I . STARTING SITUATION: WORLD WAR I, END OF THE MONARCHY, FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA, AND THE TREATY OF SAINT-GERMAIN-EN-LAYE 1914-19

21

       I . STARTING SITUATION: WORLD WAR I,
     END OF THE MONARCHY, FOUNDING OF THE
     REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA, AND THE TREATY OF
            SAINT-GERMAIN-EN-LAYE 1914–19

 1 . THE ABDICATION OF THE KAISER, “REPUBLIC OF GERMAN-
 AUSTRIA”, PROHIBITION AGAINST THE ANSCHLUSS, AND THE
        FOUNDING OF A STATE AGAINST ITS WILL 1918–19

The military defeat in the autumn of 1918 furthered the collapse of the Habsburg
Monarchy. Czechs (October 28), Croats, Serbs, Slovenes (October 29), and Poles
(November 11) proclaimed their independence and set up their own states. Hun-
gary declared the real union with Austria to be ended (October 31). In the just
mentioned “People’s Manifesto” from October 16, 1918, Emperor Charles an-
nounced the conversion of the monarchy into a federal state for the western half of
the empire, while Hungary was not rattled about the territorial unity of the crown
of St. Stephen. Charles’ initiative was not to be accepted, but rather it would only
accelerate the collapse and lead to the formation of national assemblies by the
individual nationalities.1
    On October 21, 1918, the predominantly German-speaking members of the
Imperial Assembly (Reichsrat), which had last been elected in 1911, met in the
Estates House of Lower Austria (the Niederösterreichisches Landeshaus) in
Vienna as a provisional national assembly. Out of 516 originally elected represent-
atives, 208 were left: 65 christian socials with Jodok Fink, 38 social democrats
with Karl Seitz, 100 German Liberals (Deutschliberale) and Greater Germans
(Großdeutsche) with Franz Dinghofer as the leader, and five independents. Nine
 1
     Neue Freie Presse, Oktober 18, 1918, Nr. 19450, 1; Helmut RUMPLER, Das Völkermani-
     fest Kaiser Karls vom 16. Oktober 1918. Letzter Versuch zur Rettung des Habsburgerreiches,
     München 1966; Rudolf NECK (Hrsg.), Österreich im Jahre 1918. Berichte und Dokumente,
     München 1968, 64–68; to the “Finis Austriae”, Völkermanifest and the “successor states” see
     Lothar HÖBELT, “Stehen oder Fallen?” Österreichische Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg, Wien
     – Köln – Weimar 2015, 262–274; Matthias STICKLER, Abgesetzte Dynastien. Strategien
     konservativer Beharrung und pragmatischer Anpassung ehemals regierender Häuser nach
     der Revolution von 1918 – Das Beispiel Habsburg, in: Günther SCHULZ – Markus A. DEN-
     ZEL (Hrsg.), Deutscher Adel im 19.und 20. Jahrhundert. Büdinger Forschungen zur Sozialge-
     schichte 2002 und 2003 (Deutsche Führungsschichten in der Neuzeit 26), St. Katharinen 2004,
     397–444.

22                                    I. Starting Situation

days later, on October 30, as the actual moment of birth, they elected a State
Council (Staatsrat) as an executive committee which appointed a State Govern-
ment under the Social Democrat Karl Renner for the remaining German-speaking
territory. It was a stroke of luck: as the simple leader of the State Chancellery,
he took over as chairman of the cabinet, called himself the “State Chancellor”,
rejected revolutionary violence, and stood for political compromises in the sense
of a Grand Coalition.2
    In the course of the war, the question of nationality became increasingly im-
portant. Multiethnic large armies fought on all fronts, including Australians and
New Zealanders. Political lobbies of the nationalities began to make ever stronger
demands in Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Vladimir Iljitsch
Lenin’s demands on October 27 (November 9), 1917 and those of Woodrow Wil-
son on January 8, 1918 for the right to self-determination were strong signals, if
not buzzwords of propaganda, but they had a great political and serious effect.
Therefore, in October 1918, all nationalities of Austria-Hungary invoked this right
of self-determination – including the “German-Austrians” (Deutschösterreicher).
The October 21 and 30 can therefore be seen as the hours of birth of the nation
“Deutsch-Österreich”.
    Names for the new state made the rounds in various drafts which today would
be unimaginable: “German Mountain Empire”, “German Borderland”, “Ger-
man Peaceland”, or “Loyaltyland” (“Deutsches Bergreich”, “Deutschmark”,
“Deutsches Friedland”, or “Treuland”). In the first instance the term “Austria”
was avoided. The greater Germans (Großdeutsche) but also the social democrats
understood that to mean the monarchy, while the christian socials still sympa-
thized with it. It was thanks to the latter that the name “Austria” did not perish
completely and was found again in the title of the state “German Austria”. Thus
the name would be established for the Alpine republic for the new state “accord-
ing to the will of the German people”.3
    Aside from the Renner government, Emperor Charles and his Prime Minister,
Heinrich Lammasch, were at first still in their respective positions. On October
31, the state colors of red-white-red were established, as were provisional state
coats of arms: one with a city tower provided with a hammer in a wreath of rye
and another with an eagle with a wall crown and a hammer and sickle in its talons.
The broken chains only followed after 1945. The armistice of Villa Giusti that was
still concluded with Italy by the imperial government on November 3, 19184 was

 2
     Walter RAUSCHER, Karl Renner. Ein österreichischer Mythos, Wien 1995, Siegfried NASKO
     – Johannes REICHL, Karl Renner. Zwischen Anschluß und Europa, Wien 2000; Richard
     SAAGE, Der erste Präsident. Karl Renner – eine politische Biografie, Wien 2016.
 3
     Robert KRIECHBAUMER – Michaela MAIER – Maria MESNER – Helmut WOHNOUT
     (Hrsg.), Die junge Republik. Österreich 1918–19, Wien 2018.
 4
     Johann RAINER, Der Waffenstillstand von Villa Giusti am 3. November 1918, in: Karl I. Ein
     Kaiser sucht den Frieden, Innsbruck 1996, 1–12.

1. The Abdication of the Kaiser and State against Its Will               23

not even taken note of by the national assembly. The House of Habsburg had not
only abdicated in practical terms, it also no longer had any credit with regard to
domestic policy.5
    On November 11, 1918, the at first reluctant Charles renounced “any partici-
pation in the administration of the state” and signed a declaration in Schönbrunn
Palace according to which the decision was to be recognized “which affected
German-Austria regarding the future form of its state”. The people had supposed-
ly “taken over the government through its representatives”. He therefore relieved
the Lammasch Government of its duties. In the evening, Charles decamped to
Eckartsau Palace, which was still the private property of the Habsburgs. But in
the Feldkirch Manifesto of March 23–24, 1919 on his way into exile, he revoked
the renunciation. The Habsburg Laws of April 3 thereupon immediately provid-
ed for the sharp banishment from the country and a dispossession of property.
Charles went into Swiss exile and still undertook two attempts at restoration in
Hungary. He died in 1922 on Madeira.6
    As a result of a resolution by the Provisional National Assembly, the “Re-
public of German-Austria” (“Deutschösterreich” or “Deutsch-Österreich”) was
proclaimed at 3:00 P.M. on November 12, 1918 from the steps of the Parliament
building on the Ring Road in Vienna before a gigantic crowd of people. Renner,
in the presence of the three co-presidents, Franz Dinghofer, Karl Seitz, and the
Prelate Johann Nepomuk Hauser, proclaimed the new Republic in this way. De-
cisive steps for the formation of the state were decided upon by a law on the form
of the state and the government which was accepted with only two votes against.
According to Article 1, the “Republic of German-Austria” as a new state was to
be a “democratic republic”, and according to Article 2, it was to be a “component
of the German Republic” (“Bestandteil der Deutschen Republik”). Thus the de-
sire was manifested for Anschluss with the German Reich.7
    With the proclamation of the democratic republic and the Anschluss to Ger-
many, the national revolution was driven forward into a social revolution. In Arti-
cle 9 of the law that was passed on November 12 on the form of the state and the
government, the fundamental principles of voting rights were also established.
They were to be based upon “proportional representation and upon the general,
equal, direct, and secret right to vote of all citizens without regard to sex”. That
was only achieved by the United Kingdom in 1928 and by France even later in
 5
     Manfried RAUCHENSTEINER, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonar-
     chie, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2013, 1051, 1156 (Footnote 2520).
 6
     Matthias STICKLER, „Éljen a Király!“ Die Restaurationspolitik Kaiser Karls von Österreich
     gegenüber Ungarn 1918–1921, in: Ungarn-Jahrbuch. Zeitschrift für interdisziplinäre Hunga-
     rologie Bd. 27 (2004), München 2005, 41–79.
 7
     Christian NESCHWARA, Die Entstehung der Republik. Einleitung: Von der “alten” Monar-
     chie zur “neuen” Republik, in: IDEM – Michael RAINER (Hrsg.), 100 Jahre Republik Öster-
     reich. Die provisorische Nationalversammlung und ihre Rolle bei der Entstehung der Republik
     Deutschösterreich, Graz 2018, 11–53.

24                                    I. Starting Situation

the penultimate year of World War II, 1944. Women first went to the polls with
the right to vote on February 16, 1919. On March 4, 1919, women took their seats
in the constituent National Assembly for the first time: Anna Boschek, Emmy
Freundlich, Adelheid Popp, Gabriele Proft, Therese Schlesinger, Amalie Seidel,
and Maria Tusch for the social democrats and Hildegard Burjan for the christian
socials. In 1927, Olga Rudel-Zeynek was elected speaker of the Bundesrat, the
first time in world history that a woman led a parliament. An eight-hour work-
day, unemployment insurance, vacation for workers, a Chamber of Labor, factory
committees, tenants’ protection, and the improvement of collective bargaining as
well as the protection of women and children through the social state order were
regulated by Ferdinand Hanusch, founder of the Chamber of Labour and influ-
ential co-designer of Austrian social policy in the First Republic. On October 1,
1920, the Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung) was accepted, which had been
worked on substantially by Hans Kelsen, constitutional, international law scholar
and legal theorist.8
    The Provisional National Assembly made claims for the areas of the “kingdoms
and lands that were represented in the Reichsrat” which were inhabited by Ger-
man-speaking segments of the population, that is, the western part of the former
monarchy. It was not, however, successful in reuniting the territories of the earlier
empire with a German-speaking majority. South Tyrol had already been occupied
by Italian troops since November 3, 1918, and in 1920 it was completely annexed
by the Kingdom of Italy. The areas of Bohemia and Moravia that were inhabited
by a majority of German-speakers had been occupied by Czechoslovakia and,
just like the Sudeten areas and Feldsberg (Valtice) and Gmünd-Böhmzeil (České
Velenice) in Lower Austria, they came to the new republic whose capital was
Prague. The Carinthian areas of the Mießtal (Meža Valley) and Unterdrauburg
(Dravograd) became part of Slovenia, and the Kanaltal with Tarvis (Val Canale
with Tarvisio) that had been occupied by Italy since November 1918 was awarded
to Rome. In late October 1918, Lower Styria (Untersteiermark, or Slovenska Šta-
jerska) joined the newly formed State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs which would
later become Yugoslavia (1929). “German Western Hungary” (“Deutsch-West-
ungarn”), on the other hand, was awarded to Austria in 1921 and affiliated in the
autumn. But as a result of a disputed plebiscite, the area of Ödenburg (Šopron)
remained with Hungary.9
 8
     Tamara EHS (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen. Eine politikwissenschaftliche Einführung, Wien 2009;
     Thomas OLECHOWSKI, Hans Kelsen und die österreichische Verfassung, in: Aus Politik und
     Zeitgeschichte 34–35 (2018), 18–24.
 9
     Stefan MALFÉR, Wien und Rom nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Österreichisch-italienische
     Beziehungen 1919−1923 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Öster-
     reichs 66), Wien – Graz – Köln 1978; Hans HAAS, Südtirol 1919, in: Handbuch der Neuer-
     en Geschichte Tirols, Bd. 2: Zeitgeschichte, 2. Teil: Wirtschaft und Geschichte, Innsbruck
     1993, 95–130; IDEM, Die Wiener Regierung und die Frage Kärnten 1918–1920, in: Kärnt-
     en – Volksabstimmung 1920. Voraussetzungen, Verlauf, Folgen (Studien zur Geschichte und

1. The Abdication of the Kaiser and State against Its Will                25

   New provincial authorities were also formed in the provinces. As early as on
October 21, 1918, the representatives of the autonomous provincial authorities
met in the Estates House of Lower Austria (Niederösterreichisches Landeshaus)
in Vienna. In an analogous manner to the Provisional National Assembly, “provi-
sional provincial assemblies” were set up for the provinces. The newly constituted
provinces declared their accession to the new state, but Tyrol only for the moment
(“now”). It was and remained divided, though.10
   The acceptance and approval of the secret Treaty of London that was conclud-
ed on April 26, 1915 (between the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Russia)
before the entry of Italy into the First World War on May 23, 191511 and which
provided for the granting of Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass to Italy12 by the Allied
and associated powers in 1919 was an unmistakable signal for the geographical
principle and against the demographic-ethnographic principle and thus also an
antidemocratic move.13
   The victorious powers prohibited both the Anschluss and the state name of
“German-Austria”. A three-day period of national mourning was thereupon de-
clared. On September 6, 1919, the constituent National Assembly had officially
protested against the peace treaty that was to be expected, which supposedly de-
nied “the German-Austrian people” the right of self-determination and its “dear-
est wish”: the “economic, cultural, and political necessity of life” of “unifica-
tion with the German Motherland”. The economic and financial conditions were
supposedly “unworkable” and “politically disastrous”. With this, the idea of the
“non-viability” of Austria was born, which was to turn out to be a persistent myth.

      Gesellschaft in Slowenien, Österreich und Italien 1), Wien – München – Kleinenzersdorf 1981,
      29–58.
 10
      Richard SCHOBER, Die Tiroler Frage auf der Friedenskonferenz von Saint-Germain
      (Schlern-Schriften 270), Innsbruck 1982; Michael GEHLER, Tirol im 20. Jahrhundert. Vom
      Kronland zur Europaregion, Innsbruck – Bozen – Wien 2008, second revised and updated
      new edition Innsbruck – Wien 2009; recently: Marion DOTTER – Stefan WEDRAC, Der
      hohe Preis des Friedens. Die Geschichte der Teilung Tirols 1918–1922, Innsbruck – Wien 2018,
      161–190; Oswald ÜBEREGGER, Im Schatten des Krieges. Geschichte Tirols 1918–1920,
      Paderborn 2019, 114–136.
 11
      Andreas GOTTSMANN – Romano UGOLINI – Stefan WEDRAC (Hrsg.), Österreich-Ungarn
      und Italien im Ersten Weltkrieg. Austria-Ungheria e Italia nella Grande Guerra (Österreichis-
      che Akademie der Wissenschaften, Historisches Institut beim Österreichischen Kulturforum
      in Rom/Publikationen des Historischen Institutes beim Österreichischen Kulturforum in Rom/
      Abhandlungen 18), Wien 2019.
 12
      Rolf STEININGER, 1918–1919. Die Teilung Tirols, in: Georg GROTE – Hannes OBERMAIR
      (Eds.), A Land on the Threshold. South Tyrolean Transformations, 1915–2015, Oxford – Berne
      – New York 2017, 3–25: 6.
 13
      ÜBEREGGER, Im Schatten des Krieges, 118–125.

26                                    I. Starting Situation

1919: Austrian delegation in St. Germain-en Laye with Karl Renner (standing at the center in the
 front row with hat) in the group with the other members of the delegation to the “peace treaty”
                                   of Saint-Germain-en-Laye

None of the objections or protests was of any help at all. On September 10, 1919,
Renner, as the leader of the Austrian delegation in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, had
to sign the “peace dictate” that was driven “by greed and hatred”, which carried
in it the seed for new conflicts in Europe. Just as with all of the vanquished states,
Austria was not heard. Only written submissions were allowed. The small state
had imposed upon it a share of the blame for the war, the “prohibition against
Anschluss”, and formally also reparations, even though in practical terms, those
could not and did not have to be paid.14
    Consent had to be given to the name of the state, “Republic of Austria”, that
was demanded by the victorious powers and its independence from Germany;
otherwise, no peace agreement would have been possible. The changes that were
imposed had to be accepted by the National Assembly with a law on the form of
the state of October 21, 1919. It was then also established that the “Republic of
German-Austria” under the new name of the “Republic of Austria” was not a legal
successor to the former imperial Austria. After the demobilization took effect,
 14
      Walter RAUSCHER, Karl Renner, ein österreichischer Mythos, Wien 1995; Siegfried NASKO
      – Johannes REICHL, Karl Renner. Zwischen Anschluß und Europa, Wien 2000; Klaus KOCH
      – Walter RAUSCHER – Arnold SUPPAN – Elisabeth VYSLONZIL (Hrsg.), Von Saint-Ger-
      main zum Belvedere. Österreich und Europa 1919–1955 (Außenpolitische Dokumente der Re-
      publik Österreich 1918–1938/Sonderband), Wien 2007; Siegfried NASKO, Karl Renner. Zu
      Unrecht umstritten? Eine Wahrheitssuche, Salzburg – Wien 2016.

1. The Abdication of the Kaiser and State against Its Will           27

compulsory military service was abolished and only a thirty thousand man army
was permitted.
    With the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which in
Austria was consistently called the “state treaty” (Staatsvertrag) on the official
side, its Article 88 became a reality: the independence from Germany was to be
“irrevocable”. In Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich already
had to previously recognize the independence of Austria and was obligated to
“absolutely […] respect it”.15
    With Versailles, Saint-Germain was practically decided in advance. Versailles
was also far more important for the victorious powers than Saint-Germain was.
The shadow of the German question was to repeatedly fall upon Austria. The new
Republic of Austria which had been thusly compelled to its own good fortune
owed its existence to the demands by the victorious powers, above all France, to
hinder a new, overly powerful Germany. The legendary Austrian publicist Hell-
mut Andics16 spoke of “the state that no one wanted”, and Viennese historian
Thomas Angerer cited the “foreign foundation of Austrian independence”.17
    In the law of the Republic of Austria of October 21, 1919 on the form of the
state, it unequivocally stated in Article 3 that in the implementation of the State
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the legal provision up until that point that
“German-Austria is a component of the German Reich” was annulled. But even in
1920, Renner formulated a national anthem “German-Austria, You Lovely Land”
(Deutschösterreich, du herrliches Land) which was to retain the no longer official
name for the country. It did not, however, become official. The “Social Demo-
cratic Workers’ Party of German-Austria” (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter-Partei
Deutschösterreichs) continued to use its name, though. It dreamed of an all-Ger-
man socialist revolution which was in fact to arrive in very different form, namely
as a German nationalist and national socialist movement in 1938 with the tempo-
rary end of Austria. At first, that was not at all perceived as being overly difficult,
since it had been a state against its will in 1918. It would only be a success story
much later. The social democratic party conference in Austria did recognize the
risks that threatened Austria’s sovereignty in a timely fashion, and after Hitler’s
rise to power in Germany, it deleted the paragraphs on Anschluss from the party
platform on October 30, 1933.18
 15
      Michael GEHLER – Thomas OLECHOWSKI – Stefan WEDRAC – Anita ZIEGERHOFER
      (Hrsg.), Der Vertrag von Saint-Germain 1919 im Kontext der europäischen Nachkriegsord-
      nung (Sonderband der Beiträge zur österreichischen Rechtsgeschichte), Wien 2019; Klaus
      SCHWABE, Versailles. Das Wagnis eines demokratischen Friedens 1919–1923, Paderborn
      2019, 176–181: 184, 187.
 16
      Hellmut ANDICS, Der Staat, den keiner wollte. Österreich 1918–1938, Wien 1962.
 17
      Thomas ANGERER, Frankreich und die Österreichfrage. Historische Grundlagen und Leitli-
      nien 1945–1955, phil. Diss., Universität Wien 1996, 27–33.
 18
      Fritz KAUFMANN, Sozialdemokratie in Österreich. Idee und Geschichte einer Partei. Von
      1889 bis zur Gegenwart, Wien – München 1978, 275–293; Helmut KONRAD, Sozialdemokratie

28                                     I. Starting Situation

                         2 . ON THE EVE OF CATASTROPHE

Breathtaking developments set in at the turn of the twentieth century, with psy-
choanalysis shedding light on the dark side of the human soul, physics revealing
the secret of atoms, art detaching itself from objects, and women demanding the
right to vote. A “spiral of infinite forces” came into existence, as Philipp Blom
showed in his book The Vertigo Years: Change and Culture in the West, 1900–
1914.19 In addition to artistic, technical, and scientific innovations, a cult of the
soldier and a spirit of irrationality also prevailed at the same time. The increase in
defense budgets20 which all European Great Powers carried out in the second half
of the nineteenth century, the expansion of rifle clubs, the use of young men for
the military, and general compulsory military service all created a comprehensive
societal militarization and already generated a mood of war during peacetime.
Within that context, the degrees and consequences of increased modern arma-
ment technology as results of industrialization was underestimated.
    The younger generation in the Habsburg Empire no longer had any memories
of war, or if they did, it was only of one battle, such as the Battle of Königgrätz
from 1866,21 which was in fact already five decades before. Militarism and na-
tionalism triumphed over internationalism and liberalism in the summer of 1914.
Social democracy veered over to the “Fatherland”. The former anarchist and so-
cialist, Benito Mussolini, pled for Italy’s entry into the war. The French pacifist
and friend of Germany, Jean Jaurès, was shot dead in his own country on July 31,
1914 by a nationalist fanatic. The potential for diplomatic and political mediation
was too modest, and in people’s minds, the war was already underway.
    Laborers, artists, professors, and university students were enthusiastic. The
revolutionary artist Oskar Kokoschka enlisted voluntarily and was made a re-
serve officer with a dragoon regiment. The violinist Fritz Kreisler hurried from
a health spa in Switzerland to his regiment in Styria, where he gave a concert in
an officer’s uniform. As late as 1916, Arnold Schönberg composed the march Die
Eiserne Brigade (“The Iron Brigade”).22 The war that was longed for was to be a
liberating force from conventions that had been handed down and finally clear the
way for the modern era as a cleansing “storm of steel” according to Ernst Jünger.23

      und Anschluss. Historische Wurzeln, Anschluss 1918 und 1938. Nachwirkungen (Schriften-
      reihe des Ludwig Boltzmann Instituts für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung), Zürich – Frank-
      furt/Main – New York 1978.
 19
      Philipp BLOM, Der taumelnde Kontinent. Europa 1900–1914, München 2009, 453–476.
 20
      For a contemporary observation, see: H. W. WILSON, The growth of the world’s armaments,
      in: The Nineteenth Century 43 (1898), 706–716: 707.
 21
      Klaus-Jürgen BREMM, Bismarcks Krieg gegen die Habsburger, Darmstadt 2016, 243–281.
 22
      RAUCHENSTEINER, Der Erste Weltkrieg, 85–118.
 23
      Ernst JÜNGER, In Stahlgewittern. Aus dem Tagebuch eines Stoßtruppführers, Leipzig 1920
      (self published), 46th edition, Stuttgart 2008.

2. On the Eve of Catastrophe                                  29

The ecstatic desire for societal catharsis was quickly followed by the sobering up
in blood-soaked graves of riflemen.
    In world politics, enormous shifts in power by new overseas powers had al-
ready been indicated: in 1898, the United States of America (USA) destroyed the
Spanish world empire and climbed to the level of a world power, while in 1905,
Japan defeated the Russian Tsarist Empire. In Europe, peace no longer reigned
even before 1914. Vienna had provoked the Bosnia crisis in 1908, and Berlin, after
1905–06, stoked the second Morocco crisis in 1911. Two wars in the Balkans in
1912–13 clearly showed the instability of the European system of states. The shots
in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 which fatally struck the heir to the throne, Archduke
Ferdinand, and his wife were not the cause of the war, but rather they formed the
pretext for it, which was erroneously still viewed in Vienna as a third Balkan War.
Mobilizations and declarations of war swiftly followed. As a result of the alliance
configurations of the Entente Cordiale (France and the United Kingdom) and the
Triple Entente (France, the United Kingdom, and Russia) against the Dual Alli-
ance (the German Reich and Austria-Hungary) and the Triple Alliance (the Ger-
man Reich, Austria-Hungary, and Italy), within three weeks Austria-Hungary,
Belgium, France, the German Reich, Japan, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom all found themselves in a state of war, while Bulgaria,
Romania, Italy, Portugal, Greece, the United States, and China followed in sub-
sequent years. Disagreement between the European dynasties that were related
and most closely associated with each other was followed by the collapse of their
empires: the Tsarist Empire, the German Reich, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the
Ottoman Empire all fell between 1917 and 1922.24
    ‘We all slid into the war,’ British Prime Minister David Lloyd George25 lat-
er commented on the events. Christopher Clark argued that the Europeans had

 24
      Fritz FELLNER, Der Zerfall der Donaumonarchie in weltgeschichtlicher Perspektive, in:
      Heidrun MASCHL – Brigitte MAZOHL-WALLNIG (Hrsg.), Fritz FELLNER. Vom Dreibund
      zum Völkerbund. Studien zur Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen 1882–1919, Wien
      – München 1994, 240–249; Mathias STADELMANN, Strukturprobleme, persönliches Ver-
      sagen oder doch nur Kontingenz? Das Ende des russischen Kaiserreiches; Ewald FRIE, The
      End of the German Empire; Matthias STICKLER, The End of the Habsburg Monarchy, all in:
      Michael GEHLER – Robert ROLLINGER – Philipp STROBL (Eds.), The End of Empires.
      Decline, Erosion and Implosion, Wiesbaden 2021 forthcoming; Arnold SUPPAN, L’Impero
      asburgico. Lineamenti essenziali e bilanci, in: Brigitte MAZOHL – Paolo POMBENI (a curi
      di), Minoranze negli imperi. Popoli fra identità nazionale e ideologia imperiale, Bologna 2012,
      295–327; Şevket PAMUK, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge 2000;
      Douglas A. HOWARD, Das Osmanische Reich 1300–1924, Darmstadt 2018, 352–411.
 25
      The original quotation “Europe slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war”, see
      David LLOYD GEORGE, War Memoirs, Vol. 1, London 1933, 32; Michael KINNEAR, The
      Fall of Lloyd George. The Political Crisis of 1922, London 1973; John CAMPBELL, Lloyd
      George: The Goat in the Wilderness 1922–1931, London 1977; Roy HATTERSLEY, David
      Lloyd George. The Great Outsider, London 2010.

30                                       I. Starting Situation

gotten pulled into the war like “sleepwalkers”.26 One of the most significant histo-
rian for the history of Austria in the twentieth century, Manfried Rauchensteiner,
demonstrated in his monumental work on the First World War that the desire for
a preventive war was very broadly widespread in political and military circles in
the Cisleithanian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the war that was
declared against Serbia on July 28, 1914, it was accepted at the top in Vienna by
Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtold and Chief of General Staff Conrad
von Hötzendorf that Russia would also get involved. The emperor wanted the war
and rejected a ceasefire up to his death in 1916. Behind this desire was also the ex-
pectation of overcoming the domestic weakness of the monarchy and revitalizing
the quasi-existence of the neo-absolutist order of 1859.27
    In any case, the desire for war was also broadly widespread in the other me-
tropolises of Europe. The European powers did not “slide into” a misfortune (un-
intentionally and unforeseen, Lloyd George), nor did they stagger like “sleep-
walkers” (blindly and unsuspectingly) into a “tragedy” (Clark) with regard to the
consequences.28
    The totalization of the war with armies of millions, the inclusion of non-com-
batants, the high number of civilian deaths, the grinding war of attrition at Verdun,
at the Somme, at Isonzo, and in the mountains; artillery duels with an anonymous
long-distance effect, and the use of poison gas such as in Ypres were escalations
of completely dehumanized warfare which were still inconceivable before 1914,
and much of that anticipated what was to be repeated in World War II.

          3 . THE SUMMER OF 1914 AND DEEPER-SEATED CAUSES

In many cities in Europe, a short-lived feeling of the “liberation from endless
boredom”29 prevailed in the summer of 1914, as the young Hans Jonas, later a
convinced Zionist and philosophical mentor of the ecology movement, felt in
Mönchengladbach, the Manchester on the Rhine:
      “My consciousness of world events necessarily began on August 1, 1914 when my own country
      suddenly found itself at war. With my own stupidity of a child, I had the feeling that now some-
      thing was finally happening. Up until then, I had grown up under privileged conditions in a
      country which for decades had known only peace, had flourished economically, as the child of
      a well-off house where the father was a respected industrialist and recognized member of the

 26
      Christopher CLARK, Die Schlafwandler. Wie Europa in den Ersten Weltkrieg zog, München
      11th edition 2013.
 27
      RAUCHENSTEINER, Der Erste Weltkrieg, 121–159; Lothar HÖBELT, „Stehen oder Fallen?“
      Österreichische Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2015.
 28
      CLARK, Die Schlafwandler, 519–555.
 29
      Karl BOLAND on Mönchengladbach, quoted by Jürgen NIELSEN-SIKORA, Hans Jonas. Für
      Freiheit und Verantwortung, Darmstadt (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft) 2017, 26–33: 28.

3. The Summer of 1914 and Deeper-seated Causes                         31

      Jewish community, where for the long holidays we would always head to the North Sea with
      giant suitcases and believed that everything would always continue that way.”30

    The enthusiasm for war in the summer of 1914 did not last long. More than
1,500 days of battle followed. Between 1914 and 1918, four people died every
minute as a result of military actions. At today’s value, gun barrels fired the
equivalent of more than 600 billion dollars.31
    The motives and causes of the war were far more complex and multilayered
than were explained in the interpretations and explanations that for a long time
were very dominantly shaped in a national German tone. This follows Fritz
Fischer’s books such as Griff zur Weltmacht or Krieg der Illusionen,32 before the
publication of the monumental work by Clark. In the summer of 1914, the elites
who were ready to wage war, such as the diplomats, military men, and rulers in
Belgrade, Berlin, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, and Vienna remained at
the helm, while moderates and mediators in leading positions were in the mi-
nority. With comparative perspectives of European history, the isolated fixation
of historical consideration upon the leadership of the German Reich as the sole
originator of the war is no longer to be adhered to.33
    The European elite who were already oriented towards war before 1914 ac-
cepted the calculable consequences with the knowledge of the automatic nature
of the alliances, thus condoning those consequences in a negligent way.34 Clark is
trailblazing with these findings, and they have a prior history that reaches far back.
    In that respect, the much-quoted designation “the great seminal catastrophe of
this century”35 by George F. Kennan for World War I may at first glance be very
obvious, but upon closer examination of the longer prior history, it is not correct.

 30
      Original Quotation: “Mein Bewußtsein der Weltereignisse setzte notwendigerweise am 1. Au-
      gust 1914 ein, als sich plötzlich das eigene Land im Krieg befand. Mit der dem Kinde eigenen
      Dummheit hatte ich das Gefühl, daß nun endlich etwas geschah. Bis dahin war ich unter
      bevorzugten Bedingungen aufgewachsen, in einem Land, das seit Jahrzehnten nur Frieden
      gekannt hatte, das wirtschaftlich blühte, als Kind eines Hauses, das gut gestellt war, wo der
      Vater ein geachteter Fabrikant und anerkanntes Mitglied der jüdischen Gemeinde war, wo man
      in den großen Ferien immer mit riesigen Koffern an die Nordsee fuhr und glaubte, das werde
      immer so weitergehen.” Ibid., 26.
 31
      Ibid., 28; for facts and figures on World War I: Wolfdieter BIHL, Der Erste Weltkrieg 1914–
      1918: Chronik – Daten – Fakten, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2010; Gerhard HIRSCHFELD – Gerd
      KRUMEICH – Irina RENZ in connection with Markus PÖHLMANN (Hrsg.), Enzyklopädie
      Erster Weltkrieg, Paderborn 2003, updated and expanded study edition Paderborn 2014.
 32
      Fritz FISCHER, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland
      1914–1918, Düsseldorf 1961; IDEM, Weltmacht oder Niedergang. Deutschland im Ersten Welt-
      krieg (Hamburger Studien zur neueren Geschichte, vol. 1), Frankfurt am Main 1965; IDEM,
      Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914, Düsseldorf 1969.
 33
      CLARK, Die Schlafwandler, 519–555.
 34
      Ibid.
 35
      George F. KENNAN, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order. Franco-Russian Relations,
      1875–1890, Princeton 1979, 3.

32                                     I. Starting Situation

The “great seminal catastrophe” already occurred a century before from 1809 to
1813 with the wars of liberation against Napoléon and the first massive armies
which unleashed European nationalism and which found their most visible ex-
pression with the “Battle of the Nations” (“Völkerschlacht”) at Leipzig (1813).
The mobilization before 1914 of Europe’s intellectuals had its roots in the na-
tionalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The allegedly short war in
the Balkans as an intentionally provoked regional conflict turned into a lengthy
European war with global implications. Millions of dead paved the road to a poor
postwar political order, which formed the motivation and precondition for the
next Great War. The “great seminal catastrophe of Europe in the twentieth centu-
ry” was not World War I, but rather, with an overall consideration of modern his-
tory and contemporary history, the greater cause was the kindling, development,
and spread of European nationalism in the long nineteenth century36 in the wake
of the French Revolution and the Wars of Coalition against the background of the
arming of the people. The levée en masse resulted in the wars between nations,
triggered by Napoleon’s campaigns and responded to by the national “wars of
liberation” directed against his rule by Prussia, Russia, and Spain. Starting out
from this continental European catastrophe, the global catastrophe of World War
I followed. “In the beginning, there was Napoleon,” was how Thomas Nipperdey
introduced his masterful Deutsche Geschichte series covering German history in
the nineteenth century.37 That also holds true for the beginnings of the twentieth
century and the Great War from 1914 to 1918, which consisted of a multitude
of wars between nations and peoples (Germany-France, Germany-Russia, Aus-
tria-Italy, Austria-Serbia, etc.).
    The European pentarchy system of states that grew out of the nineteenth cen-
tury was fragmented in terms of alliance policy, on one hand through the Dual
Alliance and the Triple Alliance and, on the other hand, through the Entente Cor-
diale or the Triple Entente, and it was increasingly polarized with great tension.
The oft-quoted “Concert of Powers”38 had already shattered before 1914. When
Queen Victoria died in 1901, more than an age ended. The cracks in the European
Power Concert grew bigger and deepened more and more. There was no longer
any Klemens Wenzel Lothar von Metternich,39 any Henry John Temple Viscount

 36
      Eric J. HOBSBAWM, Nationen und Nationalismus. Mythos und Realität seit 1780, Frankfurt
      am Main 1991; IDEM, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991, London
      1994; IDEM, Das Zeitalter der Extreme. Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, München –
      Wien 1995.
 37
      Thomas NIPPERDEY, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1918, München 1998, new edition München
      2013.
 38
      Winfried BAUMGART, Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung. Internationale
      Beziehungen 1830–1878 (Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen 6), 2nd
      edition Paderborn – München – Wien – Zürich 2007.
 39
      Miroslav ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question (University of West
      Bohemia), Pilsen 2013, 977–986, Wolfram SIEMANN, Metternich. Stratege und Visionär.

4. World War I Sees No Victors                              33

Palmerston, or any Otto von Bismarck40 present as the shining lights of Europe-
an diplomacy around the turn of the twentieth century who could conceive of a
correspondingly workable and lastingly effective system of alliances as a balance
against this loss in European statesmanship.41
    The patriotism of the national French Revolution that had been established
since 1789 unleashed European nationalism of the ruling and power elite. In 1914,
it was far stronger than the Realpolitik as the “art of the possible”. Starting out
from the Wars of Liberation (Befreiungskriege) against Napoleon a century be-
fore and the existing Europe of the Congress from Vienna in 1814–15 to Berlin
in 1878, the First World War marked the endpoint and, at the same time, the low
point of a hundred year development of the Old World, with it being responsible
and to blame itself for initiating its descent at the world political level.42

                        4 . WORLD WAR I SEES NO VICTORS

What the war and the totalization of it made clear in the intellectual and ideo-
logical perspectives was: what was concerned was more than just the winning of
territory that was striven for, improved positions of power, and geopolitically mo-
tivated goals, but rather a conflict of principle between “good” and “evil”, a war
of world views by “German culture” against “Slavdom” or between the “Western
advanced civilization” and the “Eastern backward civilization”, as had been ar-
ticulated by university professors and representatives of the Academy of Sciences
in an emphatic, patriotic “appeal to the cultural world”43 in 1914.

      Eine Biografie, München 2016.
 40
      Dominik HAFFER, Europa in den Augen Bismarcks. Bismarcks Vorstellungen von der Politik
      der europäischen Mächte und vom europäischen Staatensystem (Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung,
      Wissenschaftliche Reihe 16), Paderborn – München – Wien – Zürich 2010, 643–665; Ulrich
      LAPPENKÜPER – Karina URBACH (Hrsg.), Realpolitik für Europa. Bismarcks Weg (Otto-
      von-Bismarck-Stiftung/Wissenschaftliche Reihe 23), Paderborn 2016.
 41
      Alan PALMER, Glanz und Niedergang der Diplomatie. Die Geheimpolitik der europäischen
      Kanzleien vom Wiener Kongress bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs, Düsseldorf 1986,
      353–414.
 42
      Ibid.; classical: Harold NICOLSON, The Congress of Vienna. A study in Allied Unity: 1812–
      1822, London 1946 and critical of the shortcomings and failure of the conference system:
      259–277; see also the studies by Holger AFFLERBACH, Das Deutsche Reich, Bismarcks
      Allianzpolitik und die europäische Friedenssicherung vor 1914 (Friedrichsruher Beiträge 2),
      Fried richsruh 1998; IDEM, Der Dreibund. Europäische Großmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor
      dem Ersten Weltkrieg, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2002; IDEM, The Purpose of the First World
      War. War Aims and Military Strategy, Berlin – Boston – Massachusetts 2015; IDEM, Auf
      Messers Schneide. Wie das Deutsche Reich den Ersten Weltkrieg verlor, München 2018.
 43
      Jürgen von UNGERN-STERNBERG, Wolfgang von UNGERN-STERNBERG, Der Aufruf
      “An die Kulturwelt!” Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Er-
      sten Weltkrieg mit einer Dokumentation (Historische Mitteilungen Beiheft 18), Stuttgart
      1996, 144–145, also see Rüdiger VOM BRUCH – Björn HOFMEISTER (Hrsg.), Deutsche

34                                     I. Starting Situation

1915: Lighting effect of the seventy-hour artillery drumfire and the light grenades being prepared
                       against the great French offensive, end of September

1916: “The prey of rat hunting” on a night of Argonne. Friedrich Hölte of the “MG Scharfschüt-
  zentrupp” (machine gun sniper squad) writes to his family on September 14, 1916: “My loved
ones! I send you the best greetings. I am still well. Hope it also from you. So that you can get an
 idea of how many rats and vermin you have to live under, I send you this photograph. The rats
                                     have a cimelike size ....”

     Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung (Kaiserreich und Erster Weltkrieg 1871–1918, 8), 2nd
     edition, Stuttgart 2002, 366–369.

4. World War I Sees No Victors                              35

       1914–1918: Rudolf Unterkircher (1878–1953), born in Schabs/Mühlbach (Putzerhof ) in
          South Tyrol, lived in the Schererschlößl in Innsbruck and was a master butcher.

                       1917: Destroyed catholic church on the Western front

The four and a half years of war meant a new dimension in the history of the
experience and intensification of violence in the Modern Era.44 The Hague Con-
ferences of 1899 and 1907 also changed nothing about this, as it was not possible
 44
      Oswald ÜBEREGGER, „Verbrannte Erde“ und „baumelnde Gehenkte“. Zur europäischen Di-
      mension militärischer Normübertretungen im Ersten Weltkrieg, in: Sönke NEITZEL – Daniel
      HORATH (Hrsg.), Kriegsgreuel. Die Entgrenzung der Gewalt in kriegerischen Konflikten
      vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Krieg in der Geschichte 40), Paderborn – München –
      Wien – Zürich 2008, 241–278.

36                                     I. Starting Situation

to reach agreement on steps towards disarmament or the international jurisdiction
of a court of arbitration with majority decisions. They did, however, at least con-
tribute to the establishment of a court of arbitration in The Hague.45
    Around 40% of the war deaths were civilians. That was a scale of victims in a
far shorter period of time than Europe saw in the Thirty Years’ War.46
    Out of 65 million mobilized soldiers, 9.6 million fell, which included 16.8% of
the army of France, 16.6% of that of Austro-Hungary, 15.3% of Germany, 12.1%
of Italy, 11.4% of Russia, and 11.2% of Britain, along with more than a third of the
armies of Serbia and Montenegro, one quarter each of the Ottoman and Romanian
armies, and more than a fifth of that of Bulgaria. The newly constituted states had
to take care of millions of widows, orphans, and disabled veterans.47

   1916: “To the good defenders of the Tyrolean front, thanks and greetings! Archduke Eugen,
    Christmas 1916.” Archduke Eugen was commander of the 5th Army (Balkans) since 1914,
 commander of the Southwest Front since 1915 and chief of the Army Group Tyrol since 1916. In
this function he gave his soldiers, the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger, a greeting card with his photo and a
  dedication at Christmas 1916. The great-grandfather of the author, Rudolf Unterkircher, sent
 45
      Walther SCHÜCKING, Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen, München – Leipzig
      1912; Jost DÜLFFER, Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen 1899 und
      1907 in der internationalen Politik, Frankfurt 1981.
 46
      C. V. WEDGWOOD, Der 30jährige Krieg, München – Leipzig, 4th edition 1994, 438–458.
 47
      Worth reading the comprehensive contribution by Arnold SUPPAN, Die imperialistische
      Friedensordnung Mitteleuropas in den Verträgen von St. Germain und Trianon, in: Helmut
      RUMPLER (Hrsg.), Die Habsburger Monarchie und der Erste Weltkrieg, Wien 2017, 1257–
      1341: 1257; on matters of the history of the sexes in the First World War: Ute DANIEL, The
      War from Within: German Working-Class Women in the First World War, Oxford 1997; Chris-
      ta HÄMMERLE – Oswald ÜBEREGGER – Birgitta BAADER-ZAAR (Eds.), Gender and the
      First World War, Houndmills – Basingstoke – New York 2014, 1–15.

4. World War I Sees No Victors                                 37

   this card to his wife Juliane on December 2, 1916 as a field post. On the back a “letter” is
written in pencil (difficult to read): “Im Felde den 2ten 12. 16 – Liebste Julie! Danke Dir vielmals
           für Deine Weihnachtsgrüße. Es grüßt und küsst Dich herzlichst Dein Rudi.”

It was a war which, as a result of its radicalization, saw no victors, only losers.48
    But this is an afterthought. Britons, French, but also Japanese, Czechs, Poles,
Romanians and Serbs would have seen this statement differently. They behaved
as ‘haves’ and victorious states accordingly until 1938 and beyond, especial-
ly towards Austria and Hungary which were seen as ‘have nots’. They had not
only been politically humiliated, but had also been severely punished with large
territorial losses.49 The financial and economic conditions were particularly se-
vere, and in the end the Austrian First Republic never got out of them.50 Richard
Schüller recognized this early on. As an expert on questions of protective tariffs
and free trade, he became head of the trade policy section of the State Office for
Foreign Affairs in 1918, belonged to the Austrian delegation in Paris in 1919 and
conducted the trade policy negotiations of the First Republic (1918–1934) and the
authoritarian corporative state from 1934 until 1938. After the Anschluss he was
forced to retire due to his Jewish background and he went into emigration via Italy
to Great Britain in 1938 and finally to the United States in 1940.51
    Upon the “great catastrophe”,52 a “turbulent peace”53 set in which followed the
“Hell on Earth”54 (Ian Kershaw). The bloody legacy of the war had to be borne not
only by the vanquished,55 but also by the victors. Aside from the sharp increase
in political radicalization and forced paramilitarization56 against the background
of the European civil war from 1917 to 1945 by increasingly “enemy ideology

 48
      Jörn LEONHARD, Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges, München
      2014; Margaret MACMILLAN, The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914, New York 2014,
      285–316, 501–543, 599–631.
 49
      Zarah STEINER, The Lights That Failed. European International History 1919–1933 (Oxford
      History of Modern Europe), Oxford University Press 2005.
 50
      John Maynard KEYNES, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, London 1919; in Ger-
      man: Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen des Friedensvertrages, München 1920.
 51
      Gusztáv GRATZ – Richard SCHÜLLER, Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Öster reich-
      Ungarns. Die Tragödie der Erschöpfung (Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieg-
      es, Österreichische und ungarische Serie 2), Wien 1930; Dieter BÖS, In memoriam Richard
      Schüller (1870–1972), in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 34 (1974), 1–2, 238–240; Jürgen P.
      NAUTZ (Dir.), Unterhändler des Vertrauens. Aus den nachgelassenen Schriften von Sektion-
      schef Richard Schüller, Wien – München 1990; IDEM, Schüller, Richard, in: Neue Deutsche
      Biographie 23 (2007), 638–639.
 52
      Ian KERSHAW, Höllensturz. Europa 1914 bis 1949, München 2016, 73–138.
 53
      Ibid., 139–214.
 54
      Ibid., 473–552.
 55
      Fundamental: Richard GERWARTH, Die Besiegten. Das blutige Erbe des Ersten Weltkriegs,
      München 2017.
 56
      Robert GERWARTH – John HORNE (Hrsg.), Krieg im Frieden. Paramilitärische Gewalt nach
      dem Ersten Weltkrieg, Göttingen 2013.

38                                       I. Starting Situation

states”,57 the totalization of the Second World War is to be traced back not insig-
nificantly to the militarily and politically decisive events, the individually severe
experiences, and the collectively traumatizing events of World War I with its ex-
cesses in violence.58
    Aside from the deplorable millions of human victims, massive material losses
had to be dealt with. Catastrophic conditions prevailed in the front areas of Lith-
uania, Belarus, Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine, Transyl-
vania, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, the Austrian Littoral along the
Isonzo River, and Trentino as well as at the arms factories set up for the war, in
the ruined railway transport system, and in the depleted livestock agriculture.59
    The years starting from 1918 are therefore to be comprehended as a period of
dealing with the aftermath of the devastating conflict and consequently as falling
within the realm of research on the consequences of the Great War. The “home
front” was part of the events of the war and continued to suffer for a long time
thereafter from the consequences. There could be no discussion of a real estab-
lishment of peace in 1919–20. The civil service cuts in Austria, the hyperinflation
in Germany, those disabled by the war, the extremists on both the left and the right
that joined together into militia formations on the entire continent, in particu-
lar in Central Europe, such as the “Organisation Consul”, the “Marine-Brigade
Ehrhardt”, the “Bund Oberland”, the front fighters’ associations (Frontkämpfer-
verband), resident and home militias (Einwohnerwehren), the “Steel Helmets”
(Stahlhelm), the “Reichsbanner” in the German Reich and the “Home Guards”
(Heimwehren)60 as well as the “Republican Defense Alliance” (Republikanischer
Schutzbund) in Austria, the “Squadrists” (Schwarzhemden) in Italy,61 the “Arrow

 57
      As controversial as ever but still worth reading in terms of the philosophy of history: Ernst
      NOLTE, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,
      Frankfurt am Main – Berlin 1987, 213–334.
 58
      Oswald ÜBEREGGER, Erinnerungskriege. Der Erste Weltkrieg, Österreich und die Tiroler
      Kriegserinnerung in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Tirol im Ersten Weltkrieg. Politik, Wirtschaft
      und Gesellschaft 9), Innsbruck 2011, 253–268; Laurence COLE – Christa HÄMMERLE – Mar-
      tin SCHEUTZ (Hrsg.), Glanz – Gewalt – Gehorsam. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Habsburg-
      er Monarchie (1800 bis 1918) (Frieden und Krieg. Beiträge zur Historischen Friedensforschung
      18), Essen 2011.
 59
      SUPPAN, Die imperialistische Friedensordnung Mitteleuropas, 1257.
 60
      Lothar HÖBELT, Die Heimwehren und die österreichische Politik 1927–1936. Vom politischen
      “Kettenhund” zum “Austro-Fascismus?”, Graz 2016; IDEM, Italien und die Heimwehr 1928–
      1934, in: Maddalena GUIOTTO – Helmut WOHNOUT (Hrsg.), Italien und Österreich im Mit-
      teleuropa der Zwischenkriegszeit/Italia e Austria nella Mitteleuropa tra le due guerre mondiali
      (Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Historischen Instituts in Rom 2), Wien – Köln – Weimar
      2018, 349–370.
 61
      Sven REICHARDT, Faschistische Kampfbünde. Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen
      Squadrismus und in der deutschen SA (Industrielle Welt 63), Köln – Weimar – Wien 2002, 2nd
      revised edition supplemented by an afterword, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2009.

4. World War I Sees No Victors                               39

Cross” (Pfeilkreuzler) in Hungary62 or the “Iron Guards” (Eiserne Garden) in
Romania63 are all to be named as symptoms of crisis. They shaped the image on
the streets of the cities and in the countryside. The war was therefore still not
over. The militarization of society continued and in that way hindered a spiritual,
moral, and material disarmament.64
    Added to the millions of war dead were the many victims of the so-called
“Spanish flu” from the spring of 1918 through March 1920. According to older
findings, it led to approximately 25 million deaths, but the latest research points
to 50 to 100 million fatalities (between 2.5% and 5% of the population of the
planet). That was far more victims than the war itself caused, if not both world
wars together.65
    The supply situation, which was already catastrophic during wartime, wors-
ened with the end of the war because of the customs borders that had newly aris-
en with the many newly formed nation-states of Europe. The returning soldiers
streaming back and the quickly rising unemployment were additional factors add-
ing to the aggravation of the social situation. The paramilitary mobilization and
political radicalization of the people increased considerably. They unleashed a
violent (racial) anti-Semitism, above all among scholars, but also among universi-
ty students66 and they promoted an ethnocentrically and ethnically motivated na-
tionalism67 as well as a polarization between camps with left-wing and right-wing
world views which had the roots of their development in the nineteenth century.68

 62
      Margit SZÖLLÖSI-JANZE, Die Pfeilkreuzlerbewegung in Ungarn. Historischer Kontext,
      Ent wicklung und Herrschaft (Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 35), München 1989.
 63
      Traian SANDU, Un fascisme roumain. Histoire de la Garde de fer, Paris 2014.
 64
      Gerd KRUMEICH, „Die Stunde der Abrechnung ist da.“ Die Friedensverhandlungen von Ver-
      sailles 1919 und die Fortführung des Krieges in den Köpfen, in: Militärgeschichte 3 (1999),
      48–55; IDEM, Versailles 1919. Der Krieg in den Köpfen, in: IDEM (Hrsg.), Versailles 1919.
      Ziele – Wirkung – Wahrnehmung, Essen 2001, 53–64.
 65
      Laura SPINNEY, 1918 – Die Welt im Fieber. Wie die Spanische Grippe die Gesellschaft
      veränderte, München 2018.
 66
      Michael GEHLER, Studenten und Politik. Im Kampf um die Vorherrschaft an der Universi-
      tät Innsbruck 1918–1938 (Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte 5), Innsbruck 1990;
      93–116; Dieter A. BINDER, Antisemitismus als Ersatzreligion, in: Maximilian LIEBMANN
      – Hans PAARHAMMER – Alfred RINNERTHALER (Hrsg.), Staat und Kirche in der
      “Ostmark”, Frankfurt/Main – Berlin – Bern – New York – Paris – Wien 1998, 15–26; Oli-
      ver RATHKOLB, Gewalt und Antisemitismus an der Universität Wien und die Badeni-Krise
      1897. Davor und danach, in: IDEM (Hrsg.), Der lange Schatten des Antisemitismus. Kritische
      Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte der Universität Wien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Zeit-
      geschichte im Kontext 8), Göttingen 2013, 69–92.
 67
      George L. MOSSE, Die völkische Revolution. Über die geistigen Wurzeln des Nationalsozial-
      ismus, Frankfurt am Main 1991.
 68
      Ibid., 21–160, 163–248.