Why Oxfam is 'just giving the cash': Unconditional cash transfers to the very poor in central Vietnam.
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Why Oxfam is 'just giving the cash': Unconditional cash transfers to the very poor in central Vietnam. Prepared for the International Conference on ‘Chronic Poverty’ BRAC, Dhaka, Bangladesh – December 2006 Peter Chaudhry East Asia Poverty Researcher, Oxfam Great Britain Introduction 1 Oxfam Great Britain in Vietnam is giving a one-off, cash payment to around 500 households on or below the official poverty line in all 8 villages of An Loc Commune, Can Loc district of Ha Tinh Province in Vietnam. The payment of around USD 375 is equivalent to more than half of the average annual income of a poor household in the commune, and is provided with no conditions attached other than that, if the household accepts the money, they agree to report over a three-year period on how the money has been used. This research project has just begun (as at November 2006) and so little ‘hard evidence’ currently exists against which to report. This paper instead discusses why Oxfam is experimenting with unconditional cash transfers in a development (non-emergency) context, and highlights some of the methodological and conceptual challenges that have arisen in the course of setting up the research.2 The paper also discusses expectations for the study, in light particularly of a growing international literature on direct cash programming, and an increasing policy interest in Vietnam and elsewhere of the potential of cash transfers to address chronic poverty within a social protection framework. Overview of the Study Ha Tinh province is located on Vietnam’s central coast. The province is disaster prone, with frequent floods and typhoons, and the tough climate and poor quality of land make rural livelihoods challenging for farmers, who make up the overwhelming majority of the provinces inhabitants. Although a poor province of Vietnam, however, Ha Tinh is not considered to be amongst the very poorest, according at least to official poverty measurements. The province also does not have a high proportion of ethnic minority peoples, whom the latest government 1 The Oxfam GB team responsible for the development of this research project is Nguyen Quang Quynh, Kate Raworth, Ashvin Dayal & Steve Price-Thomas. This paper has benefited enormously from their comments, though responsibility for remaining limitations rests solely with the author. 2 Oxfam has considerable experience already of delivering unconditional cash transfers in emergency situations. Page 1
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka data identifies as the population group overwhelmingly most vulnerable to living in poverty.3 The reason for selecting Ha Tinh for this research project was made on the grounds that Oxfam has a track record of working with the provincial authorities (an important consideration in Vietnam) and that, given the sensitivity and relative uniqueness of the project, an area which we knew, and where we were known, would best facilitate establishment of a research pilot. If it proves to be successful, Oxfam will consider rolling out to more challenging locations. At the same time, the poverty landscape of Vietnam is changing, and inequality gaps in particular appear to be widening. These gaps are appearing between provinces, but also within provinces and districts too. So it is possible to see very poor communities even in districts where the aggregate poverty indicators are not so low. This is the case for Can Loc district, where the research project is located, and particularly for An Loc commune, which has a poverty rate of 55% according to people’s committee estimates (against the national poverty rate of 19.5% in 2004). Within the eight villages of the commune, four have poverty rates of above 59%, with the highest rate 84% in one village.4 The commune’s eight villages have an estimated 3,358 people living in 758 households. According to official poverty data, there are 4 households that could be considered rich, and 84 that are better-off with incomes of at least VND 400,000 per person, per month (double the official income-poverty line).5 Oxfam is planning to give VND 6 million (approximately USD 375) to approximately 400 households below the official poverty line, and VND 3 million to around 100 households just above the poverty line. The money will be delivered as a one- off cash payment into a savings account, with male and female household heads free to decide whether they have a joint account (requiring joint signatures for withdrawals), or two separate accounts. Oxfam will impose no conditionality upon the use of the cash, other than it should not be used for illegal purposes, and require only that beneficiaries participate in the monitoring of the use of the money over a three-year period.6 A baseline socio-economic survey of household income and consumption patterns, and household assets, was completed in November 2006 and identification of the poorest households through the survey was subsequently validated through village discussions and with the commune people’s committee. Discussion groups will take place with project beneficiaries every six months after dispersal of the money, to monitor both how it has been 3 The official poverty rate for ethnic minorities in Vietnam in 2004 was more than three times the rate for the majority Kinh ethnic group. 4 The poverty rate for Ha Tinh province overall is 35%, and for Can Loc district 38.5%. 5 The official income poverty rate of VND 200,000 per person, per month is equivalent to approximately USD $12.5. Peter Chaudhry Page 2 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka used, and what wider changes are noticeable in the community. A follow-up household survey will take place in year three, to analyse the medium term impact upon household income and assets of the cash payment. It is also intended that market information will be provided to beneficiaries, to enable them to track movements in prices. But otherwise, households are free to use the money for consumption, investment, or how so ever they see fit to best meet their livelihood needs. Oxfam’s Rationale for ‘Just Giving the Cash’ In 2003 Lord Meghnad Desai, then of the London School of Economics (LSE), observed the following: ‘We are giving fifty billion dollars of overseas aid. There are a billion poor people in the world. Why don’t we just find the poor and give them one dollar a week and do nothing else. No questions asked. What they do with the money is not our concern. That would probably do more to relieve poverty than anything else’. (quoted in Hanlon, 2004, Pg 375). This is an oft-quoted belief, frequently made by development practioners, politicians, academics and ‘lay’ observers alike. Although frequently borne of frustration with the perceived failures of development assistance, Oxfam in East Asia believes that the presupposition that simply giving cash unconditionally can make a real difference to poverty bears serious discussion and analysis, and the project was therefore developed to test hypotheses around this, in a ‘real world’ situation. Unconditional cash transfers to the very poor challenge many of the assumptions under which development organisations work, with traditional development projects often favouring a high level of outside technical assistance, and the delivery of often highly technocratic solutions to perceived poverty problems. Beneficiaries participation is actively sought, but this is often ‘framed’ within the context of the kind of assistance the project is seeking to provide (i.e. agricultural extension support, education or health service provision). Implicit in this (whether conscious or not) is a belief that development agencies know what’s best for the poor. By ‘just giving cash’ to the poor and observing the impact, Oxfam hopes to benchmark, in broad terms, what the net poverty reducing effect of a project would need to be, to outweigh simply giving the poor a lump-sum cash payment. This project is predicated on the assumption (borne out by Oxfam’s experience with unconditional cash transfers in emergency contexts) that the poor can use money responsibly when given the chance, and that they themselves are best placed to make 6 The project’s implementation and monitoring will be carried out by a local partner, the Pro-Poor Centre (PPC), in collaboration with the commune, district and province people’s committee’s. Peter Chaudhry Page 3 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka choices about their priorities. This is not to say that the only obstacle to people escaping poverty is a lack of cash. The project recognises that there are significant structural obstacles facing the poor, which they cannot necessarily overcome alone. Foremost among these is a lack of voice in decision-making processes, particularly for those considered to be ‘on the margins’ of mainstream development processes, (such as marginal small-scale and upland farmers, or in other context’s in Vietnam, ethnic minority groups or slum dwellers) or actively excluded from decision making through cultural ‘norms’ (often the case for poor rural women). The project is seeking to understand what role a significant injection of cash can play as a potential catalyst in wider change processes, and what sort of complimentary measures might help address the underlying ‘drivers’ of deep seated, chronic poverty. In the course of developing the project, a number of methodological and conceptual challenges emerged, which are discussed in the following section. Project Challenges How we understand poverty, and identify the poor Vietnam’s recent track record in poverty reduction has been widely heralded. The analysis of this record is deeply rooted in the mainstream methodologies and agenda of the World Bank, which has played a key role in developing the capacity of the government of Vietnam, and associated research institutes, to undertake poverty research in a certain way. Income/ consumption definitions dominate the national level discourse as a result, and a powerful narrative exists in Vietnam over how poverty should be ‘measured’, which in turn drive definitions of what it is to be poor.7 As John Harriss points out, through this process poverty becomes solely about what can be measured, and not about the ‘social and political- economic relationships that bring about the effect of poverty’ (Harriss, 2006, pg 23). In our approach to this research, Oxfam has had to accept some of the presuppositions about poverty which the prevailing discourse in Vietnam throws up, for practical reasons. Because of limited resources and a need to work closely with the Government, we have relied upon largely income/ consumption measures of well-being in communities, to define poor households. This is not to say, however, that relational and non-economic dimensions to poverty have been ignored in our analysis and approach. The baseline survey has concentrated upon establishing a monetary benchmark of poverty to define possible beneficiaries of the cash payment, but this has been supplemented by community discussions into the wider aspects of powerlessness that the project seeks to address. Villagers have also validated, as a group, the poverty status of proposed beneficiaries case by case following the survey. Regular discussions will take place over the course of the Peter Chaudhry Page 4 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka project to understand what role the cash transfers have played in wider socially transformative processes for the poor within communities, and particularly how these have affected relationships of power. And at the household and community levels too, the project will carefully monitor how the cash has impacted gender relationships, and how (if at all) some of the structural obstacles faced by women in terms of lack of power and voice have been challenged. The project recognises that within the communities, poverty is experienced in different ways. There are those, for example, with some assets, who are nevertheless extremely vulnerable to shocks over time, and those in a deep and chronic state of poverty, whose circumstances seem to change little over time.8 The project seeks to capture both a large (and therefore representative) group of the poor within the commune, whilst ensuring also that the available resources for the cash payment are not spread too thinly – that the money can still be potentially ‘life changing’. Possible targeting scenarios that were considered included giving money to all households from the three poorest villages in the commune; targeting the very poorest in all villages in the commune with a large payment to each; and covering both the very poorest and poor in all villages, but with a smaller cash payment. Eventually, it was decided to make the payment to all households in all eight villages that were below the poverty line in the baseline survey, and make a smaller payment to those households just above the poverty line, who nevertheless face a significant risk of falling into poverty periodically. This was seen as being least divisive, and a flexible cut-off point for the payment also ensures that the project is not creating a new ‘underclass’, by simply catapulting those who are currently poor, above those who are marginally better off. The centrality of existing (and enduring) local configurations of politics and power The research project is taking place within an existing political context where, by definition, the poor are relatively disadvantaged and powerless. Local relations, between governors and the governed, between groups, and between the powerful and powerless, have a history and ongoing dynamic over which the project will be ‘superimposed’. These relations of power will not simply cease to exist once the project is introduced, and they may well dictate how the cash transfers are perceived, and perhaps ‘re-negotiated’. Cash transfers to the very poor are particularly vulnerable in this regard, with the threat of the cash being ‘re-appropriated’ by the powerful, either from within village elites, or from within the local Government structure. 7 See Pincus and Sender (2006). 8 Emerging panel survey data from the region shows evidence of a significant ‘churning’ in and out of poverty, reflecting both increased economic opportunity in a booming region, and a related high level of vulnerability and insecurity. A recent study in Cambodia, part of the World Bank’s global ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ study, has more than half of households slipping into poverty at some point over a four year period (CDRI 2006). (See also Baulch & Scott, 2006, on the importance of Panel Surveys and Life History methods). Peter Chaudhry Page 5 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka Indonesia’s recent experience with social protection programmes, (both unconditional cash transfer programmes and conditional schemes) clearly highlights these risks. Education subsidies intended for the poorest households immediately after the economic crisis in the late 1990’s were often appropriated by village heads and re-distributed through their own patronage networks. (Mukherjee et al. 2002). And a recent review of the Indonesian Government’s unconditional direct cash transfer programme to the poor (the SLT) to offset the effects of the removal of the national fuel subsidy, has highlighted how, in some incidences, communities forcibly redistributed the cash assistance intended for specific poor households, to a general subsidy to all villagers, irrespective of their wealth. (SMERU, 2006). The project has taken steps to mitigate this risk, (on the ‘official side at least) by electing to work with local Governments we know, who appear committed to the objectives of the research. But understanding more broadly how change can (and can’t) happen in a particular local context, what the structural obstacles are, and the opportunities afforded to over come them, is the primary purpose of the research, so engaging with the ‘politics’ is a key study objective. The impact of the cash upon the wider economic landscape Experience from Oxfam’s cash transfer work in disaster contexts shows how important cash is to maintaining a functioning local economy, and the key role cash transfers play in quickly re-establishing markets for key goods. By extension then, a significant injection of cash to local economies should facilitate greater economic activity. It is recognised, though, that there are risks associated with unconditional cash transfers in a development context – the risk of inflationary pressure from introducing a large quantity of cash in a short time, and the possibility that the cash will simply bolster the already dominant position of local elites in economic relations, through existing monopolies on trading networks and economic opportunities. But much of the existing cash transfer literature seems to highlight the potential wider benefits an influx of capital can provide to local economies, and with money spent or invested locally, a far wider group of beneficiaries stand to benefit, across all income groups. (See Farringdon & Slater, 2006). Intra-household dynamics: who should control the cash? The project team has discussed long and hard over who within the household should control the money. Women in poor households are often subject to a punishing double burden of work (productive and household) that leaves them amongst the poorest of the poor. Intuitively then, giving women control of the cash would appear to offer the greatest poverty- reducing dividend. Evidence to date from micro-credit and other schemes also seems to suggest that women use funds more responsibly, and for family well-being, whereas men are Peter Chaudhry Page 6 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka more likely to spend money irresponsibly, for personal benefit, and particularly on the consumption of alcohol. Initial project design therefore favoured giving women in the household sole control over the cash. However, after extensive consultation with partners and Vietnamese staff, it was decided that giving control of the funds to women alone could exacerbate the potential for domestic violence within the household and that, as a result, it would be better to establish bank accounts that required the signature of both male and female household heads. Inherent risks in ‘windfall gains’? Some early reviewers of the project concept warned against the dangers inherent in ‘windfall gains’ – that there is a significant risk in giving money to people when they have not budgeted for, or anticipated this money. They are less likely then to use the cash in a productive way, as they do not consider it to be a part of their everyday household budget. There is certainly an acknowledged risk that the money may not be used for productive purposes, and may well be spent on consumption. But the boundaries for what constitutes ‘frivolous’ or ‘non-productive’ expenditure are blurred and, to a degree, culturally loaded – is the purchase of a karaoke machine frivolous, for example, if it is periodically hired out for weddings and other social events, and so offers an (unpredictable) economic return? Is money spent on entertaining influential businesspeople and officials misspent, if it results in a good business opportunity? As discussed above, the project is premised on a presumption that the poor are not inherently irresponsible in using money. If evidence shows this assumption to be well-founded, then misuse of money by the ‘poor’ in other context’s may be as much about mistargeting (i.e. giving money to those who don’t really need it) than the inherent incapacity of the poor to make sensible decisions about money. One-off, or staggered payments? The project team also discussed how the cash payment should be delivered: as a large one off payment, or as several smaller payments over time. Smaller payments would certainly reduce any risk of money being ‘squandered’, and would perhaps have a ‘long, slow burn’ effect in reducing poverty, through regular payments to cover education costs for example, which could result in better educated children and therefore a better long term prospect of the household ‘escaping’ poverty permanently. But providing a large lump sum which could be immediately used, though perhaps more risky, was also deemed to have greater transformative potential, enabling households to make a significant, potentially life changing one-off investment. Whilst there is considerable evidence already of the impact of regular, smaller unconditional cash transfers (through pensions for example) there appears to be little experience with large one-off cash payments. The project will therefore be somewhat unique Peter Chaudhry Page 7 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka in this regard. Of course the poor are still free to decide how to use the money as they see fit, and so can use the cash in small tranches, or in one go, according to their need. Is a ‘control’ group, against which to measure change, necessary? The methodological issue that was perhaps most intensively discussed was over whether or not to have a survey ‘control’ group to test against in the research. This would have required identifying a commune similar, as far as possible, in every way to An Loc commune, but where villagers would not receive the cash transfer. By carrying out a survey in a control location, the project would be able to compare ‘with’ and without’ project scenarios, and distinguish to a degree impacts that could be attributed to the project, from those that would have taken place anyway. This was deemed particularly important in the Vietnamese context, where economic and social change in the countryside is already widespread and dynamic. In the event, it was decided that a control sample wouldn’t be taken, primarily for two reasons. Firstly, finding a suitable location as similar as possible to An Loc, without any form of current or planned development assistance project, was considered too difficult. Secondly, concern was raised over the ethics of running a survey in a community where we did not plan to provide assistance. Instead of a control community, data from the bi-annual national household survey (the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey – VHLSS) will be used for comparison purposes, so that project community trends can be compared against district, provincial and national trends. The possibility of having the VHLSS ‘over-sample’ in Can Loc district will also be explored, to provide a larger data set against which to make comparisons. The baseline survey tool has been developed to fit, as closely as possible, VHLSS modules. The Research in the Context of Vietnam’s Emerging Policy Debate on ‘Social Protection’ Through the close association of the commune and district People’s Committees in the project, it is hoped that project experience will feed into wider policy discussions within the Government of Vietnam around appropriate modalities for supporting the poor in the future, particularly in the context of the emerging policy discussion in Vietnam over the necessity of providing ‘social protection’ for the poor and vulnerable. Social protection, broadly defined, refers to income or consumption transfers that protect the weak against shocks and risks. (Adapted from IDS 0.1.1, 2006). Examples of unconditional cash transfer mechanisms as social protection measures include pensions, social and disaster insurance payments, and Peter Chaudhry Page 8 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka child and family support grants.9 Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler have taken this on a stage, to talk about ‘transformative social protection’ (IDS 0.1.3, 2006); interventions that also address problems of social exclusion and marginalisation, for the chronically, structurally poor particularly. As they note: ‘Vulnerable people need protection not only against obvious livelihood shocks such as illness or drought, but also against exploitation, discrimination and abuse…. By challenging power hierarchies and inequitable social relations, social protection can contribute to social transformation, which in turn will reduce economic vulnerabilities’ (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, IDS 0.1.3, 2006). Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler provide a useful typology of different kinds of social protection: Protective (social assistance); preventive (insurance and diversification mechanisms); promotive (economic opportunities) and transformative. This project undoubtedly has potential in reducing vulnerability to shocks, and improving economic opportunities. But it is the transformative potential of unconditional cash transfers that is most intriguing. Oxfam hopes the project will generate evidence of this, as a contribution to global learning in this important policy arena. 9 It is worth noting that these kinds of payments made to the poor are well established in most western European countries, and are considered essential ‘rights’ that guarantee a minimum standard of living for those least well-off. Peter Chaudhry Page 9 Oxfam Great Britain
Chronic Poverty Conference Why Oxfam is ‘just giving the cash’ December 2006: Dhaka References & Select Bibliography Baulch, B. and Scott, L. (2006). Report on CPRC Workshop on Panel Surveys and Life History Methods. http://www.chronicpoverty.org/CPToolbox/images_and_files/CPRC_2006- Q2-Workshop_Report.pdf Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) (2006). Moving Out of Poverty: Cambodia National Synthesis Report (Draft) Department for International Development (DFID) (2005). Social Transfers and Chronic Poverty: Emerging Evidence and the Challenges Ahead. A DFID Practice Paper. Devereux, S (2006). Looking at Social Protection Through a Livelihoods Lens. IDS in Focus: Issue 01.1 Devereux, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2006) Transformative Social Protection. IDS in Focus: Issue 01.3 Farrington, J., Harvey, P., Slater, R. (2005). Cash Transfers in the Context of Pro-poor Growth. Hot topic paper for OECD/DAC Povnet Risk & Vulnerability Task Group (ODI). Farrington, J. and Slater, R. (2006). Cash Transfers: Panacea for Poverty Reduction or Money Down the Drain? Development Policy Review, 24 (5): 499-511 Hanlon, J. (2004). It is Possible to Just Give Money to the Poor. Development and Change 35 (2), 375-383. Harriss, J. (2006). Why Understanding of Social Relations Matters More for Policy on Chronic Poverty than Measurement. http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/rdr.cfm?doc=DOC11754 Mukherjee, N., Hardjono, J., Carriere, E. (2002). People, Poverty and Livelihoods: Links for Sustainable Poverty Reduction in Indonesia. Department for International Development (DFID). Pincus, J. and Sender, J (2006). Quantifying Poverty in Vietnam: Who Counts? Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. SMERU Research Institute (2006). The Implementation of Direct Cash Transfer in Indonesia. SMERU Bulletin No. 17. Peter Chaudhry Page 10 Oxfam Great Britain
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