BURDEN SHARING OF CLIMATE CHANGE-SHOULD INDONESIA BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS DEFORESTATION AND TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE? - DIVA
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Linköping University | Department of Culture and Society Master’s Thesis, 15 ECTS Credits | Applied Ethics Spring Semester 2020 | LIU-CTE-AE-EX--20/09--SE Burden Sharing of Climate Change – Should Indonesia Be Held Responsible for Its Deforestation and Transboundary Haze? Siska Purnamasari Putri Supervisor: Elin Palm Examiner: Lars Lindblom Linköping University SE-581 83 Linköping +46 13 28 10 00, www.liu.se
Abstract The IPCC’s report in 2018 projects global warming will increase by 1.5oC in 2030, which makes contribution of each country to control their emissions becomes significant. This study seeks to investigate what entitlement human beings have over the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere as well as the harm it caused by elaborating the Entitlement Theory of Justice, thereto, finding out how the burden of climate change should be distributed according to the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and the Equal per Capita Shares Principle (ECSP). Furthermore, this study seeks to investigate Indonesia's part in increasing the burden of climate change and whether Indonesia should be held responsible for its part by comparing data of Indonesia’s emissions to some developed countries’ emissions. Humanity has a collective ownership over the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere, which implies that every individual has equal share of this absorptive capacity. A violation of this equal share should be compensated. The PPP suggests countries, who has the most cumulative amount of emissions from the past to present, to compensate and bear the climate change burden. While, the ECSP suggests countries, who emit more than their equal share per capita, to bear the climate change burden and reduce their emissions. Indonesia, despites massive amounts of CO2 released by its deforestation and annual haze, contributes insignificant to climate change due to both its cumulative and per capita emissions are considerably low compared to developed countries and even lower than a country with large population size such as China. Key words: climate ethics, private property, collective ownership, historical principle, equal per capita principle, climate burden, Indonesian deforestation, Indonesian annual haze 2
TABLE OF CONTENT Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________ 4 1.1. A Brief Introduction to Climate Ethics __________________________ 4 1.2. Problem Formulation _________________________________________ 9 1.3. Aim _____________________________________________________ 12 1.4. Theoretical Approach _______________________________________ 12 Chapter 2: Equitable Distribution of the Absorptive Capacity of the Atmosphere ___ 13 2.1. Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice _________________________ 14 2.1.1. Nozick and Locke’s Theory of Acquisition _________________ 15 2.1.2. Nozick and the Lockean Proviso __________________________ 17 2.1.3. An Equitable Distribution of the Absorptive Capacity of the Atmosphere According to Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice ____ 17 2.2. Summary _________________________________________________ 21 Chapter 3: Equitable Distribution of the Burden of Climate Change _____________ 22 3.1. The Polluter Pays Principle ___________________________________ 22 3.2. The Equal per Capita Shares Principle __________________________ 26 3.3. Summary _________________________________________________ 30 Chapter 4: Should Indonesia Bear the Burden of Climate Change _______________ 31 4.1. A Brief Introduction to Indonesia Forest ________________________ 31 4.2. Deforestation of Indonesian forest _____________________________ 32 4.2.1. Deforestation in 1960s-1980s ____________________________ 33 4.2.2. Deforestation in 1990s-present ___________________________ 33 4.3. Indonesian Forest conversion into Palm oil plantation ______________ 33 4.4. Indonesian Forest Fires Crisis and Transboundary Haze ____________ 34 4.5. Do Indonesia’s Deforestation and Transboundary Haze Contribute Significantly to Climate Change?__________________________________ 35 4.6. Summary _________________________________________________ 39 Chapter 5: CONCLUSION _____________________________________________ 40 REFERENCES ______________________________________________________ 42 3
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1. A Brief Introduction to Climate Ethics Climate change has become a major concern and important issue of many countries in the world as its evidence and effects are increasingly visible. The online survey performed by The Harris Poll on behalf of the American Psychological Association from December 12-16, 2019 has reported that at least 56 % of adults in the United States believe that climate change is a crucial issue (Science Daily, 2020). Eurobarometer 300 conducted a survey in spring 2018 to see how people in EU countries are responding to climate change. According to 62% respondents in this survey, climate change or global warming is one of the most serious problem the world currently facing after international terrorism (the Directorate-General for Communication of the European Commission, 2008). The term climate change refers to changing in climate. Climate itself is a long term average of weather conditions prevailing in a given region. Thus, climate change, simply put, is long term changes in average weather conditions in particular region. According to Cambridge Dictionary (2020) climate change is defined as “changes in the world's weather, in particular the fact that it is believed to be getting warmer as a result of human activity increasing the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere”. While Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) refers climate change to “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer” (Data Distribution Centre, 2020). From these two definitions, it can be concluded that climate change is a change in the pattern of world climate in a relatively long period of time (decades) due to the increase of global average temperature. The increase of global average temperature results when the atmosphere surrounding the earth traps heat that radiates from the earth into space. Certain gases, known as greenhouse gases, in the atmosphere prevent the heat to escape into space. The more amount greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the warmer the earth becomes. As the earth gets warmer and warmer, several feature changes in the world’s climate can be seen. For 4
example, the rise of sea level, the disruption of the water system, the melting of ice in the arctic, longer drought, extreme hot temperature during the summer, severe tropical storms and so forth. Greenhouse gases are naturally present in the atmosphere. These greenhouse gases absorb the heat from solar energy and hold it in the atmosphere, which is known as the greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect makes the earth conveniently warm and habitable for humans and other species. However, human activities on the earth have increased the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and thus, altered this natural greenhouse effect. Allegedly, the increase of global average temperature since the mid-twentieth century is clearly due to an increase in greenhouse gases concentrations, which are predominantly caused by human activities (IPCC, 2013). Human activities, such as excessive use of fossil fuels, land clearance (usually done by the burning of forests), deforestation, sea pollution, goods manufacture, and mining waste, are considered to contribute significantly to the increase in greenhouse gases emissions, mainly carbon-containing gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane, in the atmosphere. High emissions of both CO2 and methane as well as other greenhouse gases such as, water vapor (H2O), nitrous oxide (NO2), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to the atmosphere lead to the greenhouse effect phenomenon where the solar energy is absorbed and re-radiated to the earth by the greenhouse gases resulting in the rise of the earth’s surface temperature. The increase of the earth’s surface temperature consequently alters the climate. “Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system…” (IPCC, 2018, p. 7) The increase of the earth’s surface temperature, which changes the climate, is a result of increased amount of greenhouse gasses. Greenhouse gases, once emitted, will remain in the atmosphere for a very long time before natural processes can remove them. Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide will remain in the atmosphere for 5 to 200 years, 12 years, and 114 years, respectively, while other carbon-containing industrial gases such as chlorofluorocarbon, hydrofluorocarbon, and perfluoromethane will linger for about 45 years, 260 years, and more than 50000 years, respectively (IPPC, 2001). Thus, it is 5
important to calculate the amount of greenhouse gasses, especially carbon-containing gases, released in the atmosphere, which is known as carbon footprint. Carbon footprint as defined in Cambridge Dictionary (2020) refers to “a measurement of the amount of carbon dioxide produced by the activities of a person, company, organization, etc.”. While a universally accepted definition of carbon footprint set by Laurence A. Wright, Simon Kemp and Ian Williams (2011) is as follow: “a measure of the total amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) emissions of a defined population, system or activity, considering all relevant sources, sinks and storage within the spatial and temporal boundary of the population, system or activity of interest. Calculated as carbon dioxide equivalent using the relevant 100-year global warming potential”. Greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide and methane, have been occurring over a long period of time. Industrial and transportation activities that involve the process of burning fossil fuels that occur consistently but also continuously from the era of the Industrial Revolution to the present are the main factors of the amount of greenhouse gas emissions in the earth's atmosphere today. It is reported that in the last 150 years, carbon dioxide concentration levels in the atmosphere have increased from 280 ppm to 412 ppm and there is more than 95% probability that human-induced greenhouse gases have caused much of the increase in the earth's temperatures over the past 50 years (IPCC, 2014). The World Research Institute (WRI) has also simulated the amount of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 1850 to 2011. From the simulation, it is reported that CO2 emissions in 1850 is 150 times higher than in 2011. In the beginning of 1850 the United Kingdom (UK) was listed as the top emitter country of CO2 with emissions nearly six times higher than the United States (US), the second place. The third, fourth and fifth places of the top five countries with the highest CO2 emissions in 1850 were filled by France, Germany, and Belgium, respectively. However, in 2011, China took place as the top emitter country, followed by the United States, India, Russia, and Japan (Friedrich and Damassa, 2014). The change of the world's climate results in a wide impact, not only on the environment but also social-politics, economy, health, as well as moral-ethics, in human life. As living organisms become part of a society in which social interaction and mutual relations occur 6
with one another, all people in the world will be affected by the impact of climate change. For example, climate change impacts on the availability of food, water and energy in the community, transmission of disease and various problems in the health sector, and disruptions to the transportation system and other public facilities. However, there are several groups of people in a society that are more severely affected than other groups to the change of world's climate. Byrd and DeMates (2014) describes that women, children, elderly, unemployed, small farmers, and poor people who live in rural and urban areas, as well as socially marginalized people are vulnerable to climate change as they are more susceptible to the health and economic impact of climate change. In underdeveloped and developing countries, women are usually responsible for domestic work in the household, such as preparing food, transporting clean water from the central water supply (the distance can reach tens of kilometers from the house) to the kitchen, looking for firewood, cleaning the house and yard, washing clothes, taking care of children and many others. Climate change makes the burden borne on the shoulders of women become overwhelmingly heavier due to the higher workload and both psychological and emotional stress. Furthermore, the existence of gender inequality experienced by women especially in underdeveloped and developing countries, makes women more vulnerable to climate-related hazards. Correspondingly, the same thing was also narrated by Verona Collantes, an intergovernmental specialist with UN women, in an interview with Global Citizen. “Gender inequality hampers women’s capacity and potential to be actors of climate action. These gender inequalities — access to and control over resources, access to education and information, and equal rights and access to decision-making processes — define what women and men can do and cannot do in a particular context of climate change,” (Collantes cited in McCarthy, 2020) Apart from that, most small-scale farmers in underdeveloped and developing countries rely their agricultural land on natural rainwater and sunlight. They also usually do not have access to capital or agricultural technology. At the same time, they have to compete with large agricultural corporations who monopolize the market. Changes in climate's patterns such as drought, extreme temperatures and precipitation, and heavy rainfall are 7
worsening their condition. An example of the case is shown by Harvey et al (2018) in the research on the impact of climate change on small-scale farmers in developing countries in Central America, i.e., Turrialba and Los Santos in Costa Rica, Choluteca and Yoro in Honduras, and Chiquimula and Acatenango in Guatemala. The result shows that climate change has a negative impact in the form of a decrease in the production of their agricultural crops, namely a decrease in production of 87% of corn farmers, 78.4% of bean farmers, and 66.4% of coffee farmers (Harvey et al, 2018). Furthermore, the impact of climate change on health sector on people who live in the rural area in developing countries in the Caribbean is also visible. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has reported that the rural people in countries in the Caribbean have experienced serious problems in health sector due to the spread of various deadly diseases as a result of climate change. Some types of mosquitoes which play an important role as vectors of deadly diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, are sensitive to changes in temperature in the Caribbean as it induces the maturity periods of those mosquitos. Overpopulation of mosquitos causes the outbreak of malaria and dengue fever and has killed many civilians in the Caribbean (Clarke et al, 2013). Eventually, people who live in underdeveloped and developing countries are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change than those who live in developed or industrial countries. Ironically, activities of those people who live in underdeveloped and developing countries considerably contributed less to the impact of climate change as they mostly live close to nature and do not do any activities that result in high emission of carbon such as the use of car and electronic devices, travel via airplane more, high consumption of meet, working in industrial sector or living in huge house or apartment. In addition, they also usually have limited access to advanced technology and financial resources in order to help them to adapt to the impact of climate change. Most of them are nature dependent agricultural sectors which lead their earnings are susceptible to the change of nature's climate. Meanwhile, people in developed countries that are the main contributors to carbon emissions, both in total and per capita, especially the United States and developed 8
countries in Europe, considerably suffer less to the change of climate as their countries are technology well equipped with advance technologies as well as finances to help them adapt to the change of climate. In addition, they are mostly working in the sector that are not nature dependent. The unequal capacity in both contributing to the cause of climate change and coping the impact of climate change between poor (underdeveloped and developing) and rich (developed) countries raises moral-ethics problems. Greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere will be uniformly dispersed. Therefore, the harm they incur will not only be borne by the people live in the place where they are emitted. They can, thereto, harm the people who live further away from those who cause the harm. Meanwhile, those who cause the harm reap benefits from their emissions without or less being affected by the harm. Accordingly, there will be a condition, where the victims who suffer the impacts of climate change are not the main actors who emit most of the greenhouse gases that cause climate change. In other words, those poor countries will be left to bear the burdens of rich countries’ wrongful emissions that benefit from their emissions. Can this condition be justified? If not, should the rich countries be held responsible and how should the burden of climate change be allocated? 1.2. Problem Formulation The IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018, p. 6) summarizes that “Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate”, which implies that within the next 10 years the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases without causing temperatures to rise above 1.5oC will be depleted, if carbon dioxide emissions are not drastically reduced. Limiting average global temperature to only rise by 1.5oC compared to 2oC can reduce the harm imposed on human beings and ecosystems. “Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C.” (IPCC, 2018, p. 11) 9
The report, thereto, concludes that a 2oC increase in average global temperature will lead to more complex social-economic problems, e.g., higher mortality rate, decline in agricultural sector production, extreme weather which lead to natural disasters, slowing economic growth, poverty, scarcity of clean water and sanitation problem by up to 50% compared to an increase by 1.5°C. Thereto the impacts will be increasingly worse if average global temperature raises beyond the 2°C limit. To avoid this condition and keeps average global temperature to not rise more than 1.5oC, carbon-containing gases concentrations need to be cut down by 45% by 2030 and reach zero by 2050 (IPCC, 2018). This would demand countries who emit the most greenhouse gases to take the lead to reduce their emissions and even to compensate for their excess emissions. It seems an easy task to point out that developed countries are the main suspect who emit the most greenhouse gases and use up the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases without causing rising in temperature above 1.5oC, and thus, they should be held responsible. As James Garvey (2008) expresses in his work The Ethics of Climate Change: right and wrong in a warming world (cited in Chalmers 2008), developed countries have the greatest responsibility to shoulder the burden of climate change both because they emit much more greenhouse gases and they have greater financial and technical capacity to mitigate climate change. Nevertheless, pointing a finger at developed countries for causing the harm of climate change and holding them responsible is not as easy as blaming and holding responsible a person who breaks other’s window. If someone broke someone else’s window, it would be clear who the culprit was, who the victim was, and what the harm had caused. Thus, it would be easier to hold the culprit (the one broke the window) responsible for the harm (shattering the window) he caused to the victim (the window owner). Meanwhile, the dilemma of climate change can rise where a person who drives a fossil fueled car in an affluent country can contribute, many years later due to accumulated carbon-containing gases, to malaria outbreak in the Caribbean, for instance. Could this person be held responsible, responsible for what? Could people in the Caribbean demand compensation, what sorts of compensation, to whom compensation should be demanded? More importantly what is ‘the harm’ been done exactly? 10
Thus in this thesis, I will examine what entitlement human beings have over the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere and what harm human beings can impose on others by appropriating this absorptive capacity of the atmosphere more than they are entitled to. Thereby, I will discuss what sorts of responsibility should be imposed on them who appropriate the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere to the extent that their appropriation deprives others of their share of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. Apart from that, cutting carbon-containing gases emissions will affect developing countries who depend their energy and even earnings from fossil fuels, one of which is Indonesia. Indonesia depends on its oil, gas, coal and timber exports as the main source of its national income. The cutting of carbon-containing gases in developed countries would bring adverse effect to Indonesia’s income. This can lead to Indonesia will depend more on its second main income, i.e., palm oil sector. As one of the largest producers and exporters of palm oil in the world, Indonesia provided 50% of the palm oil world production in 2014 (Schleicher et al, 2019). Utilizing palm oil sector would mean increasing in Indonesia’s deforestation. Peatland clearings for palm oil agriculture, thereto, has caused Indonesia suffers annual forest fires. This annual forest fires also causes pollution problem in the region of South East Asia due to its transboundary haze. Moreover, it is pointed out that both Indonesia’s deforestation and forest fires have contributed to the increase of greenhouse gases concentrations in the atmosphere which cause climate change. Meanwhile, the IPCC’s report (2018) projects the essential role of forests in stabilizing the global temperature and suggests reforestation up to 3.86 million square miles (10 million square kilometers) by the year 2050. The forests can remove about 25% of carbon- containing gases lingered in the atmosphere. As a country who possesses great potential of tropical forest, which ranks third behind Brazil and the Republic Democratic Congo (FAO, 2015), it is expected that Indonesia will preserve its forests, one of which through REDD+, a global initiative aims at curbing carbon emissions from changes in forest cover (UN-REDD programme, 2019). 11
This raises a dilemma, where Indonesia, in its attempt to develop, not only contributes more to the global carbon-containing gases emissions but also losses its forests that the world expects to reduce carbon-containing gases concentrations in the atmosphere. Thereby in this thesis, I will also try to discuss whether Indonesia has contributed significantly to the global climate change thus should take part in bearing the climate burden. 1.3. Aim This study seeks to investigate what entitlement human beings have over the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere, what harm can be caused if violation of this entitlement occurs, and what sorts of rectification can be imposed on those who violate this entitlement. Thereto, this study also seeks to investigate Indonesia's part in increasing the burden of climate change and whether Indonesia should be held responsible for its part. 1.4. Theoretical Approach This thesis consists four chapters. The first provides some background of climate ethics. I begin this chapter with some basic information regarding climate change, inter alia, the causes and effects, as well as the relation of human activities and climate change. Thereto, I point out some ethical issues that I will discuss in this thesis. The second elaborates the Entitlement Theory of Justice. In this chapter, I defend collective ownership of the atmosphere and its implication that every human being entitles to the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere without depriving others’ access to it. The third differentiates between the Polluter Pays Principle and the Equal per Capita Shares Principle, two principles that can assess burden sharing of climate change. The fourth outlines Indonesia’s forests and its problem of massive deforestation and annual transboundary haze. In this chapter I attempt to compare Indonesia’s emissions’ contribution to climate change to other countries and find out if it is significant or not. 12
Chapter 2: Equitable Distribution of the Absorptive Capacity of the Atmosphere In discussing global climate change, we cannot avert from the discussion on collective ownership of the earth since changes in climate have affected the earth that humanity collectively owns. The conception of humanity owns the earth collectively was a leading discussion by philosophers in the 17th century, among others are Hugo Grotius and John Locke. One of the main discourses is the conditions under which parts of the earth, namely the land, the air, and the sea, can be owned privately. Grotius in 1609, for instance, proposed ideas about the possibilities of owning the sea. “The sea cannot become the property of anyone, but owes forever to all men a use which is common to all… not even fishing on the sea could be prohibited by anyone… nor navigating the sea” (Grotius, 2004, pp. 78-79) Grotius formulated two reasons in which might justify collective ownership of the sea, i.e., 1) it was originally discovered in nature and was never ruled by anyone, 2) it gives the impression to be created by nature for the common use. “…those things which cannot be occupied or were never occupied can be proper to none because all propriety hath his beginning from occupation… all those things which are so ordained by nature that anyone using them they may nevertheless suffice others whomsoever for the common use are at this day (and perpetually ought to be) of the same condition whereof they were when nature first discovered them.” (Grotius, 2004, p. 24) Accordingly, Grotius considered the sea as common property of all that cannot be possessed by anyone and thereby, anyone’s access to it cannot be denied. In Grotius’ day, the air space surrounding the earth, namely the atmosphere, were untouched by human activities and technologies, thus the idea about the possibility of owning the atmosphere never arose. Nevertheless, Grotius considered an application of his conception about collective ownership to the atmosphere. “Of this kind the air is for a double reason, both because it cannot be possessed and also because it oweth a common use to men” (Grotius, 2004, p. 25). Hence, the atmosphere is more like the sea than the land, i.e., cannot be owned privately and is a common use for all. This directs to questions of what entitlements humanity could have over the atmosphere and what legitimate use humanity could make of the 13
atmosphere. Does it entail that every human being could labor the atmosphere as they pleased? Is it permissible to use the atmosphere to the exclusion of others? These questions should lead us to a broader discussion regarding the distribution of climate change burdens. It is, thereto, morally necessary to create fair principles in regulating the distribution of climate change burdens. To do so, first we need to consider whether owning the atmosphere privately, i.e., to make use of the atmosphere to the exclusion of others, is possible or not. In order to justify the possibility of owning the atmosphere privately, we need to consider the acceptability of appropriating the atmosphere to the exclusion of others, what I mean here is appropriation of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere which deprives others of their share of this absorptive capacity. Thereby, in this chapter I will discuss property ownership according to Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of justice. In the following, I will attempt to answer what is an equitable distribution of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere according to this approach. 2.1. Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice Atmosphere as a common goods entails that every person on the earth has a shared right to utilize the atmosphere, including in putting carbon-containing gases emissions and other waste gases into it. While the atmosphere itself is limitless resource, however, its capacity to absorb waste gases without causing harm is limited. Then, how do we justify the actions of some people who put their waste gases into the atmosphere more than others and thus limiting others’ opportunity to put the same amount of waste gases? Before answering this question, we need to consider whether or not human beings may claim ownership over the atmosphere, i.e., the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. If so, what entitlements could human beings have over the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere and what legitimate use could human beings make of it? Robert Nozick proposes a theory of distributive and private property that may give answers to these problems, when viewed from a complete principle of distributive justice. According to Nozick, the commons, i.e., resources belonging to human beings collectively, can be acquired legitimately as a private property. He proposes a well known the Entitlement Theory of justice in resources which consists three major aspects. The first is a principle of justice in acquisition, which accounts the initial acquisition of 14
resources, e.g., the processes of how people first came to claim ownership of unowned resources, what kind of resources that can be owned by those processes, and so forth. The second is a principle of justice in transfer, which accounts the processes of how one human being can acquire resources from other human beings, including voluntary exchanges. The third is a principle of rectification of injustice, which assesses how past injustices in acquiring or transferring resources should be dealt (Nozick, 1999). Suppose the world were absolutely just, Nozick believes that a principle of justice in acquisition and a principle of justice in transfer would be enough for a complete principle of distributive justice that assesses whether a person's entitlement to some resources is legitimate or not. 1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) application of 1 and 2 (Nozick 1999, p. 151) Unfortunately, not all ownership of a resource or common goods is acquired by legitimate means, i.e., in accordance with a principle of justice in acquisition and a principle of justice in transfer. In fact, “some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in exchanges” (Nozick, 1999, p. 152). Thus, the third principle of distributive justice is a necessity, to wit a principle of rectification of injustice. 2.1.1. Nozick and Locke’s Theory of Acquisition Robert Nozick's conceptions of private property are heavily influenced by John Locke, one of the prominent 17th century philosophers, particularly his thoughts on the initial acquisition. Nozick’s notion on how people originally came to claim ownership of unowned resources is adapted from Locke’s theory of acquisition, which may give answers to how human beings could have entitlements over the commons, the atmosphere is one of which, as well as what legitimate use could be made of it. 15
Locke (1980) views the earth, and everything in it, as a common property given by God for humanity, in which each of them can claim ownership of, and take benefits from, some part of the earth by appropriation. Thereto, Locke considers appropriation can be done by mixing one’s labor with something from the common resources. Locke argues that a person owns his labor, hence if he mix his own labor with an unowned resource, he will make that certain resource his own because his labor has permeated and thus adds something to that particular resource. “…The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being… in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use… Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property…, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others… That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right…” (Locke, 1980, chapter 5, sect. 26, 27, 28) In adapting Locke’s theory of acquisition, Nozick admits that some limits are necessary in order to determine what a human being entitled to by adding his labor into the common resources. For instance, if an astronaut clears a place on an uninhabited planet, does he own that particular part of the planet that he cleared, or the whole planet, thereto why does clearing that particular place of the planet mean that he has gained property in the planet rather than lost property that he spent during the clearing process? ”… why isn’t mixing what I own with what I don’t own a way of losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don’t? If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” (Nozick, 1999, pp. 174-175) Regarding this problem, Nozick suggests that when a person adds value to unowned resources through his labor, he also gains ownership over that resources, if the resources is limitless so as there are still some resources left for other people. This condition is in line with Locke’s proviso that there ought to be “enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Locke, 1980, chapter 5, sect. 27), as a means to guarantee that the appropriation of an unowned object does not make other people worse off. 16
2.1.2. Nozick and the Lockean Proviso What happens then, when there are others who end up worse off due to one’s acquisition over an unowned resource? What if there exist some affluent groups in society while the others left with nothing to sustain their lives? Nozick develops a thought experiment to assess this problem, i.e., suppose a person Y acquires land that leaves Z without enough and as good land to acquire, which makes Z worse off. In this case, Y’s acquisition violates the Lockean proviso, hence it is illegitimate and Y cannot acquire the land. Y’s situation may indicate that person X, who acquired the land before Y, left Y in such situation where Y is not allowed to acquire, which means that X has also made Y worse off. Consequently, X’s acquisition over the land is illegitimate as well. The situation may go on and may end up with A whose acquisition makes person B worse off, thus no one acquires the land legitimately. Nevertheless, there is one condition that may not violate the Lockean proviso, hence makes this kind of acquisition permissible, i.e., if Z’s baseline condition ends up better off overall. Z may still be able to use the land without acquire the land or Y pays compensation to Z, for instance by opening employment to Z that makes Z better off than before the employment (Nozick, 1999, pp. 176-177). Even though the condition Nozick set may raise some issues with equality, for instance in the thought experiment above where Z ends up with no property while Y with property, it is a legitimate appropriation as long as it does not worsen Z’s overall condition. This justification is possible because the entitlement theory is premised on the idea that what matters for distributive justice is the process of acquisition and transfer along with the history of those processes. This theory rejects end-states, viz., the end result after the distribution, as a standard in assessing justice. Hence, this theory is also known as a historical conception of justice, i.e., “whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about” (Nozick, 1999, p.153) 2.1.3. An Equitable Distribution of the Absorptive Capacity of the Atmosphere According to Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice Can human beings own the atmosphere? How do we justify the actions of some people who put their waste gases into the atmosphere more than others and thus limiting others’ 17
opportunity to put the same amount of waste gases? In this section, I intent to answer these questions. In so doing, I will discuss a thought experiment developed by Peter Singer in his book One World: The Ethics of Globalization. “Imagine that we live in a village in which everyone puts their wastes down a giant sink. No one quite knows what happens to the wastes after they go down the sink, but since they disappear and have no adverse impact on anyone, no one worries about it. Some people consume a lot, and so have a lot of waste, while others, with more limited means, have barely any, but the capacity of the sink to dispose of our wastes seems so limitless that no one worries about the difference. As long as that situation continues, it is reasonable to believe that, in putting waste down the sink, we are leaving “enough and as good” for others, because no matter how much we put down it, others can also put as much as they want, without the sink overflowing” (Singer, 2002, p. 27). If we evaluate this thought experiment in accordance with the principle of initial acquisition we have discussed in section 2.1.1. above, we will agree that anyone in the village who puts their waste down that giant sink has gained ownership over the sink as long as the sink is limitless, so as everyone after them can still put their waste down the sink. It is also permissible for everyone to put as much waste as they want, even though they may put much more than others. As long as the sink has the capacity to contain everyone’s waste and thus, no one is forced to limit the amount of waste they put down, no violation to the Lockean proviso has been done, hence Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice will justify this condition. Let us continue Singer’s thought experiment. Suppose, as the conditions continue, everyone keeps putting their waste into the giant sink as they pleased. One day, the giant sink becomes no longer limitless, namely the sink’s capacity to contain the waste reaches its limit and the sink becomes overloaded. As a result, seepage occurred and caused some problems, e.g., a foul odor covers the village, the water becomes smelly and turbid, etc. In this condition, if people keeps putting their waste down the sink the way they always did, there will no longer be “enough and as good” sink for everyone. But as the sink is a collective property, there is no guarantee that everyone will reduce their waste to lift up the burden of the sink. Thus, no one in the village is willing to reduce their waste and no one feels responsible to do it. This condition is called tragedy of the commons. In this condition, the giant sink becomes a limited resource that needs to be distributed in an 18
equitable way. Nozick’s entitlement theory may still allow us to take the sink out of the collective ownership and giving someone private ownership over the sink, since there is the weaker requirement on the Lockean proviso, i.e., “appropriation is acceptable if it leaves people as well or better off overall” (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 113) This experiment thought is analogous to today’s climate change problem, if we think of the atmosphere “as a giant global sink into which we can pour our waste gases” (Singer, 2002, p. 29). Everyone feels entitled to the atmosphere, thus everyone dumps their waste gases, as they pleased, into the atmosphere. No one feels environmentally responsible since the atmosphere would be polluted by others anyway. As a result, the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb waste gases will be depleted, which leads to the changes of the climate that caused harmful effects. Once the atmosphere’s capacity is depleted, there will be tragedy of the commons, where everyone will be worse off, i.e., no one will be left with enough and as good atmosphere to absorb the waste gases without causing harmful effects. For this reason, owning the atmosphere as a private property that entails rights to utilize the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity more than the others, seems to be justifiable. Taking the atmosphere out of the collective ownership, thus allowing some people or some countries to deprive others of their share of the atmosphere’s capacity would be justifiable if it does not worsen anyone’s overall condition. As Nozick (1999, p. 178) states “a process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened”, the proper test for the legitimacy of such appropriation is that it does not worsen the situation of others. But, what exactly does it mean by worsening the situation of others? Nozick’s answer to this is a materialistic standpoint (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 115), i.e., if the appropriation will not make people’s economic conditions worse off, than they had been when the atmosphere was in collective use. One may argue that developed countries who have used the global sink, namely the atmosphere, more than other countries through their industrialization, have increased productivity which its benefits, such as inventions and technologies, have spread across the world. Thereto, global economic development has increased throughout the world, 19
which improves people’s life quality in terms of income or decent standard of living, life expectancy, and literacy or education. Thus, developing countries or even the poorest people in the world have taken benefits from the industrialization of developed countries, and thereby, their condition ends up better off overall than they would otherwise be. Hence, their appropriation of the most absorptive capacity of the atmosphere is justifiable. But there has been much controversy about this argument, since many people in developing countries, whose share of the atmosphere’s capacity has been deprived, cannot afford the benefits of industrialization. Singer (2002, p. 39), for instance, points out that at any rate in the US, “most goods and services that the United States produces, 89% of them, are consumed in the United States… Many residents of other countries, especially the poorest countries, cannot afford to buy goods produced in the United States, and it isn’t clear that they benefit from U.S. production”. Moreover, despite the benefits they might obtain, the poorest people in the developing countries are most vulnerable to the harmful effects of the depletion of the atmosphere's capacity to absorb waste gases, e.g., natural catastrophes due to changing of the climate, which might cause crop failure or even destroy their homes and land. In this situation, they will be left much worse off which violates the Lockean proviso. Apart from that, the people of developed countries have used up the most of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity in their daily life activities as well as in developing their domestic economy to the extent that if the people of developing countries, in their attempt to improve their life style and living standard, behave as the people of developed countries do, the atmosphere will no longer be able to sustain their waste gases. Thus, this means that appropriation of absorptive capacity of the atmosphere by the people of developed countries has effectively deprived others (in developing countries) of their option to develop as the people in developed countries, i.e., preventing the people of developing countries from living as they choose. Regarding this circumstance, Nozick (1999, p. 180) asserts that “Once it is known that someone’s ownership runs afoul of the Lockean proviso, there are stringent limits on what he may do with his property”. Thus, a person or a country is not permissible to appropriate the limited absorptive capacity of the atmosphere, which imply that appropriation of the most absorptive capacity of the 20
atmosphere by developed countries could not be justified. Accordingly, the Entitlement Theory of Justice demands enforcement of the third principle, i.e., a principle of rectification of injustice. Furthermore, it is a matter of fact that developed countries were using fossil (carbon) fuels since the Industrial Revolution and were benefited from the Industrial Revolution to this day. Accordingly, their affluence and prosperity this day is linked to their past unjustified appropriation of the most absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. If we put this into consideration, then the present global distributive injustice happened as a consequence of illegitimate appropriation of a collectively owned resource by the people of developed countries. This historical wrongful appropriation may become a reason for rectification. 2.2. Summary In this chapter, I have discussed the conception of property ownership according to the Entitlement Theory of Justice. According to this theory, appropriation of the limited absorptive capacity of the collectively owned atmosphere cannot be justified. Thus, any action of depriving others of their access to the same entitlement of the atmosphere is wrongful doings which need to be rectified. The sorts of rectification can be implied will be discussed in the next chapter. 21
Chapter 3: Equitable Distribution of the Burdens of Climate Change As a collectively owned property, the limited absorptive capacity of the atmosphere should be distributed justly among individuals. Wrongful appropriation of the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb human-induced emissions in the past has led some countries to use up this capacity more than other countries. On the other hand, some countries, even today, still use the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere more than other countries. Thus, these particular countries have contributed more to climate change than other countries. Meanwhile, the burden of climate change are borne by those both who contribute more and less, without exception. This leads to unfair distribution of climate change burden, where countries who contribute less to climate change should bear the same burden as countries whose contribution is significant to climate change. Moreover, countries who contribute less to climate change usually have less capability to cope with the burden. Therefore, distribution of climate change burden needs to be regulated, and thereby, fair norms need to be set. Johansson-Stenman and Konow (2017) proposes four norms of fairness that can assess the distribution of climate change burdens, i.e., the Accountability Principle, the Efficiency Principle, the Need Principle, and the Equality Norm. In this chapter, I will discuss two principles that can be used as guidelines in regulating the distribution of climate change burden, namely burden sharing. These two principles hold the accountability principle and the equality norm, i.e., the Polluter Pays Principle and the Equal per Capita Shares Principle, respectively. 3.1. The Polluter Pays Principle One of the main ethical questions regarding the climate change is whether individuals or countries who have used up the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere in the past should be held responsible for their wrongful emissions. If it is true that individuals or countries should be held responsible for their past appropriation of the atmosphere’s capacity, they would be required to rectify the harm they caused. Thus, this is the role of rectificatory 22
justice. But, a question may arise whether rectificatory justice, a backward-looking account, has any moral force? Regarding this matter, Collste (2010) argues that rectificatory justice complements distributive justice. The entailment of rectificatory justice is weighed by distributive justice i.e., rectification for wrongful acts in the past can only be demanded if the wrong acts generate injustices in the distribution of benefits and burdens among people in present day. As I have discussed in chapter 2 that developed countries have been using fossil fuels, which emitted greenhouse gasses to the atmosphere, since the Industrial Revolution and thus have luxuriated in wealth to this day. Developed countries, accordingly, appropriated the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere more than other countries in the past. Thus, rectificatory justice that holds individuals or countries responsible for their past emissions would demand developed countries to reduce their present emissions more than developing countries. However, there are a number of discourses regarding which past emissions should be counted for responsibility. Among other considerations are as follow: first, can past emitters be held responsible when they could not have known the effects of the emissions at that time? These past emitters, thereto, could not have known that the industrialization in the far future would continue to depend on fossil fuels, which problems raised to date are because of this continuation. Second, who should be held responsible? Is it a responsibility of countries, companies or individuals, or even is it a collective responsibility? Third, how can present day generations be held responsible for the wrongful emissions of their ancestors? Regarding these matters, Daniel Butt (2013) argues that past emitters could be held responsible if they benefited from their wrongful emissions in the atmosphere. The fact that the developed countries used up the most of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere in the past and the wealth they obtain nowadays is indivisible, those past emissions should be counted even though the effects of the emissions were not understood at that time. This responsibility can be passed down to their descendants who have also benefited from these wrongful acts. Thus, the present day generations have a moral responsibility to 23
rectify the wrongful acts of their ancestors as a result of the benefits they have received. Hence, the developed countries should be held responsible for the emissions they caused since the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, a set of reasons for holding developed countries responsible for their past emissions has been raised in various discussions, among others are the contributions of Peter Singer and Henry Shue. “If the developed nations had had, during the past century, per capita emissions at the level of the developing nations, we would not today be facing a problem of climate change caused by human activity, and we would have an ample window of opportunity to do something about emissions before they reached a level sufficient to cause a problem. So… as far as the atmosphere is concerned, the developed nations broke it. If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the problem with the atmosphere” (Singer, 2002, pp. 33-34). “When a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of others by imposing costs upon them without their consent, those who have been unilaterally put at a disadvantage are entitled to demand that in the future the offending party shoulder burdens that are unequal at least to the extent of the unfair advantage previously taken, in order to restore equality” (Shue, 1999, p. 534). The idea that past emissions should be taken responsibility stirs up some issues, e.g., what is “broke” in Singer’s term and what are “the costs that are imposed without consent” in Shue’s term. Both Singer and Shue refer to what sorts of harm been inflicted by past emitters (polluters). There are, in any case, two harms that could arise from both past and present emissions, i.e., the physical harm and the harm of the excess use of the atmosphere. The past emissions would likely be borne by today’s generation, while the present emissions would be borne by future generation. Hayner and Weisbach (2016, pp. 97-98) defines the physical harm as the harm caused by a drastic change in climate, such as “the harm from sea level rise, the loss of agricultural productivity, storms, droughts, and even the harm from forced changes to lifestyles and the resulting loss of cultures”, while the harm of the excess use of the atmosphere as the harm of appropriating an unequal portion of the limited absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. To put it simple, the physical harm points out historical principles, i.e., who ends up worse off due to wrongful appropriation, while the excess use of the atmosphere points out end-result principles, 24
i.e., who ends up with the less portion of the atmosphere’s capacity due to inequality in sharing the atmosphere’s capacity. The idea that past emissions should be held responsible for the physical harm it caused is an application of rectificatory justice concerning the global environmental justice, to wit the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). The PPP is expressed in the Rio Declaration on the Environment principle 16, which urges the polluters to bear all the costs of the physical harm they caused: “National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment” (United Nations Environment Program, 1993, p.6) As an account of rectificatory justice, the PPP is built upon a premise that every individual has a negative right to not be wrongfully harm, which implies that every individual has a duty to rectify the harm caused by his wrongful acts. Thus, it is important to know not only which past emissions that count and who emitted those emissions in the past, but also who have been harmed -who have ended up worse off- by those past emissions and in what amount. In order to determine what the PPP demands, namely what sorts of obligation would entail responsibility for past emissions, a measure of harm, in this case the physical harm, needs to be provided, because “some nations polluted disproportionally relative to the harm that they bear” (Hayner and Weisbach 2016, p.100). Simply put, the so called largest emitter countries would also be affected by the physical harm they caused. Therefore, the estimation is needed to ensure who the harmed are. Accordingly, even though the PPP seems to put burdens to developed countries, a measure of harm, viz. who is harmed by those emissions and in what amount, however, needs to be provided in order to determine what sorts of rectification should be borne by developed countries. What if, by the estimation, developed countries, who appropriate the atmosphere’s capacity illegitimately and thereby emit the most waste gasses, is facing the same amount of physical harm as developing countries, who emit less. More dramatically, what if developed countries bear most of the physical harm or even bear all 25
of the physical harm, namely if it is the developed countries who ultimately become worse off. Nevertheless, the PPP does not specify the form of rectification, which means that the obligation to rectify the physical harm caused by past emissions can be complied with any transfer of value. The burdened countries, for instance, may demand the high emitter countries in the past to have the greater commitment to reduce their present emissions, or to transfer green technology to them, or even to give cash payments that may help them adapt to the climate change. 3.2. The Equal per Capita Shares Principle As I mentioned in section 3.1. above, the second harm that could arise from both past and present emissions is the harm of the excess use of the atmosphere, which points out end- result principles. Contrary to the physical harm, which points out historical principles, the excess use of the atmosphere does not generate a claim of responsibility from rectificatory justice, but distributive justice, i.e., an equality claim. It is built upon a premise that every individual has a right to an equal share of a collectively owned resource. The absorptive capacity of the atmosphere, which is limited, is owned collectively by humanity, thus every human being should have the same right to access this limited capacity of the atmosphere in the same portion. It means that each human being possesses the same entitlement to put their waste gasses into the atmosphere. The harm of the excess use of the atmosphere is the violation of this right, which is allowing some countries to use the most portion of the atmosphere’s limited capacity to absorb waste gasses while depriving others of their share. The argument could be structured as follow: (1) Humanity has a collective ownership of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere (2) If humanity owns the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere collectively, a right to use it should be equally distributed to each of individuals (3) Excessive use of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere is a violation of this right, which causes harm to others whose fair share are deprived (4) Those who violate this right, should be held responsible for their excess use 26
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