WA COVID-19 Testing Guidelines - State Health Incident Coordination Centre (SHICC) Department of Health, WA
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WA COVID-19 Testing Guidelines State Health Incident Coordination Centre (SHICC) Department of Health, WA Version 3.0 09 January 2022
Version Control and Approval
This document should be considered a ‘live document’ and will be reviewed and updated regularly in
response to:
• New legislation or statutory directions;
• Changes in advice based on emerging evidence or national guidelines;
• Learnings from outbreak management locally, in other jurisdictions and internationally; or
• Stakeholder engagement and feedback.
Review and update of this document is coordinated by the State Health Incident Coordination Centre
(SHICC) Planning Cell which can be contacted with feedback at PHEOC@health.wa.gov.au.
Version Date Author Approved by Comments on revision
1.0 03 December SHICC Dr Paul Armstrong Original version
2021 Planning Deputy Chief Health
Cell Officer
2.0 04 January SHICC Dr Paul Armstrong Stakeholder feedback
2022 Planning Deputy Chief Health Table updated
Cell Officer Hospital ED testing aligned to
HSP framework for respiratory
pathways
Omicron variant information
included
3.0 09 January SHICC Dr Revle Bangor- WA Health System Alert Levels
2022 Planning Jones Red and Black completed in table
Cell A/Deputy Chief Health Table aligned to national policy
Officer Removal of Outbreak testing
Appendix C updated
2Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 4
Objectives ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Out of Scope ................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Priority Groups for Testing ............................................................................................................... 5
Surveillance activities ........................................................................................................................ 6
Wastewater testing....................................................................................................................................................... 6
Whole genome sequencing ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Funding Considerations .................................................................................................................... 6
Legislative Considerations ............................................................................................................... 7
Omicron ............................................................................................................................................... 7
TTIQ ............................................................................................................................................................................... 7
WA COVID-19 Testing Framework ................................................................................................... 8
COVID-19 Testing Matrix ................................................................................................................... 9
Symptomatic Testing ................................................................................................................................................... 9
Asymptomatic Testing - Borders ................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
Asymptomatic Testing – Hospitals (Staff) ............................................................................................................... 10
Asymptomatic Testing – Non-Hospital health settings ......................................................................................... 14
Asymptomatic Testing – Specific settings ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
APPENDIX A: SARS-CoV-2 specific testing, Australia .................................................................16
APPENDIX B: Rapid Antigen Testing (RAT) ..................................................................................17
APPENDIX C: Current Directions for Testing ................................................................................19
Works Cited........................................................................................................................................21
3Introduction
It should be noted that these guidelines will be subject to frequent revision in response
to changing epidemiology, emerging evidence, stakeholder feedback and experiential
learning of effectiveness and logistical challenges.
On 30 July 2021, the National Plan to Transition Australia’s COVID-19 Response was
announced, which outlined federal plans for the opening of Australia’s interstate and
international borders. Western Australia’s (WA’s) Safe Transition Plan for easing border
controls once a 90% double dose vaccination rate is achieved was announced on 5 November
2021. The date for the easing of Western Australia’s border controls has been set for February
5th, 2022.
The goal for the management of COVID-19 in Western Australia will transition from elimination
to suppression of community transmission to a level that does not overwhelm health services.
Test, trace, isolate and quarantine (TTIQ) practices will be an important part of the public health
response to slow COVID-19 transmission, minimise serious illness, hospitalisation and death
and ensure health system capacity. Slowing community transmission will allow time to achieve
good vaccination coverage in the 5-11-year-old cohort, third dose vaccination for those eligible
and maintain delivery of usual health services.
High levels of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing and maintenance of rapid turnaround
times for results, will be important to ensure case detection of COVID-19 and efficient contact
tracing to contain an outbreak [1]. Maintenance of high PCR testing rates for symptomatic
individuals is key to early detection of outbreaks during the transition phase; noting that the
pressure on testing capacity will require the use of alternative testing methods, such as rapid
antigen testing, at a certain level of community transmission and in specific settings [1].
Established community transmission and maximum utilisation of laboratory PCR testing
capacity will lead to wider use of rapid antigen tests (RATs) to complement, but not replace,
the PCR test as the gold standard test for diagnosis of SARS CoV-2 infection [2]. Where there
is little or no community transmission of COVID-19, screening for the virus using RAT in low-
risk settings (including workplaces) has limited benefit [3]. In these situations, it would be more
beneficial for employers to encourage workers to apply COVIDSafe work practices, ensure
high vaccination coverage, and for employees and their close contacts to get tested via PCR
and isolate if symptoms develop [3].
In an environment with little or no community transmission, any non-negative RAT result must
be followed up by a PCR test with the person isolating until the PCR result is known.
RATs could be used as a screening test in occupational settings that have a potential for
greater exposure to the SARS CoV-2 virus (such as quarantine workers, health care setting
and border workers) with increased frequency of RAT testing improving sensitivity. Further
information on the advantages and limitations of RAT is provided in Appendix B.
The areas of testing this guideline will address which require state-level strategic planning
are:
1. Symptomatic testing for self-presenting individuals
42. Asymptomatic testing for screening
Objectives
This paper will:
1. Outline PCR testing prioritisation and use after border restrictions in WA are relaxed.
2. Determine the role of rapid antigen testing (RAT) for screening.
3. Provide guidance for the use of RAT in WA, including in high-risk settings and
workplaces.
4. Inform legislative changes to support the testing guidelines.
Out of Scope
Out of scope for this paper includes:
• Wastewater surveillance, which is governed by a separate steering committee.
• Emerging technologies such as extraction-free loop-mediated isothermal amplification
(LAMP)
Priority Groups for Testing
The national framework [5] identified four priority groups for targeted testing in Australia:
1. People with COVID-19 compatible symptoms
2. People with known recent exposure to SARS-CoV-2
a) Household – secondary attack rate, can be close to 100% in some Australian
households [1]
b) Other contacts
3. People at higher risk of exposure to SARS-CoV-2
a) International or domestic travellers
b) Health care workers with direct patient contact
c) Aged and disability care workers with direct patient contact
d) Border staff
e) Quarantine centre workers
f) Workers transporting persons arriving to WA via air or sea
g) Aircrew
h) Maritime crew
4. People in high risk settings where disease amplification is likely, or where people live or
visit who are at increased risk of severe disease. For example:
a) High population density settings
b) People living or working in proximity to others e.g. Congregate living
c) Specific environmental conditions
d) Remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities
e) Secure facilities (correctional and detention facilities)
f) Mining and Offshore sites
5g) Food processing, distribution, and cold storage facilities, including abattoirs –
(Industrial facilities)
h) Residential aged care facilities
i) Hospitals
j) Schools and childcare facilities
The testing approach used in WA must be adaptable and responsive to the introduction of
community transmission when border restrictions are relaxed and must strike the right balance
between limiting community transmission through case finding and controlling outbreaks, and
protecting the sustainability of laboratory and testing site capacity [5].
Surveillance activities
Wastewater testing
The WA Department of Health led SARS-CoV-2 Wastewater Surveillance Program
commenced on 17 September 2020, with the aim of providing information about the existence
of COVID-19 disease (active or recovered) within the WA community, by detecting non-
infectious genetic material shed by cases or recovering cases, in order to complement existing
and future clinical COVID-19 surveillance activities.
Whole genome sequencing
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) is used to compare the genomic relatedness from multiple
COVID-19 cases to facilitate investigations by public health units. It has also allowed mutational
analysis for Variants of Concern (VoC) [6]. While a comprehensive WGS strategy of
sequencing all suitable SARS-CoV-2 positive clinical specimens is possible in a low prevalence
setting, this will not occur when case numbers rise and a change in genomic surveillance to
selective and targeted sequencing will be required.
With the recommencing of international travel the potential for importation of new VoC will
increase. Indeed, this has been highlighted in the recent detection of the Omicron variant:
B.1.1.529 detected in Southern Africa.
Where there is an accepted level of community transmission, it will not be necessary to
sequence all samples where COVID-19 has been acquired in Australia, but a testing approach
will be required to ensure detection of new variants with increased transmissibility/virulence
and vaccine escape occurs in a timely manner. Considerations for targeting sequencing for
cases include:
• Sampling all positive cases acquired overseas
• Sampling one or two cases from identified clusters
• Sentinel surveillance through community-based surveillance, including samples from
those who are fully or partially vaccinated
• Sampling of hospitalised cases [1].
Funding Considerations
• PCR testing for COVID-19 that is mandated under a Public Health Order or Emergency
Management Act Order is funded under the National Partnership on COVID-19
response. This is a 50:50 cost shared arrangement between the Commonwealth
Government and jurisdictions.
6• The funding for rapid antigen testing in residential aged care facilities is the responsibility
of the Commonwealth Government.
• Any testing that has been requested or arranged from the Public Health team as part of
a COVID-19 outbreak response is the responsibility of the WA government.
• Any surveillance testing in a workplace performed outside of a public health outbreak
response, will be the responsibility of the workplace or organisation.
Legislative Considerations
A comprehensive list of all current Directions related to testing are contained in Appendix C.
This includes Directions and Chief Health Officer (CHO) approvals for testing made under the
Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) and the Public Health Act 2016 (WA). Any changes
to COVID-19 testing arrangements will affect these instruments.
Omicron
The Omicron variant has become the dominant strain of COVID-19 in Australia. Evidence of
the intrinsic transmissibility of this variant, disease severity and the effectiveness of current
vaccines and treatments against transmission is emerging.
Early evidence indicates that Omicron is substantially more transmissible than the Delta variant
in populations with a high previous exposure to COVID-19 and/or high vaccination coverage,
with most recent estimates demonstrating that the number of cases doubles every 2-3 days
[7]. Secondary COVID-19 infection rates in household contacts of Omicron cases in the United
Kingdom appear higher than those for Delta (13.6% versus 10.1% respectively) [8] and more
transmission occurs to contacts of Omicron than those of Delta cases.
Preliminary findings in the United Kingdom also suggest up to a 40-45% reduction in the risk
of hospital admissions for Omicron relative to Delta infections [9] and a reduction in emergency
department attendance [8]. However, relative to Delta, Omicron infections in the United
Kingdom are currently more concentrated in the young adult age group (20-29) and this should
be kept in mind in comparison analyses.
Even at the reduced hospitalisation rates observed compared to previous variants, the
increased transmissibility of Omicron has the potential to put pressure on the health system
due to the potential to infect more people leading to high numbers of hospital admissions.
Health system capacity will be further impacted by staff being furloughed due to being
diagnosed with COVID-19 or being identified as a close contact.
TTIQ
While TTIQ has been demonstrated to be effective, it is limited by operational factors and the
community’s willingness to be tested and comply with public health
recommendations. Therefore, the overall contribution of TTIQ to limiting transmission will
decrease with higher case numbers. This may lead to a requirement in the future to rely more
heavily on other control methods such as indoor mask wearing and strategic use of rapid
antigen testing, to control transmission and impacts, particularly in high-risk settings.
In the context of community transmission specific strategies will be needed to protect high risk
settings and those who work or visit these. This may include expanding the use of rapid antigen
testing in settings such as aged care facilities, clear messaging to individuals at higher risk of
7severe disease to ensure they are fully vaccinated and have accessed a booster dose and
ensuring timely access to therapeutics.
WA COVID-19 Testing Framework
The framework below uses the epidemiological contexts described as “Epidemiological Zones”
in the CDNA publication Revised Testing Framework for COVID-19 in Australia (in press). For
ease of use these Epidemiological Zones have been renamed phases in the matrix below.
There may be more than one Epidemiological Zone or phase occurring at the same time within
WA. This will require different, regional approaches to testing in addition to consideration of
local vaccination rates.
When COVID-19 is introduced into WA, enhanced testing responses to localised outbreaks will
be proportionate to local epidemiological factors and may be limited to local areas. The
emergence of the Omicron variant as the dominant strain in some jurisdictions has shown a
rapid increase in cases compared to previous variants, with testing and health system capacity
being reached earlier than modelling projections. In WA a relatively short timeframe (weeks
rather than months) should be prepared for before testing or tracing capacity is reached.
An additional category may be considered later to represent a new ‘business as usual’ once
WA passes the expected wave of cases when border restrictions cease. The CDNA
Epidemiological Zones are defined as:
Epidemiological Zone 1 No locally acquired cases outside of returned travellers in
quarantine. No community transmission. Current WA position as
of 26 November 2021 prior to border relaxation.
Epidemiological Zone 2 Sporadic cases and clusters, through to wide-spread community
transmission, with laboratory testing and public health capacity
meeting testing demand.
Epidemiological Zone 3 Wide-spread community transmission, with testing demand
exceeding laboratory and public health capacity.
Please note that the epidemiological zones described above may vary as the epidemiological
context in WA evolves.
8COVID-19 Testing Matrix
Phase Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
CDNA Zones Epidemiological Zone 1 (current) Epidemiological Zone 2 Epidemiological Zone 3
No local transmission Clusters and community transmission Widespread transmission exceeding
testing and public health capacity
Triggers Current conditions Once there is sustained community Rate of transmission exceeds:
transmission, manageable within existing i. health system capacity;
health services and resources. ii. testing capacity; or
iii. the ability to perform detailed
contract tracing activities.
WA Health System Green: COVID-19 READY Amber: COVID-19 ALERT Red: Widespread Black: SYSTEM
Alert Level Disease contained, nil to very limited Disease in community but still contained transmission AT CAPACITY
(current definitions) numbers increasing in community Community Service demand
Satisfactory vaccination rates and testing transmission of exceeds service
capacity COVID-19 no capacity
longer contained
Symptomatic Testing
Symptomatic All to be tested with nose and throat PCR All to be tested with nose and throat PCR RAT as soon as possible.
individuals until testing capacity is reached then If negative, repeat RAT in 24 hours.
Particularly important to test patients consider rapid antigen test (RAT) for
*PCR should be presenting to hospital with pneumonia or diagnostic purposes. Positive RAT should be considered
encouraged as the acute respiratory infection [5] confirmed COVID-19 case.
appropriate test for
symptomatic people.
9Asymptomatic Testing – Hospitals (Staff)
WA Health System Green: COVID-19 READY Amber: COVID-19 ALERT Red: Widespread Black: SYSTEM
Alert Level Disease contained, nil to very limited Disease in community but still contained transmission AT CAPACITY
(current definitions) numbers increasing in community Community Service demand
Satisfactory vaccination rates and testing transmission of exceeds service
capacity COVID-19 no capacity
longer contained
Hospitals (Public and
Private sector) staff Voluntary nose and throat PCR test on Voluntary twice weekly RAT with a No testing required.
day 5 and 12 after first contact with a minimal interval 72 hours apart
Areas within a hospital COVID-19 patient and then every 7 days
• Intensive care unit until 14 days pass from last contact.
• High dependency
If an HCW who has had contact with a Any breach of infection control practices
unit
positive COVID-19 patient is involved in a or personal protection equipment should
• Respiratory wards breach of infection control practices or
• Emergency be managed by the health service
personal protection equipment, then infection control team
departments Public Health advice is sought to decide if
• A COVID clinic any additional COVID-19 testing in
• Other units at the addition to the above is required.
discretion of the
hospital operator
Hospitals (Public and
Private sector) staff Twice weekly RAT with a minimal interval Daily RAT for all staff if feasible – but
• Healthcare 72 hours apart consideration may be given to limiting to
settings symptomatic staff only.
managing very
RAT for visitors at each visit
high-risk
patients (e.g.
Note: This regime is subject to
transplant ward,
consideration of community prevalence
haematology
and availability of RAT kits.
unit, oncology
10ward, renal
dialysis unit)
Asymptomatic Testing – Hospitals (Patients/Visitors)
WA Health System Green: COVID-19 READY Amber: COVID-19 ALERT Red: Widespread Black: SYSTEM
Alert Level Disease contained, nil to very limited Disease in community but still contained transmission AT CAPACITY
(current definitions) numbers increasing in community Community Service demand
Satisfactory vaccination rates and testing transmission of exceeds service
capacity COVID-19 no capacity
longer contained
Hospitals (Public and Recommend triaging patients presenting If supplies of RAT adequate, test all
Private sector) – to emergency departments according to patients presenting to emergency
unplanned patient the reasons for attending as per the departments with RAT to assist with
presentations EMHS proposed respiratory pathways in patient management.
Emergency Departments in WA Health
a) Hospital If RAT limited, then
emergency Group 1: Confirmed COVID-19 case. No
• All patients to be managed as
departments further COVID-19 testing required
probable COVID
Group 2: Suspect COVID-19 infection. • If symptoms consistent with
COVID-19 then for RAT
i. Patient has clinical and/or
epidemiological criteria consistent Positive RAT should be considered
with the case definition for confirmed COVID-19 case.
COVID-19.
• RAT testing on arrival +/- PCR
test
ii. Patients unable to use PPE
effectively e.g. agitated patients,
11patients with dementia, paediatric
patients
• RAT testing on arrival
iii. Patients unable to provide
sufficient information on their
symptoms or risk factors for
COVID-19
• RAT testing on arrival
Group 3: Patient does not have
symptoms of, or epidemiological risk
factors for, COVID-19 infection.
• no RAT or PCR testing needed.
RAT and PCR (collected at same time) if
a patient will be admitted to hospital
Hospitals (Public and N/A Testing 72 hours pre-admission and/or RAT at home on the day of admission (or
Private sector) RAT on arrival (vaccinated and on presentation).
planned patient unvaccinated).
presentations e.g. day
procedures and NB: Patients would need to isolate after a
multiday admissions pre-admission PCR test until admission
Hospitals (Public and N/A RAT on presentation at each visit. This to RAT at home prior to attendance; alert
Private sector) – be reviewed with an aim to decrease clinic if positive
Patients at risk of severe frequency dependent on patient
disease e.g. patients acceptability.
undergoing renal
dialysis, chemotherapy
radiotherapy, transplant
patients,
immunosuppressed.
12Hospitals (Public and Consider RAT on presentation at each For Emergency Department
Private sector) visit. presentations – manage as above
- Paediatric patients
aged 5-11 For planned admissions, labour ward,
- Maternity patients birth suites – RAT on presentation
(Likely low vaccination
rates in these cohorts)
Aerosol generating RAT on presentation RAT on presentation
procedures
As defined in
Mandatory Policy MP
0133/20
Hospitals (Public and N/A No testing required. No testing required.
Private sector) –
outpatient attendances
– clinics, imaging,
pharmacy, pathology
etc
13Domiciliary services N/A No testing required. No testing required.
e.g. Hospital in the
Home, Silver Chain,
Community health
nursing
Hospitals (Public and N/A
Private sector) RAT testing for visitors to high risk RAT for visitors each visit if in a very
settings and vulnerable patient cohorts high-risk setting e.g. transplant ward,
• carers e.g. oncology wards, ICUs. Hospital haematology unit, oncology ward, renal
accompanying ED operator to determine high risk area for dialysis unit etc
patients that hospital
• visitors of
inpatients RAT every third day for long term regular
• carers visitors
accompanying
children
Hospitals (Public and N/A No testing required. No testing required.
Private sector)
Contractors and
suppliers
Asymptomatic Testing – Non-Hospital health settings
WA Health System Alert Green: COVID-19 READY Amber: COVID-19 ALERT Red: Widespread Black: SYSTEM
Level Disease contained, nil to very limited Disease in community but still contained transmission AT CAPACITY
(current definitions) numbers increasing in community Community Service demand
Satisfactory vaccination rates and testing transmission of exceeds service
capacity COVID-19 no capacity
longer contained
14Ambulance staff Tested at 48 hours, Day 7 and day 14 Voluntary twice weekly RAT with a No testing required.
post contact with a confirmed case. minimal interval 72 hours apart
Non-hospital health care
setting No testing required. No testing required.
• WACHS remote area
clinics
• WACHS remote
nursing posts
15APPENDIX A: SARS-CoV-2 specific testing, Australia
TYPE OF TEST USES
Nucleic acid amplification testing Test of choice to detect SARS-CoV-2 during the acute
(NAAT) (PCR) illness.
Can use pooling of specimens when pre-test probability
of infection is low.
Pooling not advised when infection rates are high
Rapid, low throughput, NAAT To detect SARS-CoV-2 during the acute illness when a
(GeneXpert) (PCR) rapid result is required.
Limited to one sample at a time
Serology Retrospective diagnosis of infection when will influence
individual or outbreak management.
Not recommended as check of immunity post
vaccination
Antigen testing (RAT) Most accurate when used for the diagnosis of a SARS-
CoV-2 infection in the early stages of symptomatic
infection.
They are intended for use with nasopharyngeal, throat
or nasal swabs
Any positive result must be confirmed by NAAT testing
Whole genome sequencing WGS is used to compare the genomic relatedness from
(WGS) multiple COVID-19 cases to facilitate investigation of
clusters by public health units.
Used to detect and monitor for Variants of Concern
(VoC)
Monitoring for strains resistant to antiviral therapies,
impact NAAT performance or vaccine effectiveness
Virus culture Limited use for diagnosis
Wastewater testing Surveillance activities
Source: [6]
16APPENDIX B: Rapid Antigen Testing (RAT)
Rapid Antigen Testing (RAT)
Established community transmission and maximum utilisation of laboratory PCR testing capacity will lead to
wider use of RAT to complement, but not replace, the PCR test as the gold standard test for diagnosis of
SARS CoV-2 infection [2]. RAT testing may be considered:
1. In public health investigations where the pre-test probability is high for SARS CoV-2 infection. For
example:
a. Close contacts of a confirmed case in a closed setting e.g., schools, care homes, workplaces
b. Broader contacts in a community for which it may inform isolation and quarantine strategies. In
this situation it may need to be repeated regularly
c. To rapidly identify an outbreak in a closed setting with several symptomatic individuals [11]
d. When community transmission has been established.
2. When the pre-test probability is high, and PCR is unavailable or where an extensive delay in
turnaround time for results is anticipated but confirmatory testing by PCR is available.
3. In situations where a false negative result is considered a reasonable risk and has minimal impact on
the management of the individual.
4. When RAT is used for screening purposes or as an initial diagnostic tool in high-risk exposure or
transmission settings, to maximise the public health benefit, individuals should be screened two to
three times a week to mitigate the reduced sensitivity of the test [12].
5. For screening in certain settings for early detection of outbreaks. Daily testing would be considered to
counteract the lower test sensitivity compared to PCR. For example:
• Primary schools where children are not yet eligible for vaccination
• Health care facilities
• Aged care facilities
• Food distribution centres
• Meat, poultry, porcine processing centres
• Construction sites
• Mine sites
6. In an outbreak setting, consideration of the potential impacts of false negative results from using RAT
and the small proportion of cases that will be missed.
7. The use of RAT should consider the potential impact on resources used to investigate false positive
results in the setting of low prevalence.
8. Then use of RAT may need to be revoked in the event of reduced test sensitivity caused by antigenic
change in new variants [2].
Page 17 of 22Advantages of RAT
• Can be used at point-of-care
• Rapid turnaround time to result (15-30 minutes)
• Potential lower cost of PCR if only non-negative RATS are followed by PCR. Rapid antigen tests vary
in cost but are usually between $10-$20 per unit. Additional implementation costs, including
supervising workforce, personal protective equipment (PPE), waste management and results
management need to be considered [3]
• Ability to use as a self-test at home
• Use for populations far removed from pathology services
• With regular testing, enhanced confidence of lower likelihood of being infectious in the community; and
• Can supplement laboratory-based PCR capacity [2].
Limitations of RAT
• Lower sensitivity and specificity than PCR
• Not recommended as a diagnostic tool where accuracy of every test is important to detect cases
• PCR testing is preferred in symptomatic persons
• Risk of false positives in areas of low prevalence
• Labour intensive for supervised screening programs
• Not scalable to large numbers of samples
• Need for confirmatory PCR test for non-negative RAT results
• Failure to undertake confirmatory PCR testing
• Notification to Public Health is not automatic
• Limited in the ability for genomic testing
Page 18 of 22APPENDIX C: Current Directions for Testing
Relevant Directions to COVID-19 testing under the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) – subject
to change
OVERARCHING DIRECTION
▪ Controlled Border for Western Australia Directions (and Amendment Directions)
PRESENTATION FOR TESTING DIRECTIONS
• Presentation for Testing Directions (No 37)
o Premises Approved for the Purposes of Paragraph 17(b)(i)
• Presentation for Testing (Airport Workers - Direct International Arrivals) Directions *
• Quarantine Driver Directions*
• Presentation for Testing (Quarantine Centre Workers) Directions (No 8)*
o Authorisation under paragraph 14e and 15(f)
• Transport and Accommodation Services (Exposed Maritime Worker) Directions (No 2)*
• Exposed On-Board Worker Directions (No 2)*
• Maritime Crew Member Directions (No 2)*
• Rig or Platform Crew Member Directions (No 2)*
• Transport, Freight and Logistics Directions (No 7)*
• Flight Crew Directions (No 7)*
• Exposure Site (Western Australia) Directions (No 2)*
• Exposure Sites (Outside of Western Australia) Directions (No 3)
• New South Wales Traveller Quarantine Modification Directions*
• Outbreak Outside of Western Australia Response Directions (No 12) *
* Refer to applicable CHO approvals made under COVID-19 Testing Directions (PHA) for medical practitioners
and persons duly and properly engaged to collect specimens to request a COVID-19 test (due to person
presenting as asymptomatic)
Relevant Directions to COVID-19 testing under the Public Health Act 2016 (WA)
OVERARCHING DIRECTION
COVID-19 Testing Direction (No 4)
CHO Approvals pursuant to above “Testing Directions”
• Chief Health Officer Approval to Conduct COVID-19 Testing People Isolated or Quarantined (No 2)
• Chief Health Officer Approval to Conduct COVID-19 PCR Testing at Point of Care in Remote Clinics
(No 2)
• Chief Health Officer Approval to Conduct COVID-19 Testing Before Proceeding with Organ Donation
or Organ Transplantation (No 2)
• Chief Health Officer Approval to Request COVID-19 Testing and Authorisation to Inform in relation to
COVID-19 Detect Borders Initiative
Page 19 of 22CHO approvals to request COVID-19 Testing on:
• Patients who are Required to Provide Evidence of a Negative COVID-19 Test to Meet the Entry
Requirements of Overseas Governments (No 3)
• Persons who have Been to Locations Visited by Confirmed Cases (No 2)
• Persons who are quarantine workers from anywhere in Australia
* CHO approvals to request COVID-19 Testing on persons who are presenting for testing under the:
• Controlled Border for Western Australia Directions (AS AMENDED)
• Presentation for Testing Directions (No 37)
• Presentation for Testing (Airport Workers- International Arrivals) Directions (No 4)
• Quarantine Driver Directions
• Presentation for Testing (Quarantine Centre Workers) Directions (No 8)
• Transport and Accommodation Services (Exposed Maritime Worker) Directions (No 2)
• Exposed On-Board Worker Directions (No 2)
• Maritime Crew Member Directions (No 2)
• Rig or Platform Crew Member Directions (No 2)
• Transport, Freight and Logistics Directions (No 9)
• Flight Crew Directions (No.7)
• Exposure Site (Western Australia) Directions (No 2)
• Exposure Sites (Outside of Western Australia) Directions (No 2)
• New South Wales Traveller Quarantine Modification Directions
• Outbreak Outside of Western Australia Response Direction (No 12)
Note: Refer to Restatement of Approvals and Authorisations Directions, whereby the schedule of approvals
made under prior Testing Direction (No 2) continue to have effect under current amendment (No 3).
TESTING REPORTING DIRECTIONS
▪ COVID Testing Reporting Directions (No 2)
▪ Wastewater COVID Testing at WA Laboratories Reporting Directions (No 2)
▪ Wastewater COVID Testing at Laboratories Outside of WA Reporting Directions (No 2)
PROHIBITED TESTING DIRECTIONS
▪ Prohibition on the Use of Rapid Antigen Test Directions (No 2) Revocation Directions
▪ Prohibition on the Use of Point of Care Serology Tests Directions (No 2)
Page 20 of 22Works Cited
[1] CDNA, “Considerations for COVID-19 Test, Trace, Isolate and Quarantine (TTIQ) in transition phases
of the National Plan (Draft),” Communicable Diseases Network Australia, Canberra, 2021a.
[2] CDNA&PHLN, “Joint Statement on SARS-CoV-S version 201,” XX November 2021. [Online].
Available: https://www.health.gov.au/resources.
[3] DHHS, “Guidance for the provision of rapid antigen testing for COVID-19 screening in non-clinical
settings,” 05 October 2021a. [Online]. Available:
https://www.dhhs.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/202110/Guidance-for-the-provision-of-
RAT_1.pdf.
[4] DHHS, “Surveillance testing industry list and requirements.,” 11 November 2021b. [Online]. Available:
https://www.health.vic.gov.au/covid-19/surveillance-testing-industry-list-covid-19.
[5] CDNA, “Revised Testing Framework for COVID-19 in Australia (draft),” XX November 2021b. [Online].
Available: https://www.health.wa.gov.au/resources.
[6] Public Health Laboratory Network, “PHLN guidance on laboratory testing for SARS-CoV-2 version 2.1,”
29 October 2021. [Online]. Available: https:www.health.gov.au/resources.
[7] Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, “AHPPC statement on the Omicron public healht
implications and response options,” 22 December 2021. [Online]. Available:
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