MS13 IN THE AMERICAS HOW THE WORLD'S MOST NOTORIOUS GANG DEFIES LOGIC, RESISTS DESTRUCTION - INSIGHT CRIME
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MS13
in the Americas
How the World’s Most Notorious Gang
Defies Logic, Resists Destruction
Picture by Rodrigo Abd/AP Images
MS13 in the Americas
Table of Contents
Major Findings ..........................................................................................................3
Introduction ...............................................................................................................7
Methodology .............................................................................................................10
MS13: A Brief History...............................................................................................13
From Stoners to Deportees.............................................................................13
La eMe and the MS13 .....................................................................................16
From El Salvador to the East Coast.................................................................17
From Gang Truce to War..................................................................................18
Philosophy, Ideology and Guidelines ....................................................................22
Philosophy: El Barrio and Las Letras .............................................................22
The Ideology of the Other................................................................................24
MS13 Guidelines .............................................................................................25
Organizational Structure..........................................................................................29
Cliques ............................................................................................................29
Programs and Ruling Councils .......................................................................31
Modus Operandi........................................................................................................34
Recruitment ....................................................................................................34
Joining the Gang.............................................................................................35
Day-to-Day in the MS13..................................................................................37
Criminal Economy............................................................................................39
Use of Violence................................................................................................47
Social and Political Capital.............................................................................49
Case Studies: The Dichotomies of the MS13........................................................51
MS13: Hierarchy vs. Federation .....................................................................51
Violence: Method or Madness? ......................................................................54
Criminal Migration: Master Plan vs. Opportunism..........................................58
International Drug Trafficking: Gang Project vs. Entrepreneurism.................62
Gang Truce: Social vs. Criminal Capital..........................................................66
Policy Recommendations........................................................................................71
Annex I: The Problem With Counting the MS13.........................................................74
Annex II: Glossary.......................................................................................................77
Works Cited ...............................................................................................................80
Investigative Team....................................................................................................88
Organizations ............................................................................................................89
Major Findings
Picture by Luis Romero/AP Images
The Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) is one of the world’s largest and arguably most
violent street gangs. After relatively humble beginnings in Los Angeles in the 1980s,
it has spread to more than a half-dozen countries and become a central focus of
law enforcement in two hemispheres. In spite of these efforts, the MS13 remains a
persistent threat and shows signs of expanding its criminal portfolio. This report
attempts to explain what makes the MS13 such a difficult problem for authorities
to tackle. It focuses on assisting law enforcement’s understanding of the gang’s
criminal activities, but it includes deep discussion on the social and political issues
around the MS13. Below are our major findings.
The MS13 is a largely urban phenomenon that has cells operating in
two continents. The MS13 has between 50,000 and 70,000 members who
are concentrated in mostly urban areas in Central America or locations outside
the region where there is a large Central American diaspora. In Honduras and
Guatemala, the gang is still largely urban. In El Salvador, however, the gang has
steadily spread into more rural areas. Expansion beyond urban areas has also
happened in places in the United States, most notably in Long Island and North
Carolina, and increasingly California. The gang has appeared as well in Europe,
specifically in urban areas of Spain and Italy. The size of the gang in these settings
varies greatly and fluctuates, mostly in accordance with law enforcement efforts
and migration patterns unrelated to the gang.
The MS13 is a social organization first, and a criminal organization
second. The MS13 is a complex phenomenon. The gang is not about generating
revenue as much as it is about creating a collective identity that is constructed and
reinforced by shared, often criminal experiences, especially acts of violence and
expressions of social control. The MS13 draws on a mythic notion of community,
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 3
a team concept, and an ideology based on its bloody fight with its chief rival,
the Barrio 18 (18th Street) gang, to sustain a huge, loosely organized social and
criminal organization.
The MS13 is a diffuse organization of sub-parts, with no single leader
or leadership structure that directs the entire gang. The MS13 has two
poles of power: in Los Angeles, where it was founded, and in El Salvador, its
spiritual birthplace where many of its historic leaders reside. But the gang has no
single leader or leadership council. Instead it is a federation with layers of leaders
who interact, obey and react to each other at different moments depending on
circumstances. In general terms, most decisions are made by the individual cell,
or what is known as the “clica,” the Spanish term for clique. The highest-ranking
members in some geographic areas make up a leadership council, but not all
areas have a leadership council. In Los Angeles, the MS13 is subservient to the
prison gang known as the Mexican Mafia. In El Salvador, the gang is also run
from prison by its own leadership council. Along the East Coast of the United
States, the gang has no council, although it is takes much of its directives from
Salvadoran-based gang leaders. Because these leaders are mostly in jail, it is
exceedingly difficult for them to impose total control over the rank-and-file.
The MS13 has guidelines more than rules, which are subject to varying
interpretations. The diffuse nature of the organization has widespread
implications for how it operates. The gang has guidelines more than rules. These
guidelines are subject to haphazard interpretations and application. In other
words, this internal justice is not necessarily a strict system and often depends
more on who the leader is and who is being judged, rather the actual transgression
or the circumstances surrounding it. This inconsistent application of the rules
leads to constant internal and external conflicts and is the cause of widespread
violence wherever the gang operates.
MS13 violence is brutal and purposeful. Violence is at the heart of the MS13
and is what has made it a target of law enforcement in the United States, Central
America and beyond. It is central to the MS13’s ethos, its modus operandi, and
its evaluation and discipline of its own members. Violence also builds cohesion
and comradery within the gang’s cliques. This use of violence has enhanced the
MS13’s brand name, allowing it to expand in size and geographic reach, but it
has undermined its ability to enter more sophisticated, money-making criminal
economies. Potential partners see the gang as an unreliable, highly visible target,
and the gang’s violent spasms only reinforce this notion.
The MS13’s diffuse nature makes it hard for it to control its own
expressions of violence. The MS13’s diffuse nature has made it difficult to
curtail its violence. The gang itself has attempted to implement rules to control
the use of force. Most murders must be sanctioned from the highest levels, but
as one of our case studies illustrates, this is often a perfunctory task, reflecting
what seems to be a disregard for human life. In addition, the very system that
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 4
is designed to control the violence often leads to more violence, since failure to
carry out a sanctioned hit becomes cause for internal disciplinary action.
The MS13 is a hand-to-mouth criminal organization that depends
on control of territory to secure revenue. The gang’s lack of a centralized
leadership has kept it relatively impoverished. While it has established revenue
streams, the MS13 has a hand-to-mouth criminal portfolio. Extortion is the
single most important revenue stream for the gang in Central America, although
a significant and rising portion of the MS13’s criminal portfolio comes from
local drug peddling, especially in US cities such as Los Angeles. The gang is
also involved in prostitution, human smuggling, car theft and resale and other
criminal activities, but the gang’s revenue nearly always depends on its ability to
control territory.
The MS13 is a transnational gang, not a transnational criminal
organization (TCO). While the gang has a presence in two continents and
at least a half-dozen nations, the gang is a small, part-time role player in
international criminal schemes. In cases of international drug trafficking, for
instance, the MS13 is dependent on other criminal actors such as the Mexican
Mafia. The gang plays a similar, part-time role in other international criminal
activities such human smuggling as well. Its diffuse organizational structure and
public displays of violence are two of the main reasons why the gang has not
succeeded in transforming itself into a TCO. And while some criminal activity –
most notably the MS13’s involvement in petty drug dealing on a local level – is
driving the gang’s maturation process and leading it to new opportunities, this is
a slow process that is causing significant conflict within the gang.
El Salvador’s MS13 leaders are trying to assert more control over the
US East Coast. Some MS13 leaders, especially those operating from jails in
El Salvador, are trying to create more top-down control, and expand its social
and political influence. In El Salvador, the gang has negotiated delivering votes
to some of the country’s most powerful politicians. They have also instituted
more formal and complex command structures inside and outside of jail, and
they have emissaries in places as far away as Boston who are trying to corral the
rudimentary and undisciplined gang cliques operating along the US East Coast.
The MS13 is taking advantage of traditional migration patterns, not
sending members to set up new cells. The MS13’s efforts in El Salvador
have alarmed law enforcement officials who say the gang’s high-ranking leaders
are also moving their rank-and-file around the region, including to the United
States. But while the gang is repopulating cells and establishing new ones, the
MS13 appears to be taking advantage of circumstances, rather than actively
creating those circumstances. MS13 members migrate for the same reasons that
other migrants do, and they go to the same places. They also face many of the
same risks such as indigence, isolation, victimization, detention and deportation.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 5
This report is divided into five sections. We begin by chronicling the multi-national
history of the MS13. The group is the byproduct of war, migration and policy, and
it has a footprint in a half dozen nations. We then turn to the gang’s philosophy,
its guiding principles and ideology. The gang centers itself around the idea of
community, which is reinforced mostly via violent rituals and expressions of rage
towards outsiders and rivals.
From there, we move to organizational structure. This includes explaining the
largely misunderstood loose hierarchy of the gang and its clique system. Then we
cover modus operandi, tackling the all-important questions of recruitment, criminal
economy, use of violence, and political and social capital. Finally, we elaborate
five case studies, which address the MS13’s: 1) organizational structure; 2) use of
violence; 3) criminal migration; 4) involvement in international drug trafficking; and
5) political and social capital.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 6
Introduction
Picture by Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP Images
O n July 28, 2017, President Donald Trump traveled to Brentwood, Long Island.
The area had seen an uptick in violence related to the MS13. In April, four teenagers
had been brutally murdered in nearby Central Islip. In September, 2016, two teenage
girls had been killed in Brentwood. They were just part of a string of 17 murders
prosecutors blamed on the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS13, in the previous 18 months.
“They kidnap, they extort, they rape and they rob,” Trump said of the gang. “They
prey on children. They shouldn’t be here. They stomp on their victims, they beat
them with clubs, they slash them with machetes, and they stab them with knives.
They have transformed peaceful parks and beautiful quiet neighborhoods into blood-
stained killing fields. They’re animals.” (Associated Press and CBS News, 2017)
The MS13 is one of the largest gangs in the world. Operating in more than a half-
dozen countries across two continents, the gang has thousands of members that have
formed a loosely knit criminal and social federation with a powerful brand name. As
Trump noted, the gang is known for its violence. It is responsible for thousands of
homicides per year, many of them committed against its own members. Its brutality
has become its hallmark, leaving hacked and dismembered bodies in public parks,
rivers and ditches.
The gang’s violent activities have also become the focus of special gang units and
inter-agency task forces across the United States. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is targeting its members to find and deport violent undocumented
migrants. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is trying to undermine the
MS13’s attempts to break into transnational criminal drug market. And in El Salvador,
Honduras and Guatemala, the gang is the perennial focus of law enforcement and
prosecutors.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 7
Gang-related murders are thought to represent around 13 percent of all homicides
in the United States (National Gang Center, 2012), and upwards of 40 percent of the
homicides in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. There are no empirical studies
strictly concerning MS13-related violence, and quantifying its offenses lies beyond
the scope of this investigation, but in the areas we studied for this report, the MS13
was uniformly seen by law enforcement and civil society experts as the most, or
one of the most, violent gangs. The numerous federal and local murder cases would
appear to at least partially confirm this perception.
The MS13 is as violent with its own members as it is towards its rivals and anyone
who is perceived to cross the gang, including innocent bystanders. In the United
States, this violence seems to come in waves. For example, in Suffolk County, Long
Island, authorities blame the gang for 17 of the 45 murders in the county between
January 2016 and May 2017. (Sini, 2017) Law enforcement gang experts in the Los
Angeles area offer similar if not so specific estimates. Even where the gang has less
of a role in homicides, such as the Greater Washington, DC area, the murders they
do commit are notable for its brutal, macabre nature. (Montgomery County, 2017)
In Central America, violence is more acute and widespread, so tracking these patterns
as they relate specifically to the MS13 is more difficult. While gang-related homicides
are believed to represent a sizeable portion of the murders in El Salvador, Guatemala
and Honduras, there is little reliable empirical information to prove this theory.
(Dudley S. , Homicides in Guatemala, 2017) The one data point we do have came
during the gang truce in El Salvador from 2012 to 2013, when homicides dropped by
half after the MS13 and the Barrio 18 entered a temporary cease fire. (Gurney, 2015)
For the Trump administration, the MS13 is particularly important. The Justice
Department has made the gang a top priority, and a series of indictments in the
murder cases in Long Island and elsewhere show that it is putting law enforcement
resources towards this end. Trump has also used the gang for political purposes,
conflating the dangers of undocumented migrants in the United States with gang
violence in order to further his anti-immigration agenda.
For some, the MS13 is a transnational criminal
organization, capable of orchestrating cross-border
assassinations and trafficking illicit drugs. For others,
it is a dangerous but predictable response to abuse
and social marginalization.
“I have a simple message for every gang member and criminal alien that are
threatening so violently our people: We will find you, we will arrest you, we will jail
you and we will deport you,” Trump said in his July speech in Brentwood.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 8
Still, despite the prosecutions and the rhetoric, there is little to suggest that the
Trump administration’s response to the gang will yield better results than what
has already been tried. Since emerging in the streets near downtown Los Angeles
in the early 1980s, the MS13 has vexed authorities and resisted efforts to destroy
it. It has persisted for almost four decades without a master plan, an all powerful
leader or a reliable source of income. Its core membership consists of teenagers
who communicate mostly via text messages. Its principal communications strategy
is conveyed with spray paint. Its leaders are in jail. Most of its members did not
complete high school. (Cruz, 2017)
Yet the MS13 remains strong, some would say thriving. It is experiencing a resurgence
in areas along the US East Coast, and establishing new beachheads in rural
California and cities in Europe. (Alonso, 2016) It is also reorganizing, establishing
clear hierarchies and lines of discipline in an effort to professionalize and enter
new criminal markets. All of this while it faces down fierce government efforts to
dismantle it in the United States, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Italy (Valencia,
2016) and Spain. (Roberts, 2014)
The gang is a study in contrasts; a violent criminal group, to be sure, but also part
social and part political. It is a group that can fill basic human needs just as easily
as it can end a human life. It can move drugs over international borders, but it has
a difficult time paying its members a living wage. These divergent characteristics
explain contradictory assessments of the gang by law enforcement and gang
researchers alike. For some, it is a transnational criminal organization, capable of
orchestrating cross-border assassinations and trafficking illicit drugs. For others, it
is a dangerous but predictable response to abuse and social marginalization. As we
shall see, the gang encompasses elements of all of the above and more, which is why
it has become so difficult to eradicate.
This report focuses on the criminal enterprises the MS13 has developed. But
understanding this criminal economy requires a deep look into the gang’s history,
its core ethos, its structure and organization, and its modus operandi. The result is a
more nuanced understanding of the gang, something that goes beyond the one-sided
version offered by the president on that July day in Brentwood.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 9
Methodology
Picture by Ginnette Riquelme/AP Images
This report is part of a project financed by the United States Department of Justice’s
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) program. In 2013, the NIJ awarded a grant to
American University, which co-hosts InSight Crime, to complete a multi-disciplinary
study on the Mara Salvatrucha or MS13. The project set out to explore, among other
topics, the gang’s:
• Criminal activities
• Relationship with other criminal organizations and criminal organizations
• Modus operandi
• Use of violence
• Accumulation of social capital
• Political power
• General development and organization
• Recruitment
The research was done in El Salvador, Greater Washington, DC and Los Angeles,
and it was broken into two major components: 1) a quantitative component based
on hundreds of surveys of gang members and gang experts, supplemented by
social network analysis designed to elucidate ties between different pieces of the
organization. Results of the quantitative analyses, undertaken by criminologists at
American University and Arizona State University, are presented in papers that are
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 10currently under review in academic journals; and 2) a qualitative component based
on dozens of interviews with gang members, gang experts and stakeholders was
carried out by InSight Crime researchers. The qualitative component included field
notes from interviews with stakeholders in all three venues, additional field work in
Long Island and Houston, interviews with a wide set of actors working on gang issues,
as well as analysis of dozens of judicial cases in the United States and El Salvador,
government and media reports, and an exhaustive review of relevant secondary
literature. The findings of the qualitative research, combined with additional
reporting that InSight Crime conducted with separate funding in Honduras (InSight
Crime and ASJ, 2015) and Guatemala (Dudley S. , Homicides in Guatemala, 2017),
form the basis of this report.
In all, project researchers interviewed over 100 gang experts and over 100 gang
members, a combination of imprisoned members and those on the street. For this
report, gang members interviewed all self-identified as such. Gang experts and
stakeholders were law enforcement officials and civil society members with regular
interaction with the gang, such as religious leaders or those working in youth
prevention and other programs.
This project is subject to an Institutional Review Board protocol that protects the
anonymity of our sources. We have attempted to mitigate this by identifying the
type of gang expert consulted, distinguishing two broad categories: law enforcement
experts and civil society experts. We also make clear when more than one gang expert
expressed a particular view and, if the gang expert is engaged in law enforcement,
we indicate the government the gang expert represents. In instances where these
experts are noted in the text, we do not provide citations. Where data was gathered
by InSight Crime outside the scope of the NIJ-funded effort governed by the IRB
protocol, sources may be identified by name.
We have used case studies from judicial cases to reinforce our understanding of the
gang. We understand that these examples are not perfect representations of how
the gang works, and that there is a built-in sample bias. Prosecutors have a clear
interest in depicting the gang as a complex, sophisticated criminal group, one that
should be subject to conspiracy laws such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statute in the United States. Nonetheless, the testimonies and
experiences of the gang members and their victims in these cases help us see what
the gang is and how it works. And when this information overlaps with information
from interviews, it serves to fortify our knowledge base.
The word gang is loaded term with multiple definitions that can be used for political
purposes. (See Annex I: The Problem with Counting the MS13) For the purposes
of this report, we define a gang as: A group of people – usually young and from a
low socioeconomic background – that is made up of relatively autonomous cells,
each with a clearly identifiable leader. These cells define themselves, in part, around
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 11constant, reciprocal violence against other groups of youths. It is this conflict that
makes them a cohesive organization, and that is the means for establishing internal
hierarchies and awarding status and power.
The MS13 fits well within this definition. The gang emphasizes group cohesion
over financial revenue, and its ideology of hate separates it from other criminal
organizations we have studied. To bring this into sharp focus, it is useful to first
explore the history and development of the gang.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 12MS13: A Brief History
Picture by Luis Romero/AP Images
From Stoners to Deportees
The MS13 began in the late 1970s in Los Angeles, California, where Salvadoran
refugees were looking for more economic opportunity and fleeing a growing civil
conflict in their own country. Mostly teenagers and young adults in Rampart Village,
Pico Union, Korea Town and Westlake gathered, listened to rock music and smoked
marijuana. They called themselves “Stoners,” an homage to the music and the drugs.
The Salvadorans among them – mostly in Korea Town – formed what they called
a “clica,” or “clique,” near where Pico Boulevard crosses with Normandie Avenue.
(Ward, 2012) (Diaz, 2009) (Martínez C. a., El origen del odio, 2012)
They took on the name “Mara Salvatrucha Stoners” or MSS. (Ward, 2012) There
is much dispute about the origins of the name. “Mara” is a reference to a large,
swarming group. Some have traced it to a 1954 Charlton Heston movie “The Naked
Jungle,” which was translated as “Cuando ruge la marabunta,” or “When the Ants
Roar.” Marabunta gave way to mara, which was eventually used to refer to the large,
swarming youths forming gangs at their doorstep.
For its part, “Salva” is supposedly a reference to El Salvador. And “trucha” is a trout,
and some interpret this as referring to savviness or cunning. However, the word
“Salvatruchos” was also used to describe the Salvadorans who helped thwart William
Walker. Walker built his own mercenary army and tried to conquer parts of Central
America in the 1850s before being executed.
In some accounts (Flynn, 2017), there are also references to the MSS13, and we
obtained photos of “MSS13” graffiti from that time period. The “13” in this case was
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 13said to be a universal symbol for outlaw, according one former US law enforcement
officer; although others said it was more likely a reference to Sureños, the grouping
of all southern California gangs explained in more detail below.
The MSS members were fans of rock bands like AC/DC, Judas Priest, Led Zeppelin,
Kiss and others. Like their idols, they flashed horns with their forefinger and pinky.
They wore shorn jeans and had long hair. A tiny portion reportedly used satanic
symbols and paraphernalia, some of which remain an important part of the gang’s
symbolic repertoire. (Ward, 2012) They got into fistfights with other gangs and
were prone to disturbances, but there was little to suggest they would become an
international gang that would eventually operate in at least a half-dozen countries
around the globe.
By the mid-1980s, the MS13 was growing as a result of the steady influx of
Salvadorans fleeing what had become a full-fledged civil war in their country, and
it was transforming into something anticipating its modern form. Those entering its
ranks were equal parts fearful and curious. They sought protection from other Latino
gangs but also a means to connect with their fellow Salvadorans. Knives, machetes
and even axes soon replaced fists. Territory became more important to the gang’s
identity than music or drugs. And they expanded. What was one clique became five;
this would later expand to close to 20. It took on the Los Angeles street names that
would eventually spread into other parts of the United States and abroad: Western
and Leeward were among the first.
Rivalries emerged. The MS13’s main enemy was the Barrio 18, a gang that had been
in the area since at least the 1960s. The Barrio 18 was a rare Latino gang that accepted
many nationalities. At first, the two gangs were friendly. But in the late 1980s, for
reasons that are in dispute1, a battle broke out between them. The killing has since
spread throughout the hemisphere and has come to be a core feature of the MS13’s
ethos. Younger members of both gangs have little idea of its origin and simply accept
it as part of gang life. The gang depends on this rivalry to create cohesion and loyalty.
Some would even argue that without this rivalry, the gang would suffer an identity
crisis. (Savenije, 2009)
Authorities noticed the surge in Latino gang activity in Los Angeles, but their efforts
to quell the scourge only accelerated the learning curve and growth of the gang. Gang
injunctions and a new RICO-style state law2 in 1988 led to more and longer prison
sentences for gang members. (Greene, 2007) In jail, the gang learned new lessons
that were taken back to the street where the gang was beginning to collect fees for
1 Ward’s account, which is based on dozens of interviews with MS13 members, cites three different reasons:
1) a fight over a woman; 2) an effort by some Barrio 18 members to join the MS13; 3) a drive-by shooting by
MS13 members targeting a rival gang in which a Barrio 18 member died .
2 California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) effectively criminalizes member-
ship in a gang and allows prosecutors to “enhance” the sentences attached to crimes that are part of gang
activity.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 14illegal activities in its territory. Drug sellers were the most common target. Weekly
collections became daily collections. (Martínez C. a., El origen del odio, 2012) The
“renta,” or “rent,” as it was known, took form. It was the beginning of the gang’s
criminal economy.
Enforcement efforts also led to more deportations and gang migration within the
United States. The Northern Triangle countries of the El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras bore the brunt of these deportations. Gangs with US brand names began
appearing in the early 1990s in these countries. This process accelerated in the late
1990s and through the 2000s after changes in US laws (Saint Germain, 1996) in the
mid-1990s opened the door for massive deportations of ex-convicts back to their
countries of origin. Of the 129,726 convicted criminals deported to Central America
between 2001 and 2010, over 90 percent were sent to the Northern Triangle.
(Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2011)
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 15At the same time, the MS13 spread across the United States. The first cliques in
Washington, DC and Long Island can be traced back to the 1990s. While the Central
American version of the MS13 evolved steadily into a more menacing, somewhat
sophisticated criminal organization, the MS13 cliques on the East Coast were, and
remain, crude copies of the gangs in other parts of hemisphere. They are known
more for their penchant for violence than their criminal savvy, and they rise and fall,
often in conjunction with migration patterns, leading authorities to conflate the two
phenomena.
La eMe and the MS13
In Los Angeles, the MS13 follows a slightly different logic, one governed by a more
powerful force known as the Mexican Mafia. “La eMe” (sometimes written “La M”
or “La Eme”) has strength that belies its numbers. While it only has about 100 full-
fledged members – referred to as the “los señores” – spread mostly throughout the
California state prison system, it controls thousands of gang members inside and
outside of the jails. It achieves this by keeping gang members and others safe from
other prison gangs. Unlike the outside, where Latinos are often divided by nationality,
inside jail criminal groups are mostly divided along ethnic and racial lines. The
Mexican Mafia is the head of the Latino jail population in Southern California.
The Mexican Mafia’s umbrella is known as the Sureños. Loosely translated as
“Southerners,” or “South Siders,” the Sureños incorporated all the major Latino
gangs in southern California, including the MS13 and the Barrio 18. (Amaya, Sureños
en El Salvador: Un acercamiento antropológico a las pandillas de deportados, 2014)
Outside of prison, these gangs fight to the death. Inside, they are allies. In both spaces,
they are obliged to follow the orders of the Señores and to pay a tribute from their
licit and illicit activities. The arrangement has always been more than financial. The
MS13 assumed some of the Mafia’s internal codes, its “cholo” style and eventually
officially added 13 to its name, an homage to the letter M, which is the thirteenth
letter in the alphabet.
From the beginning, failure to follow orders or to pay tribute to the eMe resulted in
severe consequences. The eMe could “green light” the killing of a single member,
an entire clique, or an entire gang. The eMe could also quell conflict. In 1993, the
Mexican Mafia famously prohibited drive-by shootings and took other measures to
lower conflict among Latino gangs on the streets. Like a gang truce in El Salvador
nearly two decades later, the eMe-imposed truce was controversial. Many civil
society organizations viewed it positively, as a means to slow the senseless tit-for-
tat that seemed to be fueling the violence between the gangs. On the other hand,
police and other law enforcement agencies believed it was a ruse designed by the
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 16eMe to enhance its control over the local distribution of drugs. The government
later prosecuted several Mafia members for their activities during this time period.
(Greene, 2007)
The MS13’s relationship with the eMe has evolved over time. Some MS13 members
have sought to gain entry in the upper echelons of the prison-based criminal
organization with varying degrees of success. But the MS13’s efforts to graduate
from small-time street gang to big-time transnational criminal organization have
been undone time and time again. This is in part due to its diffuse organizational
structure, ever-changing leadership and haphazard way of applying the rules. And it
may help explain why El Salvador’s more disciplined, battle-hardened leadership is
starting to come to the fore.
From El Salvador to the East Coast
The MS13 in El Salvador has evolved considerably since the early 2000s. Jailed
in large numbers as the government employed what was known as “mano dura,”
or “iron fist,” security policies that criminalized gang membership or perceived
affiliation, the MS13 began to impose discipline and structure. At the behest of its
imprisoned leaders, the gang established rules – first inside the jails then outside
– that restricted members from doing certain types of drugs and forced them to cut
their hair, among other guidelines.
They also began to create what they called programs, which grouped a number of cliques
together under the same umbrella, so they could better channel communications from
the leadership, or “ranfla,” in jail to the “corredores” (“runners”), and “palabreros”
(leaders), on the streets. Its criminal economy evolved as well. With an increasingly
high number of members in jail, its costs of living and maintaining its families were
rising, so they instituted mechanisms to collect more money, which included selling
or controlling the sale of narcotics on the street.
Lastly, the MS13 spread its influence, mostly to the East Coast of the United States.
There, in Washington, DC, Maryland, Virginia, New York and New Jersey, the gang
established small, crude cliques. Some came from El Salvador and were therefore
loyal to their Salvadoran-born cliques, answering to them. Others were independent,
born in their areas of influence and donning their neighborhood names. Notably, few
of them answered to the leadership in Los Angeles.
From early on, the East Coast would be known for its spasms of public displays of
brutal violence, including the 2003 murder of Brenda Paz, an MS13 member from
Honduras turned US law enforcement informant. After luring the pregnant Paz into
Shenandoah National Park, Virginia, several gang members stabbed her dozens of
times, including in her pregnant belly. (Stockwell, 2005) The killing would lead to
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 17a crackdown, which would quell the gang for a period, as its members migrated to
different parts of the East Coast or El Salvador. Many others were arrested, but the
pattern has continued through the present. Beginning in 2012, there has been yet
another spasm of violence.
From Gang Truce to War
In Los Angeles and El Salvador, gang members have developed social and political
capital by prohibiting certain, predatory criminal activities in their areas of influence
and aligning themselves with non-governmental organizations, religious institutions
and others that work in jails and poor communities with marginalized youths and
convicted criminals. From the beginning, it has been difficult for authorities to
distinguish between when these are cynical ploys to assist the gang and when they
are legitimate efforts to quell gang activity. There have been several attempts to
prosecute former gang members who straddled that line. But in both Los Angeles and
El Salvador, these connections have helped establish the groundwork for temporary
gang truces and remain important places to stage violence prevention programs.
The El Salvador gang truce, which began in March 2012, has become a lightning
rod for debate over how best to deal with street gangs. On the surface, the truce
– brokered by a government-sanctioned mediator
Following the named Raúl Mijango and the Catholic Bishop Fabio
truce, the homicide Colindres – was an agreement between the MS13 and
the two factions of the Barrio 18 gang in El Salvador
rate dropped
to lower homicides. In return, the gang leaders would
precipitously. get transferred from the maximum-security prison in
Zacatecoluca to medium-security facilities where they
could have access to their mid-level commanders and their rank-and-file, as well
as enjoy more amenities and access to their family and friends. The agreement also
permitted them to communicate freely to their mid- and low-level gang leaders on
the streets and enforce the truce.
Within the government-sanctioned negotiating team, and indeed among some
stakeholders from the NGO and multilateral development assistance sectors, there
were some who thought it could also be the beginning of a longer process in which
gang members went through a “demobilization” of sorts. In this scenario, public-
private partnerships would finance social, educational and economic projects, which
would open the door for these gang members to engage more productively with their
communities. That effort, however, never got off the ground. This was due to the
private sector’s mistrust of the gangs, the public’s open rejection of the deal in polls,
as well as the Salvadoran government’s own ambiguous stance towards the truce.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 18From the beginning, the administration of President Mauricio Funes privately
sanctioned the truce and empowered Security Minister David Munguía Payés to
pursue talks with gangs. At the same time, it publicly distanced itself from these
negotiations and the prison transfers that followed. Although Bishop Colindres was
participating in the talks, the Catholic Church hierarchy declared its opposition to
the truce. The US embassy also sent a clear message that it was against the truce. A
further, more frank signal came from the US Treasury, which, just months after the
pact, put the MS13 on its “Kingpin List” and later named six leaders to that same
list. The gangs did not help. They continued their criminal activities, most notably
extortion.
But while the door never opened for social, economic and educational projects, the
homicide rate dropped precipitously from almost the moment the gang leaders
were slotted back into their former jails. (Katz, 2016) This drop in homicides was
undoubtedly the truce’s most important consequence. The surprisingly quick results
of this negotiation and re-insertion of these gang leaders into their prisons of choice
illustrated the level of control exerted by the gang leadership over their rank-and-file.
As shown in later sections of this report, gang cells have a measure of independence
and control over their own members. But what few analysts expected was the speed
with which the leadership could reign in its membership on the streets.
Of course, it was more complicated than a simple order from the gang leaders to their
mid-level commanders and rank-in-file. The truce’s main achievement was really a
complicated series of alliances and a plan to interrupt violence that depended on the
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 19gang leaders in the jails, and on interaction with the government brokers and the
police. During the 16 months the truce managed to lower violence, the gang leaders,
government brokers and the police were regularly communicating, ensuring that the
lower ranks and mid-level lieutenants were abiding by their commitments. When
they did, there were carrots. When they did not, there were sticks.
Discerning what those carrots and sticks were exactly, and who received them, has
been difficult. What has trickled out since the truce effectively ended in June 2013
comes from a mix of reporting and judicial cases. The case files show (La Prensa
Gráfica, 2017) how the gang leaders may have received direct cash payments or
indirect payments via businesses inside the prisons from the government as part of
a way to pay for their participation in the truce. In May 2016, Salvadoran authorities
charged 21 people with crimes ranging from moving contraband into prisons to
falsifying documents, including the former government-sanctioned broker, Raúl
Mijango; the former head of the prison system, Nelson Rauda; and several police
officials. The Attorney General’s Office says that as much as $2 million in public
funds were diverted illegally to the truce brokers, facilitators and possibly gang
leaders themselves. (Tabory, 2016) In August 2017, a judge dismissed the charges,
but the Attorney General’s Office appealed the decision. (Kiernan, 2017)
Meanwhile, following the dissolution of the truce, a series of videos and an audio
recording have revealed more interactions between gang leaders who participated
in the truce and political leaders looking to capitalize on the gang’s increasingly
evident political power. In one video revealed in March 2016 by El Faro, gang leaders
spoke with members of the opposition Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza
Republicana Nacionalista - ARENA) party in a bald-faced effort to exchange votes for
money during the 2014 presidential election. (Labrador, 2016) In an audio recording
that emerged just a few days later, a prominent member of the governing Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
- FMLN) party negotiates with gang leaders during the same time period. (Martínez
C. a., 2016) Two more videos leaked later showed FMLN officials and gang leaders
talking about up to $10 million in government-financed microcredit, presumably in
return for votes during those same presidential elections. (Martínez J. J., 2016)
The videos illustrate the de facto recognition of the gangs as a political and social
power, a process the truce appeared to have accelerated. Specifically, they show just
how much the political parties depended on the votes the gangs could mobilize (and
possibly suppress) in order to win. The 2014 presidential election may have turned on
these very votes. The gangs also negotiated directly with mayors during the following
mid-term elections. These negotiations resulted in jobs in various city halls and, in at
least one case, a criminal alliance with a mayor. (Puerta, 2017)
The truce also offered the MS13 an opportunity to reestablish control over its rank-
and-file in the streets, and reorganize the gang’s structure. Following the truce,
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 20the gang leadership created what it called “La Federación,” or “The Federation,” a
group of 30 or so leaders operating outside the jails that were given powers equal to
those inside the jails. The leaders also split the country into four geographic areas
to better channel communications, control their rank-and-file’s use of violence, and
systematically collect more revenue. Finally, they have used this more centralized
control to expand their influence in the United States, a process that is still playing
out and having powerful repercussions, especially along the East Coast.
Violence has since returned in El Salvador. Although homicides dropped in 2017,
(Clavel, InSight Crime’s 2017 Homicide Round-Up, 2018) the country’s security
situation resembles what it did during the 1980s: a low-intensity war. Death squads,
some of them connected to and involving police, are assassinating suspected gang
members in large numbers and dressing up the crime scenes as confrontations.
(Avelar, 2017) The gangs are now targeting the security forces when they are off-duty
and even in some cases their family members. (Clavel, Spike in Attacks on Security
Force Families as El Salvador Violence Declines, 2017)
The violence is pushing more people to flee to the United States, completing a vicious
circle that seems to have no end. Some of these refugees are being recruited into the
MS13 in the United States, where they have been tied to another spasm of violence
along the East Coast. Some of them are settling in Los Angeles, where the gang is
trying to revive cliques to their former glory. Communication, now easier than ever,
is increasing among and between cliques. Efforts to supply illicit drugs from the
south have picked up as well, while money and weapons are coming from the north
to help El Salvador’s MS13 fight back against the brutal police-led onslaught.
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 21Philosophy, Ideology
and Guidelines
Picture by Luis Romero/AP Images
E ven among well-informed analysts, there is no consensus about who or what the
MS13 is. To some analysts, it is an organized criminal group that has a hierarchical
structure, (Logan, 2009), specialized members, (Boraz, 2006), transnational capacity
(Sullivan, 2006) and a clear ideology that makes it something akin to an insurgency
movement. (Manwaring, 2005) To other academics and gang watchers, the MS13 is
more of a social expression of despair, (Arana, 2005) a group that commits crimes
and spreads to new territories because of necessity and social circumstances, (Wolf,
2012) (Cruz, 2017) It is one that is fed by insecurity and vulnerability of youths across
the Americas, (Amaya, Sureños en El Salvador: Un acercamiento antropológico a las
pandillas de deportados, 2014) as well as social exclusion. (Savenije, 2009)
There are, of course, features of all these extremes. The gang is both victim and
victimizer, (International Crisis Group, 2017) the result of a complex set of social,
familial, and individual circumstances. (Amaya, Los sistemas de poder, violencia e
identidad al interior de la Mara Salvatrucha 13: Una aproximación desde el sistema
penitenciario, 2011) The gang is a loosely organized social and criminal community
that at various points can be diffuse or hierarchical depending on the circumstances.
While it has rules and some codes of conduct, it is easier to understand them as a set
of general guidelines. And leaders and influential gang members have widespread
discretion on the application of these guidelines, which is a source of near-constant
tension and, in some cases, internal conflict.
Philosophy: El Barrio and Las Letras
It is important to understand that the MS13 is a mythic construct, an idea as much
as a real group, a brand name as much as a substitute family. In conversations, gang
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 22members make clear that it is centered on the
What separates the
notion of community, which they loosely refer
MS13 from other
to as “el barrio.” The words literally mean “the
criminal organizations neighborhood,” but it is more a reference to its
and gives it durability most intimate circle. The idea of el barrio is not
is that the construction exclusive to the MS13. Other gangs also refer to
and the maintenance of el barrio, which has become shorthand for Latino
el barrio is fundamental gang. In the case of the MS13, gang members
to all gang members. also use the term interchangeably with the word
“mara,” the gang’s shorthand for itself.
El barrio encompasses the best and the worst of the gang, an expression of its bipolar
personality that is the defining characteristic of this group. El barrio is a physical
space. It has borders, and the gang marks those borders with graffiti and other public
symbols. (Savenije, 2009) It posts its members at the edges of these borders to ensure
others do not encroach on its space, and members protect this space with their lives,
if necessary. It draws revenue from this territory and, in some cases, builds social
and political ties with its residents, even while it is victimizing them.
But el barrio is also psychological. What seems to bind all these groups is that they
are looking for a sense of place: a space where they can get protection and nurturing
– both positive and negative; a space where others are supportive of one another; a
space it can call its own, henceforth its near constant references and symbols that
beckon the homeland. That space is what they call el barrio.
What separates the MS13 from other criminal organizations and gives it durability
is that the construction and the maintenance of el barrio is fundamental to all gang
members. Efforts that put anything above this idea run into stiff resistance. This is
as tricky as it sounds and strikes at the heart of the key dichotomy of this gang. The
MS13 is not about criminal proceeds as much as it is about creating a community
that is constructed and reinforced by shared, often criminal experiences, especially
acts of violence and expressions of social control. Criminal activities or deeds need
therefore to service that community, not the individuals in that community.
The MS13 has put a name to how this works in practice. The gang members refer to
it as “las letras.” Las letras is literally a reference to the letters M and S (as opposed
to “the numbers,” or “los números,” which is what they use to refer to the Barrio 18
gang). As one gang member described to us, “We owe everything to the letters. We go
only as far as the letters allow us.” (“A las letras nos debemos, llegamos hasta donde
las letras nos dejen.”)
The phrase encapsulates the MS13’s dichotomy. They are stronger when they work
as a group, rather than as individuals. In the best of circumstances, they protect and
even support one another. And while they celebrate individual achievements, they
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 23are always reminded that any individual gain comes because they are part of that
group. In this way, it is not too different from a sports organization that preaches that
the team comes first. (Savenije, 2009) In the gang, individuals who place themselves
above the team are considered counterproductive, even traitorous, and must be
disciplined.
But the second part of the phrase – “We go only as far as the tetters allow us” – is
seemingly contradictory to the first. Going only as far as “the letters allow us” is a
reference to the counterculture spirit of the gang. In other words, the gang permits
a certain amount of independence, even entrepreneurism, if it reflects well on the
MS13’s brand. In practice, what this means is that individual members can enter
commercial arrangements and commit certain crimes without necessarily seeking
approval. In fact, they have a duty to obtain tribute for the gang, which often means
taking violent or coercive actions against others.
However, if gang members overstep their bounds, they can face severe disciplinary
action because they have besmirched the gang’s reputation and may have put gang
members at risk. The same can happen to the gang’s individual group, the “clica,” or
“clique,” which often faces a similar dilemma: pay homage to the gang by expanding
your influence, increasing your revenue, recruiting more members or exerting social
control, but in the process do not overstep your bounds – go only as far as “the
letters” permit. These are the grey areas in which gang members kill and get killed in
startling numbers.
The Ideology of the Other
The letters set the gang apart from other gangs and criminal organizations. The letters
are theirs and theirs alone. Building this loyalty is not easy and relies largely on
creation of an enemy, a life-long foe around which the gang can coalesce. (Savenije,
2009) That foe is the Barrio 18 gang.
The Barrio 18, sometimes referred to as 18th Street, is in many ways a mirror image
of the MS13. (Savenije, 2009) Like the MS13, it was formed by Latino migrants on
the streets of Los Angeles, many of whom fled civil conflicts and economic upheaval
in Latin America. The gang was once an MS13 ally. The two reportedly socialized
and operated in some of the same areas in the city in relative peace. But that peace
was broken, and the chains of retribution quickly spread, in part because of their
familiarity with one another. (Martínez C. a., El origen del odio, 2012)
Over time, the Barrio 18 became not just a useful foil, but the useful foil: a reason to
join, a reason to fight, a reason to celebrate when one of the other gang’s members was
dead. That fight built cohesion and comradery, and eventually became an ideology in
and of itself. Las letras vs. los números is the centering point for the gang. (Savenije,
2009)
InSight Crime and CLALS / MS13 in the Americas 24The vilification of the Barrio 18 is now integrated into the recruiting and training
of MS13 members. To enter the gang, many recruits are ordered to kill a “chavala,”
roughly translated as “punk,” the MS13’s word for a rival gang member. It is also part
of the indoctrination, mixed into the everyday language of its members, and at the
top of its rulebook. MS13 members, for example, are not allowed to speak or write
the word “eighteen.” Radicalism is viewed favorably and radical action towards the
enemy is rewarded, even if it is counterproductive for the gang and puts others at
risk. This is apparent in cases where extreme acts of violence are committed against
anyone who interacts, even on a superficial level, with the rival gang.
Hatred of the Barrio 18 is the glue that holds the MS13 together. (Amaya, Los
sistemas de poder, violencia e identidad al interior de la Mara Salvatrucha 13: Una
aproximación desde el sistema penitenciario, 2011) The gang has used it to build its
brand across two continents, and it may help us understand the durability of these
two gangs more than any other single factor. But the obsession with the other gang
has also pulled the MS13 to other end of the pendulum of criminal organizations:
While some criminal groups focus on obtaining and developing reliable revenue
streams, the MS13 is focused on developing new ways to undermine and destroy the
other gang. Any action, discussion or reconciliation is suspicious, even traitorous,
and will cause internal rifts.
MS13 Guidelines
The MS13’s overarching philosophy and ideology keeps the gang centered, but it
cannot keep order, so over the years, the gang has established a set of guidelines.
(Amaya, Los sistemas de poder, violencia e identidad al interior de la Mara Salvatrucha
13: Una aproximación desde el sistema penitenciario, 2011) These guidelines cover
the gang’s most persistent problems. Some of them deal with specific issues, but they
reflect the gang’s need for discipline, trust, loyalty and commitment, as well as its
desire for social control over its own members and those in its territory.
No Theft
The MS13 prohibits theft from the gang. This is, in part, because the gang’s criminal
economy is based mostly on extortion, or what they call “rent.” Individuals in the
cliques carry out this extortion, making this rule an indispensable part of the MS13
handbook. Technically, all extortions need to be decided upon and communicated to
the clique leaders. These leaders then transmit this information and a percentage of
this revenue to their bosses – in most cases, the heads of what are called “programs”
– who then pass a percentage to their bosses, who are referred to as “ranfleros,” or
“shot-callers.” (For more on these terms, see the section: Organizational Structure)
In some cases, all theft is also prohibited in the areas where the gang operates, and
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