TOP 5 CONCERNS ABOUT POLICY IN THE NEW ERA - April 2020 Douglas J. Elliott - Oliver ...

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TOP 5
CONCERNS
ABOUT POLICY
IN THE NEW ERA
April 2020

Douglas J. Elliott
Top 5 Concerns About Policy In The New Era

            In the midst of the pandemic horror surrounding us, it is difficult
            to focus on the economic and financial policy choices facing our
            leaders. However, it is also necessary to do so, in order to reduce the
            total damage.

            Overall, I am comfortable with the broad shape of the economic policy
            response, which combines massive quantities of fiscal stimulus with
            major monetary policy actions to provide further stimulus and to ensure
            acceptable levels of liquidity in the markets and the larger economy.
            Regulatory and supervisory actions have been significant as well,
            encouraging financial institutions to lend and invest.

             Despite my strong approval of the overall policy direction, I do have a
             number of major concerns that I hope will be alleviated by future policy
             actions to fine tune or supplement what has been done to date.

© Oliver Wyman                                                                          2
Top 5 Concerns About Policy In The New Era

            TOP 5 LIST OF CONCERNS
            • The risk of “start and stop” economic/health policies
            • Excessive levels of financial leverage in economies around the world
            • A return of the Euro Crisis and other sovereign debt problems
            • The medium-term temptation to ramp up inflation
            • Excessively weak credit standards and the creation of zombie companies

            THE RISK OF “START AND STOP”
            ECONOMIC/HEALTH POLICIES
            Perhaps the most immediate danger is that overall policy on the pandemic flips back and
            forth between a focus on tackling COVID-19 and restarting the economy. The right answer is
            to conduct a policy that appropriately balances the health and economic dimensions while
            responding to new information and changing circumstances. The risk is that we overreact to
            one side, create new problems on the other, and then overreact to that. The most obvious
            version would be to release the social distancing restrictions too early in an effort to reduce the
            economic damage and then rush to reimpose restrictions when the infection reignites. In the
            worst case, we could go through several rounds of this. It will be much better if we can design
            approaches to a restart that protect the most vulnerable and hold down total infection levels
            while allowing substantial amounts of economic activity to resume. There will be trade-offs, but
            they should be intelligently balanced, despite the political obstacles that will doubtless exist.
            Jumping from one extreme to the other would be far more harmful.

            EXCESSIVE LEVELS OF FINANCIAL LEVERAGE IN
            ECONOMIES AROUND THE WORLD
            Throwing substantially more debt into a system with high levels to start with brings many risks.
            There is probably not another option in the short run, but policy needs to shift as quickly as
            possible to replacing some of this debt with equity. Paying down debt as the recovery takes hold
            is also desirable, but there are strong limits on how much this can be done without undermining
            the economy. Appropriate restructuring of balance sheets will be a better approach in
            many cases.

© Oliver Wyman                                                                                                    3
Top 5 Concerns About Policy In The New Era

            This primarily applies to private debt-to-GDP ratio sector businesses, but there is room for
            some restructuring globally in the public sector as well. In some cases, more can be done with
            privatization of government-owned businesses. In a few cases, countries will simply not be able
            to handle their total debt burdens and debt instruments will have to be restructured, creating
            losses for debt holders, whether they be public or private.

            A RETURN OF THE EURO CRISIS AND
            OTHER SOVEREIGN DEBT PROBLEMS
            I am specifically worried by the difficulty some nations will have, particularly within the Eurozone,
            in managing even higher levels of debt. Italy has received the most attention, as an economy
            that is “Too Big to Fail,” the economy has been hit horribly by COVID-19, and will face many
            challenges in pulling out of the hole it is in. At the beginning of the Euro Crisis, Italy’s debt-to-
            GDP ratio was about 115 percent, versus 85 percent for the Eurozone as a whole. Italy starts this
            new crisis at roughly 135 percent, while the Eurozone as a whole is only up to 86 percent. So, Italy
            starts in a worse debt position this time around and has even more political problems than last
            time. That said, nominal interest rates are lower this time around, which reduces the running
            costs of maintaining this debt level.

            During my years at the Brookings Institution, I studied the Euro Crisis closely. I always believed
            that the strong likelihood was that Europe would pull through, but I worried intensely about the
            significant risks. In fact, Europe’s leaders walked to the edge of the cliff five times and each time
            managed to look down and step back to reach the necessary compromises. Muddling through is
            still my base case for any repeat of the Euro Crisis, but I think the probabilities of a bad outcome
            have gone up.

            Nor is Europe the only area where sovereign debt crises could blow up. Most continents have one
            or more candidate countries for such problems.

            THE MEDIUM-TERM TEMPTATION
            TO RAMP UP INFLATION
            One way out of debt problems is to inflate the currency to reduce the real economic value of
            debt, making it easier to repay. This might be sensible if done on a modest basis, but can easily
            get out of hand and lead to inflation levels that do real damage. Look back at the 1970s and 80s if
            you wish to see how costly this can be. Even if wide economic harm is avoided, there are massive
            distributional effects between savers and borrowers that must be considered.

© Oliver Wyman                                                                                                      4
Top 5 Concerns About Policy In The New Era

            I don’t see a big inflation concern in the next couple of years in the advanced economies, but
            there is a real potential as we go out further. This potential is enhanced by the fact that most
            countries have not seen a problem with excessive inflation in 30 or so years. Politicians may find
            it easy to downplay risks that have not occurred for so many years.

            EXCESSIVELY WEAK CREDIT STANDARDS AND
            THE CREATION OF ZOMBIE COMPANIES
            Right now, governments are making, guaranteeing, or encouraging very large sums of loans with
            weak or non-existent credit underwriting. That may be the only choice at the moment, but it is
            not a long-term solution. Propping up companies that cannot survive in the longer run without
            continuing support becomes a real drag on an economy. Look at Japan’s “lost decade,” now
            running well over a decade. We need to transition to providing liquidity support, or sometimes
            equity infusions, only to companies with reasonable prospects for the future. Even in the shorter
            term, there are interesting ideas such as the suggestion of Agustin Carstens (General Manager
            of the Bank for International Settlements – BIS) of government loans tied to the amount of taxes
            paid by a firm in previous years. This has the advantage of directing funding towards firms that
            have proven they can make profits in at least the good times.

© Oliver Wyman                                                                                                   5
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AUTHOR

Douglas J. Elliott
Financial Services, Partner
douglas.elliott@oliverwyman.com

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Oliver Wyman – A Marsh & McLennan Company                                                                                www.oliverwyman.com
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