The 2014 General Elections in Mozambique: Analysis of Fundamental Questions - João CG Pereira and Ernesto Nhanale
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The 2014 General Elections in Mozambique:
Analysis of Fundamental Questions
João CG Pereira and Ernesto Nhanale2014, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. This publication is available as a pdf on the Open Society Foundations website or the AfriMAP website under a Creative Commons licence that allows copying and distributing the publication, only in its entirety, as long as it is attributed to the Open Society Foundations and used for noncommercial educational or public policy purposes. ISBN: 978-1-920677-74-9 For more information contact: AfriMAP, PO Box 678, Wits, 2050, Johannesburg, South Africa info@afrimap.org www.afrimap.org Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) www.osisa.org Layout and printing: COMPRESS.dsl | www.compressdsl.com João CG Pereira is Associate Professor in the Department of Political and Public Administration, Faculty of Social Science, Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique, and Director of the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC). He teaches political science and contemporary politics at undergraduate level and is a member of the governance research group at the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE) and research fellow at the Democracy in Africa Research Unit at the Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Ernesto Nhanale has a Masters degree in media studies and journalism and is a university assistant at the School of Journalism, Eduardo Mondlane University, as well as publicity and outreach officer at MASC.
Contents
List of tables iv
1. Introduction 1
2. Social, economic and political context 3
2.1. Economic and social dynamics 3
2.2 Political dynamics 6
2.3 The media and the struggle for control 10
3. The 2014 general election 12
3.1 Politicisation of electoral management bodies 12
3.2 Voting, vote counting and dispute management 16
3.3 The media and coverage of election campaigns 18
3.4 Election turnout and civic education 19
3.5 Registration, ballot papers and transparency 20
3.6 Election campaigns 21
4. Final considerations 26
References 27List of tables Table 1 Number of parliamentary seats won in elections, 1994–2009 6 Table 2 Dominant party by district in Sofala, 1994–2009 7 Table 3 Results of 2013 municipal elections in 53 municipalities 8 Table 4 Composition of the CNE, 1994–2014 14 iv T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N S
1. Introduction
Mozambique’s fifth general election, on 15 October 2014, will be a crucial event for the country
for several reasons:
• The election marks the end of the presidency of Armando Guebuza, who became the
second elected president of Mozambique in 2005, after Joaquim Chissano (1994–
2004).
• The gradual emergence of a new leadership within FRELIMO signals a generational
transition from the liberators of the motherland – the former freedom fighters – to the
younger generation.
• Mozambique is living through one of its most difficult moments since the end of the
16-year war. Since the end of 2012, it has been plunged into a politico-military crisis
between the Mozambican government and RENAMO, the second-largest political party
in the country.
• The emergence in 2009 of a new political force, the Mozambique Democratic
Movement (MDM), is forcing the end of the bipartisan political system in Mozambique.
This new party, whose support base is concentrated mainly in the urban areas and
among younger voters, could become the second-largest political force, relegating
RENAMO to third place.
This study seeks to bring together the various elements that outline the context for the 2014
general election in Mozambique, showing in particular that the process and historical context of
the amendment of the electoral laws has been marked by the further politicisation of the electoral
bodies. The report describes the socio-economic and political context in which the elections will
take place and provides a context for the voter registration process, voter participation and the
role of the media in political processes in Mozambique. In addition, the study seeks to analyse
the nature of the electoral bodies, and the implications of how they have been formed for the
management of the 2014 elections.
The study is based on the analysis of secondary and primary documentation about elections
in Mozambique from 1994 to 2014, particularly the following:
• Reports from national and international election observation mission (EOMs);
• Recommendations from the African Peer Review Mechanism;
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N 1• Recommendations made in the 2009 Africa Governance, Monitoring and Advocacy
Project/Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (AfriMAP/OSISA) review of
democracy and political participation in Mozambique;
• The Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocols on electoral issues,
• National legislation; and
• Documents and scientific articles published by civil society organisations and national
and international research institutes.
After the analysis of documents, and in order to clarify and ground the main argument,
interviews were held with various stakeholders, notably parliamentarians, representatives of
political parties, academics, leaders of organisations and officials from government entities
linked to the electoral bodies.
The lack of trust between the country’s main political actors, FRELIMO, RENAMO and the
MDM, coupled with citizens’ lack of trust in political institutions, has contributed to a contest for
political power often characterised by conflict – including armed conflict. This lack of trust has
resulted in partisan politicisation of all spheres of the country’s social, economic and cultural life,
where FRELIMO, as the dominant party, has been receiving the greatest advantages.
2 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N S2. Social, economic and political
context
2.1. Economic and social dynamics
The 2014 election in Mozambique will take place in a changing socio-economic context. This is
characterised by several years of significant economic growth, the discovery of vast reserves of
mineral resources (natural gas and coal), increased capacity of the state in collecting revenue, and
a gradual reduction in foreign aid1 on the one hand; but an increase in social inequalities, little
progress in reducing poverty, growth in crime and unemployment on the other.
Poverty
Mozambique is among the 12 countries in the world with the greatest intensity and incidence of
poverty, as measured by the recently developed Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)2 (Alkire &
Santos 2010). With about 80% of the Mozambican population classified as poor in MPI terms,
the new poverty measure of acute multidimensional poverty falls within the range of the more
generally used international poverty indicators of ‘extreme’ poverty; that is, the estimated 75% of
the Mozambican population living on USD 1.25 or less a day and the 90% proportion living on
USD 2.00 or less a day (Alkire & Santos 2010; UNDP 2009). This means that Mozambique has
entered the second decade of the 21st century with about 18 million people living in a situation of
acute poverty, at least five million more than the commonly used national poverty line (54%) in
official policies and programmatic documents (IMF 2006).
The MPI captures a wide range of household deprivations associated with health, education,
standard of living, empowerment, work, environment, safety from violence, social relationships,
and culture among others. Unfortunately, the MPI index does not say much about the historical
trends of poverty over the last decade or so. However, in conjunction with other data sources
and more in-depth analyses of national surveys, it is possible to ascertain if poverty has been
1 Donors have sharply cut the support they give to the Mozambican state budget. The pledges given for direct budget support
in 2015 amounted to a total of USD 274,565,200, compared to total pledges for 2014 of USD 396,341,750. This is a decline of
30.7% (‘Mozambique: Budget support in decline’, AllAfrica, 13 June 2014, allafrica.com/stories/201406140479.html?viewall=1).
2 The MPI was developed and applied by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative with United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) support (Alkire & Santos 2010).
2. S O C I A L , E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L C O N T E X T 3reduced in the past decade. Some recent analyses are far from optimistic. For instance, a
recent exploration of the 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 National Agricultural Surveys led
Cunguara and Hanlon (2010) to conclude that poverty was not being reduced in Mozambique.
They conclude further that a lack of improved agricultural production – a major factor in poverty
reduction – represents a failure of the donor-led development model.
Natural resources and economic growth
With regard to economic growth, Mozambique introduced noteworthy reforms that, from the
early 1990s onwards, allowed what had once been a shattered country to achieve one of the
highest rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1990s
and 2013, Mozambique achieved an average annual rate of GDP growth of around 7.5%,3 which
is higher than the overall average GDP growth rate for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This
growth has been encouraged by the discovery of mineral resources, particularly natural gas, and
the initiation of coal mining. It is estimated that Mozambique has one of the largest reserves
of natural gas in the world.4 Apart from gas, Mozambique also has deposits of heavy mineral
sands, gold, copper, titanium, phosphates, marble, bauxite, granite, limestone, nickel, uranium,
fluorite, various semi-precious stones, and other minerals (Mikhaylova 2012). The potential
of Mozambique’s mineral resources will, according to Aaboe and Kring (2013), transform the
country from one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-income country and will
drastically reduce its dependence on aid (World Bank 2012).
Apart from reducing foreign dependence, these discoveries could also yield some perverse
results: they can create conflict within FRELIMO for their control, particularly between the
traditional families and the new FRELIMO elites, as well as between FRELIMO and the parties
of the opposition who are demanding opportunities to participate in sharing the benefits.
Another type of conflict that emerges from the discovery of mineral resources is conflict
between mining companies and local communities. For example, the mining company Vale
Mozambique has been facing problems with local communities resulting from resettlement.
This led to the intervention of the security forces and the arrest of community leaders who were
defending the interests of local communities.5
3 Although several sources have pointed out the recent unprecedented growth of the Mozambican economy, there is no
consensus on the actual evaluation of such growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Policy Framework Paper (PFP)
for 1999–2002 (IMF 1999) states that ‘during 1996–98, the economy grew at an annual average rate of 10%’. The PFP reports
an annual change in real GDP of 11.3% for 1997 and 12% for 1998. In its 1999–2002 economic plan, the Government of
Mozambique reports a real GDP growth rate of 11% for 1997 and 9.9% for 1998 (Government of Mozambique 1999). The
‘economic overview’ of the privatisation programme in Mozambique presented by UTRE (Unidade Técnica de Reabilitação
Económica, the privatisation unit of the Mozambican Ministry of Planning and Finance) states that ‘under PRES [Economic and
Social Rehabilitation Programme], and following the return to peace in 1992, Mozambique has experienced one of the highest
average growth rates of any sub-Saharan African country’ with an average annual growth rate of 8% from 1993 to 1997 (UTRE
1999). According to KPMG (2013), Mozambique’s economic growth performance averaged 7.3% during 2006–2012 and is
expected to remain strong over the short to medium term, with a forecast of 7.93% in 2014.
4 It is believed that Mozambique’s natural gas reserves are among the largest in the world; some say it may attract investments
of USD 200–400 billion over the coming 40 years (Aaboe & Kring 2013: 35).
5 ‘As razões do conflito entre Vale e famílias reassentadas em Cateme’ (The reasons for the conflict between Vale and the
families resettled in Cateme), O Pais, 18 January 2012.
4 THE 2014 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE: ANALYSIS OF FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONSIn addition to the conflicts linked to the exploitation of mineral resources, a further conflict
is beginning to arise related to the land question in the north of the country. It is linked to
ProSAVANA, a trilateral programme between Mozambique, Brazil and Japan that seeks to develop
large-scale agriculture in the Nacala Development Corridor, covering 14 districts in the Niassa,
Nampula and Zambézia provinces, in an area of about 14 million hectares. This programme
has been strongly opposed by communities and civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly
because of the lack of community involvement and information about the programme, the risk
of communities losing land and becoming impoverished, and the occupation of community land
by the large agricultural companies that will operate the project (UNAC 2012).
Distribution of wealth
Although the investments in mining and other mega-projects have had a positive impact in
terms of the GDP, they have not had the same effect on job creation, the fight against social
inequalities or poverty reduction. According to Castel-Branco (2011), the national economy has
been predominantly influenced by large projects that are capital-intensive, but are less able to
reshape the labour market intensively. The contrast between economic growth and development
is underscored by the Human Development Index, which ranks Mozambique 178th out of the
187 countries in the survey.6 In 2013, Mozambique had one of the lowest indices of education
among adults, with high rates of infant mortality, an informal economy and high levels of
vulnerability to various diseases. Although there have been various transformations and reforms
after the civil war, the country has continued to experience high levels of poverty, inequality,
crime, ostracism, and low human development (UNDP 2013). The popular demonstrations of 5
February 2008 and 1–2 September 2010, held because of rises in passenger transport fares and
in the price of bread, are examples of events which marked a hardening of living conditions
for citizens of Maputo and Matola and increased social inequalities. The social situation in the
country is explosive, and, notwithstanding all its potential, Mozambique remains one of the
poorest countries in the world.
Corruption and crime
Governance has also been affected by high levels of corruption. Transparency International
(2013) places Mozambique 119th among the 177 countries studied. High-ranking government
figures have been accused of involvement in corrupt schemes and lack of transparency in public
management.
An increase in insecurity, crime and kidnapping has been noted. Kidnappings have been
most frequent among the Asian and Portuguese communities resident in Maputo, Beira and
Nampula. Many of those kidnapped are investors linked to real estate, the import and export of
goods, foreign exchange bureaux, the building industry, small industries and large scale trade.
This led citizens to demonstrate on 31 October 2014, asking for greater government action in the
fight against crime.
6 Data, Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme, hdr.undp.org/en/data.
2. S O C I A L , E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L C O N T E X T 52.2 Political dynamics
Since the introduction of a multi-party system, the national political scenario has been
characterised by:
• Political polarisation between FRELIMO and RENAMO;
• High levels of distrust in political institutions;
• Politicisation of the state; and
• Strengthening of FRELIMO’s control over the public sphere.
History and the current political environment in Mozambique are marked by the dominance
of FRELIMO in the economic, political and social spheres. The domination of FRELIMO in
national politics is explained not only by successive victories in elections (Table 1), but also by
the persistence of values linked to the military ethos and a strong leadership7 built during the
liberation struggle and the civil war (Carbone 2005: 431; Levitsky & Way 2012: 876).
Table 1: Number of parliamentary seats won in elections, 1994–20098
1994 1999 2004 2009
FRELIMO 129 133 160 191
RENAMO 112 117 60 51
MDM8 and others 9 0 0 8
Source: Nuvunga & Salih (2013: 24)
When Armando Guebuza rose to power in 2004, the dynamics of politics in Mozambique
changed. FRELIMO control over state institutions increased, with the capture of local
community leaderships, such as régulos (chiefs), religious leaders, curandeiros (traditional
healers), representatives of CSOs and opinion leaders. Guebuza changed the political and
administrative structure of the state through increasing institutional capacity-building and
increasing the incentives for local leadership.
This was the context for the intensification, in 2013, of demands from RENAMO, whose
bases of support were being captured by Guebuza’s FRELIMO. Marc de Tollenaere (2013) shows
that in the Sofala constituency, where RENAMO used to be the dominant party, it was losing
its overwhelming majority: in three consecutive general elections, RENAMO was the dominant
party in 13 districts in the province, but in 2009, RENAMO retained only a small advantage in
7 This leadership has predominantly consisted of those who were guerrilla fighters in the national liberation struggle, known
as ‘antigos combatentes’ (veterans). These leaders enjoy special privileges inside the party, and have been seen as guarantors of
ethics, compared to the young politicians, allegedly more liable to corruption, who joined in the context of the multi-party system
(Carbone 2005: 430).
8 The MDM only competed in five constituencies in the 2009 elections, after its lists of candidates for the other constituencies
were rejected, allegedly because it had not complied with the legal requirements for forming the lists. After the elections, the
MDM emerged with eight deputies, which was less than the minimum required (11) for forming a parliamentary group. It had to
rely on assistance from the international community in Mozambique to change the rules so that the MDM could form the third
parliamentary group with its eight deputies.
6 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N SCaia and a comfortable margin in the district of Chibabava, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama’s
birthplace.
Table 2: Dominant party by district in Sofala, 1994–2009
District 1994 1999 2004 2009
Beira RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO MDM
Buzi RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Caia RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO
Chemba RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Cheringoma RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Chibabava RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO
Dondo RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Gorongosa RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Machanga RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Maringue RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Marromeu RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Muanza RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Nhamatanda RENAMO RENAMO RENAMO FRELIMO
Source: de Tollenaere (2013: 2)
Over time, as FRELIMO was becoming even stronger, RENAMO was losing its support, with
internal conflicts leading to the creation of other political forces, particularly because of the heavy
concentration of powers in the hands of its leader and its difficulty in accommodating internal
differences (Carbone 2005). This situation has resulted, in many cases, in the marginalisation or
expulsion of internal opponents, some of whom went on to create other political parties.
In 2000, Raul Domingos, at the time the head of the RENAMO parliamentary group, was
expelled from the party for motives of insubordination. In 2004, he ran with his own party, the
PDD (Party for Peace, Democracy and Development), in both the presidential and parliamentary
elections.
Likewise, Daviz Simango9 – who had won the city of Beira for RENAMO in the 2003
municipal elections – was expelled in 2008 after rebelling against RENAMO’s decision to have
someone else running as candidate for mayor in Beira. This culminated in the creation of the
Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) in 2009. Although its history is recent, the MDM
has been showing signs of very strong political vigour and skills. It has made significant gains,
and in the 2009 general elections, it became the party with the third largest number of voters,
with eight seats in the Assembly of the Republic.10 In the latest municipal elections in 2013,
9 Daviz Simango was expelled from RENAMO in September 2008. He was passed over as a candidate for a second term of
mayoral office in Beira in favour of Manuel Pereira, on the grounds that Simango was not a member of RENAMO. He decided
to run as an independent candidate and was re-elected as mayor in the elections of that year.
10 In the 2009 general elections, FRELIMO won 191 seats, RENAMO 51 and the MDM 8.
2. S O C I A L , E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L C O N T E X T 7in which RENAMO did not take part11 the MDM won four of the 53 municipalities contested12
and won seats in several municipal assemblies, such as those of Maputo and Matola, where
FRELIMO previously had an absolute majority.
Table 3: Results of 2013 municipal elections in 53 municipalities
Other political
Municipality FRELIMO mandates MDM mandates
parties’ mandates
Maputo 37 27 0
Boane 24 7 0
Matola 29 24 0
Manhiça 17 4 0
Namaancha 11 2 0
Bilene 12 1 0
Chokwé 15 2 0
Chibuto 16 1 0
Macia 13 0 0
Mandlakazi 12 1 0
Xai-Xai 31 8 0
Inhambane 17 4 0
Massinga 9 4 0
Maxixe 23 8 0
Quissico 11 2 0
Vilankulo 14 3 0
Beira 14 30 0
Dondo 17 4 0
Gorongosa 7 6 0
Marromeu 10 7 0
Namatanda 8 5 0
Catandica 10 3 0
Chimoio 21 19 0
Gondola 11 6 0
Manica 15 2 0
Sussundenga 12 1 0
Moatize 15 6 0
Nhamayábue 13 0 0
Tete 26 13 0
11 RENAMO decided to boycott the 2013 municipal elections in protest against the election law, particularly the number of
members of the National Elections Commission (CNE). In RENAMO’s understanding, the composition of the CNE by quotas of
party representation, envisaged in the law, broke with the principle of balance and equity; the CNE should instead consist of an
equal number of members of the largest parties represented in the Assembly of the Republic, i.e. FRELIMO and RENAMO.
12 Beira, Quelimane, Gurue and Nampula, three of which are provincial capitals.
8 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N SOther political
Municipality FRELIMO mandates MDM mandates
parties’ mandates
Ulongué 8 5 0
Alto-Molócuè 9 8 0
Gurué 11 10 0
Milange 7 6 0
Maganja da Costa 8 5 0
Mocuba 16 15 0
Quelimane 13 26 0
Angoche 23 1 7
Ilha de Moçambique 15 2 0
Malema 11 2 0
Monapo 15 6 0
Nacala Porto 35 4 0
Nampula 20 24 0
Mandimba 9 4 0
Marrupa 12 1 0
Metangula 11 2 0
Chiure 14 2 1
Praia 16 1 0
Montepuez 27 4 0
Mueda 15 2 0
Pemba 29 10 0
Source: ‘Final results of 2013 local elections’, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 54, Part 2, 23 December 2013
Even with the emergence of the MDM, which is gradually transforming itself into a significant
political force, FRELIMO is continuing to restructure itself in order to increase its control over
political institutions and the public space. The discourse of its leaders points in the direction of
transforming the entire opposition into insignificant institutions, as can be noted from one of
the most prominent voices of the FRELIMO Party, the veteran Mariano Matsinhe, when he said:
‘The opposition in our country should not disappear, but FRELIMO should continue its efforts
to reduce the opposition to insignificance ... we will do whatever is necessary for FRELIMO to
remain in power’.13 In addition, Margarida Talapa, the head of the FRELIMO parliamentary
group, has stressed this ambition of eliminating the political representation of RENAMO, and
by extension, that of the MDM: ‘Using the five fingers of her right hand to point to the seats
occupied by RENAMO, the second largest political force in Mozambique, she said “In the next
elections, this row will no longer exist.”’14
13 ‘A oposição deve ser reduzida a nada’ (Opposition should be reduced to nothing), Notícias, Maputo, 28 April 2007.
14 Reported in Zambeze, 26 May 2011, p. 3.
2. S O C I A L , E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L C O N T E X T 9This modus operandi of FRELIMO is characteristic of many parties born out of liberation
movements, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. According to Bogaards (2004), this party
system has been characterised by high levels of intolerance towards a diversity of viewpoints.
Forquilha and Orre (2011: 41) show that the basis for the survival of this kind of party lies in the
total control of legislative and judicial powers, sharpening intolerance and political exclusion,
with the functioning of the institutions dependent on the ruling party. In many cases, this has
resulted in a lack of transparency, clientelism, corruption, electoral fraud, and weak legitimacy
of institutions, which continue to function along the lines of the model in force during the one-
party state, with consequences for the level of political participation. Such political intolerance is
seen as one of the causes of the current situation of political tension in Mozambique (Chaimite
2014).
2.3 The media and the struggle for control
The liberal press in Mozambique was born in the early 1990s, at a time when the country was
opening up to a pluralist system.15 The first multi-party Constitution enshrined press freedom
and the right to information.16 Based on these changes, the first press law, passed in 1991, sought
liberalisation and pluralism of expression in the mass media.17
With these political and legal transformations, new media emerged with a management
independent of the state, including the newspapers Savana, Zambeze, Magazine Independente,
Canal de Moçambique, Público, Sol do Indico and community and private radio and television
stations. These new papers joined those that had already been operating during the one-party
state, such as Notícias and Domingo, which, although they had acquired the status of private
newspapers, are still tied to and controlled by the government, both in terms of their content
and their shareholding structure, since the majority shareholder is the Bank of Mozambique.
One of the problems affecting the role of the press in the promotion of citizenship in
Mozambique concerns their weaknesses, both in terms of the sustainability of the media
companies, and the readership of the newspapers themselves. For example, most of the national
newspapers are distributed in the main urban centres, with the capital, Maputo, consuming
more than half the newspapers distributed in the country. High levels of illiteracy and weak
purchasing power are additional problems (Nhanale 2014).
As in other countries with a weak press, the highly politicised press in Mozambique is
heavily used as a space for political disputes (Hallin & Mancini 2010). This scenario has led to
polarisation of the media space in Mozambique, with some, particularly the publicly owned
papers, tending to report government achievements, seeking to offer a positive image of the
main actors of the FRELIMO government; on the other hand, many of the privately owned
15 After its independence from Portuguese colonial rule, Mozambique was ruled as a one-party state, headed by the FRELIMO
Party. In this period, a system of direct state control over the media took effect through a Presidential Decree which established
that any and every publication had to be authorised by the FRELIMO Department of Ideological Work through the National Book
and Record Institute, including publications of a religious nature.
16 Constitution of 1990, Article 74.
17 Law No. 18/91 of 10 August 1991.
10 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N Spapers seek to report corruption scandals and abuses of power, exercising their function as a
watchdog and giving more space to opposition parties and activists from CSOs (Nhanale 2014).
The fact that the written press is weak means that in Mozambique the electronic media
(radio, television and the social networks) take on a significant role in transmitting information.
Of these media, Radio Mozambique (RM) and Mozambican Television (TVM)18 are particularly
outstanding in terms of their geographical coverage. In 2005, it was estimated that RM reached
about 80% of the population. A study held on electoral behaviour in Mozambique cited the radio
as one of the main sources of electoral information, with RM reaching 91% of the voters (de Brito
et al. 2005).
Although more wide-ranging in terms of coverage, these media have had strong limitations
in their editorial work, particularly because of legal constraints and political pressure. Although
the Constitution19 states that the public media are independent of the government, the
administration and other public powers, the way in which they operate is distorted by the fact that
the nomination of their directors and their budgets depend on the government.
18 The latest data show that about 14% of the Mozambican population has access to the television signal.
19 Article 48, paragraphs 4 and 5.
2. S O C I A L , E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L C O N T E X T 113. The 2014 general election
3.1 Politicisation of electoral management bodies
Frequent amendments of electoral legislation have been a constant feature of political
processes since Mozambique’s return to multi-party politics. These changes are based on
the recommendations made by the various electoral observation bodies, political parties and
international partners. Many of these changes have not been based on a strategic vision in
accordance with the norms and standards for holding elections in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), or international electoral norms and standards, but on the
basis of party political interests, particularly those of FRELIMO and of RENAMO.
The approval of the new electoral law in 2013 and its addendum in 2014, resulting from
negotiations between RENAMO and FRELIMO, as one of the requirements for the end of the
politico-military tension in the centre of the country, has brought significant changes at both
election management body and dispute management levels. This has resulted in a reversal of the
professionalisation of the electoral bodies, characterised by their re-politicisation. It also affects
the composition of mechanisms for managing disputes around the registration of parties and
their candidates and the recounting of votes.
Because of demands by RENAMO, the electoral package approved in 201320 was revised
in 2014. The law lays down the functions, composition, organisation, powers and mode of
operation of the National Elections Commission (CNE). The amendment made to this law
brought us back to the political party model – in fact, back to a model almost similar to that of
the first CNE formed in 1994. The 1994 CNE was formed only by the political parties and by a
chairperson who was to be appointed by consensus among the parties. As we know, this model
arose in the post-civil war context, when the level of distrust between RENAMO and FRELIMO
was very high.
In 2005, de Brito et al. drew attention to the fact that ‘in no amendment or reform of the
electoral package has there been any substantive consensus and the appointment of members
from civil society has always been polemical and discordant, because these members were seen
as sent by the ruling party’. This is similar to what is happening now. In the understanding of the
political parties, the option of politicised election management bodies seeks to guarantee greater
20 Law No. 6/2013 of 22 February 2013.
12 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N Scontrol within a context of distrust between the political parties. However, over time the model of
politicised electoral management has not been able to solve the problems of distrust, allegations
of fraud, and various kinds of election disputes. What happened was an increase in discourse
about fraud, electoral violence, and ever-growing intolerance. This state of affairs, documented
in various reports, was seen as pernicious and indicated an urgent need to professionalise the
election management bodies. This was one of the various recommendations made by EOMs
(EU-EOM 2004, 2013; Carter Center 2004).
Professionalisation of the CNE was attempted in electoral reforms in 2007, 2009 and
later, in order to respond to the recommendations from various EOMs. On this matter, Alfredo
Gamito, chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Public Administration and Local
Power, said:
Our effort was to professionalise the Electoral Administration Bodies. Our mission was to
remove the political parties from these bodies, since for us it makes no sense for the players
to be at the same time referees in the same game. This effort pursued two goals: to bring
the situation into line with the recommendations made after each election by the various
election observation missions, and to bring it in line with the examples from the region ...
For a long time, there have been three central elements to the recommendations: reduce the
size of the CNE, professionalise it, and make it less politicised. We have made the effort for
the CNE to be more credible, more professional and increasingly less politicised, because we
cannot say non-politicised given the context in which we find ourselves.21
Even with this willingness from some sectors of Mozambican society, the pressure from
RENAMO, through the politico-military tensions that began in October 2013, forced FRELIMO
to amend the law to accommodate the interests of RENAMO. As a result, the new amendments
made in 2014 give FRELIMO and RENAMO greater weight in the electoral bodies, compared
with the previous elections. The MDM, the third force in Parliament, also benefitted from this
new legislation.22
Under the law published in 2013, the CNE had 13 members – five from FRELIMO, two from
RENAMO, one from the MDM, three from civil society, as well as a judge and an attorney. The
amendments increased the number of members from 13 to 17, with the following composition:23
five from FRELIMO; four from RENAMO; one from the MDM and seven members from civil
society. With this amendment, the two figures from the legal system ceased to form part of the
CNE. The places of the two deputy chairpersons were occupied by members of RENAMO and
FRELIMO.
At provincial and district level, the election commissions previously had 11 members – three
from FRELIMO, two from RENAMO, one from the MDM and five from civil society. Now
21 Interview with Alfredo Gâmito, Chairperson of the Commission on Public Administration and Local Power, 7 July 2014.
22 ‘Election law changes’, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 55, 9 April 2014, www.cip.org.mz/election2013/ndoc/167_
Mozambique_Bulletin_55_Election_law_changes.pdf.
23 The political parties have the right to appoint ten members, distributed in accordance with the number of seats they hold in
Parliament.
3. T H E 2014 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N 13they have been increased in size to 15 members, with deputy chairpersons from RENAMO and
FRELIMO.24
According to the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) and
the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP),25 there was an informal agreement between RENAMO
and FRELIMO to keep Sheik Abdul Carimo as chairperson of the CNE, and to give RENAMO
the right to appoint two of the four civil society members to each of the election commissions
(national, provincial and district). Table 4 summarises the evolution and composition of the CNE
in the five general elections between 1994 and 2014.
Table 4: Composition of the CNE, 1994–2014
Elections Composition Provenance
1994 National Electoral 21 members 10 members appointed by the government
commission 7 members appointed by RENAMO
(Law No. 4/93) 3 members appointed by other parties (excluding
FRELIMO and RENAMO)
President appointed by the President of the Republic
on the recommendation of the other members of the
CNE
1999 National Electoral 17 members 10 members appointed by FRELIMO
commission 8 members appointed by RENAMO
(Law No. 4/99) President appointed by the President of the Republic
from within civil society personalities
2004 General Elections 19 members 1 Presidente nomeado pelo Presidente da República de
(Law No. 20/2002) entre personalidades da sociedade civil; 10 membros
nomeados pela Frelimo; e oito membros nomeados
pela Renamo
2009 General Elections 13 members 3 members appointed by FRELIMO
(Law No. 8/2007) 2 members appointed by RENAMO
8 members from civil society
President appointed by the President of the Republic
from within the 8 members of civil society on
recommendation of other members
2014 General Elections 17 members 5 members appointed by FRELIMO
and Provincial Assembly 4 members appointed by RENAMO
Elections 1 member appointed by the MDM
(Law No. 8/2014) 7 members from civil society
President appointed by the President of the Republic
from within the 7 civil society members
24 Law No. 6/2013, revised articles 6, 43, 44.
25 ‘Election law changes’, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 55, 9 April 2014, www.cip.org.mz/election2013/ndoc/167_
Mozambique_Bulletin_55_Election_law_changes.pdf.
14 THE 2014 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE: ANALYSIS OF FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONSThe structure of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) remained as
approved in the law of 2013 – it is composed of a General Director and three departmental
directors (of organisation, training and administration/finance). But with the 2014 amendments,
it was envisaged that a further 26 members from the political parties would be included during
election periods (from the start of voter registration until the validation of the results by the
Constitutional Council):
• Two assistant general directors from FRELIMO and RENAMO;
• Six assistant departmental directors (three from FRELIMO, two from RENAMO and
one from the MDM); and
• 18 other staff appointed by the political parties (nine from FRELIMO, eight from
RENAMO, one from the MDM).
At provincial, district and city level, during election periods, eight members will be added to the
commissions:
• Two assistant directors;
• Six heads of departments; and
• Six staff members indicated by the political parties (three from FRELIMO, two from
RENAMO and one from the MDM).
Even before the 2013 law was passed, the composition of the CNE with 13 members was
considered too large. There were suggestions that it should be reduced to seven members,
consisting of a chairperson and six other members. It was suggested that the chairperson should
be selected from among the judges of the Supreme Court, while the other members would be
elected by a list of CSOs, without interference from political parties.
It should noted that the law does not circumscribe the roles of staff appointed by political
parties, particularly those at provincial, district or city level. This fact could lead to many
ambiguities in interpreting the law and contribute to an increase in electoral disputes. Many of
the people recruited by the political parties locally have a very low level of training in terms of
managing elections and of the legislation itself.
A further concern about this new composition of the electoral bodies is the large number
of staff – estimated to be over 40,000. Of this number, 2,200 are chosen by the political parties
– more than 1,100 by FRELIMO, 800 by RENAMO and 300 by the MDM. There will be around
13,000–14,000 polling stations and the staff at each polling station will include members
appointed by the political parties. The raises concerns not only regarding the budget (already
approved by the government), but also the complexity of managing the games of party political
interests which could exist in all the electoral bodies. Taking into consideration the low level
of trust in the national political system and the political intolerance in Mozambique, this high
number of staff appointed by the political parties in the electoral bodies could create conflicts.
Returning to this politicised model strips away the merit of all the efforts to reform the
electoral legislation, made following the recommendations of various EOMs. Under these efforts
the CNE was being reshaped along professional, specialist lines in order to bring more credibility
to its activities. For example, in 2009 the European Union Observation Mission (EU-EOM)
3. T H E 2014 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N 15recommended that the ‘composition of the CNE should be professionalised. Its members should
be appointed by a platform constituted by civil society organisations’ (EU-EOM 2009: 36).
Let us recall that both in 1994 and in 2004 the model for the CNE was a politicised one. But
subsequent reforms managed to respond to the recommendations from the Electoral Institute
for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the EU-EOM arguing that the composition of
the CNE should be extended to other actors so that impartiality, independence and objectivity
would be possible. According to EISA, the need to move from a politicised model to a specialist
one (i.e. from a model that only contained the parties to a model that included civil society) was
to make it possible ‘to strengthen its independence and increase the confidence of the public’
(EISA 2009).
These recommendations to professionalise the electoral bodies were also made by various
other EOMs. Mozambican authorities undertook reforms by broadening stakeholder participation
in election management. Currently the CNE comprises members from political parties and
CSOs. However, we learnt that transparency in the selection of the CSO representatives was
questionable, thereby casting doubt over the integrity, impartiality and independence of the CNE.
3.2 Voting, vote counting and dispute management
Disputes
One of the major problems facing Mozambique, like many other countries of sub-Saharan
Africa, is the question of managing electoral disputes arising from the counting of votes and
ascertaining the election results. Since 1994, the irregularities that occurred during voter
registration, voting and counting happened at the polling station, and protests could only be
made at the moment when they occurred. During previous elections, this mechanism for solving
conflicts did not offer solutions to the problems presented by the prejudiced parties, who could
not resort to judicial solutions in cases where the chairpersons of the polling stations refused to
record complaints from the delegates of political parties, or channelled these delegates and their
complaints to bodies with no power to solve their problems (Cistac et al. 2012). This fact led most
of the international, regional and national EOMs to recommend the establishment of election
tribunals, ad hoc or not, to receive and deal with complaints concerning the election process
(EU-EOM 2009).
One of the significant changes in the new electoral law of 2013 is that complaints from the
political parties will now be submitted, not to the electoral bodies, but to the district courts. It
is important to state that these courts, during the elections, should give top priority to solving
electoral conflicts. Although this arrangement has been made and the submission of complaints
has been simplified, the district courts have little experience in managing electoral disputes nor
in-depth understanding of electoral legislation.26
The new law states that complaints should be made within 48 hours of the publication of
the results by the elections commission. The district courts in turn have 48 hours to make a
decision on the disputes presented. When this is not satisfactory, an appeal should be presented
26 Although the promise has been made to train judges in matters of criminal trails linked to the electoral process, to date, there
is no evidence of such training.
16 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N Sto the Constitutional Council within three days. Although all the protests must include evidence,
the amended law of 2014 says that there is no official format or restrictions on submitting the
protests. Furthermore, if a district judge believes that a criminal offence has occurred, s/he
should remit the case to the public prosecutor’s office within three days.27 These time frames
might be problematic for district courts and small political parties. District court judges will
not have sufficient time to collect independent evidence in order to make decisions. Given the
little experience that district courts judges have with election law, they require more time to
analyse the complaints being made by political parties. Opposition parties at district level do not
necessarily have the skills and capability to make all their complaints in the allotted period of
time, as they need to consult their headquarters in Maputo.
Voting and vote counting
According to the new legislation, the number of ballot papers supplied to each polling station
should be exactly 10% more than the number of registered voters28 in the presidential and
parliamentary elections. For the provincial assembly, the previous wording is retained, stipulating
that the number of ballots should be the same as the number of registered voters (without the
extra 10%).29
The law is clarified as to when ballot papers are destroyed. Invalid and protested votes are
sent to the CNE, but valid and blank votes are kept by the district election commissions, which
under the revised law must destroy them (in the presence of parties, observers and journalists)
after the Constitutional Council has validated the election.30
So that there may be no doubt about the credibility of the election results, from the count
to the announcement of results, the principle of transparency imposes that the ballot papers
be accessible so as to check that there is no discrepancy between the number of ballot papers
in the ballot boxes and the number of voters. This recommendation arises from the fact that
the previous electoral law31 allowed that in the event of a discrepancy between the number of
ballot papers in the ballot boxes and the number of votes, the number of ballot papers prevailed.
According to the 2014 amendments, the following procedures will be used for the vote-counting
process:32
• Numerical compliance is confirmed against numerical ballot series of the votes on the
book.
• In case of numerical inconsistency or variance with the numerical series, the ballot or
ballots in question must be placed in a separated batch.
• The voting ballots with inconsistencies in relation to the numerical series are unused by
the polling stations table, with two diagonal lines from one end to another, and placed
27 Law No. 4/2013, amended articles 174, 175, 176; Law No. 8/2013, amended articles 192, 193, 194.
28 Law No. 8/2013 amended article 63.
29 Law No. 4/2013 article 69.
30 Law No. 4/2013 amended article 104, Law No. 8/2013 amended article 97.
31 Law No. 7/2007 article 85.
32 Law No. 12/2014, article 90.
3. T H E 2014 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N 17in a sealed bag to be sent to the CNE, through the district or city election committee
with an explanatory note of the occurrence. The requalification of these votes will be
done by the CNE in Maputo and is open to political parties, the press and observers.
Observers
Mozambican electoral legislation envisages national and international election observation.
However, accreditation is the responsibility of CNE. According to de Brito (2009), observers
face limitations due to the bureaucratic aspects of the procedures and the political will of the
managers of the electoral bodies. Experience has shown, particularly in the provinces, that the
observers have faced delays in accreditation and in accessing information they deem necessary
for carrying out their mission; limitations have been imposed in terms of access to the rooms
where the results sheets are processed or to the database of the processed and valid result sheets,
for purposes of control.
This problem of accreditation also extends to political parties, mainly opposition parties. It is
very common that, in the weeks preceding the elections, opposition parties present complaints
about delays in accrediting their polling station monitors. The parties accuse the CNE of
deliberately delaying the issuing of credentials, while the CNE alleges that the parties do not
observe the deadlines for submitting the necessary documents. Many monitors from opposition
parties, even observers, only receive their credentials some hours before the polls open. This
situation has created tensions between the CNE and election observers. For example, in the 2004
elections, there was a climate of tension between the CNE and the EU-EOM, resulting from the
refusal of the CNE to allow access to the rooms where the results sheets were processed or to the
database of the processed and valid result sheets.
3.3 The media and coverage of election campaigns
Media coverage of previous elections has been characterised by restrictions on press freedom
largely due to control of media spaces by the FRELIMO Party. In 2012, various discreet actions
were reported that were intended to restrict press freedom. These actions were taken expressly
by political leaders or on the initiative of some editors, particularly in the publicly owned media,
who used their positions to turn their media into spaces for political propaganda, as well as by a
group of opinion makers, known as the G40, strategically oriented to defend the interests and
image of the ruling party.33
In addition, there has been a trend in political parties to seek figures linked to the media
or the entertainment industry to amplify the image of their election campaigns and to assist in
mobilising the electorate. For example, the MDM has recruited the journalist and newsreader
of Soico Television, Fernando Bismarque,34 while FRELIMO has recruited a popular presenter
33 ‘Media privados na mira da FRELIMO’ (Private media in FRELIMO’s sights), Savana, 27 July 2013.
34 ‘Por se candidatar a deputado pelo MDM: STV suspende Fernando Bismarque’ (Because he is standing for the MDM,
STV suspends Fernando Bismarque), Canal de Mozambique, 16 July 2014. According to Canal de Moçambique, the Soico group,
which owns the company where he works, initiated disciplinary proceedings that culminated in his suspension, arguing that standing for
a parliamentary seat for the MDM is in conflict with company regulations. Jurists interviewed by this paper believe that Soico’s action
violates the country’s laws. It is suspected that the action is politically motivated since (according to the paper) the majority shareholder
of the Soico group is connected to the FRELIMO Party.
18 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N Sof entertainment programmes, Gabriel Junior. This recruitment could represent a risk to the
quality of political and electoral debate, given that the selection of these personalities seems to
be based solely on the fact that they are in the media, not their political capital or relevant role
within the political parties.
The latest studies by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) on the behaviour of
the news media in covering the presidential, parliamentary and provincial election campaign
of 2009 provide substantial evidence of a failure to open the media space to participation by
citizens in public debate. The monitoring of media coverage of the 2009 elections by MISA-
Mozambique (2010), for example, shows the prevalence of news items based on the routine
activities of the political actors (the parties and their candidates). There is little coverage of
citizens’ engagement with electoral processes and their voices being heard.
Judging by the coverage of the 2013 municipal elections, polarised and partisan media
coverage is likely to be a characteristic of the 2014 elections. Public media will continue to favour
FRELIMO, while private media will largely be biased in favour of the opposition. While social
media networks will provide an opportunity for more diverse information, the large political
actors are increasingly making their presence felt in these media outlets as well.
3.4 Election turnout and civic education
Elections in Mozambique face enormous challenges as a viable platform for effective political
participation by citizens. Voter turn-out statistics reflect that a decreasing number of people are
voting. In the first general elections of 1994, turnout was 88% of the electorate, but in the 2009
general elections more than 50% of the registered electorate did not vote. Abstention in 1994 was
12%, and in 1999 it rose to 32%, reaching 64% in 2004. Indeed, based on these figures, some
authors are arguing that Mozambique is heading towards a situation of ‘a democracy without
voters’ (de Brito 2007).
While there have not been systematic studies on voter turn-out and its causes, some studies
have shown that low turn-out may be due to low levels of civic culture and a disengagement of
citizens from the regime (Serra 1999; Mazula 2006). There is a perception that civic education
has been weak and ineffective. The weakness of civic education has been cited as one of the
central factors behind the political disengagement of citizens.
Civic education related to elections has not been designed to effectively mobilise sections
of the community such as young, disabled, elderly, and illiterate people – groups who would
need special strategies to structure their political involvement. A further factor is the weakness
of political parties’ mobilisation strategies. In an interview, Regina Joyce Reytsinhe of the STAE
civic education department, said:
We have worked hard for civic education to be efficient and capable of mobilising citizens
to take part in elections, but what happens is that it is not possible for us to do this job
efficiently on our own. The political parties, which should be very active in these matters,
often remain aloof from the process; a further problem is that sometimes we have to travel
3. T H E 2014 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N 19across the entire country. This isn’t easy, and we have tried to ensure that all the material
reaches all the administrative structures of the state.35
On the need for political parties to be more involved in civic education, the programme officer of
the Observatório Eleitoral (OE), Augusta Almeida, said:
We want to work everywhere in the country. We want to bring the message on the
importance of political and electoral participation to the public, but we face difficulties
with the people who can do this, because we have financial problems. Without money, it
is almost impossible to ensure that this happens. We have all the material and training
manuals already drawn up, but we lack the conditions to put it into practice. We are trying
to work with other organisations so that we can mobilise young people and others to become
involved in a perspective of civic contribution, but we are still at an early stage with this.36
Regarding adequate resources for civic education, Salomão Muchanga, chairperson of the
Mozambican Youth Parliament, stated:
We have carried out a range of activities seeking to educate citizens. We have tried
to undertake civic education for everyone in Mozambique. The great problem is that
sometimes our ambitions have faced difficulties because of financial questions, even if there
is great willingness from our members. Our members need to eat, they need to travel. All
this involves resources. It’s not always possible. We had a good experience last year when
we managed to mobilise people to register as voters. Indeed I myself made a public appeal
to people to vote.37
STAE managed to registered about 12 million38 voters in 2013–2014, spending about MTZ 2
billion (USD 33 million) and employing more than 3,500 civic education agents in the process.
In addition to the civic education agents, STAE has used the media and community and religious
leaders to mobilise citizens to register as voters and to vote. Even with this effort, the level of
abstention remains high. The electoral bodies, in partnership with research institutions, need
to look at this in depth, to understand the main causes and the measures that can be taken to
overcome the problem.
3.5 Registration, ballot papers and transparency
Several problems have been identified in voter registration. These problems are linked to the
lack of updating the registration in advance, the management of electoral registers, and the
publication of the voters’ roll. Late voter registration often interferes with the later phases of the
elections, giving little time for better organisation of the process.
35 Interview with Regina Reytsinhe, 11 July 2014.
36 Interview with Augusta Almeida, Programme Officer of the OE, 7 July 2014.
37 Interview with Salomão Muchanga, Chairperson of the Mozambique Youth Parliament, 4 July 2014.
38 This figure is 89.7% of the target for voter registration for the 2014 general elections.
20 T H E 20 1 4 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S I N M O Z A M B I Q U E : A N A L Y S I S O F F U N D A M E N T A L Q U E S T I O N SYou can also read
