CORONOMICS Munich 22 September 2020 - institutional assets AWARDS
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CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
Cheap money feeds zombies Zombie share and policy rates Zombie duration and policy rates 6 0.0 2.50 0.0 2.5 2.25 2.5 4 5.0 2.00 5.0 2 7.5 1.75 7.5 10.0 1.50 10.0 0 12.5 1.25 12.5 -2 15.0 1.00 15.0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Zombie share (lhs)1 Policy rate (rhs)2 Zombie duration (lhs)3 Policy rate (rhs)4 1. Mean of country zombie shares; narrower definition; 2. Mean of country (nominal) policy rates; Source: BIS 3. Mean of zombie firm duration in years; narrower definition; 4. Mean of (nominal) policy rates
Zombies in Europe Share of capital sunk in “zombie” firms 2013 (%) Italy Spain Belgium Portugal Luxembourg Germany Sweden South Korea Austria UK Finland France Slovenia 0 5 10 15 20 Source: The Telegraph
Auch in USA Zombies auf dem Vormarsch USA: Anteil von Zombie-Unternehmen Anteil (in %) der börsennotierten Unternehmen, die mehr als 10 Jahre alt sind und deren Zinsdeckungsgrad drei Jahre in Folge unter 1 liegt Quelle: DB Global Research 10
Productivity growth slows down Annual labor productivity growth 5-year rolling average (%) USA Germany UK Japan South Korea Brasil Mexico output per hour worked Source: Conference Board, November 2016
Peak youth Young children and old people as % of the population 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 Under 5 65+ 2 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Source: BofA
IMF warned in autumn 2019 » After slowing sharply in the last three quarters of 2018, the pace of global economic activity remains weak. Momentum in manufacturing activity, in particular, has weakened substantially, to levels not seen since the global financial crisis. Rising trade and geopolitical tensions have increased uncertainty about the future of the global trading system and international cooperation more generally, taking a toll on business confidence, investment decisions, and global trade. A notable shift toward increased monetary policy accommodation— through both action and communication—has cushioned the impact of these tensions on financial market sentiment and activity, while a generally resilient service sector has supported employment growth. That said, the outlook remains precarious.« 13
IMF warned in autumn 2019 » (…) we need urgent co-ordinated political action to restore confidence, boost inclusive growth and raise living standards; global trade is stagnating and is dragging down economic activity in almost all major economies; and policy uncertainty is undermining investment and future jobs and incomes. Moreover, risks of even weaker growth remain high, including from an escalation of trade conflicts, geopolitical tensions, the possibility of a sharper-than- expected slowdown in China, and climate change.« 14
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
Correlation is not causation… still... Central banks balance sheet (USD) US 2,400 14,000 G3 stocks central 2,200 13,000 bank G3 central bank balance sheet balance 2,000 US stocks 12,000 sheet 1,800 11,000 1,600 10,000 1,400 9,000 1,200 8,000 1,000 7,000 800 6,000 600 5,000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source: bto analysis
Third bubble in 25 years? Central Asset prices vs. GDP – growth rates Bankers’ (index; December 31, 1997 = 100) bubble 400 Housing 350 bubble 300 250 Dot-com bubble 200 Recession US nominal GDP 150 Net worth of US households 100 0 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Source: Bloomberg
Our monetary order supports inflation Number of years to double the global median price level 250 1571 200 150 1698 1363 1917 1805 100 50 1248 1942 1973 1952 1995 2011 1979 1987 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Source: Deutsche Bank; bto analysis
Example UK (% of GDP) 125 100 75 100% Unproductive loans 50 35% Unproductive loans1 25 25% 25% Loans to productive sector2 0 1990 Today Source: bto analysis 1. Construction sector and mortgages 2. Excl. construction sector
Central Banks „asymmetrical reaction“ Fed Funds rate vs. 10-year treasury (%) 20 Black Monday Fed Funds rate S&L crisis US 10-year treasury 15 Japanese bubble Tequila crisis 10 Asia crisis Dotcom bubble GFC 5 ??? 0 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Source: Incremetum
Exploding debt Global Debt (Trillion US-$) Households 166 169 Non-financial corporations 156 148 138 Government 42 43 39 111 116 38 105 36 97 33 33 32 65 66 31 56 61 64 52 42 43 18 41 37 25 59 60 50 54 56 32 36 40 21 29 2000 2007 2008 2009 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 1. HY 2017 Total debt/ 198 207 213 226 224 227 232 234 237 236 GDP (%) Source: bto analysis
Somehow financial stability deteriorated… Years with a financial crisis since 1600. Internet search. Source: Deutsche Bank 22
Debt drives asset values and inequality Capital/income ratio 1980 – 2010 (%) 700 600 676 500 575 601 1980 Wealth 522 400 434 2010 412 410 300 321 322 355 309 200 253 100 0 France UK Germany Italy USA Japan Debt government, private households, non-financial corporations (% of GDP) 500 400 456 1980 2009 Debt 300 321 322 308 265 290 200 241 100 160 160 136 151 109 0 France UK Germany Italy USA Japan Source: Bank of International Settlement, Working Papers No 352 (2011); Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ , 06/06/2014
Piketty doesn`t understand the leverage effect PIKETTY: STELTER: »Debt is »Debt is not neutral.« neutral, but drives wealth.« • Gross asset: e.g., 500 • Gross asset: e.g., 500 • Debt: e.g., 200 • Debt: e.g., 200 • Net asset: = 300 • Net asset < 300 Government debt a result of wrong Public and private debt influence the gross distribution of wealth between the and the net value of all assets private and the public sector. Private debt not included in analysis. No mentioning in index of the book.
Leverage effect: example 1 Asset: e.g. a stock. Price: 100, yearly return: 10 2 100% equity financing: yield 10% 3 Bank credit available for 5% 4 Bank credit: 50, equity: 50 5 Interest expense: 2.5, return on equity: 7.5 = yield: 15% 6 Bank Credit: 80, equity: 20 7 Interest expense: 4.0, return on equity: 6.0 = yield: 30% And: You can buy stocks for 500 instead of 100! Total return: 30
Debt with less impact GDP generating capacity of global debt: all major economies 2007 2017 -37.3% 1.0 1.0 -42.6% 0.83 0.8 0.8 0.68 -17.4% -14.6% -14.6% -20.5% -11.1% -14.3% 0.6 0.6 -18.2% 0.52 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.35 0.4 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 Euro zone UK Japan USA China G (20) Emerging All reporting Advanced aggregate markets countries economies (aggregate) (aggregate) (aggregate) Source: Hoisington
Credit quality gets worse and worse… Proportion of cov-lite loans Source: Deutsche Bank, S&P 27
2,500 3,000 1,000 1,500 0 BUSD 2,000 Source: SocGEn Dec. 1998 July 1999 Feb. 2000 Sept. 2000 April 2001 Nov. 2001 June 2002 Jan. 2003 Aug. 2003 March 2004 Oct. 2004 May 2005 Dec. 2005 July 2006 US corporate debt at all time high Feb. 2007 Sept. 2007 April 2008 Nov. 2008 June 2009 Jan. 2010 Aug. 2010 March 2011 Oct. 2011 May 2012 Dec. 2012 July 2013 Feb. 2014 Sept. 2014 Net debt April 2015 Nov. 2015 June 2016 EBITDA
BBB a problem in the next recession? Share of market value in Bloomberg Barclays USD IG (%) Source: Deutsche Bank
Buy-Backs main driver of stock returns in the US US companies have been the biggest net buyers of stocks over the last decade through buybacks Cumulative net purchase of US stocks (in $ billions) Source: Deutsche Bank 30
Big worries in front of the next recession Out of Space: Central banks have no room to cut rates like they did in the last slump Source: Bloomberg data 31
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
The Mother of all Recessions The Eurozone economy endured its worst downturn on record in March Source: IHS MARKIT 33
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
“All-in” of States and Central Banks I Largest bailouts in history in 2020 USD ($bn) vs. G7 public and private debt to GDP Source: Deutsche Bank, Haver, IMF. Dotted line shows our forecast for 2020. 35
“All-in” of States and Central Banks II Extraordinary central bank stimulus has eased financial stresses Source: Citi ©FT 36
No wonder, stock markets are up Too much money chasing too few assets in 2021? Source: Nordea and Macrobond 37
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
A debt driven Boom Kredite an HH und Nicht-Finanzunternehmen (Mrd. €) Realzinssatz und Inflation 1999 – 2007 D Jährlicher Inflationsrate (%) 5 4 Wohnbau, Immobilien, Bau R2 = 0,9649 4 Greece Konsum und Dienstleistungen 3 Ireland 3 Spain Industrie und Agrar Portugal Italy France 2 Austria 2 Netherlands Belgium 1 Germany Finland 0 1 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 D Realzinssatz Realzinsrate und Kreditwachstum 1999 – 2007 Kreditwachstum und Handelssaldo 1999–2007 D Jährliche Kreditwachstumsrate (%) D Jährliche Handelssaldo (%) 25 1,0 R2 = 0,7754 Germany Austria R2 = 0,7786 20 0,5 Netherlands Ireland Greece Finland 15 Spain 0,0 Italy Portugal Portugal Belgium 10 Austria -0,5 France Belgium Italy Ireland 5 Netherlands Finland -1,0 Spain France Greece Germany 0 -1,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 D Realzinsrate (%) D Jährliches Kredit-/BIP-Wachstum (%) Source: IMF
Convergence? – Less than before the Euro (I) Treiber BIP-Wachstum 4 Länder mit hoher Produktivität Länder mit niedriger Produktivität 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 1990-1999 2000-2007 2008-2016 1990-1999 2000-2007 2008-2016 Labor Kapital TFP Durchschnittliches Wachstum Quelle: IMF
Convergence? – Less than before the Euro (II) Intra- and Extra-EA Trade in Goods Intra-EA 12 Trade in Goods Sum of exports and imports in % of GDP Sum of intra-EA 12 exports and imports in % of total trade Sources: OECD Monthly Statistics on International Trade; AMECO
Fighting a debt crisis with more debt » The Euro Zone must go towards more solidarity and integration: a common budget, a common borrowing capability, and fiscal convergence. « The „Reconstruction Fund“ and debt on EU level buys time but does not solve the problem.
Dabei geht das nicht – sagt der IWF! Anteil der aufgefangenen Fiskalische Transfers externen Schocks Kapitalmärkte und private Verluste Kreditmärkte 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 EU EMU Switzerland USA Germany Source: IMF
The fairness question with transfers Private Wealth/GDP Source: James Davies, Rodrigo Lluberas und Anthony Shorrocks, Global wealth databook 2019 44
Countries with “M” have more in common… Source: JP Morgan 45
Keine leichte Lösung Abbau fauler Ausgleich Wett- Schulden bewerbsfähigkeit 1. Interne Abwertung 2. Transferunion 3. Höheres Wirtschaftswachstum ? ? 4. Schuldenrestrukturierung und Wachstum 5. Höhere Inflation ? ? 6. Pleiten und Euroaustritte
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 48
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 49
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 50
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 51
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 52
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 53
Debt restructuring already in the Bible and Mesopotamia Debt restructuring in the Bible: Debt restructuring in "The Jubilee Year" ancient Mesopotamia In the Biblical Book of Leviticus, a Jubilee year is mentioned to In ancient Mesopotamia, debt was commonplace; occur every fiftieth year, in which slaves and prisoners would individual debts were recorded on clay tablets. be freed and debts would be forgiven Periodically, upon the ascendancy of a new monarch, debts would be forgiven: in other words, » And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty the slate would be wiped clean throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubile unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family. A jubile shall that fiftieth year be unto you: ye shall not sow, neither reap that which groweth of itself in it, nor gather the grapes in it of thy vine undressed. For it is the jubile; it shall be holy unto you: ye shall eat the increase thereof out of the field. In the year of this jubile ye shall return every man unto his possession.« Leviticus 25:10–13 Source: Wikipedia
Macron’s advisors think big Dealing with legacy debt in the Euro area »While public debt has increased over the past twenty years, so has household wealth – particularly when it comes to real-estate – with large distributional consequences. An avenue could therefore consist of a highly indebted country decreeing that it becomes part-owner of all lands on which dwellings are built, up to a given fraction of their value (establishing a leasehold in effect on part of the land). The payment for the right of occupancy by the homeowner would generate an annual revenue stream for the state. Homeowners could chose to defer annual payments, the total amount of which would become due only upon the sale or inheritance of the home.« Source: France Strategie, http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/english-articles/dealing-legacy-debt-euro-area, October 2017 55
France is the biggest debtor Schuldenstände der verschiedenen Sektoren in % des BIP Private Private Country State Companies Households Sector Total Total Germany 61.0 59 54 114 175 Austria 71.1 90 49 139 210 Italy 137.3 69 41 111 248 Spain 97.9 95 57 152 250 Portugal 120.5 100 65 164 285 Netherlands 49.3 163 101 264 313 Belgium 102.2 150 61 212 314 France 100.4 155 61 216 317 Source: Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich, Stand Q3/2019 · erstellt mit Datawrapper 56
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 57
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 58
Helicopters on the way Source: I, Igge, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2436263 59
The idea of helicopter money is gaining popularity » Let us suppose that one day a helicopter flies over this Milton Friedman The Optimum community and drops an additional $1000 in bills Quantity of Money, from the sky, which is, of course hastily collected by Chapter 1 members of the community …« 1969 » Today I will argue for a different approach and suggest Ben Bernanke that the Bank of Japan cooperate temporarily with the Speech before the government to create an environment of combined Japan Society of monetary and fiscal ease to end deflation and help Monetary Economics Tokyo, May 31, 2003 restart economic growth in Japan.« » … in some extreme circumstances – those in which there is Adair Turner a simultaneous and significant fall in both the price level Financial Services Authority and real output – it is unambiguously clear that OMF would Chairman, Lecture at the be the best policy, and in some circumstances may be the Cass Business School London, February 6, 2013 only policy available to prevent continual deflation.« 60
Deleveraging is deflationary Deflationary risk levers • Deleveraging need • Austerity programs • Excess capacity • Potential global slowdown Source: bto analysis 61
Deleveraging is deflationary, printing money is inflationary Deflationary risk levers • Deleveraging need • Austerity programs • Excess capacity Inflationary • Potential global slowdown risk levers • Inflate away high debt levels • Liquidity glut • High commodity prices • Internal EMU imbalances Source: bto analysis 62
M*V = P*Y: Watch out for the velocity of money! Increase in money supply is offset by low velocity of money 25 2500 Money velocity 1 Monetary base(B$)2 20 2000 15 1500 1 Velocityis a ratio of nominal GDP to the monetary base as measure of the 10 1000 money supply. It can be thought of as the rate of turnover in the money supply--that is, the number of times one dollar is used to purchase final 5 500 goods and services included in GDP 2 Monetary base: money supply directly 0 0 controlled by the central bank Note: M = money supply, V = velocity, 1980 2010 P = Price level, Y = GDP Source: Thomson Datastream; Federal Reserve 63
Alterung setzt mit voller Kraft ein Erwerbsbevölkerung in den Industrieländern vor Schrumpfung 1,5 % 75 Entwicklung der Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter (%) Quote der Altersabhängigkeit 70 1,0 % 65 0,5 % 60 55 0,0 % 50 -0,5 % 45 Quelle: Twitter @SoberLook 64
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 65
How to deal with too much debt? Austerity? Growing out of the problem? Back to Mesopotamia? Inflation? 66
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
Joint restructuring the euro zone debt overhang Pooling of debt of 75% of GDP Refinancing with „Eurobonds“ 160% 160% Eurozone redemption Features: fund 130% 130% ► Jointly guaranteed to obtain AAA rating and low rates ► Repayment over 100+ years 80% ► Interest free for some years 75% ► Debt does not count to Accompanying country debt. measures • Structural and fiscal ... reforms Funding by the ECB – Italy Spain Portugal France Germany • Limits on new very long period of time. indebtedness Mutual understanding that • Measures to reduce debt will be grandfathered Roll-in of government debt private debt LT of 75% of GDP per country < 60% of GDP Remaining debt on country-level > Manageable Source: Eurostat; bto analysis
Just retire the QE debt? » Instead of selling the debt back into the market, the BoE can retire the debt. At a stroke, £325bn of UK » After buying government debt disappears. If the £325B of debt US follows suit, about $1.5T of US from the market, government debt will be retired.« the public sector (the Treasury) is paying interest to » The main obstacle to retiring the debt lies with itself (the BoE) on the markets and credit rating agencies. They debt that it owes may see this as a slide towards Weimar Republic to itself.« economics: monetary financing of government debt by printing money. Consequently, both the BoE and the Treasury cannot be seen to advocate retiring QE-acquired debt at this stage.« 69
CORONOMICS – the new economic order Weak recovery from the financial crisis Fragile financial system Mother of all recessions Central Banks go “all-in” Eurozone fundamentally ill How to deal with too much debt? A bold proposal for the Euro Coronomics for Germany
Die schwarze Null ist ... • keine echte Leistung, da sie Mario Draghi, der EZB und damit vor allem der nach wie vor ungelösten Eurokrise zu verdanken ist (Zinsersparnis!). • eine große Dummheit, weil sie die Ersparnisse der Deutschen in das Ausland treibt, wo sie deutlich schlechter angelegt sind. • eine Lüge, weil in Wirklichkeit die Staatsschulden explodiert sind, weil die Politiker immer mehr Leistungsversprechen für die Zukunft abgegeben haben (in Gesetze gegossen!), für die aber keine Rückstellungen gebildet wurden. Würde der Staat wie ein Unternehmen bilanzieren, würde man das sofort an steigenden Lasten sehen.
Implizite Schulden von fast 100 Prozent des BIP 825 Das EU-Nachhaltigkeitsranking 2016 Nachhaltigkeitslücke 765 788 (in Prozent des BIP, Basisjahr 2015) Explizite Schulden 22 Implizite Schulden 603 79 100 549 458 432 106 381 390 83 311 356 331 337 249 254 256 266 272 64 108 803 38 199 89 665 710 107 109 135 147 161 179 85 64 65 40 43 177 466 497 62 86 87 96 369 351 39 51 44 273 291 343 301 39 53 26 75 71 214 169 170 229 259 132 129 155 164 153 10 87 36 22 83 61 90 128 18 29 16 40 -25 -48 Malta Zypern Bulgarien Slowenien Ungarn Deutschland Frankreich Estland UK Kroatien Slowakei Griechenland Dänemark Belgien Lettland EU28 Schweden Niederlande Finnland Luxemburg Tschechien Irland Polen Litauen Österreich Rumänien Spanien Italien Portugal Quelle: Stiftung Marktwirtschaft
Thank you for your attention. www.think-beyondtheobvious.com DR. DANIEL STELTER ·
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