Assessment of the First Year under the Kim Jong-un Regime
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ISSUE 81 March 22, 2013
Assessment of the First Year under the Kim Jong-un Regime
and Prospect for Political Stability
By Kim, Jin-moo (Ph.D.)
Center for Security and Strategy
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)
On December 28, 2011, Kim Jong-un was elevated to the
Supreme Commander of North Korea. Thereafter, during the fourth meeting
of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly in April, 2012, he was appointed to
the highest-ranking positions in the party, military, and state such as the
First Secretary of the Workers’ Party, the First Chairman of the National
Defense Commission, a presidium member of the Central Politburo of the
Workers’ Party, and the Chairman of the Party Central Military Commission.
Hereby, the Kim Jong-un regime was officially established, and his power succession in the
early phase appears to be smooth sailing despite the initial expectation that the situation within
North Korea would be extremely unstable following Kim Jong-il’s death in December, 2012.
Such assessment is based on the following:
First, since his first appearance as the successor, Kim Jong-un has consolidated his
power base by carrying out a thorough reshuffle of the key positions in the party, state, and
military. The key figures in the military command and internal security apparatus have been
entirely wiped off or purged, which means those key figures incumbent of the military command
(Choe Ryong-hae, Director of General Political Bureau; Hyon Yong-chol, Chief of General Staff;
www.kida.re.kr/eng 1
and Kim Kyok-sik, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces) and internal security apparatus (Kim
Won-hong, Minister of State Security and Ri Myong-su, Minister of People’s Security) were
newly appointed to their current posts. On the other side, Pak Nam-gi (Director of the Party
Planning and Finance Department), Ryu Kyong (Deputy Director of Ministry of State Security),
Chu Sang-song (Minister of People’s Security), U Tong-chuk (First Vice Minister of State
Security), Ri Yong-ho (Chief of General Staff), Kim Jong-gak (Minister of People’s Armed
Forces), and Hong Sok-hyong (Director of the Party Planning and Finance Department) were
either executed, purged or removed from their positions. In addition, Kim Yong-chun (former
Minister of People’s Armed Forces), O Kuk-ryol (Director of the Party Operations Department),
and Kim Il-chol (former Minister of People’s Armed Forces) stepped down from power. Even
some of the elite members who were appointed under the Kim Jong-un regime are being
replaced. It is known that Choe Ryong-hae (Director of General Political Bureau) and Hyon
Yong-chol (Chief of General Staff) were demoted from Vice Marshal to General; Choe Pu-il
(Director of Operations Bureau) was degraded from General to Colonel General; and Kim Yong-
chul (Director of Reconnaissance General Bureau) was stripped off two ranks from General to
Lieutenant General.
Second, Kim Jong-un has thoroughly exerted social control creating an atmosphere of
terror through public security organs. In particular, he has strongly pursued to control and
eradicate anti-regime sentiment and anti-leadership movements by taking the command of the
internal security apparatus himself and dispatching his watchdogs. Immediately after instated as
the Supreme Commander, he renamed the People’s Security Department to ‘The Ministry of
People’s Security’ and appointed Ri Myong Su who was then Director of Operations Bureaus as
Minister of People’s Security, while placing a combat police unit called the Korean People’s
Internal Security Forces under the command of the Ministry. He also nominated Kim Won Hong
who was then Commander of Security Command for the head of the Ministry of State Security,
the position which had remained vacant under the reign of Kim Jong-il. In addition, he placed the
Ministry of People’s Security and the Ministry of State Security, which were previously cabinet
organs, under the direct command of the National Defense Commission in order to establish a
centralized command structure for the internal security organs. Moreover, Kim Jong-un has
convened a series of meetings of the internal security apparatus and law enforcement agencies
and directed them to tightly track down rebellions. It is known that the Prosecutor’s Office, the
Police and the Ministry of State Security are the main vehicles for suppressing public
disturbances and seizing defectors.
Third, Kim Jong-un has always sought to stabilize the regime by restoring its socialist
system to the traditional style run by a more empowered central party. Since Kim Jong-il had
www.kida.re.kr/eng 2been quite dogmatic in making every
national decision, the party organs such as
the Political Bureau and the Secretariat
were almost impaired. Kim Jong-un,
however, revitalized the key posts in the
Party Central Committee, the Political
Bureau, the Secretariat and the Party
Central Military Commission through the
Conference of the Party convened in
Though Kim Jong-un’s power succession in the early phase
October 2010 and April 2012, and revived appears to be smooth sailing, there remain challenging
factors for the ‘stabilization’ of the Kim Jong-un regime.
the scale of the ruling party to match up with
the one in the 1980s, displaying different style of ruling than his father.
However, it is hard to conclude that Kim’s effort to elevate the party organs was indeed
an attempt to reinvigorate the collective party decision-making process practiced in the Kim Il-
sung era. Considering that Kim Jong-un has had hard times controlling the regime due to his
young age and lack of experience, it is more reasonable to say that he only attempts to stabilize
the regime backed by institutional support for his own decision-making and statecraft.
In sum, a series of activities and systematic rearrangements that Kim Jong-un has
shown since he came to power suggest that his power succession is deemed successful for the
moment in that he has been able to identify vulnerabilities in his power base and take
supplementary measures to mitigate them. This can be also confirmed by the fact that Kim Jong-
un has been frequently made public appearances, such as embracing local residents and
foreign guests, speeches, statements, publications and policy directives, and the idolization of
Kim is making rapid progress as well.
Yet, there remain challenging factors for the ‘stabilization’ of the Kim Jong-un regime.
First, the key elite members such as Kim Kyoung-hui, Chang Song-taek and Choe
Ryong-hae are expanding their political leverage inside the regime. This is supported by a few
cases in that Choe Ryong-hae and Premier Choe Yong-rim made on-site visits, which were
exposed to the media, and Chang Song-taek visited to China with his large-scale delegation.
Given that such movements by the privileged class were never possible in the Kim Jong-il era,
these are the cases that clearly show the limits of Kim's political capability and failure in seizing
the absolute power. This is not irrelevant to Kim's short period of power succession and political
experience. Especially, Chang Song-taek is accompanying most of Kim's public activities, and in
www.kida.re.kr/eng 3November 2012, he was selected as the Chairman of the State Physical Culture and Sports
Guidance Commission, which is assessed to be a newly emerging power organ. Putting all
these together, we cannot rule out the possibility that Kim Jong-un is running the regime jointly
together with his aunt Kim Kyoung-hui, Chang Song-taek, and Choe Ryong-hae.
Considering Kim's lack of leadership and charisma, it is likely that the political influence
of the key elite members may expand further in the future, and accordingly, the possibility of
power division by factions will increase as well. In such situation, we cannot rule out the
possibility of a power struggle taking place during the process.
Second, domestic conditions for his ruling are not showing a sign of improvement. The
greatest threats to the Kim Jong-un regime are the worsening economic situation and the
acceleration of changing perceptions of the North Korean people.
In order for the Kim Jong-un regime to strengthen its vulnerable political base and
ensure legitimacy from its people, it needs to resolve the ongoing financial difficulties. Also, the
issue of ‘stably managing’ market, which has been spreading rapidly owing to a dysfunctional
party-led distribution system, is directly linked with the stability of the regime. This is because the
market facilitates accelerated deviation from “The Great Leader,” weakened ideology, and
corruption of the officials, and it will weaken the foundation of North Korea, which has
established its unique socialism based on the Juche Ideology and “The Great Leader (Suryong)”
system.
The Kim Jong-un regime has consistently emphasized improving the quality of life for
the North Korean people that can be well explained by the formulated June 28 measures and
the 2013 New Year's address. However, how successful this economic policy will be is uncertain
at the moment. The need for resolving the financial difficulties is totally recognized, but the
unique characteristics of the North Korean power structure will refrain from undertaking any
serious reforms that might run counter the stability of the regime. Therefore, the Kim Jong-un
regime will only be able to push ahead with its economic policy in a way that does not threaten
'The Great Leader' system, while ensuring the economic privileges enjoyed by the elite group.
For the young and less-experienced leader, the presence of the elite group is an indispensible
factor for maintaining the power, but at the same time, it poses a challenge to the absolute
power. Therefore, it can be said that North Korea’s policy in the future may not deviate much
from the current policy. Should this continue, international isolation and exile of the North Korean
people in the midst of the economic crisis will be aggravated, and therefore, Kim Jong-un will be
more dependent on the power elites to control the society and maintain his power.
www.kida.re.kr/eng 4In conclusion, the destitution and the growth of the power elites pose grave threats to
''The Great Leader” system. And besides, these two issues cannot be simultaneously resolved
without having to modify the system. Indeed, if Kim desires to achieve the stabilization of his
regime and economic development at the same time, he may choose to give up the absolute
power of the totalitarian dictatorship and pursue ‘Chinese-style’ opening policy. However, North
Korea has its unique system based on “The Great Leader” system, and authorities have sworn
fidelity to their leader. Giving up “The Great Leader” system does not only mean giving up a
dictator’s power, but also a complete transformation of the North Korean regime.
Overall, the stabilization of the Kim Jong-un regime in its second year will depend on
whether it can simultaneously resolve the two issues, seizure of absolute power and economic
development, which are not possible to achieve without giving up “The Great Leader' system.”
Dr. Kim, Jin-moo is Research Fellow at the Center for Security & Strategy, KIDA. He received
his Ph.D. in public policy at the University of Pittsburgh, and MPA at George Mason University.
His research interests include North Korean affairs, inter-Korean relations, and North Korea
policies. With wealth of experience in these areas, he has served as policy advisor for the ROK
Ministry of Unification.
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