SPECPOL Background Guide - Special Political & Decolonization Committee - IMUNA
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NEW YO S MU N
RK NH
202 0
SPECPOL
Special Political & Decolonization Committee
Background Guide
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.org
Secretary-General Hello Delegates!
Vijittra Puckdee
My name is Clare Steiner and I will be serving as your Director of the Special Political and Decolo-
Director-General
nization Committee (SPECPOL) for Session I! My amazing co-Director, Darby, and I have put a
Althea Turley
lot of thought, time, and discussion into this year’s conference and we are very excited to see how
Chiefs of Staff you approach these topics this March. Last year, I was the Assistant Director of the Disarmament
Alex Burr and International Security Committee (DISEC), and I look forward to seeing the same high caliber
Walker Heintz diplomacy and creativity at my second NHSMUN!
Delegate Experience
Luis González During my freshman year of high school, a teacher recommended Model UN to me after seeing
Merve Karakas how much I enjoyed world history. Three years of conferences, papers, and research later, I had the
pleasure of serving as our team’s Head Delegate, where I discovered my passion for the collabora-
Domestic Partnerships
tive and educational aspects of Model UN. Currently, I am a sophomore majoring in both political
Maura Goss
Odion Ovbiagele science and philosophy at the University of South Carolina. In particular, I enjoy studying Middle
Eastern and African politics and political theory. In my spare time, I am trying to learn Swahili,
Global Partnerships
attempting to cook more advanced dishes than spaghetti, and working at my university’s writing
Renata Koch
center!
Salmaan Rashiq
Internal Affairs After extensive research and discussion, Darby and I found two extremely pressing topics for
Lia Lee SPECPOL to focus on this year. The first one, “The Peaceful and Sustainable Uses of Outer
Natalie O’Dell Space,” covers an area unique to SPECPOL’s mandate and requires the committee to address the
Under-Secretaries- gap between modern technology and previous legislation. Our second topic is “Supporting Political
General Reform in the Sahel,” which appeals to SPECPOL’s special political missions in that region target-
Michael Beeli ing political oppression and corruption. While seemingly very different, these topics cover similar
Jill Bendlak problems with inadequate protocols and underdeveloped infrastructure. Both topics are extremely
Rose Blackwell multi-faceted, and we are hopeful to hear innovative solutions that fall under SPECPOL’s politically
Annica Denktas focused mandate.
Rahul Francis
Omar Mufti This summer, I had the pleasure of interning at a program for children of refugee and immigrant
Jonathan Packer families, which affirmed to me the importance of conferences like NHSMUN that allow for di-
Akanksha Sancheti verse populations to collaborate and work together. This is a unique opportunity to understand the
John Wood
importance of diplomacy, and I encourage you to use your voice in a way that helps the commit-
Alisa Wong
tee come to the most comprehensive solutions possible. If you have any questions, please contact
Darby and me—we are here as a resource for you. We look forward to seeing you soon, and we are
excited to see you discover the depths of these topics!
Best Wishes,
Clare Steiner
clare.steiner@imuna.org
Special Political and Decolonization Committee
Session I
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.org
Secretary-General Welcome, delegates!
Vijittra Puckdee
My name is Darby Dayton, and I am a third-year student studying Anthropology and Design at UC
Director-General
Berkeley. It is my pleasure to serve as the Director of the Special Political and Decolonization Com-
Althea Turley
mittee for Session II of NHSMUN 2020. This March marks my first NHSMUN on the other side
Chiefs of Staff of the dais, though I attended as a delegate in high school. Outside of committee, you can find me
Alex Burr performing with my improvisational comedy team, Jericho! Improv & Sketch Comedy, or camp-
Walker Heintz ing and surfing along the California coast. I always have my earbuds in and am constantly on the
Delegate Experience lookout for new R&B and old punk rock music. I would definitely consider myself an adventurer,
Luis González which is why I am so excited for this conference! Conveniently, adventure is one of the aspects I
Merve Karakas find most intriguing about our topics, Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel and International
Domestic Partnerships Cooperation in the Peaceful and Sustainable Uses of Outer Space.
Maura Goss
Odion Ovbiagele These topics take us through the changing tides of history and the future. Crises in both of these
areas have arisen from vast shifts in the global political climate and present clear opportunities for
Global Partnerships
setting vital legislative precedents. It is my hope that we are able to delve into these situations from
Renata Koch
both internal and external perspectives in order to better understand the kind of future we envi-
Salmaan Rashiq
sion as an international community. I urge you to identify the larger historical factors from which
Internal Affairs conflicts in the Sahel and in space were born so as to pinpoint creative solutions that address these
Lia Lee issues at their roots. This guide will alert you to the many facets of the topics and should serve as
Natalie O’Dell
a useful jumping-off place for you to continue to hone the specifics that pertain to the needs, de-
Under-Secretaries- sires, and capabilities of your delegation. I can’t wait to see the creative brilliance you all will bring
General
to committee.
Michael Beeli
Jill Bendlak As far as research goes, there are many different ways to tackle these issues. As your director, I am
Rose Blackwell foremost a resource. From now throughout the very end of the conference, I am fully available to
Annica Denktas address any questions you may have about the topics, debate, NHSMUN, even life. This conference
Rahul Francis
is all about understanding our world and what we can do to change it for the better, so please do
Omar Mufti
not hesitate to ask about anything unclear in your research. I am committed to providing clarity and
Jonathan Packer
Akanksha Sancheti ease for you to the best of my ability. I wish you luck, focus, and inspiration.
John Wood
Cordially,
Alisa Wong
Darby Dayton
darby.dayton@imuna.org
Special Political and Decolonization Committee
Session II
SPECPOL 4| Table of Contents Table of Contents Background Guide 1 A Note on the NHSMUN Difference 5 A Note on Research and Preparation 7 Committee History 8 Simulation9 Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel 10 Introduction11 History and Description 11 Current Status 22 Bloc Analysis 27 Committee Mission 30 The Peaceful and Sustainable Uses of Outer Space 32 Introduction33 History and Description of the Issue 33 Current Status 43 Bloc Analysis 48 Committee Mission 50 Research and Preparation Questions 52 Important Documents 54 Works Cited 56
SPECPOL
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference |5
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference
Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Welcome to NHSMUN 2020! My name is Althea Turley and I am this year’s Director-General. Thank you for choosing to attend
NHSMUN, the world’s largest Model United Nations conference for secondary school students. We are thrilled to welcome you
to New York City in March!
As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to help transform today’s brightest thinkers into
tomorrow’s leaders. Our organization provides a uniquely tailored experience for all in attendance through innovative and acces-
sible programming. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience and this
idea permeates throughout NHSMUN.
Debate founded on strong knowledge: With knowledgeable staff members and delegates from over 70 countries, NHSMUN
can facilitate an enriching experience reliant on substantively rigorous debate. To ensure this high quality of debate, our staff
members produce extremely detailed and comprehensive topic overviews (like the one below) to prepare delegates for the com-
plexities and nuances inherent in global issues. This process takes over six months, during which the Directors who lead our
committees develop their topics with the valuable input of expert contributors. Because these topics are always changing and
evolving, NHSMUN also produces update papers that are intended to bridge the gap of time between when the background
guides are published and when committee starts in March. As such, this guide is designed to be a launching point from which
delegates should delve further into their topics.
Extremely prepared and engaged staff: The detailed knowledge that our directors provide in this background guide through
diligent research is aimed at spurring critical thought within delegates at NHSMUN. Prior to the conference, our Directors and
Assistant Directors are trained rigorously through copious hours of both virtual and in-person exercises and workshops in an
effort to provide the best conference experience possible. Beyond this, our Directors and Assistant Directors read every posi-
tion paper submitted to NHSMUN and provide thoughtful insight on those submitted by the feedback deadline. Our staff aims
not only to tailor the committee experience to delegates’ reflections and research but also to facilitate an environment where all
delegates’ thoughts can be heard.
Emphasis on participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its Member States to create resolutions most likely to make a
dramatic impact on the world. That is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. We believe that in order to properly delve into an issue
and produce fruitful debate, it is crucial to focus the entire energy and attention of the room on the topic at hand. Our Rules
of Procedure and our staff are focused on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of each delegate’s country as-
signment or skill level. However, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference.
MUN delegates are well researched and aware of the UN’s priorities and they can serve as the vanguard for action on the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, we are proud to also connect students with other action-oriented organizations at
the conference to encourage further work on the topics.
Focused committee time: NHSMUN prohibits the use of any electronic devices during committee sessions. We feel strongly that
face-to-face interpersonal connections during debate are critical to producing superior committee experiences and allow for the
free flow of ideas. Ensuring a no-technology policy is also a way to guarantee that every delegate has an equal opportunity to
succeed in committee. We staff a very dedicated team in our office who type up and format draft resolutions and working papers
so that committee time can be focused on communication and collaboration. Please note that the dais is permitted a laptop to
communicate with members of Senior Staff and for other administrative needs.
SPECPOL 6| A Note on the NHSMUN Difference Educational emphasis, even for awards: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. As such, when NHSMUN does distribute awards, we de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward schools whose students excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. More importantly, we seek to develop an environment in which delegates can employ their critical thought processes and share ideas with their counterparts from around the world. We always prioritize a dedication to teamwork and encourage our delegates to engage with others in a diplomatic and inclusive manner. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership that strives towards consensus, as delegates do in the United Nations. Realism and accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. Each NHSMUN committee is a simulation of a real deliberative body so that delegates can research what their country has actually said in the committee. Our topics are chosen from the issues currently on the agenda of that committee (except historical committees, which take topics from the appropriate time period). This creates incredible opportunities for our delegates to do first-hand research by reading the actual statements their country has made and the resolutions they have supported We also incorporate real UN and NGO experts into each committee through our committee speakers program and arrange for meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System. As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2020 and would be happy to dis- cuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. Delegates, it is my sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. I look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference. Best, Althea Turley Director-General
SPECPOL
A Note on Research and Preparation |7
A Note on Research and Preparation
Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the conference’s intellectual and
cosmopolitan perspective. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your com-
mittee. This document is designed to give you a description of the committee’s mandate and the topics on its agenda. We do not
intend to represent exhaustive research on every facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore
the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to NHSMUN in March. Delegates must be
prepared to intelligently utilize your knowledge and apply it to your country’s unique policy.
The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging, but to assist delegates, we have updated our Beginner Delegate
Guide and Advanced Delegate Guide. In particular, these guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position
paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage—they can help transform
a sometimes-overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate a given state’s views in writing. Ac-
cordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a posi-
tion paper for both topics on the committee’s agenda. In delegations with two students, we strongly encourage each student to
participate in the research for both topics, to ensure that both students are prepared to debate no matter what topic is selected
first. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the NHSMUN Research Guide. To sum-
marize, position papers should be structured into three sections, described below.
I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate’s coun-
try. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic background, but rather focus on the details that are most
important to the delegation’s policy and proposed solutions.
II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation’s policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy
in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Compari-
sons with other global issues are also appropriate here.
III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation’s proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of
each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential
obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country’s policy.
Each topic’s position paper should be no more than 10 pages long double-spaced with standard margins and font size. We
recommend 2-4 pages per topic as a suitable length. The paper must be written from the perspective of the country you are
representing at NHSMUN 2020 and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.
Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of its papers to their committee Directors via myDais on or before 14 Febru-
ary 2020. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee’s dais, a position must be submitted on or before
24 January 2020. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the dais of each committee and returned prior
to your arrival at the conference.
Complete instructions for how to submit position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via the email submitted at registration.
If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, they should contact us at info@imuna.org as soon as possible.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to directors will be ineligible for awards.
SPECPOL 8| Committee History Committee History The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL) is the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Created via the General Assembly Resolution 47/233, the Fourth Committee was established in 1993 as part of the UN’s first International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism from the years 1990-2000.1 Prior to that point, the First Committee handled political issues and security issues, and the Fourth Committee only handled decolonization issues. However, as the number of decolonization issues declined, and the number of security issues increased, the political issues were moved to the Fourth Committee to give it new life.2 Many of the Fourth Committee’s efforts before the merger were decolonization issues, mostly concentrated in Africa and the Middle East, helping many states achieve independence.3 Today, SPECPOL’s focus has shifted to include any conflict that navigates tense political disagreements as well as special topics with few established legal precedents.4 This uniquely distinguishes the Fourth Committee from other General Assembly committees that preside over a singular area of international politics as it debates issues from a range of sectors.5 Some examples of current agenda items include the proper usage of outer space, atomic research and nonproliferation, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.6 Due to the pressing and narrow focus of SPECPOL’s mandate, it works closely with the Security Council and often reviews its operations relating to peace and security.7 In some cases, this means legislation that recommends military action specifically; however, the Fourth Committee cannot authorize military action.8 Despite its diverse focus, SPECPOL is quite similar in function to the rest of the General Assembly. It follows stan- dard UN parliamentary procedure, includes all 193 member states, and is based in the UN Headquarters in New York City.9 SPECPOL also collaborates heavily with the rest of the UN to compartmentalize its broader missions. Examples of such collaboration include the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), both of which assisted with creating detailed analysis of political change and unrest10. Additionally, SPECPOL has worked in tandem with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pal- estinian Refugees in the Near East, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to provide expert support to its resolutions.11 It is exclusively through consulting specialized committees that SPECPOL is able to apply its solutions to such a wide range of specific topics. Therefore, the solutions to these topics depend on the examples set by COPUOS for its outer space legislation and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, which manages Special Political Missions.12 While geographically diverse, both topics can be best addressed by a committee that is prepared to set legal precedents and hold states politically accountable, two concepts which are key to SPECPOL’s mandate. 1 “Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth Committee),” (United Nations), accessed 19 September 2019, https://www.un.org/en/ga/ fourth/. 2 Ibid. 3 Callahan, M. (n.d.). Mandates and empire - the League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931. Sussex Academic Press, 1999.; “The United Nations and Decolonization - History,” Welcome to the United Nations, accessed 18 September 2019, https://www.un.org/en/decoloniza- tion/history.shtml. 4 The GA Handbook: A Practical Guide to the United Nations General Assembly (PDF) (2nd ed.). New York: Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations. 2017. ISBN 978-0-615-49660-3. 5 “Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth Committee),” (United Nations). 6 Ibid. 7 “Charter of the United Nations - Chapter IV: The General Assembly,” (United Nations), accessed 30 September 2019, https://www. un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-iv/index.html. 8 Ibid 9 “General Assembly of the United Nations Rules of Procedure” (United Nations), accessed 20 September 2019, https://www.un.org/ Depts/DGACM/Uploaded%20docs/rules%20of%20procedure%20of%20ga.pdf. 10 “Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth Committee),” (United Nations). 11 Ibid. 12 “DPPA Around the World,” (United Nations), accessed 26 September 2019, https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world.
SPECPOL
Simulation |9
Simulation
This simulation at NHSMUN 2020 will allow all delegates to participate equally in a vibrant debate. Delegates must thoroughly
familiarize themselves with their country’s policies so that they can accurately represent them when the committee discusses each
topic. The goal of this committee will be to build a consensus to support and pass a resolution that thoroughly addresses the
topics under discussion, while also respecting the differing goals and opinions of all member states. With this goal in mind, del-
egates should develop and support resolutions that align with their country’s policies. Each country must work towards finding
compromises without abandoning their own country’s goals in favor of the resolution. The resolutions should, therefore, aim to
improve the situation while allowing each country to stay on policy and accomplish what their government believes is important.
To start committee, after delegates have been introduced to the dais, they will first debate the setting of the agenda and then
progress to substantive debate, which will deepen and progress throughout the following sessions. There will be two main forms
of discussion in this committee: formal debate and caucusing. Formal debate consists of delegates adding themselves to the
speakers list to be formally recognized before the rest of the committee for a specified length of time. When delegates appear
before the committee, it is their opportunity to give an overview of their country’s position. It is imperative that all delegates re-
main respectful of others during this time and observe all procedural rules in order for delegates to be heard and for the speaker’s
list to flow smoothly. The chair will move down the speakers list, allowing each country who has volunteered their name to speak
for a set amount of time and present their concerns to the committee.
Caucusing can be done in one of two ways: moderated and unmoderated. The speakers list will be suspended for both types of
caucuses. Moderated caucuses flow similarly to formal debate, but delegates’ speaking times are often shorter, and each caucus
has a specific topic that delegates must discuss in their comments. A moderated caucus will allow more speakers to address the
assembly without having to wait for their turn to come on the speakers list. Unmoderated caucuses suspend formal rules of
debate for a designated period of time during which delegates are free to move around the room and informally discuss policy
and potential solutions with one another. The majority of writing for working papers and draft resolutions will occur during
these unmoderated caucuses.
The topics in this committee are challenging and will require a great deal of research. Because NHSMUN emphasizes compro-
mise and innovative problem solving, pre-written resolutions are not allowed at this conference. While your delegation may have
some informal ideas about possible solutions before committee begins, you may not bring them to the conference in resolution
form; this would defeat the purpose of the committee, which is to work together and compromise. Working papers and resolu-
tions are collaboratively created by starting with solutions, first just as a set of ideas. These solutions are formatted into a working
paper, then voted upon as draft resolutions, and finally presented as resolutions in plenary if passed in committee. Throughout
this process and the debates, the dais staff will be available at all times to help delegates with any concerns or questions they may
have. The dais is always happy to help delegates not only with substantive questions related to the topics under discussion, but
also with adjusting to the procedural aspects of Model UN.
During the conference, the chair will be moderating the committee and setting up a general direction for the flow of debate.
However, it is truly up to the delegates to decide how the committee proceeds, and it is up to the delegates to make the confer-
ence and committee the best that it can be. Delegates are welcome to contact the dais at any time for help, both before and
during the conference, as they are there to answer any questions. They will help to make sure the committee runs smoothly and
is a success.
SPECPOL
NHSMUN 2020
Topic A:
Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel
Photo Credit: USAID Africa BureauTopic A: Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel
History and Description |11
Introduction
The Sahel is a collection of countries in Africa spanning across the continent from the west coast to
the east coast. This region, accurately depicted in the image below, is faced with a variety of political,
economic, and humanitarian conflicts that have substantially lowered the stability of countries in the
region.
The Fragile States Index (FSI) determines a state’s vulnerabil- a path towards peace through a variety of methods includ-
ity based on calculations of human rights, social pressures, ing electoral assistance, improving representation, ensuring
security abilities, group grievances, and state legitimacy.1 Ac- the protection of human rights, and creating accountability
cording to the FSI, every state within the Sahel falls under “el- networks.7 Attacking the roots of structural problems, spe-
evated warning, high warning, alert, and high alert” for total cial political missions build international relationships that
state collapse.2 In particular, Chad and Sudan are respectively help support peace development. For example, the special
classified as the seventh and eighth states most likely to col- political mission in Guinea-Bissau recently focused on sup-
lapse in the world. These two states consistently suffer from porting legislative elections in 2018 as well as creating better
corrupt government practices which are perpetuated by weak processes for constitutional review.8 Additionally, they serve
accountability frameworks.3 Furthermore, frequent govern- to strengthen regional partnerships with organizations like
ment changes contribute to instability; when combined with the G-5 Sahel and the African Union to create a targeted and
political oppression, these changes erode the trust between comprehensive plan of action.9 Fixing these structural issues
the state and its people. Subsequent protests for greater politi-
requires inclusive discussion, such as the 2018 peace forum
cal reform are often met with violent suppression tactics from
held by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sa-
the government in power. Most recently, Sudan’s Transitional
hel (UNOWAS) which invited over 70 national institutions in
Military Council (TMC) was responsible for the deaths of
West Africa.10 In order to provide the most effective means of
over one hundred pro-democracy protesters.4 Other examples
political reform, the Fourth Committee has the responsibility
of restrictive consolidation of political power come from de-
to review its special political missions and better equip them
mocracies, such as when Gambian President Jammeh refused
to combat the unique challenges presented in the Sahel.
to cede power after losing an election in 2017.5 These political
problems, which often arise from underdeveloped infrastruc-
ture, can be found in varying government systems, including History and Description
transitional governments, presidential democracies, and semi-
presidential systems within the Sahel. Historical Reasons for Political Problems in
the Sahel
To address the shortcomings of these governments and re-
lated state institutions, the Fourth Committee currently has While the exact definition of the Sahel region varies based
active special political missions designed to enact political re- on interpretation, it represents roughly the 3,860 kilometers
form in the region.6 The strategy of these missions is to build stretching from Senegal to Eritrea, including the land between
1 Ibid.
2 “Fragile States Index - 2019 Annual Report,” The Fund for Peace, 2019, https://fragilestatesindex.org/2019/04/07/fragile-states-index-
2019-annual-report/.
3 Ibid.
4 “Sudan Crisis: 40 Bodies Pulled from Nile, Opposition Says,” BBC News, 5 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48512413.
5 “Gambia’s President Jammeh Refuses to Leave Office as Deadline Passes,” BBC News, 19 January 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-38672840.
6 A/73/337, “Overall Policy Matters Pertaining to Special Political Missions,” 23 August 2018, https://undocs.org/A/73/337.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.12|TH opic A: Supporting Political
istory and Description
Reform in the Sahel
as youth turn to extremism as a gateway for change.15 Since
various groups disagree over where political legitimacy lies,
the foundations of political reform remain unstable when
considering long term peace.
Moreover, the Sahel’s location between Saharan Africa and the
Middle East make it an area that represents many competing
cultures and religions, including Arabic and Islamic culture,
as well as hundreds of different indigenous peoples.16 Ethnic
conflicts prevent deep relationships between countries in the
Sahel, and this gap in regional support disproportionately af-
fects landlocked countries such as Niger.17 Additionally, po-
rous borders often include large stretches of land without
adequate governance which allows for the spread of sub-state
militant activity rising from political insecurity.18 The histori-
Map of countries considered part of the Sahel; note that this is not a universally- cal roots of these problems lie in the region’s imperialist past,
agreed upon definition when European powers created state borders based on colo-
the deserts of North Africa and the more fertile soil in South- nial land distribution rather than cultural and racial differenc-
ern Africa.11 The UN often uses the broader definition of the es. The following picture shows the regional distribution of
Sahelo-Saharan region when discussing the Sahel region, since ethnic groups, as represented by different colors in the left im-
it groups states that have commonly experienced ethno-reli- age, as compared to African countries’ borders, drawn in the
gious conflict from diverging cultures. This definition includes right image. The colonial powers imposed country borders
the G-5 Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, without consideration for the ethnic groups in the territories.
and Niger, as well as Sudan, Nigeria, Eritrea, and Senegal.12
To this day, countries like Cameroon and Nigeria have dis-
This group of states experiences recurring problems resulting
putes over land because of these colonial-era borders, under-
from temperature changes, including flooding and droughts, mining ethnic and religious groups’ requests and access to
that prevent stable economic growth.13 These environmen- self-determination. The governments’ inability to meet the
tal problems contribute to food insecurity in the region, as needs of these various groups makes those areas extremely
evident by continuing food crises, like in 2012, which left 13 susceptible to extremist tactics, as radical members vie for
million at risk of malnutrition after a massive drought.14 An- state’s attention.19 Because local groups have ties that stretch
ger at inadequate government policies during times of crisis across border regions, it becomes difficult for Sahelian gov-
contributed to a rise in extremist politics and terrorist activity ernments to enforce the rule of law in those areas with di-
11 Muhammad Dan Suleiman, “Sahel Region, Africa,” The Conversation, last updated 28 February 2017, https://theconversation.com/sahel-
region-africa-72569.
12 Ibid.
13 Robert Muggah and José Luengo Cabrera, “The Sahel Is Engulfed by Violence. Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Extremists Are
Largely to Blame,” World Economic Forum, 23 January 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-
in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/.
14 Finbarr Sheehy, “Graphic: Sahel Food Crisis Mapped,” The Guardian, 9 March 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
graphic/2012/mar/09/sahel-food-crisis-map.
15 Zoë Gorman and Dr. Grégory Chauzal, “Establishing a Regional Security Architecture in the Sahel,” Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, 25 June 2018, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2018/establishing-regional-security-architecture-sahel.
16 Suleiman, “Sahel Region, Africa.”
17 “Conflict in the Sahel Region and the Developmental Consequences,” United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, December 2016,
https://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/23474/b11580410.pdf ?sequence=3.
18 Ibid.
19 Max Fisher, “The Dividing of a Continent: Africa’s Separatist Problem,” The Atlantic, last updated 10 September 2012, https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-dividing-of-a-continent-africas-separatist-problem/262171/.Topic A: Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel
History and Description |13
Map comparing the estimated pre-colonial ethnic boundaries with moder, post-colonial state boundaries in Africa.
vided loyalties.20 For example, in Burkina Faso, the militant rebellions, four coups, and seven government changes.23 This
group Ansar-ul Islam, allied with other extremist Islamic orga- statistic is representative of the disconnect between govern-
nizations, crippled areas in the north of the country, winning ment promises and reality.24 Frustration among the popu-
support through socio-political tensions arising from an inat- lous, due to failed changes and repetitive political problems,
tentive government.21 Its limited ability to provide necessary create the conditions for a cycle of violent rebellions. This
security at its border with Mali prevents Burkina Faso from breeds criminal activity, which is estimated to be worth over
uprooting this violent organization.22 In the Sahel, historical- 3.8 billion US dollars annually. 25 This activity is not limited to
cultural tensions undermine security and stability, making it non-state groups, but also includes corrupt politicians who
imperative that future political solutions consider the reasons often use this illicit activity to create alliances that help them
for these divisions. keep office.26 These conditions weaken civil society and make
it easy for oppressive governments like those in Chad and
The Sahel has underdeveloped political infrastructure due to Mauritania to continue their fraudulent behavior and enforce
historical government instability. Since Niger’s independence rule by armed forces.27 While it is impossible to change the
almost 50 years ago, the country has undergone two armed geographic conditions in the Sahel, the entirety of the Sahel
20 Ibid.
21 Robbie Corey-Boulet, “Jihadists Open a New Front in Burkina Faso as the Army Plays Into Their Hands,” World Politics Review, last
updated 27 September 2018, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/26143/jihadists-open-a-new-front-in-burkina-faso-as-the-
army-plays-into-their-hands.
22 Ibid.
23 André-Michel Essoungou, “The Sahel: One Region, Many Crises,” Africa Renewal, last updated December 2013, accessed 8 July 2019,
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/sahel-one-region-many-crises.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Sebastian Elischer, “The Sahel: Regional Politics and Dynamics,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, published March 2019, https://
www.oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-765.
27 Ibid.14|TH opic A: Supporting Political
istory and Description
Reform in the Sahel
would benefit from political changes that allow for greater By holding the majority of political authority accountable,
governance and stable conditions. corrupt governments can prevent institutions from enforc-
ing the rule of law.34 Mechanisms for political accountability
Corruption and Lack of Government Account- include police forces, judiciaries, legislative powers like parlia-
ability ments, and, ultimately, the people.35 The existence of legiti-
In Chad, political problems have persisted since its current mate separation of powers prevents human rights abuses and
allows for policies that best favor a state’s citizens.36 For ex-
president, Idriss Déby, came to power in 1990.28 Masking op-
ample, while Sudan technically has an independent judiciary,
pressive rule under the guise of political reform, the Chadian
its judicial system is heavily controlled by the executive be-
government used revenue from massive oil reserves to sup-
cause judges are often appointed through nepotism or brib-
port an abusive military force and suppress individual free-
ery.37 This consequently means that judges often lack proper
doms.29 Despite being a declared presidential democracy, the
experience and training and fail to provide objective rulings.38
government of Chad has routinely used gaps in electoral re-
Judges in Darfur often miss trials, preventing especially those
form and constitutional limitations to maintain power.30 Déby
in rural areas from being able to air grievances against cor-
postponed elections in 2011 and blacked out communications
rupt practices.39 Similarly, in Niger, the lower-level courts have
both during and after the elections, which limited discussions
little motivation to provide justice, often facing extremely low
over his governments potential fraudulent practices.31 This
salaries and inadequate resources.40 In Mauritania, political in-
disruptive electoral calendar, paired with a lack of transpar- stitutions rely heavily on a clientelist system, which encour-
ency, fostered an atmosphere of political distrust that resulted ages the exclusion of certain ethnic groups from political par-
in multiple attempted coups, violent protests, and strikes.32
To address mounting instability, Chad approved an oppres-
sive counterterrorism strategy that allowed for the detainment
of political opponents and journalists. Furthermore, recent
constitutional reform in 2018 allowed for the expansion of
presidential power by eliminating the post of the prime min-
ister.33 The situation in Chad demonstrates how government
corruption can limit the creation of a powerful civil society,
allowing for repressive policies and weakened opposition by
expanding government powers. Ultimately, this kind of envi-
ronment breeds corruption and weakens institutions of gov-
Members of the Kubwa residential district in Nigeria wait in long lines to vote
ernment accountability. during an election season
28 “Chad,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed 8 July 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/Independence.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 “The Unstable Foundations of Political Stability in Chad,” West African Papers, No. 12 (February 2018), https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.
edu/files/Eizenga-2018-OECD-chad.pdf.
35 Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza and Rodrigo Soares, “Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter,” Economics &
Politics 17, No. 1 (March 2005), http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00894A/WEB/PDF/ACCOUNTA.PDF.
36 Ibid.
37 “Sudan Corruption Report,” GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, May 2016, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/
sudan/.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Marie Chêne, “Niger: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption” U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 23 January 2017, https://www.
u4.no/publications/niger-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption.Topic A: Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel
History and Description |15
ticipation while one is in power.41 An under-funded judicial gies to win office.47 Additionally, Nigeria has extremely long
system has proven to be too weak to both seriously threaten voting processes and this burdensome process contributes to
the state’s history of clientelism and hold officials accountable low voter engagement.48 These obstacles to voting often allow
for continued oppression.42 While Mauritania’s president, Mo- for corrupt businesses and others with a financial stake in the
hamed Ould Abdel Aziz, introduced a new code of ethics for elections to control the vote at the expense of the people.49
civil servants in 2005, his political allies and military generals This devalues the vote of ordinary citizens and reinforces dis-
still have yet to be persecuted for corrupt practices because tance between the government and the people it claims to
their support is necessary to maintain his rule.43 Therefore, represent. Senegalese President Macky Sall, who leads what is
greater divisions are created between ethno-religious groups considered to be one of the most stable countries in Africa,
as corrupt practices go unaddressed, making future rebellion has used suspect methods of securing elections, including
from the oppressed more likely. Without sufficient power, sidelining major opponents and arresting them for corrup-
judicial systems cannot maintain a standard respected by the tion.50 These unjust practices stretch across every state in the
citizens of the state. Niger’s 2010 constitution attempted to Sahel, making it a pervasive issue that needs to be addressed in
create greater government transparency, requiring that top order to create better conditions for representation and stabil-
government officials report their assets.44 While this measure ity in the region.
appeared to be a beneficial step forwards, its Supreme Audit
Institution lacked a developed mechanism for actually audit- Increasing Regional Partnerships for Political
ing government officials. Taking advantage of the insufficient Reform
capacity of the courts, Nigerien officials continued to spend
In order to combat issues pertaining to political impunity, re-
government money on superfluous items and services, includ-
gional partnerships must be strengthened. To this end, most
ing an extravagant government jet.45 This kind of corruption
of the regional organizations dealing with political problems
undermines the ability of police and security forces to protect
in the Sahel focus on development projects that encourage
the civilians of their state as it places a distinct divide between
cross-communication between the countries in the Sahel.51 In
the government and its people. As long as the state remains
particular, the G-5 Sahel, which is comprised of Burkina Faso,
immune to consequences, the government, along with its re-
Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, is a regional organization
spective forces and laws, will fail to hold the legitimacy neces-
created to address political, military, and developmental issues
sary to maintain stability.
through communication between major leaders of the region.
Along with inadequate accountability mechanisms, electoral The aim of the organization is to empower leaders and en-
corruption allows for illegitimate leaders to hold power with- courage them to share knowledge in order to most efficiently
out a real mandate from the people.46 The last three elections create lasting peace in the Sahel. By having better communica-
in Nigeria have suffered from last-minute delays, adding to tion across different countries, the G-5 Sahel Force allows for
civilian suspicion that officials have used vote-rigging strate- individual countries to better anticipate the security needs of
41 Ibid.
42 Anouar Boukhars, “The Drivers of Insecurity in Mauritania,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last updated 30 April 2012, https://
carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/30/drivers-of-insecurity-in-mauritania-pub-47955.
43 Ibid.
44 Chêne, “Niger: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption.”
45 Ibid
46 Remi Adekoya, “Democracy Has Failed in Nigeria When Voters No Longer Care Who Wins,” The Guardian, 1 March 2019, https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/01/democracy-failed-nigeria-turnout-presidential-election.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Jaime Yaya Barry, “Senegal’s President Tightens Grip on Power Ahead of Elections,” New York Times, 23 February 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/02/23/world/africa/senegal-election-macky-sall.html.
51 “G-5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance,” France Diplomatie, February 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-
policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/crises-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/.16|TH opic A: Supporting Political
istory and Description
Reform in the Sahel
their respective states.52 tential cycles of violence.59 As a result of political tensions,
national elections represent the potential for igniting an armed
However, there are major discrepancies between the resources
conflict. For example, during the 2019 presidential election in
and mandates of regional organizations related to the Sahel.
Nigeria, violence broke out in several areas of the state, which
For example, the G-5 Sahel Joint Force lacks the equipment
allowed the winner to obtain control over an oil-based pa-
and infrastructure necessary to improve the security of the re-
tronage system worth billions of dollars.60 By creating stron-
gion.53 Along with insufficient resources, powerful state lead-
ger regional networks, countries can limit election violence
ers have prevented the organization from securing enough
as others help enforce certain election standards. These early
operational bases to fully mobilize its mission.54 Often, these
warning systems can also help standardize warning signs and
leaders refuse to be transparent with other national leaders,
make it possible for countries to better understand political
making it difficult for the G-5 Sahel Force to have accurate
challenges. For example, the Commission of the Economic
information.55 Furthermore, without concrete contributions
from member states, the G-5 Sahel Force faces challenges in Community of West African States (ECOWAS) works with
returning displaced persons from political conflict and im- the African Union (AU) as well as the United Nations (UN)
proving state legitimacy.56 There is an important need for co- to strengthen the analytical capacities of these early warning
ordination between the G-5 Sahel Force and other missions systems, highlighting the importance of interregional commu-
in the area, including the United Nations Multidimensional nication.61
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).57 MI- Building these relationships can also create mechanisms that
NUSMA provides valuable support to the G-5 Sahel Force
protect human rights among all the residents of the Sahel.62
but faces significant obstacles related to the engineering of
Missions like MINUSMA play an integral role in the investiga-
operational bases that require further national cooperation.58
tion of human rights abuses by regional organizations like the
Regional organizations need better communication between
G-5 Sahel Force.63 When violations are found, it is impera-
states to best utilize their already limited resources.
tive that those states recognize the authority of these bodies
One way in which regional cooperation contributes to conflict to ensure coordination between regional organizations and
prevention is through the development of early warning sys- the criminal justice systems of these states.64 The European
tems that predict conflict outbreaks. A 2013 Security Council Union recognized that a lack of state development prevents
Report on the Sahel region emphasized the importance of human rights abuses from being uncovered and provided an
creating greater linkages between struggling national institu- extra USD 2.7 billion in aid towards development in G-5 Sa-
tions and infrastructural projects to strengthen them for po- hel States.65 The term “development” encompasses actions
52 SC/13584, “Security Council Press Statement on Joint Force of Group of Five for Sahel,” published 15 November 2018, https://www.
un.org/press/en/2018/sc13584.doc.htm.
53 “Sahel States Need International Support ‘Now More than Ever’– UN Peacekeeping Chief,” Africa Renewal, 2018, https://www.un.org/
africarenewal/news/sahel-states-need-international-support-’now-more-ever’–-un-peacekeeping-chief.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 “A Review of Major Regional Security Efforts in the Sahel” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, published 4 March 2019, https://africacenter.
org/spotlight/review-regional-security-efforts-sahel/.
57 SC/13584, “Security Council Press Statement on Joint Force of Group of Five for Sahel.”
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Adekoya, “Democracy Has Failed in Nigeria When Voters No Longer Care Who Wins.”
61 S/2013/354, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel Region,” published 14 June 2013, https://undocs.
org/S/2013/354
62 Ibid.
63 SC/13584, “Security Council Press Statement on Joint Force of Group of Five for Sahel.”
64 Ibid.
65 “The European Union’s Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries,” European Commission, published 6 December 2018, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6670_en.htm.Topic A: Supporting Political Reform in the Sahel
History and Description |17
that better legitimize state authority as well as empower great- bodies continue to fund and implement truth-seeking pro-
er civilian autonomy.66 While this funding has been beneficial cesses because it allows for countries to move beyond past
in supporting security efforts, it highlighted the need for im- conflict and build new trust between governments and civil-
proved resource management in order to coordinate efforts ians. There needs to be greater work from regional organiza-
between the G-5 Sahel and other forces on the ground.67 One tions to serve as a third party that helps victims of political
of the biggest issues with current regional initiatives is the injustices to fulfill their mandates. Overall, regional organiza-
lack of communication between different security and devel- tions need to better coordinate across governments, institu-
opment efforts.68 This prevents organizations from properly tions, and other regional initiatives to produce a more devel-
sharing training, expertise, and information, making develop- oped network of accountability.
ment efforts less productive. When development is stalled,
states are more susceptible to violent extremist threats.69 Effective Border Governance
Increasing and improving communication between regional Alongside strengthening coordination between regional bod-
organizations to other institutions of political change can ies, countries within the Sahel must address how to better gov-
mitigate these problems and establish effective systems for ern the borders between states to prevent the rise of illicit
combatting human rights abuses. Regional organizations can activity. Because most states are centralized in the interior of
create these systems by developing truth-seeking processes to their country, rural areas near borders face challenges in pro-
investigate human rights abuses committed under the guise of viding adequate policing and surveillance. Furthermore, states
political reform. In particular, regional organizations should have different visions for border management, making it even
examine transitional governments that exist during a time- more difficult for Sahel states to build the trust necessary to
frame that makes it easy to cover up human rights violations. properly govern state borders. At the Mali-Mauritania border,
Mauritania has relied on offensive military action while Mali
Moreover, regional bodies encouraged the creation and imple-
practices political rapprochement, or the establishment of
mentation of truth-seeking commissions to investigate and
cordial relations, of local border communities since 2000.74
provide reparations.70 For example, Mali created the Truth,
Contrasting strategies resulting from differences in historical
Justice, and Reconciliation Commission to promote political
approaches prevent significant growth of political infrastruc-
dialogue and air grievances against the misuse of government
ture between states. There is a need for strategies that develop
authority.71 However, despite its honorable aims, the Commis-
a culture of governance and trust, rather than ones that are
sion collected a mere 10,226 statements from regional offices
purely tactical.75
without producing any hearings or reparations for victims of
political violence.72 While the Commission does not hold any When states do not collaborate on their border security strate-
actual authority to convict perpetrators, it does represent a gies, these states become susceptible to outside threats. Crimi-
way to legitimize the crimes committed and offer solace for nal activity, which is often linked to organizations unaffiliated
victims.73 Because of that reason, it is imperative that regional with the Sahel, is able to occur in the gaps of border security.76
66 Ibid.
67 SC/13810, “Experts Urge Security Council Support for Efforts to Make G5 Sahel Joint Force Fully Operational amid Rising Terrorist
Attacks, Intercommunal Violence,” 16 May 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13810.doc.htm.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ephrem Rugiririza, “Mali and the Difficulty of Seeking Truth Under Fire,” Justice Info, last updated 15 January 2019, https://www.justi-
ceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/39996-mali-and-the-difficulty-of-seeking-truth-under-fire.html.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 “Fragile Borders: Rethinking Borders and Insecurity in Northern Mali,” The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, last updat-
ed November 2016, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/tgiatoc-northern-mali-and-its-borders-report-1793-proof31.
pdf.
75 Ibid.
76 S/2013/354, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel Region.”18|TH opic A: Supporting Political
istory and Description
Reform in the Sahel
Mauritanian troops wait along the Mali-Mauritania border after increased al-Qaeda activity in the area
Militant actors take advantage of the Sahel’s porous borders a unifying force. For example, in Mali, police forces attacking
in order to recruit members for religious and cultural reasons. militant Fulani groups and Islamic extremists have failed to
In particular, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) prevent massacres and further recruitment because of insuf-
orchestrated the deaths of government authorities under eth- ficient resources and civilian distrust of state forces.78 In these
nic excuses, creating tension in the tri-border region between conditions, marginalized minority groups have a greater at-
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.77 Because governments do not tachment to their identities rather than to their state, making
have adequate means of stopping attacks, these deaths ulti- it more difficult to control the spread of radicalism.79 Without
mately give more legitimacy to terrorist organizations in the proper attention from the state, these groups remain suscep-
eyes of the state’s civilians. This kind of tension between the tible to extremist influence and are put at risk of further po-
state and non-state actors provides the foundation for spe- litical instability and division. A 2013 report by the Security
cific ethnic groups to break away from the state and make Council emphasized the need to improve national institutions
latent divisions violent. This prevents the state from acting as to better tackle transnational crime through greater political
77 Pauline Le Roux, “Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 10 June 2019,
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/exploiting-borders-sahel-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-isgs/.
78 “Mali: Massacre in Dogon Village Leaves 35 People Dead,” The Defense Post, 11 June 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/06/11/
mali-dogon-village-massacre/.
79 S/2013/354, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel Region.”You can also read
