Greece external relations briefing: Greek Foreign Policy in 2020
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ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 35, No. 4 (GR) December 2020 Greece external relations briefing: Greek Foreign Policy in 2020 George N. Tzogopoulos 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. office@china-cee.eu Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01
Greek Foreign Policy in 2020 For Greek foreign policy, 2020 was a difficult year. The Turkish-Libyan memorandum of understanding on maritime zones, which had been inked in November 2019, sparked diplomatic initiatives to protect the national interest. These include the agreements with Italy and Egypt to delimit maritime zones. Following the model of the Prespes Agreement, the Greek government preferred to reach some compromises with the country’s neighbors – instead of postponing decisions. Of course, Greek-Turkish tensions became the most important issue of concern especially in the second-half of the year. The decision of the Turkish government to send ‘Oruc Reis’ vessel for research in undelimited waters of the Eastern Mediterranean brought the two countries to the brink of a military accident and eliminated hopes for a restart of exploratory talks. In recent years Greek foreign policy has acquired an active nature. The Prespes Agreement, for example, that was signed between Greece and North Macedonia in 2019 and solved the long-lasting name dispute was an indication of the new mentality and thinking. In this manner, Greece is being internationally considered a country that is interested in solving problems instead of postposing or undermining their potential solution. The Prespes Agreement, for example, was welcomed by both the US and the EU because it paved the way for North Macedonia to enter NATO and possibly the EU. The then Greek government of SYRIZA paid a heavy political price, however. The New Democracy opposition party had opposed the Agreement and used the foreign policy compromise of SYRIZA as a good opportunity to fuel reactions and demonstrations in Greece and politically damage its main opponent. New Democracy, which came to power in July 2019, sought to employ an agenda that would significantly rely on the economy. The implementation of the Prespes Agreement was rather convenient from the moment Prime Mitsotakis had not initiated the diplomatic process himself and had never implied that his government would not respect the deal. By contrast, his disagreement with this deal – while in the opposition – was accompanied with public assurances that he could not attempt to reverse it. After winning the July 2019 election, Mitsotakis also framed Greek-Turkish relations from the perspective of economic cooperation. But the exertion of a muscular foreign policy by Ankara in the Eastern Mediterranean made the Greek Premier 1
more skeptical. In November 2019, Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Accord signed a memorandum of understanding on the delimitation of their maritime zones. As a result the new Greek government had no other choice but engage itself in active foreign policy in order to protect the national interest of the country. The new mentality and thinking in foreign policy became evident throughout 2020. Although it was rather Turkey’s policy that led the New Democracy governing party to concentrate on foreign policy than its own interest, its activation yielded some results. There are three main examples. In June 2020, Greece and Italy updated their 1977 agreement on the continental shelf to cover maritime zones. In August 2020, Greece and Egypt inked a partial delimitation deal on maritime zones. And in October 2020, Greece and Albania decided to refer their maritime dispute to the International Court of Justice. Athens draws on these three examples to showcase its determination to solve maritime differences with its neighbors on the grounds of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Eastern Mediterranean equation is very difficult, however. Greek-Turkish relations are a significant part of it. The relationship between Athens and Ankara was particularly strained during 2020. Greece’s reaction to the Turkish-Libyan agreement sparked a diplomatic sprint that led to significant initiatives. But Greece and Turkey did not manage to resume dialogue that was interrupted in 2016. Despite the mediation of Germany in July 2020, the decision of Turkey to send its ‘Oruc Reis’ vessel for research in the Eastern Mediterranean caused a serious crisis that could have led to a military accident. For a period of some weeks in August and September, naval forces of the two countries were deployed close to each other. NATO, which saw two of its member-states on the brink of military confrontation, initiated technical talks to prevent such a scenario. Its Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has attempted to play a role in reducing tensions. In parallel with sending military ships to the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece reacted to the Turkish provocation by raising the issue at the EU level. The EU condemned the practices of Ankara but refrained from imposing sanctions as Greece was hoping for. In the European view, exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey needed to restart as a means to delimit maritime zones. The Turkish government withdrew Oruc Reis for some weeks in September and October and generated hopes for the resumption of dialogue. But hopes did not last long. Orus Reis returned to the Eastern Mediterranean after mid-October and conducted research until December. During this new phase, Greek-Turkish tensions did not reach the level of the August-September period but prevented the relaunch of exploratory talks. 2
The American posture during the Greek-Turkish crisis was rather balanced. Although Washington criticized Turkish ‘bullying’ in the Eastern Mediterranean, it called upon both countries to resume dialogue. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Athens, Thessaloniki and the island of Crete in October and further promoted Greek-American military cooperation. Washington’s main motivation has been the potential restrain of Russia’s and China’s influence, whereas Greece has mainly envisaged to benefit by the excellent status of Greek- American relations as a potential deterrence factor of the Turkish provocation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The sanctions that the American administration imposed against Turkey for the acquisition of S-400 missiles by Russia were welcomed by Athens but the main reason for this American decision is not related to the Turkish behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish- American disagreements are not necessarily related to developments in the Basin and are synthesized around the foreign policy orientation of Ankara and NATO’s skepticism about its good relations with Moscow. Following the second withdrawal of Oruc Reis in December 2020, new hopes for a restart of exploratory talks were created. The December EU Council encouraged (again) the two countries to resume discussions. It also authorized High Representative Josep Borrell to explore the possibility of a multilateral dialogue for the Eastern Mediterranean under the EU aegis. The main message that Greece received from Brussels is that the latter preferred the policy option of cooperation with Ankara. For the EU Turkey is a significant partner that can solve its maritime disputes with Greece via dialogue. This approach contradicts the content of the political and media discourse in Greece where expectations for a different European policy vis- à-vis Turkey were raised. A notable exception of an EU member-state that has pushed for a more tough line towards Ankara has been France. The French interest, among other things, has been shaped by its appetite to sell military equipment to Greece. In September 2020 Mitsotakis announced the purchase of 18 Rafale fighters indeed. Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean almost exclusively attracted the attention of the Greek government in 2020. The interest in this theme was, for example, demonstrated during the visit of State Councilor Yang Jiechi in Athens in September. A significant part of Mitsotakis’ public welcoming remarks on the occasion of his meeting with Yang Jiechi was devoted to Greek-Turkish relations. The same also happened during the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the Greek capital in October. On the same wavelength, Greece cultivated closer ties with Israel and the United Arab Emirates in an effort to strengthen regional schemes of cooperation in a turbulent neighborhood. Both these countries along with France and Egypt have been vocal in condemning Turkish practices in the Eastern Mediterranean. 3
Conclusion In 2020, Greece endeavored to respond to Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing maritime agreements with neighboring countries, boosting regional schemes of cooperation, enhancing ties with the US, raising the issue at the EU level and improving its military deterrence. Greece has somehow managed to protect its sovereign rights but has not prevented the research expedition of the Turkish vessel ‘Orus Reis’ in undelimited waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Significant as they are, Greek initiatives, which were carried out in 2020, have not solved the real problem that is the engagement in dialogue with Turkey on the delimitation of maritime zones. This difficult task is expected to take place in 2021. Both the EU and the US are encouraging the two sides to start their exploratory talks believing that Athens and Ankara need to peacefully solve their maritime disputes. The Greek-Turkish crisis of the second half of 2020 was the longest in duration and the most complicated one after the military invasion of Cyprus in 1974. 4
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