E., D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine (2004): “Learning to Play Bayesian Games”, Games and Economic
Behavior
‐ Eyster E. and M. Rabin (2005): “Cursed Equilibrium”, Econometrica
4. Valuation equilibrium and equilibrium with imperfect recall
‐ Jehiel, P. and Samet, D. (2007): “Valuation Equilibrium”, Theoretical Economics
‐ Piccione, M. and A. Rubinstein (1997): “On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall”,
Games and Economic Behavior
5. A tour of alternative approaches in behavioral game theory
‐ Nagel, R.M. (1995): “Unraveling in guessing games”, American Economic Review
‐ McKelvey, D. and T. Palfrey (1995): “Quantal Response Equilibrium”, Games and Economic Behavior
‐ Osborne M.J. and A. Rubinstein (1998): “Games with procedurally rational players”, American Economic
Review
‐ Esponda, I. (2008): “Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection”, American Economic Review
‐ Spiegler R. (2016): “Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
‐ Esponda, I. and D. Pouzo (2016): “Berk‐Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with
Misspecified Models”, Econometrica
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
OTHER REFERENCES
General References
‐ Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. (1998): “The Theory of Learning in Games”, MIT Press.
‐ Kreps, D. (1990): “Game Theory and Economic Modelling” (Clarendon Lectures in Economics)
Analogy‐based expectation equilibrium
‐ Ettinger, D. and Jehiel, P. (2010): “A Theory of Deception”, AEJ: micro
‐ Jehiel, P. (2011): « Manipulative auction design », Theoretical Economics
Valuation equilibrium
‐ Jehiel, P. and Samet, D. (2005): “Learning to Play Games in Extensive Form by Valuation”, Journal of Economic
Theory
Self‐confirming equilibrium
‐ Battigalli P., M. Gilli and M.C. Molinari (1992): “Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium in Repeated
Strategic Interactions: An Introductory Survey”, Ricerche Economiche.
Nash equilibrium with Subjective Prior
‐ Harsanyi, J.C.(1967), “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players”, Management Science
Level k approach
‐ Stahl, D.O. (1993): “Evolution of smart n players”, Games and Economic Behavior
‐ Camerer, C.F., T. Ho and J.K. Chong (2004): “A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics
Other approaches
‐ Esponda, I. (2008): “Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection”, American Economic Review
‐ Spiegler R. (2016): “Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
‐ Esponda, I. and D. Pouzo (2016): “Berk‐Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified
Models”, Econometrica
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER RATIONALITY
BOUNDED SCHOOL 2019 & BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Individual decision making
Jean‐Marc Tallon
This course takes place every day
OBJECTIVES
This course will cover some major approaches to the study of individual behavior and decision making. It will explore a
selection of the most important ideas in behavioral economics, restricting ourselves to models of individual decision
making. We will cover three domains: choice behavior, representation of and behavior under uncertainty, time
preferences. The goal is to introduce models of behavior alternative to the standard homo oeconomicus approach,
building on some insights from experimental economics and psychology.
COURSE STRUCTURE and REQUIRED READINGS
1. Introduction
‐ Camerer, C. (2006), “Behavioral Economics”, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and
Applications, Ninth World Congress, volume II, Cambridge U. Press; comments b A. Rubinstein.
‐ Thaler, T. (2016), “Behavioral Economics: past, present and future”, American Economic Review, 106,
1577‐1600.
2. Making choices
a. Rational choice
b. Psychological Motives not Included within the Standard Framework
c. Modeling Choice Procedures
d. Individual preferences and social values
e. Welfare
‐ Akerlof, G. and R. Kranton (2010), “Identitiy economics”, Princeton U. Press
‐ Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2006), “Incentives and pro‐social behaviour”, Amercian Economic Review, 96,
1652‐1678.
‐ Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (2001), “Case based decision theory”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (eds) (2000), “Choices, Values, and Frames”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Rubinstein, A. (2012), “Lecture notes in microeconomic theory : the economic agent”, Princeton U. Press
3. Judgement, beliefs, heuristics and biases
a. The formation of beliefs
b. The revision of beliefs
‐ Gilboa, I. (2010) “Theory of Decision under Uncertainty”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Kahneman D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky (eds) (1982), “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Kahneman D., (2011), “Thinking fast and slow”, Farrar, Grauss and Giroux
4. Decision‐making under risk and uncertainty
a. Expected utility
b. The use of beliefs: distortion of probabilities and rank dependent utility
c. Prospect Theory and loss aversion
d. Models of ambiguity
‐ Gilboa, I. (2010) “Theory of Decision under Uncertainty”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Wakker, P. (2010) “Prospect Theory”, Cambridge U. Press
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
5. The treatment of time
a. Discounted utility
b. Issues with discounted utility
c. Quasi‐hyperbolic discounting
d. Time inconsistency and self‐control
e. Loss aversion
‐ Frederick, S. , G.Loewenstein, and T.O’Donoghue (2002), “A review of intertemporal choice”. Journal of
Economic Literature, 90; 351‐401.
‐ Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2001) “The simple theory of temptation and self‐control”, mimeo Princeton
OTHER REFERENCES
Textbooks
‐ S. Dhami (2016), “The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis”, Oxford U. Press
‐ A. Rubinstein, “Lecture notes in microeconomic theory”.
‐ Gilboa, I. (2010) “Theory of Decision under Uncertainty”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Wakker, P. (2010) “Prospect Theory”, Cambridge U. Press
Articles
‐ Bénabou, R. and J.Tirole (2004) “Willpower and Personal Rules” Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 848–86
‐ Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (2001) “A Theory of Case Based Decision”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2001) “The simple theory of temptation and self control”, mimeo Princeton U
‐ Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (eds) (2000), “Choices, Values, and Frames”, Cambridge U. Press
‐ Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (eds) (1982), “Judgment under Uncertainty: heuristics and biases”, Cambridge U.
Press
‐ Koszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2006), “A model of reference‐dependent preferences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,.
‐ Laibson, D. (1997) “Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
‐ Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and S. Frederick (2002 “A review of intertemporal choice”. Journal of Economic
Literature, 90; 351‐401,.
‐ Shiller, R. (2000) “Irrational Exuberance”, Princeton U. Press,.
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER RATIONALITY
BOUNDED SCHOOL 2019 & BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Ignorance, Information and Sophistication
Olivier Compte
This course takes place every day
OBJECTIVES
The objective of the class is to take a critical journey across economic theory (decision theory under uncertainty,
auctions, repeated games, reputation, information transmission...). Our models generally assume that agents know
with precision the environment they face, or the exact distributions over the parameters that the analyst assumes. This
places strong cognitive demands on agents, or it gives agents extraordinary powers of discernment. Our aim will be to
identify these cognitive demands, highlight how our intuitions are shaped by (and sometimes hinge on) these
demands, and suggest alternative models that assume lesser sophistication on agents. Along the way, we shall also
review how the path proposed, based on direct strategy restrictions, compete with other methods for limiting the
rationality of economic agents.
COURSE STRUCTURE
1. Modeling ignorance and the role of strategy restrictions
2. Bounded rationality models
3. Shortcomings /criticisms of standard models
4. Strategy restrictions in Applications (Auctions, bargaining, information transmission)
5. Application continued (Learning, reputation, repeated games, global games, unraveling)
REFERENCES PER COURSE
1. Modeling ignorance and the role of strategy restrictions
References: Compte and Postlewaite 2018, Ignorance and Uncertainty, Cambridge U. Press, Part I and
Miscellanea
2. A tour of bounded rationality models
References: Geneakoplos, Gilboa Schmeidler (cased based), Thurstone (psychometrics), Brock and Marschak,
Rosenthal, McKelvey Palfrey (quantal response), Osborne Rubinstein (procedural rationality), Jehiel (analogy
based); Laibson, Mariotti Carrillo, Benabou Tirole (present biases) Koszegi (ego utility), Compte Postlewaite
(confidence enhanced performance)
3. Shortcomings /criticisms of standard models
References: Compte and Postlewaite 2018, Ignorance and Uncertainty, Cambridge U. Press, Part II All pay
auctions and revenue equivalence (Myerson), Information aggregation (Pesendorfer Swinkels, Fedderson
Pesendorfer), Surplus extraction (Cremer McLean) Folk theorems, Comparative statics with respect to
information (ex: Cremer Khalil, Ganuzza, Dessein)
4. Strategy restrictions at work
References: Compte and Postlewaite 2018, Ignorance and Uncertainty, Cambridge U. Press, Part III
SOME OTHER REFERENCES
1. Modeling ignorance and the role of strategy restrictions
‐ Allais, M. (1953). "Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes
de l'école Américaine", Econometrica 21 (4): 503–546
‐ Bewley, T.(1986), "Knightian decision theory, part I, " Cowles Foundation paper
‐ Ellsberg, D. (1961). "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms". Quarterly Journal of Economics. 75 (4): 643–
669.
‐ Fox, C. and A. Tversky (1995). "Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance". Quarterly Journal of
Economics. 110 (3): 585–603.
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
‐ Gigerenzer, G. (2007). “Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious”. New York: Viking Press.
‐ Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler, 1988, “Maxmin Expected Utility with a non‐unique prior”, Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 18, 141‐153
‐ Hacking, I. (2006) “The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability”,
Induction and Statistical Inference, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press.
‐ Hansen L.P. and T. J. Sargent (2007) “Robustness”, Princeton University Press
‐ von Mises, R. (1957) “Probability Statistics and Truth, 2nd revised edition”, Dover Publication inc., New York.
‐ Rubinstein, A. (1988) “Similarity and decision‐making under risk (is there a utility theory resolution to the
Allais paradox?)”, Journal of Economic Theory, 46, 145‐153
‐ Rubinstein, A. (1991), “Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory”, Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp.
909‐924.
2. A tour of bounded rationality models
‐ Geanakoplos, J., “Game theory without partitions, an application to speculation”, Cowles Foundation Paper
901
‐ Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1995) “Cased based decision theory”, Journal of Political Economy
‐ Thurstone, L.L. (1927). “A law of comparative judgement”. Psychological Review, 34, 273‐286.
‐ McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey (1995). "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games". Games and
Economic Behavior. 10: 6–38.
‐ Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein, (1998) “Games with Procedurally Rational Players”, American Economic
Review 88 pp 834–847.
‐ Rosenthal, R. (1981), "Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store Paradox," Journal
of Economic Theory, 25, 92‐‐100.
3. Shortcomings /criticisms of standard models
‐ Pesendorfer, W. and J. M. Swinkels (1997) “The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value
Auctions”. Econometrica, 65(6), 1247‐‐1281.
‐ Myerson, R. 1981, “Optimal auction design”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 58‐73.
‐ Fudenberg, D., D. Levine and E. Maskin (1994) “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information”,
Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 997‐1039.
‐ Radner, R., R. Myerson and E. Maskin (1986) “An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting
and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1., pp. 59‐69.
‐ Ganuza, J.‐J. (2004), “Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private
Valuations”, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 583‐598.
‐ Capen, E.C. , R.B. Clapp, and W. M. Campbell, (1971), “Competitive Bidding in High Risk Situations”, Journal of
Petroleum Technology, 23, pp 641‐53.
4. Strategy restrictions at work
‐ Compte, O. and A. Postlewaite (2015) “Pausible cooperation”, Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 45‐59.
‐ Crawford V. and J. Sobel (1982), “Strategic Information Transmission”, Econometrica, 50, 1431‐‐1451.
‐ Ottaviani, M. and F. Squintani (2006), “Naive audience and communication bias”, International Journal of
Game Theory 35:129‐‐150.
‐ Embrey, M., G. Fréchette and S. Yuksel (2014), “Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma”,
Working paper
‐ Carlsson, H. (1991), “A bargaining model where parties make errors”, Econometrica, 59, 1487‐‐1496.
‐ Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993), "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, 61, 989‐‐
1018.
‐ Morris, S. and H. Song Shin (2000), "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling," NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2000, (ed. by B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff ) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
‐ Morris, S. and H. Song Shin (2003), “Global Games: Theory and Applications”, in Advances in Economics and
Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society), edited by M.
Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky; Cambridge University Press.
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu
HOW TO APPLY TO THE PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019
Presentation
Our one‐week programmes are entirely conducted in English. You are expected to participate in all of the courses; you
can follow only one programme per week, but can apply to two consecutive ones. At the end of the programme, you
will receive a certificate. Each programme is equivalent to 3 ECTS (European Credit Transfer System). Students
interested in this transfer should contact their universities.
First week ‐ from June 17 to June 21 Second week ‐ from June 24 to June 28
CLIMATE MACROECO. MICROECO. BOUNDED DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTAL MIGRATION TRADE
CHANGE RATIONALITY ECONOMICS ECONOMICS
Participant profiles and selection
The PSE Summer School is aimed at professionals, researchers, and graduate students in Economics and Finance (Masters
and PhD). Undergraduate students in Economics will be considered if their profile is exceptionally strong.
Candidates are invited to submit their applications on a rolling basis at www.pse‐application.eu, including:
A current Curriculum Vitae in pdf format A photo of yourself [not used per se in the application process]
A copy of your most advanced degree For Students: proof of status
A short motivation text Optional ‐ Letter(s) of recommendation
Fees
Fees cover lunches and social events, as well as the welcome and farewell cocktails. They do not cover accommodation,
transport or any other services.
Early bird discount: A 10% discount applied for participants who paid before March 31, 2019.
Group discount: A 10% discount applies when a single employer or institution enrolls at least five (5) members
in the Summer School. The discount is offered to participants regardless of the course she or he selects and is
applied upon the signing of a training agreement between the employer and PSE.
Cancellation policy ‐ Confirmed participants who wish to cancel must do so in writing by email; your tuition fees will be
partially refunded as described online.
Any questions? summer‐school@psemail.eu
PSE SUMMER SCHOOL 2019 www.parisschoolofeconomics.euA SUMMER ON THE JOURDAN CAMPUS…
The 2019 Edition will take place at PSE in the 14th arrondissement of Paris. A new 12500 m² building
houses around 1500 researchers, students, and administrative teams of the PSE and the Ecole normale
supérieure. The 1-hectare Jourdan campus offers ideal conditions: numerous classrooms and working
spaces, a 300 places amphitheater, a library with more than 50000 books, a student home…
More (online) about the Jourdan Campus – google maps, gallery, videoSUMMER SCHOOL
2019, PARIS
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