Syria & Iraq Conflict Futures - Report sample Tate Nurkin & Richard Evans IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security
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Syria & Iraq Conflict Futures Report sample Tate Nurkin & Richard Evans IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security WWW.IHS.COM
Introduction & Scope On 6 February 2015 IHS held a one- In addition to developing specific day Iraq-Syria Conflict Futures scenario pathways, analysts also Workshop, bringing together a developed insights into the uncertainties, combination of subject matter experts tensions and unresolved issues shaping to develop and discuss a range of each scenario category and implications scenarios for the future trajectory of of each scenario. the linked Iraq and Syria conflicts They also addressed a series of over the next two to five years. questions about the implications of these Participating subject matter experts alternative future worlds on regional drawn from across IHS included analysts political geography and state stability; focused on the study of regional Islamist extremism; regional geopolitics; geopolitics, politics and security, as well pathways for contagion; and threats to as extremist movements and sub-state and challenges for Western states, their armed groups operating in Iraq and homeland security and regional interests Syria. among other scenario specific questions. Over the course of the event IHS In order to ensure the broadest range of analysts used input from intelligence and creative thinking about these scenarios security communities to discuss drivers, and mitigate the pitfalls associated with develop specific scenario pathways and group think and cognitive bias, workshop investigate branches of these pathways participants were divided into two teams, in three distinct categories of scenarios. each of which was asked to develop Each of the categories was designed to distinct scenario pathways within each isolate and explore a specific dynamic: category of scenario. Teams would brief their scenario pathways and discuss their analysis of scenario dynamics and The increasingly complex nature implications in a plenary session of the extremist landscape and including all Workshop participants. threat in Syria and Iraq The scenarios included in this report are The role that increasing Western amalgamations of the insights and and extra-regional actors’ pathways briefed in the plenary involvement in the region can play discussions. in either containing or escalating these conflicts The resulting report incorporates scenario pathways and analysis The intersection of the Iraq-Syria generated by IHS analysts during these wars (and IS in particular) with events, and seeks to capture both the overlapping, complex regional prevailing narratives and the analysis, as geopolitical rivalries—and the well as interesting or provocative minority implications for Western viewpoints and counter-narratives intelligence, security and policy developed during the two workshops. communities ihs.com 2
Introduction & Scope The report is divided into five separate This sample provides excerpted content sections: from Scenario 1 of the report. Executive Summary To purchase the full, unabridged report or to learn more about IHS non-state Preface: Scenario Planning, Why? armed group intelligence resources visit What? shop.ihs.com or contact us: Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism AMERICAS Scenario 2: Western Overreach and Disengagement Tel: +1 844 301 7334 E-mail Scenario 3: Turkish Intervention. ASIA-PACIFIC Tel: +604 291 3735 E-mail EUROPE & AFRICA Tel: +44 (0) 1344 328 155 E-mail MIDDLE EAST Tel: +971 4 363 5858 E-mail ihs.com 3
Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism This scenario explores the potential Idlib province and neighbouring Aleppo future trajectory of Islamist extremist province across north-central and north- influence in the Iraq-Syria conflict Eastern Syria. These extremist proto- across the next two to five years. states represent an ‘arc of extremism’ in Whilst it considers in detail some of Syria, and engage in a competition for the factors that might shape the influence over the Sunni populations development of Islamic State, it also under their control. attempts to situate the group among a The most significant entity to threaten the broader range of Islamist and survival of IS becomes Jabhat al-Nusra extremist actors seeking greater (JN) and a coalition of Islamist militant influence and territorial control in and extremist allies. With external Syria, and thus to examine the impact support from Turkey and Qatar, this of Islamist extremism as a whole on coalition gains control over most of Idlib the conflict. province, Aleppo province and crucially Scenario Aleppo city, which becomes the de facto capital of a rival JN-led Islamic Emirate Islamic State (IS) endures as a of ash-Sham. territorially-contiguous entity, sustaining a proto-state largely in the ar-Raqqah Our scenario assumes that JN will and Deir ez-Zour provinces of Syria that continue to prove successful in fostering outlasts a sustained counter-offensive by collaboration with other Syrian insurgent the International Coalition. Unable to groups, and in the pursuit of its model of precipitate complete collapse of IS, and co-governance under Sharia. It further potentially distracted by other regional or assumes that this coalition does not international security concerns, support fracture after the battle for Aleppo and for a seemingly open-ended low intensity that the US and regional partners are conflict with IS begins to decline among unsuccessful in peeling away insurgent new political administrations in Western groups from JN’s influence through members states, except for punitive funding, training, and strikes. As these states slowly scale back weapons/equipment. their support and increasingly leave the Sample Assumption: NATO’s Crowded fight to regional partners, remaining Threat Environment member states then pursue varying policies of targeted counterterrorism, One of the core assumptions of the Arc containment or confrontation through of Extremism scenario is that Western non-state proxy forces. governments scale back military involvement in Iraq and Syria, relying on However, IS survives as only one of a ‘policies of targeted counterterrorism, number of Islamist militant / extremist containment or confrontation through actors that will cumulatively control proxy groups.’ territory stretching from most of northern ihs.com 4
Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism While political or fiscal realities could militias—a strategic victory for the certainly drive this disengagement, military and the al-Abadi government that especially if current efforts are viewed as precipitates further recapture of territory having minimal effect on the situation on in Nineveh and Anbar provinces--is the the ground, so too may other security or first major event in our base scenario. geopolitical exigencies that lead to a de- The ability of the Iraqi military to achieve prioritization of the IS threat, even if low- victory in Mosul in 2015 remains level terrorist operations linked to IS in uncertain; whilst the United States is Western states persist. reportedly accelerating transfers of small Indeed, a central feature of ongoing IHS arms and other ordnance to the Iraqi NATO Futures initiative involves analysis army, some military capabilities of the exceptionally complex and assessments have suggested that the crowded threat landscape facing NATO army in particular remains insufficiently and, critically, its member and partner prepared for the prospect of difficult states and the varying perceptions urban operations against an entrenched, among these states of how to prioritize highly-motivated and experienced these threats. A significant Russia adversary. Indeed, IHS analysts noted contingency, an escalation of fighting in on multiple occasions that IS must be North Africa, and a Western Pacific considered more skilled in the security crisis or several crises operational art of urban combat, having simultaneously could stretch already thin had the benefit of significant institutional resources in a way so as to diminish the knowledge gained from combat since interest and capacity to support 2003. continued presence and Coalition The failure to evict IS from Mosul, via operations in Iraq and Syria. military action or brokered withdrawal, would inflict a political shock on the Sample Insight: The Importance of government of Haider al-Abadi and Mosul further damage the already low morale of Exercise discussions frequently centred the formally constituted ‘national’ Iraqi on the tactical, operational and strategic security forces. The ability of IS to fend importance of driving IS from Mosul, and off an assault on the city would also be how the loss of Mosul might shape the trumpeted by the group as a major future of Islamic State and extremism in strategic victory buoying its confidence, the region as both a trigger for the Arc of driving new recruits and indicating Extremism scenario and as a wildcard, enhanced prospects for longer-term the result of which could drive the future survival and, plausibly, expansion and of IS along a vastly different trajectory growth. than that posed by the scenario. But the outcome of the battle for Mosul is The recapture of Mosul by the Iraqi only one of the many drivers shaping the military and, importantly, allied Shia operational environment on the ground. ihs.com 5
Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism Of equal importance in this scenario is Strategic narratives the nature of the retaking of Mosul, ‘We will wear down the enemy, should it occur. Whilst the Iraqi military then recover and attack’ may initially seek to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, fearing ‘We will wear down the economy a public backlash, a persistent failure to of the West and their willingness recapture the city might see them resort to support Apostate Arab to more indiscriminate tactics. IS may governments’ seek to leverage rising civilian casualties ‘Dawlat ul-Islam baqiyah’—‘we will to position itself as defender of Sunni remain and then expand’ residents from an intended massacre by Impact the Shia-led government, strengthening local public support for the group. ‘Bombing hurts the population, not our capabilities’ The possible involvement of Shia militias is also likely to be a contentious issue ‘The Coalition destroys—we help among Sunni communities in and around rebuild’ Mosul. As one IHS team member ‘Air strikes alone will not defeat asserted, use of these militias to help us—the enemy has to face us on take Mosul will “guarantee another round the ground’ of atrocities, making enduring solutions Consistency and themes impossible.” Messaging is consistent between This would also place Western powers, official media units, fighters and which have been backing the Iraqi activists and reflects a shared military with air strikes, in a much more view of Sunni victimization. difficult position and may lead to a downturn in the tempo of strikes so as ‘Coalition strategy doomed to fail’ not to be seen as offering air cover for ‘Civilians are the targets—but the Iraqi army and militia atrocities. State endures’ Sample Insight: Major IS Narratives Coordination among IS enemies Relating to Coalition Air Strikes (Iran - US; Syria - US, for example) Religious narratives ‘Faith defeats aggression’ ‘Assembly of a Coalition proves the righteousness of our cause’ ‘Righteous always targeted by the unjust’ ‘Faith defeats arrogance and aggression’ ihs.com 6
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