Reshaping the Marine Reserves
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Ideas & Issues (Reserve Affairs)
Reshaping the
Marine Reserves
Opportunities and perils
by Col Mark Cancian
G
en Berger’s drive to reshape
the Marine Corps is an op- >Col Cancian (Ret) served 37 years in the Marine Corps, active and reserve. An
portunity to create a more infantry and artillery officer, he deployed overseas to Iraq (twice), Desert Storm,
effective Marine Corps Re- and the evacuation of Vietnam. He currently works at the Center for Strategic
serves to make it a better partner in the and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, DC.
Marine Corps’ total force. However,
if not done prudently, the result could Strategy (NDS) and DPG [Defense provide U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
be misalignment with the demands of Planning Guidance], and further, (U.S. INDOPACOM) and the Com-
future conflicts and frustration with the prepared to meet the demands of the mander, 7th Fleet with a fight-tonight,
reserve’s inability to provide what the Naval Fleet in executing current and stand-in force capability.
planners had intended. Therefore, in emerging operational naval concepts. This vision of change extends to the
reshaping the Marine Corps Reserves, His vision focuses on great power con- reserves: “Just as our Active Compo-
planners should consider history, les- flict, particularly against China in the nent will change, so will our Reserve
sons learned from past mobilizations, western Pacific: Component.”2
and innovations that other Services have We are designing a force for naval ex- This article proposes three ways to
made with their reserve components. peditionary warfare in actively con- better align the reserves with the NDS
Gen Berger’s vision is well known, tested spaces. It will be purpose-built and the Commandant’s vision: using
so there is little need to repeat it here.1 to facilitate sea denial and assured the reserves as a strategic hedge against
He seeks access in support of fleet and joint the unexpected, adapting to the new
significant change … to ensure we are operations … III MEF will become budget and security environment, and
aligned with the 2018 National Defense our main focus-of-effort, designed to making the reserves as deployable as
possible so they can meet the aggressive
deployment goals of the strategy.
Using Reserves as a Strategic Hedge 3
The Commandant’s guidance ex-
presses skepticism about some reserve
capabilities:
It is increasingly clear that the Marine
Corps is over-invested in capabilities
and capacities purpose-built for tra-
ditional sustained operations ashore,
including: Surge-layer capacity resi-
dent within the reserve component.4
Although the specifics are unclear, this
guidance may be missing an opportu-
nity to employ the Marine Corps as a
“total force.” The active duty force may
be overinvested in sustained operations
ashore. However, the Commandant also
desires the Marine Corps to be
the “force of choice” for the President,
Marine Reserve units must be capable for deploying and operating in any environment just Secretary, and Combatant Command-
like the active component. (Photo by Cpl Ian Leones.) er—“a certain force for an uncertain
Marine Corps Gazette • March 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE49
Ideas & Issues (Reserve Affairs)
world” as noted by Commandant campaigns in the western Pacific, the reserve flying squadrons difficult. Even
Krulak. No matter what the crisis, our reserves should fill the gaps for other if the money can be found, the rationale
civilian leaders should always have one kinds of campaigns in case the unex- for having the unit in the reserves evapo-
shared thought—Send in the Marines. pected happens. Here are some illustra- rates. The high cost (70-90 percent of
To do this, the Marine Corps must be tive examples: an active duty squadron) eliminates the
ready for all kinds of conflicts, not just • The artillery regiment might have major advantage of having a reserve
a great power conflict in the Pacific. five battalions. As the active duty artil- unit, yet the reserve unit is much less
As Secretary Gates once said, “In the lery slims down to substitute precision available.8 Although there are plans to
40 years since Vietnam, our record in for mass, the reserves could provide equip reserve flying squadrons with new
predicting where we would be militar- the mass. aircraft in the (distant) future, the high
ily engaged next, even six months out, • The logistics group might have ex- cost may curtail or thwart such plans.
is perfect: We have never once got it tra support battalions—for example, On the other hand, the reserves have
right.”5 A narrowly focused Marine two motor vehicle battalions and two a lot of aviation talent that the Marine
Corps would be too limited to be “a engineer battalions—to provide the Corps wants to retain. RAND estimates
certain force for an uncertain future.” maneuver and sustainment for con- that it costs $10 million to fully train an
The reserves can help as a hedge. flicts such as the Marine Corps fought F-35 pilot.9 Retaining that investment
Do not mirror image the active duty in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, makes both warfighting and budget
force. Gen Berger’s guidance notes that Iraq, and Afghanistan. sense, and many pilots who leave active
the reserves are “organized ... congru- • Armored firepower―LAVs, ACVs, duty still want to fly as Marine aviators.
ently” with active duty forces, but that tanks (if they ever return)―might be Associate units provide a mechanism
is a choice the Marine Corps has made. concentrated in the reserves after their to solve this dilemma. Though unused
in the Marine Corps, such units are
common in the Air Force reserve com-
ponents. Here is the definition:
A narrowly focused Marine Corps would be too lim- A regular Air Force unit retains princi-
ited to be “a certain force for an uncertain future.” The pal responsibility for a weapon system
and shares the equipment with one or
reserves can help as a hedge. more reserve component units. Under
the classic associate structure, active-
duty and reserve units retain separate
It does not need to be that way. Indeed, reduction in the active duty force. The organizational structures and chains
the reserve components of the other mil- Marine Corps could not have partici- of command.10
itary Services are organized differently pated in Operation DESERT STORM The concept is that the active duty unit
from the active forces because they fill in 1991 or Operation IRAQI FREE- owns and maintains the equipment day-
gaps and complement the active duty DOM in 2003 without such firepower. to-day while the reserve unit—organi-
forces. Thus, the Navy Reserve, with its zationally a separate unit—trains on
many support units, looks very different Adapting to the New Security Envi- the equipment, helps with peacetime
from the regular Navy. ronment missions, and in wartime provides the
The mission of the Marine Reserves The changing budget, acquisition, personnel needed to conduct 24-hour
is to “augment and reinforce active and security environments drive some operations.
forces for employment across the full changes irrespective of the dictates of From the reserve perspective, this is
spectrum of crisis and global engage- the National Defense Strategy (NDS). a second-best solution; it is more sat-
ment.”6 The Marine Corps should take The commandant’s initiative is an op- isfying to have fully equipped reserve
advantage of this broad charter by us- portunity to adapt to this new environ- flying squadrons, but it is better than
ing the reserve component to not only ment. the progressive elimination of reserve
provide more of what the active force Create associate aviation units. The squadrons.
already has but also provide forces and high cost of acquiring and maintaining Nationally source units with special-
capabilities that the active force lacks. the new generation of aircraft threatens ized skills. The custom with reserve
It already does this to a limited degree the future of reserve flying squadrons. units—in all Services, not just the
with units like civil affairs groups and The F-35 costs about $100 million Marine Corps—is that they recruit lo-
security advisory companies. Expanding per copy and $34,000 per flight hour. cally. That is fine for the Army, which
these precedents would give the Marine The CH-53K will cost $110 million per has hundreds of units spread across the
reserves the structural flexibility needed copy and $9 million per year to sustain country so that individuals can usu-
to realign with the new strategy. (about $44,000 per flight hour).7 Long ally find a local unit that uses their
Put capabilities for sustained com- gone are the days when reserve flying particular MOS. It does not work for
bat in the reserves. As the active duty units were just another kind of reserve many Marine units with scarce skills
force transitions to a focus on island unit. Costs this high make equipping that are thinly distributed across the
WE50 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • March 2021country. For example, Ordnance Main- ponent, as well as other organizational of different units—without the inflex-
tenance Company, 4th MLG, is located options.” Close alignment between ac- ibility of having to align specific active
in Waco, TX, but how many Marines tive duty and reserve units is a good duty with specific reserve units. Dur-
trained in that specialty actually live thing. Reserve units see the standard ing the 1980s, for example, the annual
within commuting distance of Waco? they will need to meet when called to NATO exercise in Norway would pair
The unit must retrain individuals or active service. Active duty units become an active duty battalion with a reserve
accept MOS mismatches. The higher familiar with the reserve units that will infantry battalion under an active duty
the skill, the more severe the problem support them in wartime. MEB headquarters. Such alignments
because of high retraining costs or the But alignment is hard. It was tried could be expanded in the future. A
difficulty in using substitutes. briefly in the 1980s when reserve in- beneficial side effect is to increase the
This shortfall is often invisible in fantry companies were designated as number and scope of major exercises
peacetime when units focus on mili- the fourth rifle company of active duty that the Marine Corps can participate
tary skills and have few opportunities battalions, but the concept was quickly in.
to exercise their specialty skills. Upon abandoned. The problem was that geog-
mobilization, the gaps in technical pro- raphy and schedules did not align well. Preparing for More Rapid Mobilization
ficiency become obvious. Active duty units were far away and of- The NDS envisions rapid deployment
The alternative is to recruit regionally ten unavailable during the reserve units’ to contain and then defeat adversary
or nationally to bring in those with the two weeks of annual training. Com- aggression. A “blunt” layer of forces ini-
right skills from a wide area. The prob- mand relationships became confused. tially meets aggression, and a “surge”
lem is travel to the drill site. Historically, If a reserve company was aligned with layer rapidly reinforces. Yet, a peren-
the Marine Corps has put this burden nial strategic issue with reserve com-
on the individual. While that may make ponents—traditionally a major element
sense for a colonel or lieutenant colonel of the “surge” layer—is that they take
whose drill pay would cover the high
One variation of align- time to deploy, and the Commandant’s
cost of travel, it is insurmountable for ment would be to in- guidance recognizes this limitation:
most enlisted Marines. Thus, an elec-
tronics technician—with years of spe- crease the participa- We cannot expect our Selected Ma-
rine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units to
cialized training and experience—may tion of reserve units in maintain the same levels of readiness
end up as a truck driver because that is as our Active Component units. What
what the local unit needed. major active duty exer- we desire and expect in our SMCR
This makes little sense from a talent cises. units and Individual Ready Reserve
management perspective. If the Corps (IRR) are Marines and units ‘ready
has invested over $200,000 in training for mobilization.’
and on the job experience to produce National defense strategies like the
a skilled technician, does it not make an active duty battalion, what function NDS understandably desire rapid de-
sense to pay $300 a month for that Ma- did the reserve battalion headquarters ployments to stem adversary aggression
rine to travel to a unit that uses those have? Further, upon mobilization, re- before it advances too far and then to
skills? Just as the Commandant’s guid- serve units were sent where they were counterattack rapidly. Thus, strategists
ance calls for “global sourcing by the needed and not where the alignment are inclined to favor active duty forces.
Total Force,” the reserves might imple- said they should go. The concept briefed This was a major issue in 2001, for ex-
ment its own version of global sourcing well but fell apart in the face of peace- ample, when then-Secretary Rumsfeld
through regional or national recruiting. time schedules and wartime exigencies. proposed a forward-leaning strategy
Marine Forces Reserve now cover some So, this concept should be rolled out similar to NDS 2018:
travel by drilling reservists, a great step in a few units as a pilot program to Deterring aggression and coercion
forward. The program needs expan- work out the details and see whether by deploying forward the capacity
sion to cover a wider variety of skills the concept works in practice; where it to swiftly defeat attacks and impose
and billets. does, other units can be added. Perhaps, severe penalties for aggression on an
Implement reserve-active alignment, alignment would be limited to specialty adversary’s military capability and sup-
but test before fully committing. The units that would, on mobilization, sup- porting infrastructure.
Commandant’s guidance proposes port very particular active duty units. The emphasis on rapid action and for-
greater active-reserve integration: “We One variation of alignment would be ward presence implied a reduced role
will examine the merits of formalizing to increase the participation of reserve for reserve components.11
command relationships between Active units in major active duty exercises. This Whatever its strategic merits, such an
and Reserve Component units. As part gets many of the advantages of align- approach runs into the twin problems
of our force design effort, we will ex- ment—pushing reserve units to meet a of requiring too many hard-to-recruit
plore the efficacy of fully integrating our high standard, active duty familiarity active duty personnel and being too
reserve units within the Active Com- with reserve capabilities, and integration expensive. The fully burdened cost
Marine Corps Gazette • March 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE51Ideas & Issues (Reserve Affairs)
performance at the battalion level was
the main reserve shortcoming in 1991.15
Though battalion performance was
better in 2003—fewer battalions were
called up and revised procedures, like
the integration of the I-I staff, improved
preparation—post-mobilization train-
ing was still poor. Only nineteen percent
of reserve Marines rated it “excellent”
or “good.”16 Better post-mobilization
training is needed if reserve battalions
are to perform to active duty standards
in the next mobilization.
These post-mobilization problems are
solvable but must be faced in peacetime.
Installations and infrastructure must include the capacity to mobilize Reserve Forces. (Photo Once mobilization begins, it is too late.
by Sgt Alex Kouns.) Above all, the Marine Corps needs to
avoid the experience of Korea where the
of an active duty service member is ponent forces will undergo additional chaos of active duty units deploying,
about $442,000/year (compared with pre-deployment training to achieve the reserve units arriving, and personnel
a reservist cost of $137,000/year), and necessary readiness for deployment and reshuffling resulted in reservists receiv-
that high cost must be sustained in employment.” This additional training ing little or no training before landing
full every year.12 As a result of these is unavoidable; in peacetime, reserve at Inchon.
high personnel costs and competing units receive 38 days of training a year. Over-staff reserve units to prevent cross-
budget demands for higher readiness That is enough to maintain individual leveling. Cross leveling is the practice of
and equipment modernization, recent skills but not enough to maintain the taking personnel from a later deploying
service plans for force expansion have full range of unit capabilities, particu- unit to bring an earlier deploying unit
collapsed.13 Indeed, the Commandant larly at the battalion level and above. up to strength. It occurs in any unit,
has stated explicitly that the Marine Post-mobilization training time has active or reserve, that is understrength
Corps will shrink to provide funds for not been an issue during the wars in in peacetime. The practice is extremely
modernization initiatives. Iraq and Afghanistan because there was damaging because the receiving unit
There is also a political dimension, no rush to get units deployed. The long picks up personnel unfamiliar with their
in that reserve components have strong timelines allowed careful synchronizing leaders, and the losing units are now far
support in Congress because of their lo- of the flow of forces and coordinating understrength. In mobilizations, there
cal ties—though this is more a National of post-mobilization training. However, can be a cascading effect, so that the
Guard phenomenon than a Marine re- post-mobilization training will be an is- last units have lost so many personnel
serve issue. For example, when the Army sue in a great power conflict when time- that they are unusable.
tried to cut its reserve components in the lines are tight, and there is competition Thus, for rapid mobilization, it is bet-
late 1990s, Congress responded by mak- for ammunition, transportation, and ter to have ten units at full strength than
ing the reserve commanders three-star training areas. Post-mobilization train- twelve at 80 percent. Having twelve
billets. All the Services, then, including ing that reserve units received in 1991, understrength units makes sense in a
the Marine Corps, need to figure out the last large-scale mobilization, was World War II situation when a long
how to use reserve forces more effec- inadequate. One senior reserve officer preparation time allows understrength
tively rather than indulging strategic noted: units to act as cadre for force expansion.
fantasies about an all active duty force. Reserves had been told that they would It does not fit today’s strategy.
The way out of this conundrum is to get 30 days of [post-mobilization] The best solution is having 9 units at
make reserve deployment more rapid so training. That did not happen. They 110 percent. That way, when the medi-
they can meet the demands of the strat- basically deployed to this war trained cally non-deployers, the hardship cases,
egy. Further implementing the many to the level they had attained through and those pending discharge are left
lessons learned from the mobilizations [annual] ATDs and monthly drills. behind, the unit still has all its necessary
of 1991 and 2003 would help. This re- As a result, battalion-level perfor- personnel.
quires some cost in peacetime but not mance in DESERT STORM was disap- In 1991, some units filled the per-
too much. Here are two lessons learned pointing. Gen Boomer, commander of sonnel gaps by taking officers from the
among many:14 I MEF during DESERT STORM, com- IRR, but that had mixed success. One
Prepare bases to support mobilization. mented that “company and below were commander complained that these vol-
The Commandant’s guidance notes, great, battalions were marginal, regi- unteers were “Rambos” who “scared the
“Once mobilized, our Reserve Com- ments were ineffective.” Indeed, weak hell out of him.” When the unit could
WE52 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • March 20219. Michael G. Mattock, Beth J. Asch, James
interview volunteers and be selective,
Hosek, Michael Boito, The Relative Cost-Effec-
the results were positive. In any case, Notes
tiveness of Retaining Versus Accessing Air Force
the numbers were limited. Such joins 1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Pilots, (Santa Monica, CA: R AND, 2019).
occurred informally when individuals Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: July The study analyzes Air Force training costs
contacted reserve units directly. The 2019). but Navy/Marine costs would be similar since
reserve personnel system was far too they produce a similar product. Indeed, costs for
slow to access the IRR systematically 2. Quotes from 38th Commandant’s Planning training Navy/Marine Corps pilots are likely to
before deployment.17 Guidance and from Gen David H Berger, “Notes be higher because of the need for carrier quali-
on Designing the Marine Corps of the Future,” fication and shipboard operations.
Over staffing is hard because person- War on the Rocks, (December 2019), available
nel are limited. Marine Corps Reserve at https://warontherocks.com.
end strength will likely stay at around 10. Air Force Reserve Command, “Glossary of
Air Force Reserve Terms,” available at https://
38,000. Growing larger might be attrac- 3. Mark Cancian, “Don’t Go Crazy Marine www.afrc.af.mil.
tive in theory but has failed in the past Corps,” War on the Rocks, (January 2020), avail-
because of difficulties in recruiting and able at https://warontherocks.com. 11. Department of Defense, Quadrennial De-
retaining a larger force. So, trade-offs fense Review 2001, (Washington, DC: Septem-
will be needed. The first place to look 4. “Notes on Designing the Marine Corps of ber 2001).
is at units that have not been mobilized the Future.”
during the recent wars. Higher head- 12. Reserve Forces Policy Board, “Update
5. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary Report to the Secretary of Defense: Requir-
quarters—regiments, groups, division,
at War, (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014). ing the Use of Fully Burdened and Life Cycle
wing, MLG—stand out here. Although Arguably, the DOD has done a bit better than
some peacetime command and control Personnel Costs for All Components in Total
Gates’ pessimistic assessment, anticipating a Force Analysis and for Budgetary Purposes,”
structure is needed for reserve battalions conflict with Iraq after 1991, but the point is (Washington, DC: September 2019). Figures
and squadrons, these headquarters may nevertheless valid. cited are FY 2018 costs to U.S. government,
not need all the personnel and capabili- DOD, plus other agencies like the Veterans
ties that active duty equivalents have. 6. Marine Corps Reserve Mission Statement is Administration.
Building on success. The Marine available at https://www.marforres.marines.mil.
Reserves, like the active duty Marine 13. For a discussion of budget tradeoffs and
Corps, need to adapt as strategy and 7. “Costs from DOD’s Selected Acquisition the low priority of force expansion, see Mark
circumstances change, but changes Report F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fight- Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020,”
er,” (December 2018), available at https:// Center for Strategic and International Studies,
should build on past success. The Ma-
www.esd.whs.mil; and “Selected Acquisition (November 2019), available at https://www.
rine Corps Reserve is not a failing orga- Report CH-53K King Stallion,” (December
nization in need of immediate reform. csis.org.
2018), available at https://www.esd.whs.mil.
It has a record of success. In DESERT Procurement cost is Average Unit Procurement 14. These recommendations are drawn from
STORM, the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, Cost. All costs escalated to FY 2020 dollars. the author’s previous research on the mobiliza-
and the long stability operations since CH-53K flying hour cost calculated by taking tion of reserve forces: LtCol Mark F. Cancian,
then, Marine reservists have mobilized, the annual operating cost and dividing by the “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest
deployed, and fought alongside their average number of flight hours ($9.4M / 12 x Asia,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA:
active duty comrades. After the 2003 17.9 hours per month= $44,000). SARs are of- September 1991); and the latter in Cancian et
Invasion of Iraq, Gen Hagee, then- ficial DOD reports to Congress on acquisition al., “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Opera-
Commandant, recognized this accom- costs and plans. Although there are different tion IRAQI FREEDOM,” Marine Corps Gazette,
ways to calculate these costs, the bottom line (Quantico, VA: July, 2004).
plishment: “Our Marine reservists are is the same: the new generation of aircraft is
Marines first, and there was absolutely expensive to procure and operate. 15. “Marine Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia.”
no difference in performance—on the
ground, in the air, in logistics.” This was 8. Cost from Department of Defense, Total 16. “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation
not an idle boast. An in-depth study Force Policy Report to the Congress: Supple- IRAQI FREEDOM.”
by the Institute for Defense Analysis ment, 1992 based on data from RAND analy-
validated this judgment: sis: Adele Palmer et al., Assessing the Structure 17. “Marine Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia.”
Analysis of SIGACTs, THOR/MIS- and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces:
Cost Estimation Methodology, (Santa Monica, 18. Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, John
REP, and mobility data indicate that
CA: RAND, 1992). The study found that a Brinkerhoff, Rachel Dubin, Ann Gilbride,
RC forces did what they were tasked
Marine reserve helicopter unit cost 73 percent Lance Hancock, Jeffery Jaworski, Drew Miller,
to do, with no sizeable differences in of and active duty unit when equipment was
performance from that of their AC Daniel Nakada, Pete Picucci, et al., Sharing
included (52 percent without equipment), Air the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment
counterparts. Combined with analysis Force fighters cost 77 percent of an active duty of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi
of deployment data, casualty data, and fighter, and Air Force tankers actually cost more Freedom. IDA Paper P-8177, (Alexandria, VA:
mishap data, findings depict a shared because of high usage. Institute for Defense Analyses, 2016).
burden and shared risk.18
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