Crisis in Ukraine: Another Effort by President Putin to Change the Existing Order in the Face of Western Determination to Preserve It - INSS

Crisis in Ukraine: Another Effort by President
Putin to Change the Existing Order in the Face
     of Western Determination to Preserve It
            Eldad Shavit and Shimon Stein| No. 1554 | February 14, 2022

The possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine and a subsequent descent into
war is now the focus of the international agenda. It is not clear if Russia intends
to launch a military move or if it seeks to leverage its buildup of troops to force
the West to accept its demands. Even if the military conflict does not materialize,
this is a crisis of an “ideological” nature that is hard to resolve. The US
administration and its NATO allies are promoting a policy revolving around the
search for diplomatic solutions, including the threat of sanctions on Russia,
while sending military aid to Ukraine, with no intention of intervening, and also
preparing to protect the Baltic states. The administration appears to have
absorbed the lessons of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and is meticulous
about an orderly process of decision making, and above all, full coordination
with NATO members. Israel, which is trying to walk a tightrope, must
immediately formulate a policy in order to both maintain good relations with
Russia and respect American interests, and it must avoid any position that
conflicts with American policy, certainly if the crisis escalates. A determined
stance by the US and the West against Russian threats, and even more so if
fighting develops, is clearly in Israel’s interest.

The possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine and a subsequent descent
into war continues to be the focus of the international agenda.
Notwithstanding the growing concentration of forces on the Russian
border with Ukraine and repeated warnings from senior United States
officials of an approaching invasion, even now it is not clear in the West if
Russian President Vladimir Putin indeed intends to launch a military move,
or if he wants to leverage the military buildup to force the West to accept
his demands, above all to stop the spread of NATO eastward and receive a
commitment that Ukraine will not be recruited into the alliance. In any case,
most estimates of the preferred date for starting the campaign, if such a
decision is taken, are no earlier than February 20 – the end of the Winter
Olympics in China.

To the United States and the other NATO countries it is clear that neither
the threat nor even an actual invasion is the Russian President’s goal, but
rather a means for achieving strategic objectives. These, like other crises
previously initiated by Russia, reflect Putin’s perception that he has been
charged with the task of restoring former glory and rehabilitating Russia’s
position as a great power, which it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Joining this is Putin’s understanding that the United States, together with
NATO, exploited Russia’s weakness in the 1990s in order to expand
eastward at the expense of Russia’s interests, while posing an ever-growing
threat to its security.

So far it seems that as Putin sees it, the US administration regards Russia
as a matter of concern that is not at the top of its priorities and therefore
there is no obligation to consider its demands, certainly not in the way that
the United States acts toward what it regards as its number one threat –
China. Putin wants to change this equation. The question is, will he succeed,
or has he climbed up too high a tree from which it will be hard to get down.
Even if that was not his original plan, he may assess that he has no choice
but to promote the military option, particularly out of fear that avoidance
will look like weakness, leading to stronger pressure on Russia.
The US administration and its allies are continuing to pursue a policy with
two main thrusts: continuation of efforts to promote diplomatic solutions
to the crisis with Russia (including during the visit of French President
Emanuel Macron to Moscow, and also during the visit to Russia of German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz) and warnings about punitive measures to be taken,
together with ongoing military preparations in Eastern Europe. The
administration announced that some 8,000 American troops have been
placed on alert in view of the possibility that they will be sent at short notice
to Eastern Europe in order to join a special NATO “response force,” and
President Biden has approved sending another 3,000 soldiers to Eastern
Europe.

In parallel, the United States and other countries are supplying Ukraine with
weapons, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. President Biden
holds regular consultations with European leaders, and recently also

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hosted the German Chancellor in the White House. At the moment, the
most probable scenario is that if Russia launches a military campaign
against Ukraine, the main response by the West will be significant
expansion of the economic sanctions. In addition, President Biden has
again threatened that in such an event, the Nord Stream 2 gas deal
between Russia and Germany will not be implemented. At the same time,
military aid to Ukraine will continue, but without actual military involvement
(Ukraine is not a NATO member), accompanied by broader military
preparations by NATO in order to defend its member states in the Baltic.

For President Biden, the crisis is a significant test of his leadership, and it
appears that the administration sees it as an opportunity to improve the
US status in view of the sharp criticism of the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
It is clear to the administration that the manner of handling the crisis with
Russia will also impact on its rivalry with China and on the shape of the
world order in the coming years. Indeed, contrary to Biden’s image as a
weak president and possibly contrary to what was expected by Putin, his
stance against Russia has hitherto been characterized by determination,
while adhering to the intention of the NATO alliance not to change the
military arrangement in Eastern Europe and to defend member states,
including taking practical steps on the ground if necessary.

Moreover, it appears that the administration has internalized the lessons
of its conduct during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and is being
meticulous about an orderly process of decision making over the crisis with
Russia. There is an emphasis on full coordination with its NATO allies,
combined with an effort to prevent Putin from achieving his aim of driving
a wedge between Europe and the United States. In this context, President
Biden is striving to show that there are no gaps between himself and the
German Chancellor. However, Germany is a special case, and it sometimes
looks as if it is not on board with the messages coming from Washington
and the other allies in Europe. Hence Germany’s “special way” of managing
its relations with Russia – the result of a complex history and geographical
proximity. Herein derives what is depicted as a cautious and hesitant
approach by the Chancellor, who has so far refused to make a clear

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statement about the fate of the Nord Stream 2 project if Russia invades
Ukraine, and has also avoided sending defensive weapons to Ukraine – and
thereby strengthening the image of Germany as deviating from the
Western consensus.

Nevertheless, there is an impression that the crisis has breathed new life
into NATO, which was heavily criticized during the Trump presidency,
demonstrating once again to European countries that they not only have to
find ways of reducing their dependence on energy from Russia but must
also take more meaningful steps to strengthen their military capabilities.
President Biden is indeed working to find an alternative for the energy
issue, including with Qatar, which was declared, during the recent visit of
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Khalifa al-Thani in Washington, to be “a major
non-NATO ally.”

It is still too early to estimate the full global significance of the Ukrainian
crisis, particularly if it develops into a military conflict. The Middle East is
also following the actions of the United States, in an attempt to understand
whether President Biden’s policy reflects weakness or readiness to stand
up to President Putin, and how far the impression he creates will affect the
conduct of America’s rivals in the region, against the background of the
targeted killing of the head of ISIS in Syria. Even if the current tendency in
the region is to present the administration as weak against its rivals, so far
it seems that in the face of a challenge with strategic significance for the US,
the administration is showing determination not to yield to Russian
pressure and manipulation.

The crisis between the West and Russia requires the Israeli government to
formulate an immediate policy for the dilemma – which Israel also faced
when it was required to define its position after the Russian invasion of
Crimea in 2014 – of choosing between the desire to maintain good relations
with Russia and the need to take account of American interests. Naturally
Israel is trying to walk the tightrope and as far as possible avoid taking any
position over the crisis in Eastern Europe, while not choosing a side.
However, even so, and certainly if military hostilities break out and

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decisions are made to extend the diplomatic and economic sanctions on
Russia, Israeli policy must not conflict with that of the US administration.
The determined stand of the United States and the West against Russian
threats, and their success in any military conflict, are clearly in Israel’s
interest.

The bottom line is that the conflict between the West and Russia cannot be
resolved, and the pressures applied by Russia will probably continue, even
if there is no actual military engagement. This is a crisis of an “ideological”
nature, replete with tensions between the principles that guide Western
countries (such as territorial integrity, sovereignty, honoring of treaties) and
Russia’s ambitions to preserve and expand its areas of influence (even at
the cost of military escalation). Presumably the West’s efforts will focus on
conflict management, with an attempt to prevent any uncontrolled flare-
up, and all this without renouncing its principles. The West still has much
room to maneuver and make concessions to Russia on security aspects
without interfering with the security of NATO members. Will Putin be
satisfied with that? At this stage, nobody knows.

Editors of the series: Anat Kurtz, Eldad Shavit and Judith Rosen

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