Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament
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Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the
Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament
A. Kovacs¹; I. Fertő²; L. Kóczy²; B. Sziklai²; A.A. Nás²
1: Tec de Monterrey, Department of International Business, Mexico, 2: Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Institute of Economics, Hungary
Corresponding author email: attila.kovacs@itesm.mx
Abstract:
We analyze the voting power of the members of the agricultural committee of the European Parliament
using a spatial Banzhaf power index. Using a novel dataset of roll-call votes in the current EP-term, we
identify critical members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that committee
members with formal positions, EP group coordinators as well as German, French, Italian and British
members are powerful actors. Nevertheless, rapporteurs are not necessarily influential. We also concluded
that members with moderate ideological position but from Member States with extreme agricultural
importance are the most powerful ones.
Acknowledegment:
JEL Codes: C71, A12
#1419Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in
the Agricultural Committee of the European
Parliament
Abstract
We analyze the voting power of the members of the agricultural committee of the European Parliament using a
spatial Banzhaf power index. Using a novel dataset of roll-call votes in the current EP-term, we identify critical
members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that committee members with formal
positions, EP group coordinators as well as German, French, Italian and British members are powerful actors.
Nevertheless, rapporteurs are not necessarily influential. We also concluded that members with moderate
ideological position but from Member States with extreme agricultural importance are the most powerful ones.
Keywords: European Parliament, Common Agricultural Policy, voting games, Banzhaf index, voting
game over a convex geometry
1. Introduction
Discussion about the content as well as the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
of the European Union (EU) have been high on the political agenda in the last decades and
generated strong scientific attention as well. CAP reforms have been subject to
comprehensive analysis both from political and policy aspects. In his landmark book, “The
Perfect Storm” on the 2003 Fischler reform, Swinnen (2008) shares the view that this has
been the most radical reform of the CAP since its creation. Ten years later, another, more
moderate CAP reform, the “Imperfect Storm” (Swinnen, 2015a) took place. Swinnen (2015a)
identifies four key domains of this reform: first, the drivers and the assessment of the reform
(see Swinnen, 2015b); second, the factors influencing policy outcomes, including internal,
like the Multiannual Financial Framework (Matthews, 2015), as well as external factors, like
the WTO negotiations (Swinbank, 2015); third, the content, including direct payments
(Sahrbacher et al., 2015) or the so-called greening (Erjavec et al., 2015); finally, the
institutional aspects, with focus on the role of the European Parliament after the entering into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon (Fertő and Kovács, 2015; Olper and Pacca, 2015).
Throughout the last CAP reforms and the EU’s legislation on agricultural policy, scholars
focused on the external and internal stakeholders, their motivations and influence on the
policy and legislative outcomes. Similarly, the driving forces, constraints and achievements
of reforms have been part of the political and scientific discourse. On the other hand, the
decision-making of the CAP, the role and influence of various stakeholders on the legislative
outcome is still largely uncovered. This is especially true for the European Parliament and its
members. This article aims at filling this gap by analyzing the role of the Members of the
European Parliament’s agricultural committee (COMAGRI, Committee on Agriculture and
Rural Development) in the CAP legislation through coming up with quantifiable power
scores based on the roll-call votes of agricultural legislative pieces.
1The aim of article is to analyze the power relations and the legislative influence of the
COMAGRI members of the European Parliament. This paper provides the voting power
ranking of the MEPs – both Members and Substitute Members – of the Committee on
Agriculture and Rural Development based on their policy positions along two dimensions:
ideological spectrum of national parties and the agricultural value-added in the total GDP of
the Member States of the MEPs. Unlike previous research on the power of Member States in
the Council, we focus on the analysis of the European Parliament. Contrary to previous
studies on intra-EP structures, like committees or EP Groups (Whitaker, 2005), we
concentrate on the decision-making at the level of individual EP members. The main novelty
of the paper is that it comes up with quantified power scores of individual MEPs in any policy
domain, based on the members’ position in the ideology space. We provide the ranking of
the MEPs – both Members and Substitute Members – of the Committee on Agriculture and
Rural Development on the basis of their Banzhaf power index in a voting game over a convex
geometry. We classify members along two dimensions: an ideological spectrum and the
value-added to the GDP by agriculture. These two dimensions induce an ideology space,
where the members are placed. For the first dimension the member is assigned a value based
on the left-right measure (ParlGov) of the political party he/she belongs to. For the latter we
use the World Bank agricultural value added index of the member’s home country.
2. Influence on EU decision making
There is a broad literature on the role and influence of EP committees. Westlake (1994:191)
described the Standing Committees as the “legislative backbone” of the European
Parliament. Many authors emphasize the increasing role of committees in shaping EU
legislation. In addition, Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) find that the allocation of the
rapporteurship measures the power of Committee members. Neuhold (2001) argues that the
key players in the EP committees are the committee chairmen, the vice-chairs – holding the
formal positions in the committees –, as well as the rapporteurs, also draftsmen of opinion,
shadow rapporteurs and party coordinators in the committees. Kaeding and Obholzer (2012)
also emphasized the key role of EP Group coordinators in the legislative process at EP
committee level. In line with Kaeding (2004), Marshall (2010) also states that rapporteurs
are the most powerful actors of the committee, but also added that the distribution of
influence among ordinary members of the committees is still unclear. Regarding the role of
COMAGRI in the EP, Greer and Hind (2012) concludes that the COMAGRI plays key role
in agricultural legislation. Fertő and Kovács (2015) corroborated this finding.
Power indices are widely used to measure the actors’ a priori voting power in the legislative
and political decisions in the EU institutional setup. In the EU context, most papers deal with
the power of Member States in the Council of the European Union – better known by its
former name: the Council of Ministers (Algaba et al., 2001; Le Breton et al., 2012; Bilbao et
al., 2002; Barr and Pasarelli, 2009; Kóczy, 2012), studying the fairness of voting weights
(before the Lisbon Treaty) and how the extensions of the Union affected existing members’
powers. It is important to stress that these models study voting power a priori, that is, without
taking policy positions into account. This approach is usually motivated by the assumption
that the subject of voting and therefore the voters’ policy positions are not known in advance.
When we study voting in the COMAGRI this approach is neither informative nor appropriate.
We assume that members have clear policy positions that can be approximated by their
2political inclinations and the significance of agriculture in their delegating member states.
We present a model with this information taken into account.
Dataset
The dataset of this analysis contains three sources of information. The first source of
information is the roll-call votes of legislative proposals and amendments in the COMAGRI
during the first two years of the current EP-term. In case of the roll-call votes, we listed the
votes of MEPs – for, against and abstention –, both Members and Substitutes of COMAGRI.
The second pillar of the dataset is the ideological position of the MEPs based on the left-right
ideological orientation of their national parties (Döring and Manow, 2016). The third dataset
used in this analysis was the agricultural value-added in the percentage of the GDP (The
World Bank, 2013) of the Member State of the MEP. These latter two constitute the two
dimensions of the analysis.
3. Methodology
We study the COMAGRI members’ ability to make and change decisions using spatial voting
indices. Here we introduce and explain the method we use.
We consider a set of voters. Subsets of voters are called coalitions. A coalition is winning if
it is able to make a decision according to the voting rule, for instance, by having the majority
of the votes. Coalitions that are not winning are called losing. We are interested in critical
voters, that is, players, whose loss can turn a winning coalition into a losing one. When all
members of a coalition are critical the coalition is a minimal winning coalition. A priori
voting power then refers to the ability to change decisions without knowing the actual topics
the committee must vote on.
Formally, let denote the set of voters and the set of winning, ℳ the set of minimal
winning coalitions. For each voter in , let = { ⊆ | ∈ , \{ } ∉ } denote the
set of winning coalitions, where voter is critical and = | | the number of such
coalitions. Then the Banzhaf index – a normalized version of the Banzhaf measure (Banzhaf,
1965) – is defined as
=∑ .
∈
The standard version of the Banzhaf index ignores the voters’ policy preferences. It is
reasonable to assume that a decision – a CAP policy position – that is acceptable to both a
liberal (ALDE) and a conservative (ECR) MEP, will be acceptable to more central, moderate
(S&D and EPP) MEPs too, as long as they have a comparable interest in agriculture. In the
so-called games on convex geometries (Edelman, 1997) it is presumed that only convex
coalitions may form. In the ideology space, convex coalitions are induced by convex
polytopes whose facets are parallel with one of the axis of the space – in two dimension these
are rectangles (see Fig. 1). In such games only voters residing on the boundary of these
convex polytopes are critical. The Banzhaf index has been extended to such games by Bilbao
et al. (1998). In this paper, we use a Monte-Carlo method for calculating the Banzhaf-index.
This has already been applied for weighted majority games, but not for games over convex
geometry (Matsui and Matsui, 2000).
3Fig. 1: Convex (on the left) and concave coalitions (on the right). Note that the coalition on
the right is convex in the Euclidean sense, but not as a voting group.
In order to establish the convex geometry, COMAGRI members are treated as points in the
plane (i.e. the ideology space) where the horizontal axis ( ) represents the ideological
position of the national parties of COMAGRI members and the vertical axis ( ) represents
the agricultural added-value to the GDP index of their home countries. We calculate the
influence of each COMAGRI member by finding all rectangles corresponding to minimal
winning coalitions and checking how frequently a particular MEP is placed on the outline of
such a rectangles. Kóczy and Sziklai (2015) applied a similar methodology for the power
ranking of the cardinals in the Papal Conclave in 2013.
Considering that a voting session consists of 46 representatives where some members are
replaced with substitute members, the number of possible different configurations is
astronomical. Thus, we estimate the Banzhaf-indices by applying a Monte Carlo simulation
based on the probabilities of absence and substitution. The scores in the Table (see Appendix
B) are obtained from the average of four simulation containing 100,000 samples each.
In the current, 8th EP term between 2014 and 2019, the COMAGRI has 46 Members and the
same number of Substitute Members. The ideological and national distribution of Members
and Substitutes in EP Committees reflect the weight of EP Groups and Member States in the
Parliament. It is important to note that substitution in EP committees is not on a Member-to-
Substitutes relationship, but any Substitute Member can replace any missing (standing)
Member. In the power ranking of COMAGRI Members and Substitutes, we finally ranked
72 members. This is the number of MEPs who participated in the 15 roll-call votes in the
first half of this EP-term.
4. Results
4At first glance the results are well in accordance with our intuition. Members with low
absence rates are usually ranked higher than members with high absence rates. Similarly high
substitution probability comes with better ranking on average. The interesting cases are the
exemptions. How come that some members with relatively high absence value, like Rebega
(20.0%) and Dăncilă (33.3%) are influential while a member like Dorfmann (6.7%) who is
almost always present is virtually powerless? The answer comes from the spatial position of
these players. Kóczy and Sziklai (2015) observed that players close to the center of the
ideology space are rarely critical, while those with relatively extreme positions are likely to
do well and become an influential member. In Appendix A, we see that our results
corroborate this finding. COMAGRI members with central ideological position but with
extreme agricultural position – that is, the agricultural index of their countries is either
extremely high or low – are the most influential ones. The top 6 MEPs in our ranking –
Brannen, Buda, Noichl, Rebega, Jahr, Hausling – are all in these spatial spaces (marked with
red in Appendix A).
Previous research reveals the importance of ‘strong’ persons in EU politics and decision-
making. Now, we provide an overview on this fact for the European Parliament’s agri-
committee. First, we look at the formal Committee positions, the chair and the vice-chairs.
The chair of the COMAGRI in the current EP term is Poland’s Czeslaw Siekierski from the
European People’s Party (EPP) EP Group. There are also four vice-chairs of COMAGRI.
We see in Appendix B that in the power ranking, the chair of COMAGRI takes the 15 th
position (out of 72), but he is not the most powerful member of those with formal position,
as one of the vice-chairs, Viorica Dăncilă is ranked higher. In sum, we can conclude that all
COMAGRI Members with formal positions are in the first half of the ranking, with an
average ranking of 21.2. Therefore, our empirical findings are in line with Neuhold (2001).
Second, we observe the rapporteurships in the legislative files we analyze. We see that only
two MEPs – De Castro and Nicholson – have more than one legislative proposal.
Our calculations show that the ranking of rapporteurs – bold in Appendix 2. – does not
concentrate on the top of the list. While there are influential rapporteurs – Hausling, De
Castro – we observe rapporteurs with minimal influence (Selimovic, Nicholson). Therefore,
the rapporteurs of the legislative proposals in our sample are not critical players in voting
games. Their results do not confirm findings of earlier research revealing the importance of
rapporteurs in the EP committees (Kaeding, 2004; Marshall, 2010).
Third, party coordinators of EP Groups in the committees – underlined in Appendix 2. – play
a key role in the legislative process (Neuhold, 2001; Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012). Our
analysis reinforces this view as four EP Group coordinators are in the top 15, including the
coordinators of the two main EP Groups (EPP and S&D).
Fourth, power rankings in the European Council show that German, British, French and
Italian Council members – ministers – are assumed the most powerful ones. Now, we test
whether Members of the European Parliament from these countries are highly ranked.
5Our estimations imply that in case of the top 25 MEPs that members from these four countries
dominate the list (14 members out of 25), including positions 1, 3 and 5. These findings are
in accordance with the power ranking of Member States in different Council formations.
Therefore, we see that political actors from the same, limited number of Member States –
Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy – dominate both legislative branches of the
European Union, the Council and the European Parliament.
Note, that 16 out of these 25 MEPs are from net contributor, EU-15 Member States. These
16 MEPs represent only 6 Member States. The other 9 MEPs are from net beneficiary, EU-
13 Member States, but these 9 members represent only three countries: Poland, Romania and
Croatia.
5. Discussion, conclusions
The paper analyzes the voting power of the Members of the Committee on Agriculture and
Rural Development of the European Parliament using the Banzhaf index. Our major findings
are following. First, those MEPs who hold formal positions, being either the chair or any of
the vice-chairs of the Committee. In line with Neuhold (2001) we find that these committee
members are highly ranked and powerful. Second, contrary to previous research (Kaeding,
2004; Marshall, 2010) we cannot confirm high power indices for the rapporteurs of the
analyzed legislative files. Third, the party coordinators, who are the most important members
of EP Groups at committee level and have a big say in formulating the legislative proposals
(Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012). We find that most of the group coordinators are powerful and
highly ranked, our research results confirm the main findingsof previous empirical
investigations. Fourth, we also analyze the role and power of those committee members who
are from the most powerful Member States (Germany, France, Italy and UK) are the most
powerful politicians. Our results are in accordance with these findings: COMAGRI members
from these countries are powerful and highly ranked. Future research can be extended to the
calculation of power indices based on plenary roll-call votes. The comparison of the two
intra-EP decision-making stage, committee and plenary, may reveal the power gains or losses
of COMAGRI members in the legislative process.
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8Appendix A
Most powerful committee members
7
REBEGA
BUDA
DĂNCILĂ
6
Worldbank Agriculture Index
NEKOV
5
ERDŐS
JAKOVČIĆ PETIR
4 ROPĖ
GLEZOS
KUŹMIUK SIEKIERSKI
KALINOWSKI WOJCIECHOWSKI GOSIEWSKA
TORRES MARTÍNEZ
3 SENRA RODRÍGUEZ VALCÁRCEL SISO
AGUILERA GARCÍA AYUSO
SEBASTIÀ
ZULLO RIBEIRO HERRANZ GARCÍA
CAPUTO FERNÁNDEZ POLČÁK
VIEGAS SERRÃO SANTOS MELO
MOI DORFMANN BOGOVIČ
2 DE CASTRO
HAZEKAMP D'AMATO BELDER LOISEAU
BOVÉ HUITEMA DELAHAYE
KADENBACH MCGUINNESS KÖSTINGER
CARTHY ANDRIEU DANTIN
FLANAGAN DOHRMANN FERRAND
HEUBUCH ERIKSSON FEDERLEY PAULSEN SELIMOVIC ROHDE
1 TARABELLA JAHR
MÜLLER ASHWORTH
NOICHL AGNEW
ECK
DEß NICHOLSON
HÄUSLING BRANNEN LINS GIESEKE
SCOTT CATO
DODDSMCINTYREGIRLING
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Left-Right index
9Appendix B
Left-right
Probability Agricultural
ideology
COMAGRI Member of absence/ value-added Banzhaf-
Rank Name EP Group (ParlGov,
position State substitution (World index (%)
1-left; 10-
(%) Bank, 2013)
right)
United
6.7
1 Paul Brannen Member Kingdom S&D 4.35 0.693 4.218
2 Daniel Buda Member Romania EPP 0.0 5.38 6.128 3.556
3 Maria Noichl Member Germany S&D 13.3 3.64 0.789 3.040
4 Laurenţiu Rebega Member Romania ENF 20.0 4.76 6.128 2.987
5 Peter Jahr Member Germany EPP 13.3 6.25 0.789 2.961
6 Martin Häusling Member Germany Greens-EFA 0.0 2.93 0.789 2.797
7 Marijana Petir Member Croatia EPP 0.0 5.30 4.393 2.638
8 Albert Deß Member Germany EPP 0.0 7.28 0.789 2.611
9 Giulia Moi Member Italy EFD 13.3 2.50 2.327 2.212
10 Zbigniew Kuźmiuk Member Poland ECR 0.0 4.18 3.236 2.187
11 Nicola Caputo Member Italy S&D 0.0 2.62 2.327 2.180
12 Paolo De Castro Member Italy S&D 0.0 2.62 2.327 2.180
13 Viorica Dăncilă Vice-Chair Romania S&D 33.3 3.23 6.128 2.070
14 Marc Tarabella Member Belgium S&D 6.7 2.93 0.791 2.054
Czesław Adam
6.7
15 Siekierski Chair Poland EPP 4.18 3.236 2.053
16 Rosa D'Amato Substitute Italy EFD 53.3 2.50 2.327 2.050
17 Marco Zullo Member Italy EFD 20.0 2.50 2.327 2.044
18 Ivan Jakovčić Substitute Croatia ALDE 53.3 3.42 4.393 2.011
19 Eric Andrieu Vice-Chair France S&D 0.0 2.93 1.627 1.927
20 Jarosław Kalinowski Member Poland EPP 13.3 4.18 3.236 1.917
21 Michel Dantin Member France EPP 6.7 7.49 1.627 1.877
22 Ulrike Müller Member Germany ALDE 20.0 7.40 0.789 1.788
23 Norbert Lins Substitute Germany EPP 20.0 6.25 0.789 1.676
24 Esther Herranz García Member Spain EPP 13.1 7.59 2.821 1.643
25 Janusz Wojciechowski Vice-Chair Poland ECR 26.7 4.18 3.236 1.622
26 Jordi Sebastià Member Spain Greens-EFA 33.3 1.20 2.821 1.620
27 Norbert Erdős Member Hungary EPP 33.3 6.54 4.553 1.593
United
40.0
28 Anneliese Dodds None Kingdom S&D 7.40 0.693 1.522
29 Peter Eriksson Substitute Sweden Greens-EFA 40.0 3.37 1.386 1.476
30 Elisabeth Köstinger Member Austria EPP 6.7 6.47 1.433 1.463
31 Mairead McGuinness Member Ireland EPP 13.3 6.43 1.430 1.459
32 Momchil Nekov Substitute Bulgaria S&D 26.7 3.00 5.341 1.413
33 Bronis Ropė Member Lithuania Greens-EFA 33.3 3.26 3.952 1.385
Clara Eugenia
0.0
34 Aguilera García Vice-Chair Spain S&D 3.73 2.821 1.194
35 Jan Huitema Member Netherlands ALDE 6.7 7.34 1.920 1.192
1036 Bas Belder Substitute Netherlands ECR 40.0 7.40 1.920 1.189
Estefanía Torres
20.0
37 Martínez Substitute Spain GUE-NGL 1.20 2.821 1.177
38 Beata Gosiewska Member Poland ECR 40.0 7.69 3.236 1.177
United
46.7
39 Richard Ashworth Member Kingdom ECR 7.42 0.693 1.160
40 Luke Ming Flanagan Member Ireland GUE-NGL 40.0 1.20 1.430 1.157
Maria Lidia Senra
40.0
41 Rodríguez Member Spain GUE-NGL 2.91 2.821 1.151
42 Nuno Melo Member Portugal EPP 40.0 8.02 2.365 1.076
43 José Bové Member France Greens-EFA 20.0 3.15 1.627 1.069
United
26.7
44 Molly Scott Cato Substitute Kingdom Greens-EFA 2.57 0.693 1.039
45 Maria Heubuch Substitute Germany Greens-EFA 13.3 2.93 0.789 1.027
46 Philippe Loiseau Member France ENF 46.7 9.65 1.627 1.011
47 Edouard Ferrand Member France ENF 46.7 9.65 1.627 1.011
48 Fredrick Federley Substitute Sweden ALDE 20.0 5.80 1.386 0.968
49 Marit Paulsen Member Sweden ALDE 60.0 6.29 1.386 0.839
50 Matt Carthy Member Ireland GUE-NGL 60.0 1.20 1.430 0.783
51 Sofia Ribeiro Substitute Portugal EPP 60.0 6.29 2.3650 0.781
52 Angélique Delahaye Substitute France EPP 13.3 7.49 1.627 0.778
United
13.3
53 Anthea McIntyre Substitute Kingdom ECR 7.42 0.693 0.770
54 Jens Gieseke Substitute Germany EPP 6.7 6.25 0.789 0.729
55 Jasenko Selimovic Member Sweden ALDE 66.7 6.29 1.386 0.701
56 Karin Kadenbach Substitute Austria S&D 20.0 3.72 1.433 0.688
57 Stefan Eck Substitute Germany GUE-NGL 20.0 1.21 0.789 0.653
58 Jens Rohde Member Denmark ALDE 60.0 7.29 1.488 0.645
59 Herbert Dorfmann Member Italy EPP 6.7 5.40 2.327 0.600
United
46.7
60 John Stuart Agnew Member Kingdom EFD 7.84 0.693 0.589
United
6.7
61 James Nicholson Member Kingdom ECR 8.30 0.693 0.534
62 Miguel Viegas Substitute Portugal GUE-NGL 6.7 2.17 2.365 0.479
63 Franc Bogovič Substitute Slovenia EPP 20.0 6.69 2.065 0.476
64 Anja Hazekamp Member Netherlands GUE-NGL 80.0 1.21 1.920 0.472
United
6.7
65 Julie Girling Substitute Kingdom ECR 7.42 0.693 0.461
Ramón Luis Valcárcel
6.7
66 Sisoi Substitute Spain EPP 7.59 2.821 0.433
67 Pilar Ayuso Substitute Spain EPP 6.7 7.59 2.821 0.432
68 Emmanouil Glezos Substitute Greece GUE-NGL 6.7 4.49 3.727 0.400
Czech
6.7
69 Stanislav Polčák Substitute Republic EPP 7.40 2.695 0.367
70 Jørn Dohrmann Substitute Denmark ECR 6.7 8.22 1.488 0.360
71 Ricardo Serrão Santos Substitute Portugal S&D 6.7 4.04 2.365 0.166
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