Tunisia and the Arab Democratic Awakening - IEMed
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The New Era of the Arab World
Tunisia and the Arab Democratic
Awakening
Bichara Khader the protest had reached the point of no return.
Keys
Director Ben Ali calls in the army but it rebels and, through
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Arabe the voice of its chief, refuses to shoot at the crowd.
Contemporain (CERMAC), Louvain-la-Neuve
The regime collapses and the dictator, pursued,
flees on 14 January 2011.
Who would have foreseen such agitation? Who Tunisians themselves were surprised at the turn of
dared hope that the Tunisian people would be ca- events. They were prone to believe that the dicta-
Med.2011
pable of overturning a plundering police regime tor had sharp teeth and long arms, but he turned
whose stability and strength were extolled in Eu- out to be a paper tiger in the face of a population
rope and elsewhere? Even those who are not nov- no longing fearing him and going into action. Evi-
ices in Arab politics were taken by surprise, dumb- dently, fear changed sides.
founded by the turn of events, stunned by the I pride myself in closely following political, eco-
speed of the victory of the Tunisian people and nomic and social developments in Tunisia and
astonished by the maturity and modernity that it the Arab world. Nevertheless, I must admit that I
15
displayed. was caught unawares. I wanted change; I deeply
It is thus hardly astonishing that the uprising by hoped for it and never stopped repeating that
the Tunisian people had the effect of an electro- “night is darkest just before the dawn” and that
shock. Let’s admit it – the surprise was complete: “after the winter of dictatorship will come the
a young street vendor, harassed by police in Sidi spring of freedom.” Then came the great sur-
Bouzid, immolates himself on 17 December 2010 prise, a youth immolating himself and an entire
and a sweeping movement of revolt is triggered. country rising up for freedom. Thus, everything
Arising in the Centre-West region (Kasserine, Sidi begins in the sacrificial mode, as it is called by
Bouzid, Feriana, etc.), the movement spreads like Abdelwahab Meddeb, who adds that “it is Christ-
wildfire throughout the entire country, which is like: giving of oneself to give health to others.”
roused and takes to the streets. Mohammad Personally, I believe that Bouazizi’s self-immola-
Bouazizi dies on 4 January 2011. tion was devoid of any religious or sacrificial im-
Believing it to be a simple riot like those that have port; it was simply a statement made through fire,
punctuated the history of this country, the police an act committed in order to say “enough” or
do not go in for half-measures: tear gas and real “no.” This gesture cannot be associated with a
bullets. But the more the Tunisians are cut down, form of Jihad either, for any cause whatsoever,
the more the protests spread and become gener- nor, a fortiori, a simple suicide. These young Ar-
alized. Deaf to the appeals of youth, Ben Ali first abs who immolate themselves are seeking above
takes refuge in silence, confident in the efficiency all to make their despair visible. Perhaps they be-
of his police force, then he takes the floor only to lieve they can spark the population through a rip-
attribute the riots to “excited and subversive” ele- ple effect and put them into action. And if they
ments, before finally facing the facts and acknowl- have succeeded, it is because their countries re-
edging the errors committed, uttering the famous sembled dry scrub fields that only needed a
phrase coined by another general (of greater stat- spark to set them ablaze. Without believing in the
ure) “I have understood you.” This came too late; miracle of unpredictability, it is clear that the situ-ation was ripe for generalized revolt; all that was Arab population was still low; it no longer functions
needed was a triggering event. today because the Arab population has quadru-
pled over the past sixty years, its needs have rock-
eted and the States’ means have been diminished
The Longevity of Authoritarian Arab Regimes by poor governance: the predatory excesses of re-
gimes, arms purchasing and generalized corrup-
Yet if the situation was ripe for change, how can one tion. Having lost all legitimacy, the States resort to
account for the longevity demonstrated by authori- a single or dominant party and a highly sophisti-
tarian Arab regimes? Where were they getting their cated system of repression and control, making a
capacity to withstand such headwinds? And as a real climate of terror reign.
corollary, why have the Arab peoples waited so long, In oil-producing countries, oil revenues func-
when waves of democratization had swept away the tion as a damper: they devalue labour, the entre-
Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal in preneurial spirit and efficiency, since the States’
Keys
the 1970s and the dictatorships of Latin America in revenues are not linked to labour; they reduce taxa-
the 1980s and the authoritarian regimes of Eastern tion and empower States (recall the catchphrase of
Europe in the 1990s? the early Americans: “no taxation without represen-
Let’s first answer the question on the longevity of tation”); they canker the national economy via ple-
these regimes. I ascribe it to several factors of both thoric public employment and the generalization of
an internal and an external order. corruption; and they buy the populations’ consent.
Med.2011
In sum, they clearly embody the “natural resource
Internal Factors curse” known as the “Dutch disease,” where reve-
nues have a negative effect not only on economic
First of all, these factors have to do with the efficiency, but also on democracy. This is true in
nature of the post-colonial Arab State. In- emirates and monarchies just as well as in repub-
deed, once the threshold of independence was lics, as in the cases of Libya and Algeria.
passed, the problem of affirmation of nationhood The Palestinian issue has had negative ef-
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took precedence over everything else. The Arab fects on democracy: certainly, it is perceived as a
republics, created by military coups or national source of suffering and humiliation by Arab peoples
revolutions (Algeria 1962, Syria 1948, Egypt 1952, from Mauritania to Oman, but for regimes, it has
Iraq 1958, Sudan 1969, Libya 1969), brought to been the object of all sorts of manipulation. Haven’t
power new elites, essentially military and often of they bombarded their peoples with misleading slo-
rural or petit-bourgeois origins. Under this new gans? They were supposed to “close ranks against
governing class, the nationalist, socialist and Ara- the Zionist enemy,” and were told “not to create di-
bist State succeeded the liberal State of the pre- versions,” not to “break the national consensus on
ceding decades. These military teams posed as the struggle against Israel and its occupation” and
the “saviours of the Arab nation from the clutches that “it is time for combat and not debate.” Regimes
of colonialism” and “developers of societies,” but have used and abused this fallacious, so-called na-
quickly lapsed into elementary populism, silencing tionalist litany. The worst thing, as indicated by the
all dissent and accusing any opponents of being journalist, Khaled Hroub, is that “these bywords
“agents of imperialism.” In the name of the “glori- have resounded for decades and have had a con-
ous Arab nation” and its “eternal mission” (Al-ris- siderable impact on large sections of the popula-
alah al-khalidah), as per slogans brandished by tion, which have accepted these regimes in return
the Ba’ath Party and other parties of that type, the for the struggle against Israel” without asking them-
new regimes rubbed out differences for the sake of selves whether a dictatorship is more effective than
unity. They made stability take precedence over a democracy in a struggle against a national enemy.
democracy, establishing a tacit social contract In monarchies, a different logic has prevailed:
with their populations: the State would take charge it is what Joseph Maila called “the logic of retribu-
of matters of development, political independence tion.” It is essentially a logic that seeks to maintain
and social justice in exchange for the population’s the hierarchical representation of social order
consent and its not demanding political participa- based on tribal order (the emirates), the use of a
tion. This negative consensus could work when the “lineage indicating blood relations or proximity tothe Prophet” (the Hashemite lineage), “the protec- its geographical location (key, corridor or crossroads
tion of the Holy Places of Islam” (Kingdom of Saudi region), its geopolitical and geostrategic importance
Arabia), or the fact of being “the Commander of the (connecting the Mediterranean with oceans and
Faithful” (Morocco). bordering Africa, Europe and Asia) and its economic
interest as a vast market, or even in its geotheologi-
cal dimension, since the region is endowed with a
Not only are populations not sort of “sacred geography” by the three major mono-
involved in economic and social theistic religions. The penetrated nature of the Arab
regional subsystem predates the Cold War – since
choices, but they are the victims
ancient times the Arab world has been coveted by
of the predation of public political powers and has been the object of all sorts
officials, whose corruption raises of desires and rivalries. But with the onset of the
society’s sense of helplessness and Cold War, the penetration became complete; not a
Keys
single remote area was spared.
weakens awareness of the public
This produced a nearly systematic polarization in the
nature of the State Arab world between the pro-American (and pro-
Western) contingents and the pro-Soviet sectors.
Thus, globally, Arab political culture, both in republi- Roughly speaking, the monarchies sided with the
can and monarchic States, leaves little room for the Americans and the “popular socialist republics” with
Med.2011
citizens due to a lack of the institutional mediation the Soviets. Yet neither the Americans nor, a fortiori,
necessary between the head of state and his sub- the Soviets considered the issue of “political free-
jects (ra’aya), between the Founding Father of the dom.” Their concern was that their respective allies
nation and his “children,” between the “saviours of be “loyal” to their commitments. Dictatorships did
the nation” and their “protégés.” In such a relation- not pose much of a conscience problem for the So-
ship, the State is no longer a “public good,” but rath- viet Union. As for the Western world, it recognized
er a “private resource,” tapped by the Head of State, the low degree of freedom granted populations by
17
his family and the ruling classes that revolve around their allies, but they were nonetheless “their allies”
them. This means that not only are populations not (“our son of a bitch”). Hence the Cold War froze
involved in economic and social choices, but they democratic claims and fossilized regimes.
are the victims of the predation of public officials, These regimes put themselves forth as guar-
whose corruption raises society’s sense of helpless- antors of stability, and if necessary, of a regular
ness and weakens awareness of the public nature of flow of oil and gas. Indispensable to the operation of
the State, making the latter a hostile phenomenon the word economy, these two resources are widely
seen as a necessary evil. present in the Arab world, which possesses nearly
60% of proven oil reserves and nearly 20% of gas
External Factors reserves.
These regimes portrayed themselves as bul-
Naturally, in addition to these endogenous factors warks against Islamism, or even against jihad-
contributing to the longevity of authoritarian regimes ism. However, all experts on the matter unanimous-
in the Arab world, we must also consider external ly recognize the role of authoritarian Arab regimes
factors, which can be summed up as the “instrumen- in the re-Islamisation of societies in the Southern
tal function” of these regimes in the defence of the and Eastern Mediterranean. Early on, after the
interests of external powers. death of Nasser and the erosion of Arabist ideolo-
These regimes’ alliances with the major world gy, Sadat encouraged student Islamist movements
powers during the Cold War were a determin- in order to counter students of left-wing, Nasserist
ing factor in their longevity. Indeed, from 1956 ideology at Egyptian universities. Elsewhere, re-
to the collapse of the USSR at the beginning of the gimes have sought to beat Islamists at their own
1990s, the entire Arab subsystem was penetrated game by competing in mosque-building zeal. In Al-
and polarised. By “penetrated system,” I understand geria, for instance, more mosques have been built
a system submissive to interference by external ac- than schools. Other Arab countries have followed
tors. This is due to its geological riches (gas and oil), suit, leading to the development of a conservativeculture, the reinforcement of the role of religion and these regimes have been able to detain sub-Saha-
the multiplication of signs of Islam or references to ran immigrants under wretched conditions or enlist
it, and of religious TV and radio programmes. In Tu- them as mercenaries in their armies of repression, as
nisia, according to Hakim Ben Hammouda, it was is the case in Libya.
Ben Ali’s son-in-law who was behind the creation
of the Ezzitouna radio station and an Islamic bank.
Far from being secular, authoritarian powers have The Fiction of the Arab Exception
largely contributed to Islamization in both its mod-
erate and radical versions. The development of the To account for the longevity of authoritarian Arab po-
rule of wearing headscarves has been concomitant litical systems, we must thus consider the nature of
to the strengthening of dictatorships. the governing teams, the different legitimations they
Have these regimes been more effective as anti- have used, and the instrumental functions with which
terrorist bulwarks? Certainly, but above all in order to they have been entrusted. In sum, to understand
Keys
protect themselves and not the West. And in any events in the Arab world, it is in social sciences that
case, could one assume that democratic States we must seek an answer and not in the Koran or a
would not be capable of fighting against terrorism? fortiori in culturalist explanations. However, the cultur-
These regimes portrayed themselves as anti- alist theory on the Arab exception, the least pertinent
migration sentinels. It was the European Union one from a social sciences viewpoint, was and contin-
(EU) that pressed them to play the role of border ues to be widespread among certain intellectual cir-
Med.2011
guard for the EU, often in exchange for substantial cles and in the Western media, and therefore on the
financial aid packets. We know that this externalisa- level of popular perception. How many magazine cov-
tion of control causes human tragedies, fosters traf- ers – and not only sensationalist ones – haven’t we
fic in human beings, changes migratory routes and seen bearing such headlines as “Is Islam Compatible
simply makes the crossing more dangerous, longer with Democracy?,” “Islam Against the Republic,” “In-
and more profitable for people smugglers. But what tegration of Muslim Immigrants Impossible,” “The Is-
is ethically unacceptable in this policy of “long-dis- lam-West Shock.” All of these headlines lend a dis-
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tance policing” is that the EU demands that authori- torted image and denote great intellectual poverty.
tarian regimes, which do not need to consult their What exactly is the “Arab and Muslim exception”
peoples, turn an open, vibrant, interdependent and theory? For the culturalist school, “there is a specific
integrated border into an “alienated border,” to use homo islamicus, anthropologically cut off from the
the expression of Donnan and Wilson. rest of humanity,” which implies that Islam is irrepa-
This delocalisation of control offers no guarantees rably associated with a sort of theocracy incapable
insofar as democratic rights. How can we trust of opening up to the pluralist world and its demo-
someone like Gaddafi to protect the rights of mi- cratic corollary. This is the thesis held by Bernard
grants in his country, in his temporary holding facili- Lewis on “the intrinsic despotism of Islam.”1
ties or detention centres? This is like asking a wolf to According to the proponents of the culturalist theory,
protect sheep. the Arab world, since it is primarily Muslim, suffers
Thus, the longevity of authoritarian Arab regimes from the same authoritarian exception and consti-
over the course of decades cannot simply be as- tutes the only region that has remained behind in the
cribed to internal factors, but also to the instrumental planetary process of democratisation, as it is refrac-
function assigned them by their external allies, with tory to pluralism. “At present, an Arab democrat,”
the damage this has entailed. In fact, it is as a “bul- writes David Pryce-Jones, “is not even an idealiza-
wark against terrorism” that authoritarian Arab re- tion, but a contradiction in terms.”2
gimes have managed to crack down on civil society Others have followed his lead, pointing out tribal di-
demonstrations, whether Islamist or not, imprison- visions, the constant challenging of authority, chains
ing, silencing, torturing, exiling, in the face of the as- of seditions and the succession of revolts that would
tonishing near silence of manifest Human Rights render the Islamic City anarchic from the start, such
advocates. And it is as “anti-migration sentinels” that that the culture of violence and of force supposedly
1 Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Reponses, Oxford University Press, 2002.
2 Pryce-Jones, David. The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs, NY, Harper and Row, 1989, p. 406.prevailing in the Arab-Islamic area would not allow are writing the epitaph, not only for dictatorship in
the emergence of a dynamic civil society and an area Arab lands, but also for the dictatorship of culturalist
of Rule of Law. To back up their arguments, the pro- ideas on Arabs and Muslims. In doing so, they have
ponents of the culturalist theory go as far as evoking dealt a powerful lesson to those who only saw inert,
the importance of obedience to a Prince, Sultan, docile crowds walking Arab streets; they have pro-
King, Zaim, Sheikh or father. In sum, social life is vided an incisive rebuttal of the thesis of stability
supposedly characterised by relations of authority, through dictatorship and revealed the incoherence
domination and dependence, and the Leader is at- of the EU, which planned on rewarding Tunisia and
tributed the features of an agent of repression. Egypt by granting them “advanced status.” At the
same time, they have condemned the suspect friend-
ships of certain European States with authoritarian
For the culturalist school, “there regimes in the South in the name of a misconception
is a specific homo islamicus, of realpolitik.
Keys
The Arab peoples have followed the Tunisian and
anthropologically cut off from the
Egyptian revolutions with enthusiasm, and even with
rest of humanity,” which implies a certain degree of envy. The other Arab regimes
that Islam is irreparably have attempted to divert attention or minimise the
associated with a sort of significance of these events. They believe they are
safe, but the pursuit of liberty is contagious, as can
theocracy incapable of opening
Med.2011
be seen in Syria, Yemen, Libya and other Arab coun-
up to the pluralist world and its tries, both rich and poor.
democratic corollary Insofar as a “successful revolution,” that of Tunisian
youth will create a following. We can rightly speak
of a Tunisian paradigm. Indeed, a number of les-
The extreme poverty of such a theory is blatant, yet it sons can be gleaned from events in Tunisia. The
has had a great deal of repercussion. Why? The an- first is this population’s maturity: it remained united,
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swer is not simple. I assume it is in part due to major its movement remained spontaneous and there
ignorance regarding the ancient and recent history was no political party or religious organisation lead-
of the Muslim and Arab world, and that this negative ing it. This prevented partisan or religious appro-
determinism is nourished by a generalised confusion priation. The Tunisian people demonstrated ex-
between Islam in texts and historical Islam, that is, traordinary courage and self-control: they did not
Islam as manifested by the social practices of those respond to police violence with violence. By re-
who live in it. Perhaps among some there is a hint of maining pacific, the protest finally triumphed over
bad faith, or a will to present Israel as a “democratic the obstinacy of the cronies of despotic power.
haven” amongst “an ocean of tyranny,” in others, an Better yet, the slogans chanted by crowds remained
erroneous reading of Ibn Khaldun’s notions of al- secular: freedom, employment, dignity. I never once
Asabiyyah and Hisham Sharabi’s notions of neopa- heard “God is great.” Although there has indisputa-
triarchy. It is not unlikely that the proponents of this bly been a re-Islamisation of a sector of Tunisian so-
thesis are influenced by the Muslim legal corpus, ciety, as one protestor recalls, “God is in the heart of
where the interests of the Ummah (Muslim commu- Tunisians, but he is absent from the street.” Tunisian
nity) normally prevail over individual rights. Islamists took a low profile and did not seek to con-
trol the protest movement or even appropriate it.
This is a first in Arab countries: religious claims and
Arab Democratic Revolutions Debunk political demands were not mixed. This says a great
the Myths deal about the progress of secularisation in Tunisia,
whose merit, needless to say, lies with Bourguiba
The Arab revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt not only himself.
toppled authoritarian regimes; they also debunked Women were efficient actors in the movement.
the theories of the Arab and Muslim exception. With Spearheads of social change in Tunisia, they did not
their blood and their courage, young Tunisians and remain on the margins, nor were they sidelined. To-
Egyptians – like other young Arabs – have written, or day they are cited as examples in all Arab countries.This revolution is not one of “empty bellies” but of tact, should be on its guard, avoiding blunders and
“minds full of dreams and hope” for a different Tuni- not giving in to the temptation of producing a “sav-
sia. Certainly, economic issues such as youth unem- iour of the nation” figure from among its ranks. How
ployment, corruption and clientelism have been sin- many “saviours of the nation” have actually been,
gled out, but it was above all the irrepressible desire under other horizons, the “gravediggers of democ-
for freedom that spurred the protesters on. racy”?
In view of these Tunisian specificities, it is clear that
the Egyptian revolution comes the closest to the Tu-
Tunisian Islamists took a low nisian paradigm, with a more important role assigned
profile and did not seek to to the Military Council, whereas Libya is the country
farthest from the paradigm. In the latter, the revolu-
control the protest movement or
tion by youth veers towards armed rebellion, the
even appropriate it. This is a first Gaddafi regime’s repression takes on a bloody turn
in Arab countries: religious
Keys
and the West intervenes, with an international man-
claims and political demands date and Arab endorsement, to impose a no-fly zone
and “all necessary measures.”
were not mixed
Insofar as the EU, it will have to review its policies
from top to bottom and thoroughly reconsider its re-
The dictator deposed, democracy remains to be lations with Mediterranean countries and with Arab
Med.2011
conquered. In this sense, the path remaining will be countries in general. Paralysed by the risks of all the
difficult: the technostructure of the dictatorship and “isms,” including fundamentalism, Islamism, terror-
the regime’s foundations (the militia, the secret ism, radicalism and “harraguisme” (illegal migration),
service, the single party system, etc.) need to be the EU has kept its eyes well closed to dictatorships.
dismantled, elections worthy of the name have to Now it will be forced to open them; the Arab demo-
be organised and a democracy of appeasement cratic awakening could well awaken Europe. From
and inclusion must be established. Yes, moderate now on, it will not have to deal with the “Arab street”
20
Islamists will have to be included, but no one should but with “Arab opinions.” And this is not the least of
ever be allowed to monopolize the Tunisian revolu- the merits of the democratic revolution in the South
tion. The army, whose credibility has remained in- Mediterranean Basin.You can also read
