Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens - International IDEA Discussion Paper 6/2018
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Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens International IDEA Discussion Paper 6/2018
Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens International IDEA Discussion Paper 6/2018 Lead author: Steven van Hecke Contributors: Alex Andrione-Moylan, Nathalie Brack, Isabelle de Coninck, Stephen Day, Wojciech Gagatek, Emilie van Haute, Isabelle Hertner, Karl Magnus Johansson, Teona Lavrelashvili, Gilles Pittoors and Wouter Wolfs
© 2018 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members. The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it, provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information on this licence visit the Creative Commons website: . International IDEA Strömsborg SE–103 34 Stockholm Sweden Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00 Email: info@idea.int Website: Design and layout: International IDEA DOI: Created with Booktype: International IDEA
Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 5 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 6 Executive summary ....................................................................................................................... 7 1. European political parties ...................................................................................................... 11 2. Improving European political parties’ connection with citizens through regulation ....... 23 3. Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 44 Annex. Proposals on transnational lists for the European Parliament .................................. 50 References ................................................................................................................................... 57 About the authors ....................................................................................................................... 68 About International IDEA ............................................................................................................ 70
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
This paper was commissioned by the Office of International IDEA to the European
Union. It was compiled by Steven van Hecke and a team of contributors, including
senior and junior academics from various universities, who shared their expertise and
insights on different aspects of the role European political parties play within the
European Union polity, based on the state of play in December 2017. The sections
to which they contributed inform the recommendations at the end of the paper.
Special thanks to the representatives of European political parties and other
participants in the expert round table and public panel debate, organized by the
Office of International IDEA to the European Union, which took place in Brussels
on 13 July and 23 November 2017, respectively. Additional information about the
round table is available on International IDEA’s website (Neven 2017).
Finally, thanks to Andrew Bradley, Director, and Marilyn Neven, Programme
Manager, of the Office of International IDEA to the European Union, for their
contributions to the text.
International IDEA 5Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens Abbreviations ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe CSPEC Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community EFA European Free Alliance EGP European Green Party EP European Parliament EPP European People’s Party GG Global Greens GPI Global Party International ICT Information and communications technology IDC-CDI Centrist Democratic International IDU International Democrat Union LI Liberal International MEP Member of European Parliament PA Progressive Alliance PES Party of European Socialists SI Socialist International TEU Treaty on European Union 6 International IDEA
Executive summary
Executive summary
Democracy involves popular control over decision-making, as well as political equality
among those exercising that control (see e.g. International IDEA 2017). In a
parliamentary system, day-to-day control is delegated to elected politicians, who
organize themselves in political parties. Political parties have become an important
interface between the government and the people in many democracies around the
world.
In recent decades the European Union has refined its democratic functioning by,
for example, extending the decision-making powers and control of the European
Parliament (EP) and facilitating the creation of European political parties. Given the
multiple challenges to democracy worldwide, the EU must strengthen its legitimacy
and accountability, and connect with citizens.
European political parties have come a long way but only recently established
themselves at the heart of European democracy, a process that has paralleled the
increasing attention paid to enhancing democracy and transparency in EU decision-
making. European political parties play an important role, but face challenges in
bringing messages to EU citizens and making them more aware of EU politics. In
addition, the European institutional and electoral frameworks do not provide the
same structure and tools for European political parties as their national counterparts
are used to working with, which enable national parties to attract the attention and
interest of citizens or to be featured in the media.
This Discussion Paper takes a comprehensive approach to understanding the
role(s) of European political parties within the polity of the EU. Its focuses on how
European political parties can (re)connect with EU citizens. The paper emphasizes
the regulatory framework in which European political parties operate, their internal
organization and the outreach in relation to various political actors, but especially
citizens. It also considers ways to broaden, deepen and diversify how European
political parties are able to connect.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the political
context, including recent developments, and analyses what is known about European
political parties and why they matter. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at the legal and
institutional framework in which European political parties operate, the role of
national political parties, the rise of Euroscepticism and the linkages with citizens,
individual membership of European political parties, the problem of representation
International IDEA 7Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens
and membership of the Global Party Internationals. Chapter 3 presents a set of
recommendations to European political parties and stakeholders, including proposals
to strengthen the role of European political parties and enable their engagement with
EU citizens, and therefore enhance democracy within the EU. The Annex includes a
proposal on transnational lists.
Key recommendations
The recommendations presented in this paper are primarily directed at European
political parties, but also address EU institutions, national political parties, EU civil
society, democracy supporters and citizens. Implementation can in some instances
take place immediately (short term), while others require the adaptation of existing
rules and/or the introduction of new ones (medium term), or treaty changes (long
term). Overall, European political parties should play a larger role within (as well as
outside) the ‘Brussels bubble’, especially during EP election campaigns and between
elections.
For citizens of the European Union
• Improve EU education in school curricula throughout Europe, to promote
citizen engagement in EP elections and their understanding of decision-
making throughout the legislature.
For national political parties and national authorities
• Use Europarty logos next to national party logos on ballot papers, and
ultimately only the Europarty logo, to improve the visibility of Europarties and
of the EU dimension in EP elections.
• Endorse the election manifesto and political programme of the respective
Europarty, and use these policy documents in election campaigns to increase
understanding and visibility of Europarties, especially their endeavour to seek
EU-wide compromise.
• Debate EU issues in national election campaigns and throughout the
legislature to promote understanding of the impact of EU decision-making on
national decision-making and citizens’ daily lives.
• Separate EU and national elections to allow for distinct political debate at
these policy levels.
• Transfer the power to select candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) to Europarties to
reinforce their procedural role and visibility.
For European civil society
• Address policy memoranda directly to Europarties, and engage with them
throughout the legislature.
8 International IDEAExecutive summary
• Promote citizens’ understanding of EU policymaking.
• Create initiatives to hold European leaders and institutions (such as
VoteWatch Europe) accountable to all citizens, and lift the paywalls.
For Europarties
• Facilitate Europarty membership for individual citizens and improve their
participation in Europarty decision-making.
• Rethink internal decision-making structures, and consider a greater role for
individual members, majority voting and representation of party associations
to improve internal democracy.
• Improve ideological homogeneity and strengthen relations with a single
political group in the EP.
• Engage with civil society to enhance grassroots-level input in EU decision-
making and to improve connections with civil society in daily party life.
• Ensure that affiliated foundations reach out beyond the ‘Brussels bubble’ to
improve outreach to citizens.
• Enhance social media presence by investing in the use of adequate information
and communications technology (ICT) applications and by copying good
practices worldwide in this field.
• Develop and maintain permanent forums for citizens to facilitate debates on
EU issues.
• Organize primaries for the selection of Spitzenkandidaten to enhance
democratic decision-making, visibility and transparency.
• Diversify ways to increase funding (e.g. membership fees) to allow for more
visible outreach to citizens.
• Improve transparency of revenues and spending patterns to enhance
understanding and legitimacy.
• Strengthen links with EP political groups to improve Europarty impact on
daily decision-making.
• Strengthen European Council summitry coordination to enhance public
understanding and visibility.
For European institutions
• Reconsider the reorganization of ‘les lieux du politique’ or working spaces
(especially the EP) to balance better access to citizens with security concerns.
• Redistribute part of funding to Europarties in equal shares in order to redress
imbalances between larger and smaller parties and to safeguard the democratic
space at the EU level.
International IDEA 9Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens
• Consider reserving the increase in public funding to 95 per cent of their total
income for newly established parties, and for a limited time period, to
encourage them to search for alternative funding.
• Provide clear rules on joint activities between Europarties and their national
member parties to allow for more interaction during European election
campaigns.
• Introduce separate European election campaign grants with strict spending
requirements to increase visibility and safeguard operational budgets.
• Reconsider, reform, and improve the legal and political citizen-oriented
toolbox to ensure the link with EU citizens (public consultations, petitions,
European Citizen Initiative).
• Consider merging the role of President of the European Commission with the
President of the European Council.
• Provide greater clarity on the organization, impact and outcome of 2018
‘democratic conventions’.
10 International IDEA1. European political parties
1. European political parties
According to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘Our Union
needs to take a democratic leap forward’ (European Commission 2017b). Never
before has a Commission President dedicated so many words on, and referred so
explicitly to, the role of European political parties, civil society and citizens in the
framework of ‘a more democratic Union’. Juncker referred to the role of European
political parties in the 2019 EP elections, new rules on the financing of political
parties and foundations, transnational lists, the Commission’s Citizens’ Dialogues
and democratic conventions (European Commission 2017a).
It is unclear how many of these announcements will become formal proposals, yet
the fact that they were mentioned signals a recent change in perceptions of how best
to improve democracy at the EU level. While the Brexit referendum, rising populism,
and challenges related to migration and terrorist threats produced a pessimistic
atmosphere in EU circles and many EU capitals in 2016, confidence in European
integration and its institutions, policies and future ambitions grew throughout 2017.
Although leading politicians at the EU level have played a major role, the sudden
change in mood (which some have dubbed a ‘European Spring’) is largely a product
of the outcome of national elections in Austria (2016), the Netherlands (2017) and,
particularly, France (2017) as well as improved economic performance and the
stemming of migratory flows. Active support for the EU has been observed among
individual citizens—protesting Brexit or campaigning for a pro-European candidate
—as well as among new and non-traditional political movements such as Pulse of
Europe and En Marche. Yet it would be unwise to overestimate this new wave of
Euro-enthusiasm.
Apparently, European political parties have not (yet) played a significant role in
this European Spring. Eurosceptics have of course criticized the renewed support for
European integration, and parties at the national and European levels have tried to
replicate or be part of Emmanuel Macron’s success. In the run-up to the European
Council of June 2017, the newly elected French president was conspicuously absent
from the meetings organized by the major European political parties. However, his
views on how to relaunch the integration project, including his democratic stance,
have suddenly become a point of reference (European Commission 2017b).
Article 10(4) of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Lisbon Treaty, 2007), the so-
International IDEA 11Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens called party article, states that it is the role of European political parties to ‘contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union’. Their development, especially in relation to the affiliated EP political groups and alongside European political foundations, has been impressive, both legally and politically. For instance, together with their groups in the EP, European parties have enjoyed remarkable success against some member states and national political parties in the framework of the Spitzenkandidaten (candidate selection) system, such as helping to strengthen the connection between EU citizens’ voting behaviour during EP elections and the European Commission. Yet their role is still largely invisible, and they have not always participated in recent relevant initiatives. In the run-up to the 2019 EP elections, this paper examines European political parties’ role in (re)connecting with EU citizens. 1. What are European political parties and what do they do? Steven van Hecke and Wouter Wolfs Scholarly attention to European political parties has taken place in four main waves. The first wave took place during the high expectations, not to say euphoria, in the run-up to the first direct EP elections in 1979. During this period, the first European political parties were founded, and many scholars expected a breakthrough on the EU political scene, to the detriment of national political parties. The second wave came after the introduction of the original party article (138a) in the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Maastricht Treaty, 1992), which for the first time officially recognized the role of European political parties within the EU, against a backdrop of growing discontent about the European integration process. European political parties were increasingly analysed from a comparative political perspective, instead of as just another feature of the ongoing integration process. The third wave of interest emerged in the context of the EU enlargements to Central and Eastern European countries, and the establishment of a regulatory framework for these party federations. Scholars analysed internal party changes following these developments, such as an increase in the number of member parties and ideological heterogeneity, and the role of new European foundations linked to European political parties. Recent developments have triggered a fourth wave that takes the existence of European political parties for granted, both legally and politically. Not only has the number of European political parties increased significantly since the first regulations, they have also developed internally and differently in response to the changing legal and political context. European political parties can at times be seen as predominant, as in the Spitzenkandidaten process, while in other instances they appear to operate only ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. This paper focuses on this kind of approach and looks ahead to the 2019 European elections and beyond, reflecting on likely developments and feasible deliverables. The following section is partly drawn from and reproduces earlier research on the issue (van Hecke 2010: 395–411). What are European political parties? These organizations are labelled European political parties, even if they lack the main characteristic of national political parties: participation in elections. National parties 12 International IDEA
1. European political parties
dominate the selection of candidates and the electoral competition of European
elections, although further advancing the Spitzenkandidaten process and potentially
establishing transnational electoral lists could expand the role of European political
parties.
Since their inception in the second half of the 1970s, parties operating primarily at
the European level have received a number of different labels, some with a specific
(and sometimes normative) connotation. The term ‘pan-European parties’, for
example, implies a supranational aspect suggesting that these party organizations are
more than the sum of their parts. According to this perspective, European political
parties should be developed into fully fledged party organizations and take up roles
similar to their national counterparts. The term ‘Europarties’ has recently become
popular, as has ‘European political parties’, which derives from ‘political parties at
European level’, the official name in the Treaties (see TEU, article 10(4); 2016/C
202/01 TFEU; TEU Maastricht Treaty article 138a).
Academics commonly use the term ‘transnational party federation’ to refer to one
of the three parts of the European party family, in addition to ‘national political
parties’ and ‘supranational party groups’. The term has two main implications. First,
it emphasizes the fact that these parties are federations (i.e. they consist of various
national political parties) and mainly operate as ‘parties of parties’ (umbrella
organizations for their national member parties). Second, their components, member
parties, are not fully integrated into a single organization, a Europarty, as is the case
with the delegations of national political parties in the party groups of the EP. From
the moment they are formed, party groups operate independently of national
political parties and their delegations. In party federations, however, the political
centre of gravity lies with the national member parties. The fact that supranational
party groups are more developed than transnational party federations does not imply
a normative bias, however.
Calling European political parties ‘transnational’ is essential, as it refers to the level
between the national and supranational levels, for which a distinct and separate party
organization has been established. In this paper, ‘Transnational party politics’ refers
to the level at which the national (or intergovernmental) and the EU (or
supranational) spheres overlap. In other words, they are ‘multi-level’ parties
(Deschouwer 2006) that operate at both the national and European levels. At the
same time, the transnational level reflects the dual character of the EU—
intergovernmental and supranational. Transnational party federations are involved
with intergovernmental institutions (the Council of Ministers and the European
Council), as well as supranational institutions (the EP and the European
Commission) (see Table 1.1). Uniquely, they operate in both of the institutional
circuits of the EU. They provide an important link between the national and EU
levels, and between intergovernmental and supranational institutions.
International IDEA 13Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens Table 1.1. Levels and their corresponding party organizations and political institutions Level Party organization Political institution(s) National National political parties National governments and parliaments Transnational Transnational party federations Council of Ministers, European Council Supranational Supranational party groups European Commission, European Parliament Source: Van Hecke, S., ‘Do transnational party federations matter? (… and why should we care?)’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6/3 (2010): 398. Transnational party federations are also collective units, albeit in a different way than national political parties and supranational party groups. National political parties are sometimes considered non-unitary actors, especially when addressing intraparty organizations, factions, tendencies or similar topics. A Europarty also consists of several intraparty actors, each of which can have a different view on the role that the European party organization should fulfil (Day 2014). Whereas national party leaders consider European parties to be facilitating bodies for networking, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) see them mainly as support organizations for EP group work, while staff from the Europarty secretariats aim to strengthen their supranational party characteristics. Transnational party federations exhibit even more non-unitary characteristics than national parties, in the sense that they are generally composed of (national) political parties. Membership is mostly restricted to national political parties, even though the statutes of transnational party federations contain provisions that extend membership to individuals. Therefore, the number of members varies for different reasons for transnational and national parties. For example, membership variations within transnational parties are related to the size of their member parties, which does not apply to national political parties. All members of a national (or local/regional) party are equal, and size (quantity) is associated with weight (influence). In theory, all member parties, small or large, operate independently. In practice, however, larger member parties are often stronger or have greater influence over policymaking. Another major factor is policy distance (including intra-policy distance). A large member party can be weak if it is located far from the ideological centre of its transnational party federation, for instance. Intra-policy distances reflect the degree of cohesiveness within transnational parties. This is important in a number of cases, for example when a transnational party federation drafts a party document or electoral manifesto that is intended to be binding for its member parties. Transnational party federations are much more elite driven than national political parties. The leadership runs the party, and there is limited participation from partisans in the party’s day-to-day work; transnational parties do not have an electorate, membership or rank-and-file actors, and (unlike national political parties) they have almost no direct links with society. The only exception is the slowly growing number of actors that comprise European civil society. Transnational parties are, therefore, not as embedded in society as national political parties. Like national political parties, however, transnational party federations have organized themselves 14 International IDEA
1. European political parties
around party families or familles spirituelles (von Beyme 1985), although not all of
these families have been present from the early days of transnational party
federations.
Since 2004, transnational party federations have had a legal status and have
benefited from direct financing from the EP budget (European Parliament and
Council 2003, 2014). In the period 2004–17, no less than 20 organizations were
recognized as ‘political parties at European level’ and consequently received EU
funding (European Parliament 2017); there are currently 16 (see Table 1.2).
The link with the supranational branch of the party family—comparable to
political groups in the EP—represents a process of growing emancipation. European
political parties become more independent from EP political groups by forming
families. Before the introduction of direct European subsidies in 2004, most
European political parties depended on their corresponding political group in the EP
for staff, accommodation and resources. These subsidies have given the Europarties
more independence, but this—together with the establishment of a large number of
new Europarties—has complicated the relationship between the Europarties and the
political groups (see Table 1.2). The clear one-to-one relationship between a
Europarty and a political group that characterized the pre-funding situation is now
rather uncommon. Some groups bring together MEPs from various Europarties,
whereas the members of other parties are dispersed over several groups. Furthermore,
every European election generates some disruptive effects: once the new EP is
composed, the centre of activity—and, accordingly, media and public attention—
shifts from the European political parties to the elected assembly and its groups
(Bardi 2006). The composition of political groups, and especially the total number of
members, affects their political weight within the EP.
International IDEA 15Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens
Table 1.2. Political parties at the European level and their political families,
2017
Political party at European level Political group(s) in the European Parliament Political family
European People’s Party (EPP) Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Christian Democrats/
Democrats) Conservatives
Party of European Socialists (PES) Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Socialists/Social
Democrats in the European Parliament Democrats
Alliance of Conservatives and European Conservatives and Reformists Group Conservatives/
Reformists in Europe (ACRE) Eurosceptics
European Christian Political Christian–Social
Movement (ECPM)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Group of Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Liberals
for Europe (ALDE) Party
European Democratic Party (EDP) Centrists
Europeans United for Democracy Confederal Group of the European Left–Nordic Green Eurosceptics
(EUD) Left
Group of Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
Party of the European Left (EL) Confederal Group of the European Left–Nordic Green Non-Socialist Left
Left
European Green Party (EGP) Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance Greens
European Free Alliance (EFA) Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance Regionalists
European Conservatives and Reformists Group
Confederal Group of the European Left–Nordic Green
Left
Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group Anti-establishment hard
Europe (ADDE) Eurosceptics
European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group and Nationalist Eurosceptics
Non-Attached
Movement for a Europe of Nations Europe of Nations and Freedom Nationalist/right-wing
and Freedom (MENF) Eurosceptics
Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF) No corresponding group (Non-Attached) Ultranationalist far-right
Eurosceptics
Alliance of European National No corresponding group (Non-Attached) Ultranationalist far-right
Movements (AENM) Eurosceptics
Coalition for Life and Family (CLF) No EP representation Reactionary Catholic
Eurosceptics
Source: European Parliament, Directorate for Political Structures Financing and Resources, ‘Grants from the
European Parliament to political parties at European level per party and per year’, October 2017, , accessed 28 November 2018.
Note: Parties listed from largest to smallest. Groupings based on the affiliations of individual MEPs to European
political parties in the context of the distribution of Europarty funding by the EP, as included in the annex of the
note of 5 December 2016 of the Secretary General of the European Parliament on the grant award decision for
the financial year 2017.
16 International IDEA1. European political parties
What do European political parties do?
Using Duverger’s (1951) terms, European political parties were internally (rather
than externally) created in the run-up to the first EP elections in 1979. The party
groups that had existed since the 1950s took the lead in creating party organizations
(see e.g. van Hecke 2006). Since then, European political parties have developed in
terms of both organization and membership. There is longstanding consensus among
scholars about the number and main features of the various phases of development,
as well as the decisive role of the environment in explaining party change (Hix and
Lord 1997; Kreppel 2001; Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Bardi 2006; Ladrech
2006). Integration (institutional incentives) and enlargement (broadly understood as
an increase in the number of parties) have been of paramount importance (Hix,
Noury and Roland 2007) in each of these developmental stages. Niedermayer (1983)
used a three-stage model to analyse the development of European political parties. He
differentiated between a contact stage in which infrequent contacts between national
parties do not require a permanent transnational structure, a cooperation stage with
permanent interactions and an integration stage in which national parties transfer
sovereignty over decision-making to the European party organization. Day (2014)
also applied a three-stage model of Europarty development, although he
acknowledged that the eventual point of arrival depends on normative assumptions
about the role that the Europarty should fulfil.
Panebianco (1988) distinguishes between two empirically linked dimensions in the
development of European political parties. First, institutionalization depends on an
organization’s degree of autonomy relative to its environment. European political
parties are rather weak along this dimension, because they must respond and adapt to
an environment that they are not able to control. Second, institutionalization relates
to the degree of ‘systemness’—the interdependence among subgroups that is made
possible by the centre’s control of resources. Given the primary importance of
national political parties among its constituent elements, European political parties
are not institutionalized in this way either. As the two dimensions are empirically
linked this is not surprising. Indeed, an organization with a low degree of systemness
will find it hard to become autonomous from its environment.
The normative benchmark that is often used for European political parties is the
functions that national parties perform in the member states. However, when
compared to the traditional functions of political parties, Europarties have a more
limited role and political weight (see Table 1.3; Wolfs and Smulders 2018).
International IDEA 17Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens
Table 1.3. Functions of European political parties
Function European political parties
1. Structure the vote Limited, since European elections are ‘second-order national elections’, but can be improved through
Spitzenkandidaten process, EU transnational lists or Europarty labels for national member parties.
2. Mobilization and Limited due to low recognizability of Europarties, but can be improved through Spitzenkandidaten
socialization of the process, EU transnational lists, Europarty labels for national member parties and a more developed
public individual Europarty membership.
3. Recruitment of Only through the Spitzenkandidaten process, and can be improved through the introduction of
political personnel transnational lists.
4. Aggregation of Limited, since few Europarties have built a network of civil society organizations.
diverse interests
5. Integration and Limited, since most Europarty manifestos represent the lowest common denominator of their member
shaping of public parties, and the link with a political group in the EP can be ambiguous. This is especially true for larger
policy Europarties, as they often need to reconcile more diverse political opinions. For an improved policy
impact, more detailed party manifestos and a stronger link with a political group are desirable.
6. Organization of Limited, since few Europarties have meetings to bring together their representatives in different EU
government institutions. Summits should become an important activity of all Europarties.
7. Legitimation of the Limited, since Europarties cannot provide a strong link with the EU political system.
political system
Source: Wolfs, W. and Smulders, J., ‘Party financing at the supra-national level: the example of Europe’, in J.
Mendilow and E. Phéllipeau (eds), Handbook of Political Party Funding (London: Edward Elgar, 2018).
The first function of general political parties is to structure the vote in elections
through party labels. However, Europarties have only a limited electoral connection,
since European elections are fought in national electoral districts, among national
political parties. Indeed, the first European elections were ‘national’: candidate
selection, issues, campaigns and other aspects took place at the national level. Reif
and Schmitt (1980) define EP elections as ‘second-order national elections’ in the
sense that they had little or no direct effect on the parties that were in government at
the national level (as is the case with local elections). Reif (1984) later refined the
concept of ‘second-order national elections’, particularly with regard to the electoral
cycle and the timing of European elections. Elections that take place in the middle of
a legislative term generate a vote sanction for government parties prior to first-order
national elections. Because EP elections were for a long time considered second-order
national elections, European political parties (and even EP groups) were seen as a
posteriori party organizations. As national parties wield power in a number of ways,
including by controlling the selection of candidates and the party group MEPs join
once they are elected, they were always late. The Spitzenkandidaten system, however,
has changed the aforementioned process, and provides European political parties with
an a priori attribute (van Hecke, Wolfs and de Groof 2018).
The second function of political parties is the mobilization—or representation—
and socialization of the population: parties connect citizens to the political system,
and foster their social attachment to that system. Such a function requires high party
recognizability, but European political parties are not well known by the general
electorate (Mair and Thomassen 2010; van Hecke 2010). A more developed
Spitzenkandidaten process and transnational EU lists could significantly improve
18 International IDEA1. European political parties
Europarties’ visibility. National parties should also be more active in displaying their
connection to a European political party in their communication, political
programmes and campaign material. Political parties can also represent and socialize
citizens by mobilizing them as party members or activists, which increases their
affinity to particular parties and the political system in general. However, individual
membership of European political parties is underdeveloped: only a few Europarties
have introduced individual membership, or make ample use of political activists
during campaigns (see also section 2.4 of this paper).
A third party function is candidate selection: political parties recruit political
personnel and select political leaders. In the EU framework, two institutions are
directly elected or appointed: the EP and the European Commission. However,
European political parties have (almost) no role in the candidate selection process.
The selection of political personnel is therefore not a key function of Europarties
(Raunio 2006; Bardi et al. 2010). National political parties create the electoral lists
for EP elections, and national governments propose candidates for the various posts
of European Commissioner. This slightly changed during the 2014 European
elections, when five of the largest Europarties put forward their candidate for
president for the European Commission—or Spitzenkandidat—using different
internal selection procedures (Put et al. 2016). Transnational electoral lists,
composed by the European political parties themselves, would give European parties
more influence over recruiting political personnel to EU institutions.
The aggregation of interests of various groups in society is a fourth function of
political parties. Some European parties have a large network of affiliated civil society
organizations, but this is more the exception than the rule. Therefore, most European
political parties only weakly perform this function (Mair 2007).
This is also related to the fifth party function—the integration and formation of
public policy. Parties try to influence policymaking on the basis of their ideology.
Although European political parties are organized according to political ideology,
they are internally more heterogeneous than most national parties. Consequently,
their political programs and manifestos are usually rather short and undetailed.
Moreover, the corresponding political groups in the EP do not always act in line with
the positions of their Europarty. Some parties, for example, are represented by
various groups in the EP, which raises questions about its ideological coherence.
Stronger links with one particular EP group and the development of more extensive
party platforms that are followed by its group and its member parties could
significantly improve Europarties’ ability to perform this function.
The sixth function of political parties is the organization of government: parties
structure the relations between the legislative and executive branches. Three of the
four largest European political parties have developed a tradition of organizing party
summits that bring together representatives of their political family from different
institutions. However, these meetings are mostly limited to an exchange of views, and
do not facilitate a thorough coordination of positions. Moreover, only 3 out of 20
Europarties organize this type of summit.
The seventh function—legitimization of the political system—flows from the
previous six: parties connect citizens to the political system. Since Europarties fulfil
the different functions only to a limited extent, they cannot provide a strong
International IDEA 19Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens legitimization for the European political system. The further development of European political parties is required to enable them to form a strong link between European citizens and EU institutions. European political parties have demonstrated a remarkable adaptability to alter their organization and, even more significantly, to incorporate a large and diverse number of new members, from both new and old member states, despite their being caught for a long time in second-order elections, and the above-mentioned reservations regarding the functions they perform. As a result, their size, strength and policy distance have become more complex. This has even become the rule, as European political parties require representation in a number of EU member states in order to be recognized. Similarly, changes in EP rules have made it impossible for single-party groups to be recognized as official groups. As ‘rational, purposive organizations’, similar to national political parties, ‘they obviously have considerable incentives to mould the institutional opportunity structure in their favour’ (Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002: 340). The study of European political parties has been part of a tradition within comparative politics that views the EU as a developing political system (Bardi 2002: 294). This comparison with political parties at the national level has both advantages and disadvantages. One disadvantage is that by making national political parties the dominant unit of comparison, this analogy is ‘caught’ within the state-centric paradigm. Therefore, in areas such as organization, policy formulation, interest representation, media access and staff, European political parties were considered weak. However, the analogy is also advantageous as it allows the study of European political parties to benefit from numerous insights and findings about national political parties, such as party financing and MEP voting behaviour, which have developed within the field of comparative politics. 1.2. Do Europarties matter? Karl Magnus Johansson In addition to providing a nuanced definition and detailed account of their functions, the material impact of Europarties should also be considered. This section explores the conditions under which Europarties can be expected to ‘make a difference’ or matter. What factors can be hypothesized to condition Europarty influence? This section is partly drawn from, and reproduces, earlier research on the issue (Johansson 2016, 2017; see also van Hecke 2010). Europarties’ influence and effectiveness largely depend on their capacity to mobilize ‘their’ heads of government for the party cause. Pre-summit meetings involving government/party leaders are a central aspect of this mobilization process. However, their significance appears to vary over time and across party families (Tallberg and Johansson 2008, 2010). And while Europarties may be able to secure the participation of their heads of government at pre-summit meetings, their lack of organizational capacities to facilitate and coordinate positions may decrease their influence. Nor can they effectively impose their views on or influence decisions taken at European Council summits—at which the EU’s main policy orientations and decisions are agreed. Europarties have a limited capacity to influence national 20 International IDEA
1. European political parties
government leaders in these negotiations and have no formal powers to take binding
decisions themselves (Johansson 2016).
Europarties are better able to influence European Council decisions when leaders
from one party family outnumber those from other party families (Johansson 1999,
2002a, 2002b; Lightfoot 2005; Tallberg and Johansson 2008). However, numerical
strength or superiority alone is insufficient to influence political outcomes in the
European Council along party political lines. A Europarty’s heads of government
must also be mobilized for the joint cause. Holding more Europarty summits ‘may be
a necessary condition for influencing EU decision-making, but it is not sufficient by
itself’ (Hix and Lord 1997: 186). Hix (2005: 187) notes that for parties to exercise
general influence in the EU, ‘translation from party strengths to policy outputs
requires party actors in the same party family to cooperate, and winning coalitions to
be constructed between different party families’.
So, arguably, the greater the dominance of a particular Europarty—that is, the
relative strength of the party families, as well as their greater cohesion and capacity to
mobilize—the more likely it is to influence the process and outcomes of European
Council negotiations (Tallberg and Johansson 2008). Exploring party politics in the
European Council theoretically and empirically, Tallberg and Johansson (2008:
1238) note that the theoretical hypotheses advanced ‘may be refined to incorporate
other factors, such as the domestic political context of heads of government
(majority/minority government, coalition/one party government)’.
Domestic political factors shape Europarties’ cohesion, mobilization and degree of
influence. Hanley notes in the context of the European People’s Party (EPP) that
even though the group of national party and government leaders happens to agree
about very fundamental aspects of policy and consult regularly, ‘these leaders remain
first and foremost national politicians, responsible to national electorates’ (Hanley
1994: 197; see also Hanley 2008). Arguably, this concern about domestic politics,
constituencies and elections is the central factor restraining Europarty influence.
Essentially nation-bound institutions that are rooted in national societies, social
cleavages and issue dimensions, political parties are likely to prioritize domestic over
European concerns. It is difficult to create a unitary command and control structure
within Europarties, as they are federative ‘parties of parties’, consisting of national
member parties.
Accordingly, it is essential to take domestic politics into account when exploring
how governments and parties act in the EU. However powerful heads of government
may be, they do not have full control over the domestic context in which they
operate. This highlights the impact of the interplay (and inherent conflict) between
government and opposition, and the party–political battles and intra-government
divisions that break out as a consequence.
Therefore, in order for Europarties to exercise influence, they must exhibit a
certain degree of cohesion in the internal arena, effectively mobilize, and work within
domestic constraints on national parties and leaders. One way to assess whether
Europarties matter or ‘make a difference’ is to gauge the extent to which they attempt
to mobilize and influence. In other words, to explore how Europarties, through their
party networks, make efforts to shape political processes and policy outcomes.
International IDEA 21Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens In conclusion, Europarties matter when they are in numerical ascendance, relatively cohesive and able to mobilize their networks of political parties and leaders. The following chapter explores the context in which they operate, including the regulatory framework, their complex relationship with national parties and the challenge of reconnecting to (and representing) EU citizens, with the rise of Euroscepticism and the ‘untapped potential’ of their membership in Global Party Internationals (GPIs). 22 International IDEA
2. Improving European political parties’ connection with citizens through regulation
2. Improving European political
parties’ connection with citizens
through regulation
2.1. Carrots and sticks, rules and loopholes: how to regulate
European political parties
Wouter Wolfs
Although the first European party federations were established in the run-up to the
first direct EP elections in 1979, the EU regulatory framework was not developed
until 2003. The legal groundwork was laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, which
added a strong political dimension to the European integration project that until
then was predominantly economic in nature. Following strong political pressure from
the presidents of the three main party federations—Wilfried Martens (EPP), Guy
Spitaels (Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community, CSPEC)
and Willy De Clercq (European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party, ELDR)—a
specific article on Europarties was included in the treaty text (Roa Bastos 2012).
Article 10(4) states that ‘political parties at European level are important as a factor
for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness
and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union’. This reference
provided a ‘constitutional recognition’ to the Europarties, but was mainly declaratory
in nature; it did not constitute a sufficient legal basis to develop a comprehensive
regulatory framework.
Nevertheless, political pressure allowed for the establishment of rules, including
important provisions for EU funding for Europarties. The EP issued a resolution in
1996—the so-called Tsatsos report—calling for amendments to the party article in
the EU treaties, so that rules on the legal status and financing of European political
parties could be introduced (European Parliament 1996). Furthermore, the Greek,
Austrian and Italian governments called for a revision of the treaty article in the
1996–1997 Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997–99). Although these attempts did not achieve their goal of changing the
article, they created a narrative and pathway towards Europarty funding and rules
(Day and Shaw 2003; Johansson and Raunio 2005).
International IDEA 23Reconnecting European Political Parties with European Union Citizens The Europarties themselves also continued to push for revising the treaty article. In December 1999, the presidents of four of the then five Europarties issued a statement that emphasized the need to strengthen these party organizations. In February 2000, the secretaries-general of all five parties published a working document that set out a common position on party funding rules. The five party presidents endorsed these proposals with a joint letter to the European Commission and encouraged the institution to take a legislative initiative (Day and Shaw 2003; Johansson and Raunio 2005). The issue became more urgent when the Court of Auditors published a critical report on the finances of the political groups in the EP later that year. The court denounced the practice of political groups providing Europarties with accommodation, staff and resources. At that time, most parties were located in the EP with their corresponding political groups, and most of the party personnel were group staff members. The court emphasized that financial support for Europarties could not be taken from budgets intended to fund political groups. However, withholding such support would seriously jeopardize the organization and activities of the Europarties, which made separate EU funding for these organizations even more pressing (Wolfs and Smulders 2018). In February 2001, the European Commission launched its legislative proposal on the statute and financing of European political parties. However, no agreement was reached in the Council of Ministers, and the negotiations collapsed at the end of the year (Johansson and Raunio 2005: 527). The Treaty of Nice (2001–03) provided a new opportunity for legislative action: the party article was amended to include a specific provision on party funding. The treaty provided a stronger legal basis for an EU regulation on the rules and funding of European political parties. Only three weeks after the treaty’s entry into force, the European Commission launched a new legislative proposal. The EP and the Council built on earlier efforts to reach an agreement: the regulation was published in November 2003 and entered into force after the 2004 EP elections. The regulation was amended in 2007 to permit separate funding for European foundations that are linked to Europarties. Since 2008, these political think tanks have also received grants from the EP. The regulation was more substantially revised in 2014. The main changes related to the control of European political parties and possible sanctions for misconduct. The 2014 revision also included the establishment of an independent authority to handle party registration and monitor compliance with the rules. In September 2017, the European Commission once again published a proposal to make minor changes to the definition of party membership and how EU subsidies are distributed among the parties (European Commission 2017c). In May 2018, the EP and the Council of Ministers agreed on the text, so it can be fully implemented by the 2019 European elections. This regulatory framework for European parties follows the same rationale as party finance laws at the national level: it combines public funding (carrot) and rules to regulate party organization and activities (stick) (Scarrow 2011). Yet the motivation behind these EU rules and subsidies significantly differs from the rationale behind similar legislation ruling political parties in EU member states. Whereas at the national level it was historically seen as an instrument to combat corruption and to 24 International IDEA
2. Improving European political parties’ connection with citizens through regulation
make party competition fairer, the reasoning at the European level was much more
normative. The regulatory framework was considered to be a measure to build up the
Europarties and create strong party organization at the EU level, which could help to
overcome the EU’s democratic deficit. The rules were not designed to make party
competition more equal, but—more fundamentally—to establish political party
competition (Wolfs and Smulders 2018).
Overall, regulation of internal party organization is relatively limited; parties have
considerable flexibility (for a more extensive discussion, see Wolfs 2017). First, the
rules rather loosely define the concept of a party, both ideologically and
organizationally. The regulatory framework does not include specific ideological
requirements: European political parties do not necessarily need to support European
integration, and Eurosceptic parties are also eligible for EU funding. Second, parties
are not required to be ideologically homogenous. By contrast, technical groups in the
EP are no longer allowed, and MEPs must form political groups ‘according to their
political affinities’. European political parties are required to have a political
manifesto that observes the EU’s fundamental values, but no further conditions are
imposed in this respect.
The rules include few organizational requirements. A Europarty cannot pursue any
profits, and must have its seat in an EU member state. Participation in European
elections is a third requirement, although the role of European political parties in
these elections remains rather limited in practice. The national member parties draft
the electoral lists, and the European elections largely represent the sum of 28 national
elections. The Europarties themselves do not compete directly. Europarties can
indeed campaign with a Spitzenkandidat—their candidate to become European
Commission president—but in the last European elections in 2014, only 5 of the 13
Europarties nominated a top candidate. It therefore remains unclear how this
particular condition is assessed.
The most challenging requirement for European political parties is to have
sufficient EU-wide representation. In order to be eligible for EU funding, the
Europarty must be represented in at least a quarter of the member states, either by
members of European, national or regional parliaments, or by a national member
party that has secured at least 3 per cent of the votes in the most recent EP elections.
This requirement is interpreted rather broadly: members of an assembly that is not
directly elected, such as the House of Lords, are also taken into account.
The regulatory framework contains no requirements regarding other organizational
aspects. There are no specific provisions on the modalities of membership of
European political parties; a European party can be composed of (a combination of)
national political parties, individual politicians, citizens or civil society organizations.
However, in order to reach the above-mentioned representational threshold of seven
member states, only members of parliament and national parties are considered. Nor
does the regulation encourage a strong link between a European political party and a
political group in the EP. MEPs from one political group can be affiliated with
different Europarties, and a European party can count MEPs from various political
groups.
The main consequence of these rather loose provisions is that party life at the
European level can become rather complicated and unstable. A one-to-one
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