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Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper David Pratt | March 2011 Strategic Studies Working Group Papers
Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The Honourable David Pratt, P.C. is Senior Vice President of Public Affairs for GCI Canada. Mr. Pratt served as
an elected representative at the municipal, regional and federal levels for 16 years. He was first elected to the
House of Commons for Nepean-Carleton in 1997. He also chaired the first Liberal Caucus Committee on Foreign
Affairs, National Defence and International Cooperation and was as a member of the Justice Committee’s
Sub-Committee on National Security. He served as a Special Envoy to Sierra Leone under two foreign affairs
ministers, was involved extensively in promoting more Canadian assistance to the war torn country, and
introduced legislation on “conflict diamonds”.
He was Chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs from
2001 to 2003. Mr. Pratt was appointed as Canada’s 36th Minister of National Defence in December, 2003 in the
Government of the Rt. Hon. Paul Martin, P.C.
From late 2004-2008, he served as Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross
(CRC) where his focus was on issues related to international humanitarian law, the control of small arms and
light weapons and government relations. He also led the CRC’s “Auxiliary to Government” project which
promoted a new relationship between the CRC and governments at all levels. In 2009 and 2010, Mr. Pratt
worked as a consultant on a democracy promotion project in Baghdad as part of a USAID effort to support the
Iraqi Parliament.
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Canadian International Council, its Senate or its Board of Directors, or the views of the Canadian Defence &
Foreign Affairs Institute.
If you would like to download a copy of this report please visit www.cdfai.org or www.onlinecic.org.
If you would like to be added to our mailing list or have questions about our publications please contact:
contact@cdfai.org or info@onlinecic.org
ISSN 1925-4903
© 2011 Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and Canadian International Council
–1–Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In recent years, strategic thinking and military restructuring have been confounded, not only by the uncertainties
of the threat environment, but also by significant budget restraints. The latter has had important implications for
the size of military forces, equipment purchases, training and potential commitments. One of the areas to which
many have looked to help mitigate the lack of resources and for ensuring the long term viability of an effective
military is the Reserve Forces. How best to make use of the Reserve component has become an important matter
of concern not only for Canada, but for many of our allies as well.
This report is an initial attempt to highlight some of the more important issues facing the Canadian Army
Reserve. The report does not pretend to have all the answers, but is an important first step in promoting what
is hoped will be a wider ranging examination of the Reserve and its role as part of an effective and modern
Canadian military. The report recognizes the important contribution made by the Reserve to deployments in
the post-Cold War era and argues that the experience gained must be built upon in order to ensure an effective
Reserve Force for the future.
The first section deals briefly with the implications of recent expenditure reductions for Canadian and other
allied militaries. As well, it provides a brief discussion of the importance allied defence establishments are
placing on their Reserves. It then goes on to provide a brief historical background on the evolution of the
Canadian Army Reserve and what successive governments have done with regard to its development.
Next, the report provides a discussion of the changing strategic environment and its implications for the
Canadian Forces. This section places particular emphasis on the importance of 9/11 and the subsequent need to
re-evaluate our strategic assumptions and force structures. The discussion is pursued in light of various reports
and studies done by governments and parliamentary fora in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.
The subsequent section provides a review of the Regular and Reserve force structures as well as a discussion
of the CF transformation launched by the then Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier. There is also
an analysis of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) announced by the Harper Government in 2008. Also
addressed are the Command and Control (C2) challenges related to the effective management of operations that
combine military and civilian capabilities in foreign and domestic settings. It is argued that if we are to achieve a
unified vision and more integration within the CF then the Regular and Reserve forces will have to work together
very closely. The efficient use of the Army Reserve is critical to the sustainability of Canada’s land forces into
the future.
The report supports a recent view expressed by LGen Leslie concerning the need to reduce headquarters
staff in order to better support the field force and examines the idea of a divisional model where Canada’s
three Regular Force Brigades would comprise the 1st Division and an unspecified number of Reserve Brigades
the 2nd division. The primary role of the former would be expeditionary deployments with support to domestic
operations while that of the latter would be domestic deployments with support to expeditionary operations.
Each division would contain a certain percentage of Reservists and Regulars, thereby providing for a degree of
“cross-fertilization”. The pros and cons of the idea are also laid out. A variety of other important issues facing
the Reserve are also discussed including budgets, recruitment and training, retention rates and medical care. Also
examined is the question of whether or not the Reserve should have their own chain of command. In the end, the
report supports the “integrationist” position while noting that the ”separationists” and those calling for reforms
have some valid points as well. The report supports the conclusion that Canada needs one army with the Army
Reserve being an integral component thereof under one chain of command.
In discussing the question of mobilization, the report brings the debate over the Reserve into the 21st century.
It contains a critique of the long standing argument on behalf of stage four or mass mobilization as a core role
for the Reserve. This role, the report concludes, should simply be abandoned. In the present and foreseeable
future strategic environment, a focus on mass mobilization simply makes no sense. The future roles laid out
for the Reserve “must be realistic insofar as the strategic environment is concerned and affordable from the
–4–Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
standpoint of force size, training and equipment”. Today, the Reserves are an integral part of the CF family, but
they need roles that are relevant in a modern context to the people they serve.
Having dispensed with mass mobilization as a key role for the Reserve, there remain those of augmentation
and the Reserve “footprint” in the community. The former is self-explanatory, but the latter is one we may do
well to further develop. The Reserve is more representative of the ethnic diversity of Canadian communities than
the Regular Force. It also brings recruits with skills not always readily found amongst those who decide to make
the military their first career choice. Therefore, it is important that we provide the Reserve with meaningful tasks
or roles where young recruits feel they are making a significant and intelligent contribution to their community
and nation. The report offers some do-able examples in this regard; one of the more intriguing being that of
cyber-defence.
The report also provides insights into the “culture” of the Reserve Force and its relationship to the Regulars.
While the relationship has not always been an easy one, it has improved significantly. Much of this is due to the
respect generated by Reservists in deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan. Also recognized is the important
role tradition has played with respect to the Militia and the “veneration” of historic regiments. However, while
paying tradition its due, the report provides an argument for the need to stay abreast of today’s realities and the
necessity for change.
The paper surveys a variety of programs in place among allied countries and suggests that we take a serious
look at adopting the recommendations recently made by the C.D. Howe Institute concerning employer support.
The basic message conveyed is that, if we expect the Reserve to honour its commitment to serve when
called upon, then it is our responsibility as a society to ensure that they are able to do so. The responsibility is
mutual. The report argues that if we consider the Reserve to be an important national institution, then its long
term well-being cannot be left to a few individuals in the Reserve community, the senior command of the CF, a
few pundits and a select group of senior bureaucrats. It should rather be decided by open and public debate that
involves outreach to the public and important stakeholders through either a Special Commission or some form
of parliamentary study.
–5–Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
SOMMAIRE
Ces dernières années, on a confondu pensée stratégique et restructuration militaire. Incertitude quant aux
menaces, certes, mais aussi sérieuses restrictions budgétaires qui ont joué sur la taille des forces armées, sur
l’acquisition de matériel, sur l’entraînement et sur les engagements à prendre.
Aussi, pour pallier au manque de ressources et assurer la viabilité à long terme d’une armée efficace,
s’est-on tourné vers la force de réserve. Reste à savoir comment faire le meilleur usage de cette composante? La
même question se pose à nos alliés.
Nous tentons, dans ce rapport, de signaler quelques-uns des gros défis auxquels fait face la réserve de
l’Armée canadienne. Nous ne prétendons pas avoir toutes les réponses, mais c’est une première étape
importante. Il faudrait en effet poursuivre un examen plus approfondi de la réserve et de son rôle dans une force
militaire canadienne efficace et moderne.
Nous faisons état de la contribution importante de la réserve aux interventions qui ont suivi la guerre froide
et jugeons que l’expérience acquise devrait permettre d’étayer une force de réserve efficace.
La première partie du rapport traite brièvement des implications des récentes compressions budgétaires
pour la force militaire canadienne et pour celle d’autres pays alliés. Nous rappelons brièvement l’importance que
les alliés accordent à leur réserve. Suit un bref historique de l’évolution de la réserve de l’armée canadienne et
de ce que les gouvernements successifs ont fait quant à son développement.
Nous évoquons ensuite l’évolution du contexte stratégique et ses implications pour les forces canadiennes.
Cette section met un accent particulier sur l’importance du Onze Septembre qui a obligé à réévaluer nos
hypothèses stratégiques et les structures de nos forces militaires.
La discussion se poursuit à la lumière de divers rapports et études émanant du gouvernement et de forums
parlementaires dans le sillage des attaques terroristes. Nous passons ensuite à un examen de la structure des
forces régulières et des forces de réserve et de la transformation des FC entreprise par le Général Rick Hillier,
ancien chef de l’état-major de la Défense. Nous analysons aussi la Stratégie de défense Le Canada d’abord,
annoncée par le gouvernement Harper en 2008, les défis du Commandement et Contrôle (C2) quant à la gestion
efficace d’opérations combinant capacités militaires et civiles dans des cadres d’opération à l’étranger et au
Canada. Nous soutenons que si nous voulons parvenir à une vision unifiée et à une plus grande intégration des FC,
les forces régulières et les forces de réserve devront œuvrer en très étroite collaboration. Une utilisation efficace
de la réserve de l’armée de terre est critique pour la durabilité des forces terrestres.
Le rapport défend un point de vue récent exprimé par le L.Gén Leslie concernant la nécessité de réduire
le personnel du quartier général afin de mieux soutenir la force sur le terrain, et avance l’idée d’un modèle
divisionnaire, où les trois brigades des forces régulières seraient la 1ère Division et un nombre non spécifié
de brigades de réserve, la 2ème Division. Le rôle fondamental de la première serait les déploiements
expéditionnaires avec soutien aux opérations intérieures alors que celui de la seconde serait les déploiements
intérieurs avec appui aux opérations expéditionnaires. Chaque division compterait un pourcentage de réservistes
et de réguliers, favorisant une certaine intégration. Nous présentons le pour et le contre. Le rapport aborde tout
un éventail d’autres questions concernant la réserve, notamment les budgets, le recrutement et l’entraînement,
les taux de rétention et les soins médicaux. Nous examinons en outre si, oui ou non, la réserve devrait avoir sa
propre chaîne de commandement. Enfin, le rapport soutient la position « intégrationniste » tout en reconnaissant
que les « séparationnistes » et ceux qui’réclament des réformes ont eux aussi des arguments valides. Le rapport
conclut que le Canada a besoin d’une armée dont la réserve est une composante intégrale sous une seule chaîne
de commandement. En discutant de la mobilisation, le rapport situe dans le 21e siècle le débat sur la Réserve.
–6–Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
Il comporte une critique du vieil argument selon lequel la quatrième étape, la mobilisation de masse est le
premier rôle de la réserve. Ce rôle devrait simplement être abandonné. Dans le contexte stratégique actuel et
futur, centrer le débat sur une mobilisation de masse n’a simplement aucun sens. Les rôles futurs de la réserve «
doivent être réalistes dans le contexte stratégique et possibles si l’on considère son effectif, son entraînement et
son équipement ». Aujourd’hui, la réserve fait partie intégrante de la famille des FC, mais elle doit avoir un rôle
qui, dans un contexte moderne, a quelque pertinence pour la population qu’elle sert.
La mobilisation de masse n’étant plus considérée comme un rôle clé pour la Réserve, reste l’augmentation et
de « l’empreinte » de la réserve dans la communauté. Le premier rôle est clair, mais le second mérite peut-être
d’être accentué. La réserve est plus représentative de la diversité ethnique de la population canadienne que
la force régulière. Elle apporte aussi des recrues possédant des compétences qui ne se trouvent pas toujours
facilement chez ceux qui décident de faire carrière dans l’armée. Il est donc important de confier à la réserve des
tâches et des rôles qui permettent aux jeunes recrues de sentir qu’elles apportent une contribution significative
et intelligente à leur communauté et à leur pays. Le rapport offre quelques exemples pratiques à cet égard,
notamment dans le domaine de la cyberdéfense.
Le rapport donne aussi une meilleure idée de la « culture » de la Force de réserve et de sa relation avec
les forces régulières. Même si cette relation n’a pas toujours été facile, elle s’est sensiblement améliorée. Ceci,
en partie, grâce au respect qu’ont inspiré les réservistes déployés aux Balkans et en Afghanistan. Le rapport
s’arrête aussi sur le rôle majeur de la tradition quant à la milice et à la « vénération » des régiments historiques.
Toutefois, il expose aussi combien il est nécessaire de considérer les réalités actuelles et les changements
qu’elles imposent.
Enfin, le rapport traite de la vieille question du soutien accordé par les employeurs aux réservistes. La
question fondamentale est la suivante : «quelle est la responsabilité du pays envers les réservistes et leurs
familles quand on fait appel à leurs services ? » Le rapport suggère que si nous voulons pouvoir compter sur
notre réserve, nous devons repenser la façon dont nous la soutenons. Au Canada, les programmes de protection
des emplois varient selon les provinces et selon qu’ils relèvent ou non du gouvernement fédéral. Il faudrait
une certaine constance. En même temps, il est important que les employeurs, qui supportent les coûts de
remplacement des employés qui servent ainsi la nation, puissent bénéficier de quelque soutien. Nous passons
en revue un certain nombre de programmes existant dans les pays alliés et suggérons d’envisager sérieusement
d’adopter les recommandations récentes du C.D. Howe Institute au chapitre du soutien de l’employeur.
Le message fondamental de ce rapport est que, si nous nous attendons à ce que la réserve honore son
engagement à servir quand on fait appel à elle, nous devons, en tant que société, veiller à ce qu’elle soit en
mesure de le faire. C’est une responsabilité mutuelle. Si nous considérons que la réserve est une institution
nationale importante, son avenir à long terme ne peut être décidé par quelques uns de ses représentants, le haut
commandement des FC, quelques pontes et hauts fonctionnaires. L’avenir de la réserve doit faire l’objet d’un
débat ouvert et public. Une commission spéciale ou une forme quelconque d’étude parlementaire s’impose.
–7–Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
RECOMMENDATIONS
(In the absence of a positive response to Recommendation One, other actions should be taken independently by
the DND/CF and the Government of Canada.)
1. That the Government of Canada undertake a comprehensive study of the Army Reserve either through
a Special Commission or through the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence to
review: a) the roles of the Reserve, b) budget allocations to the Reserve, c) administrative and other
problems relating to recruitment, pay, training and equipment, d) the results of the CF “transformation”
exercise as they affect the Reserve, e) “cultural” issues between the Reserve and the Regular Force,
and e) any other matter the Commission/Committee deems appropriate for the effective and efficient
functioning of the Reserve;
2. That the DND/CF undertake an internal study of the roles of the Reserve;
3. That the DND/CF take action to address problems in the recruiting and pay systems;
4. That the DND/CF take action to improve the recruitment of women, visible minorities and aboriginals;
5. That the follow-up report from the Ombudsman’s office entitled “Reserved Care: An Investigation into
the Treatment of Injured Reservists” be completed as soon as possible and that a plan be developed to
assist Reservists who experience Post Traumatic Stress Disorder after they leave the CF;
6. That DND/CF study and consider the establishment of the Office of the Inspector General to investigate
complaints and conduct investigations related to effectiveness and efficiency with the department and
the CF;
7. That the Government of Canada re-examine the four stage mobilization/activation framework contained
in the 1994 White Paper to ensure that it reflects current needs and is consistent with the Government’s
overall plan for emergency planning and preparedness and take whatever follow on action is required;
8. That the DND/CF take action to expand its presence on university campuses and consider new recruiting
programming similar to the Canadian Officer Training Program;
9. That the DND/CF examine the National Defence Act with a view to identifying possible amendments to
the Act that would be required for the Reserve to play a more substantive role in domestic operations;
10. That the DND/CF continue to strengthen its relationship with provincial emergency management
officials to ensure that all the necessary protocols and arrangements are in place to expedite CF
assistance during emergencies;
11. That the DND/CF investigate a possible role for the Reserve in the area of cyber defence and security in
support of the CF Network Operations Centre and the Government’s overall Cyber Security Strategy;
12. That the Government of Canada and the DND/CF take action to implement a program of job protection
and employer support for Canada’s Reservists based upon recent proposals by the C.D. Howe Institute.
– 76 –Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
STRATEGIC STUDIES WORKING GROUP
The Strategic Studies Working Group (SSWG)is a joint venture between the Canadian International Council
(CIC) and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The CIC absorbed the former Canadian
Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) upon the CIC’s formation in 2008, and the CISS’s original focus is now
executed by the SSWG.
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