The Journal of Baroque Studies
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The Journal of Baroque Studies
Editor
Frans Ciappara
Editorial Board
Hermann Bonnici
Denis De Lucca
Stephen C. Spiteri
Secretary
Andre Debattista
Advisory Board
David V. Bagchi, University of Hull
Monica Borg, University of Birmingham
Anne Brogini, University of Nice
Emanuele Colombo, DePaul University
Fabrizio d’Avenia, University of Palermo
Andrea Del Col, University of Trieste
Marcello Fagiola, University La Sapienza
Irene Fosi, University of Siena
Francesco Gaudioso, University of Salento
Lino Bianco, University of Malta
Maria Giuffre, University of Palermo
Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini, University of Udine
Beat Kumin, University of Warwick
Ulricht Lehner, Marquette University
Oliver Logan, University of East Anglia
Salvador Ryan, St Patrick’s College, Maynooth
Lucia Trigilia, Centro Internazionale di Studi sul Barocco, Syracuse
Jonathan P. Wainwright, University of YorkBaroque Intellectual Developments on Members of a Chivalric Order in France Charles Savona-Ventura 157 Balì de Souza’s Establishment of a Fondazione for the Production and Supply of Bronze Cannon for the Order of St John, 1770 Stephen C. Spiteri 181 Books Received 189
181
Balì de Souza’s Establishment of a Fondazione
for the Production and Supply of Bronze
Cannon for the Order of St John, 1770
Stephen C. Spiteri - University of Malta
The mid-eighteenth century was an important and frantic period in
the military administration of the Hospitaller knights of St John. The
1750s and 1760s, in particular, saw massive efforts directed towards
the reorganization and upgrading of the Order’s military equipment
and its storage facilities. Chief amongst these undertakings was the
introduction of a much needed restructuring of the knights’ armouries
and of their ordnance department. In particular, a massive purchase
of weapons, begun in 1759, involving an armaments deal with the
weapons-manufacturing firm of St Etienne en Forest, in France, for
the supply of 20,000 infantry muskets, 700 pairs of Pistolets d’Arcon
(cavalry pistols), 700 pairs of boarding pistols, sabres and ‘gros
trombons à fourchette’, was not only meant to upgrade the then-existing
quality of the Order’s equipment, as well as create an adequate reserve
of serviceable weapons, but it was also meant to introduce a much
needed degree of standardization.1
1 A brief version of this paper first appeared on line on Military Architecture.com
http://www.militaryarchitecture.com/index.php/Siege-Warfare-Weapons/bali-de-
souzas-cannon.html in 2016. For further reading on the 1759 armaments deal see
Stephen C. Spiteri, Armoury of the Knights: A Study of the Palace Armoury, Its182 Stephen C. Spiteri
By the late 1760s, the Order of St. John could muster a force
of some 18,000 men and hundreds of cannon with which to defend
some 25 km of bastioned ramparts and scores of coastal defences.
Rationalizing the logistics underpinning this growing organization had
become a serious priority.
One individual who was directly involved in much of this re-
armament programme was the Portuguese Knight Fra Raimondo de
Souza (Sousa) da Silva, Balì di Lessa and Langone, ‘Gran Croce della
ven.da Lingua di Castiglia e Portugallo’ and member of the Congregation
of War and Fortification, the main body responsible for directing and
overseeing all the defence preparations of the Maltese islands. In 1769,
Balì de Souza was instrumental in reviewing the storage facilities and
state of equipment in the Order’s armouries.2 In his report Balì de Souza
mentioned some 24,000 muskets ‘in pessimo stato per la ruggine’, a
large number of which were ‘totalmente inservibili’ and practically
useless, particularly those earmarked for use by the militia. At the time,
the master armourer had estimated that these thousands of unserviceable
firearms required the employment of at least a hundred forzati, or gente
di ciurma, if they were to be repaired in a reasonable period of time:
‘... almeno di cento forzati di più ogni qualvolta questa
Ven. Congregatione sarebbe del sentimento di voler le
armi in buon stato: almeno di cento persone di ciurma
per accomodare, e pulire tutte le armi che sono in
quest’Armeria quali presentemente si trovino in pessimo
stato, e di trascurare su tal particolare sarà di grandissimo
danno a Sacra Religione, stanteche se si tralascia più tempo
si renderanno del tutto inservibili’.3
Collection and the Military Storehouses of the Hospitaller Knights of the Order of
St John (Malta: Midsea Books, 2003), pp.93-101. This publication is alos available
online at https://issuu.com/arkitettura/docs/armoury-of-the-knights.
2 NLM, Arch. 634, f. 82r.
3 NLM, Arch 1015, pp. 79-80.Balì de Souza’s Establishment of a Fondazione 183 Figure 1. Foldout with large scale detailed drawing of a 24-pounder cannon attached to the notarial deed establishing the Fondazione set up by Balì de Souza in 1770, showing the template to be adopted in the manufacture of bronze guns financed by his foundation (Image source: Courtesy of the Notarial Archives, Valletta).
184 Stephen C. Spiteri
The Artillery
As far as the artillery was concerned, however, the situation was not as
dire, and although the fortifications and warships were well equipped
with cannon of different calibre, these too needed to be replaced when
worn out and there was never enough to go round to equip the Order’s
galley’s, men-of-war and its many miles of bastioned enceintes and
coastal fortifications. The Order’s records show that in 1761 the knights
had 721 iron guns and 498 bronze cannon of various calibres. By 1788,
however, these numbers had fallen down significantly to 533 iron
guns, and 332 bronze cannon (of which only 235 were serviceable),4
implying that a significant number were old worn out pieces that
needed to be replaced.
One can thus appreciate why in 1770 Balì de Souza took the
personal initiative to establish a special foundation (Fondazione)
intended to help with the acquisition of new cannon and mortars of
which the Order, we are told, was then apparently ‘molto sprovista’.
Balì de Souza set out to finance this ‘fund’ directly out of his own
pocket with the sum of 50,000 scudi invested in the massa fromentaria
(a grain-importing agency which was then the equivalent of a modern
bank), the profits from which investment were to be used ‘nell’ acquisto
di bronzo di perfetta lega per fondere quella quantità di Cannoni
corrispondente al denaio rammassato’, which guns (or mortars –
mortari a bomba – depending on what was mostly in need at a given
time) were to be ‘del calibre e proporzioni prescritte ed ordinate dalla
Ven.da Congregatione da Guerra’.
In 1779, the sum of 50,000 scudi was indeed a phenomenal
amount of money – by comparison, the construction of some 30 coastal
batteries and redoubts erected earlier in 1715 had cost a little more than
41,000 scudi and their building was only made possible thanks to a loan
provided by the Prior of France, Philip de Vendôme.
The deed established in 1770 shows that all the guns to be
4 Stephen C. Spiteri, The Art of Fortress Building in Hospitaller Malta: A Study of
Building Methods Materials and Techniques (Malta: BDL, 2008), 483Balì de Souza’s Establishment of a Fondazione 185 Figure 2. Detail from a manuscript drawing attached to the deed establishing the Fondazione set up by Balì de Souza, showing the template to be adopted in the design of the commemorative inscriptions for the bronze guns financed by his foundation (Image source: Courtesy of the Notarial Archives, Valletta).
186 Stephen C. Spiteri
Figure 3. First page of the notarial deed, dated 27 August 1770, establishing the
Fondazione set up by Balì de Souza. (Image source: Courtesy of the Notarial
Archives, Valletta).Balì de Souza’s Establishment of a Fondazione 187
manufactured and paid for by Balì de Souza fondazione were to be
decorated with a set of three escutcheons cast in low relief on the breech
of the weapons. These guns were to bear the coat-of-arms of the Order
and the reigning grand master (the drawing attached to the deed, see
figures 1 and 2) shows the arms of the then-reigning Grand Master,
Emanuel Pinto de Fonseca), as well as those of Balì de Sousa himself,
all set above a cartouche containing a commemorative inscription
which reads as follows:
‘Che in detti Cannoni e Mortari vi si dovranno essere in due
scudi di basso rilievo assieme legati le armi della S.R. [i.e.
Sacra Religione]; e dell E.me Sig.r Gran Maestro Regnante, e
sotto alli sud.i due scudi, lo scudo con le armi del Illm.o Sig.r
Fondatore, ed in una cartella l’inscrizione descritta nel foglio
di carta reale inserita’.
This inscription, to be placed within a cartouche on the first reinforce of
the cannon barrel (between the first reinforce astragal and fillets and the
first reinforce ring), was to read as follows:
FONDAZIONE DI UN CAPITALE
DI SCUDI 50000. SOPRA LA MASSA FORMEN=5
TALE DAL BALLIO DI LESSA’ E LANGON E
COM:re DELLE COM:de DI OLIVIERA DELL’
OSPITAL, E HOLEJROS, FRA DON
RAIMONDO DE SOUZA DA SILVA DEL
VENER:do PRIORATO DI PORTUGALLO
Invariably, the foundation was also duly recorded in the Order’s own
official records and papers, particularly those relating to the Common
Treasury. To this end, a detailed account was entered in the Archivij e
Registri della Ven.a Congreg.ne di Guerra Contenente tutte le circostanze
e requisiti spiegate nella Fondazione di Capitale di cinquanta mila
5 This appears to be an error, as it should read ‘FROMENTALE’188
scudi nella Massa fromentaria di questa fatta con tutte le opportune e
necessarie licenze dal Ven.do Balì di Lesa e Langone’ and recorded in
the acts of the notary employed by the Comun Tesoro.
It is not known how many cannon and mortars were actually
produced through the profits generated by Balì de Sousa’s generous
foundation in the course of the following 28 years, prior to the Order’s
expulsion from the Maltese islands by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798.
Nor have any examples of guns or mortars bearing Balì de Sousa’s coat-
of-arms or inscription been identified by the author to date.You can also read
