Using OSINT to track online separatist sentiment in Papua - Janes Intelligence Unit
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Using OSINT to track online separatist sentiment in Papua Janes Intelligence Unit © 2020 Janes TM. All Rights Reserved.
What is Janes Intelligence Unit (JIU)? • Gives you open-source assessments of the global threat environment, tailored to you and your organisation’s needs • Provides an independent, unclassified perspective to increase your awareness of strategic and operational challenges • Derives information from a wide array of open sources, combining subject matter knowledge with social media fluency and language expertise
Four key capabilities of Janes Intelligence Unit
Threat assessments
• Insight into threats including terrorism, extremism, organised crime and state-level
threats
Horizon scanning
• Conflict analysis, security implications of tech advances, assessments of fragile
states
Capability innovation
• Assessing military capabilities, analysing the evolution of warfare and doctrine
Optimising OSINT
• Improving the OSINT skills of client organisations through in-person training and e-
learning, providing outsourced intelligence support
This report covers • Walk through how Janes Intelligence Unit approaches open-source investigations, focusing on the topic of online separatist sentiment in Papua • Share some of the tools and methods that we both teach on our OSINT courses and use ourselves as OSINT practitioners to conduct online research • Share some of the results of our ongoing research into online separatist sentiment in Papua
What research is already out there? • Has someone already answered the question you have posed? • If not, does similar research exist? • This is always a key first step to undertake because: > It could save you time, allowing you to focus your efforts elsewhere > If you find relevant research, it helps you: – Familiarise yourself with your topic – build a list of key words you can use later when conducting online searches
Targeting your search
• Before starting your own research, always construct a targeted search query using search
operators to save you time.
• We have constructed a basic targeted search query below:
> Papua AND “online sentiment” OR “social media” “online separatism” filetype:PDF
– This searches for a set of basic key words, and asks for results to returned in PDF, which
means we will likely get reports back from NGOs, academics, or media orgs focusing on this
topic
This returns the following results • Firstly, this helps us build our subject matter knowledge • Secondly, by reading these reports, we can build up lists of key words to be used in future searches • Thirdly, it appears there is no up-to-date research on our research topic, so it means we must undertake our own!
Know your online environmentInformation we can derive from social media
• Always ask the question: What
sources of online information are
Individuals Networks
going to be relevant to my
research?
• As we are tracking online
Conversations
sentiment, then social media
intelligence (SOCMINT) is going
to be a key area for our research
Organisations Groups /
movements
Know your social media environment
• The popularity of social media platforms changes by country, but
having an overview of where online sentiment is likely to
generated will also help you target your research more effectively
• This research gives us an indication of where Indonesians are
most active on social media
• Provides us with a good start point for our research
Source: Greenhouse.co, May 2019
Investigating Papuan separatist sentiment on Facebook • From research we did earlier using our search operators, we began to build a list of key words to help us find content linked to Papuan separatist sentiment • One of the obvious search terms to begin with is “Free Papua Movement” • Let’s start our search on one of the key platforms we’ve identified - Facebook
A basic Facebook search returns these results • This indicates the existence of an international network of pro- separatist accounts • Emphasis on use of English indicates attempt to influence international opinion to support separatist cause • Gives us a good start in terms of building out potential sources of information
Taking a closer look • Looking at the Australia branch as an example, we begin to open up more sources • With this Facebook post, we can see individuals are commenting, liking or sharing the post – this gives us avenues for more investigation • The post also leads to a blog that carries a statement from an armed separarist group known as the West Papua National Liberation Army, as well as images of militants of the group
Taking a closer look • A larger image of the militants is found the blog • This allows us to: > Begin identifying suspected militants > Build a picture of their armed capabilities and the threat they pose
Taking a closer look • The blog also carries activity reports from the militant group • This gives us names of individuals who may be key to the group’s operations • This report claims to be from an individual known as Maj. Gen. Lekagak Telenggen, who is described as the group’s “General Operations Commander”
Taking a closer look • The statement also gives an indication of the group’s base of operations
Taking a closer look • The blog also carries more statements from the group, which gives us more investigative leads
Taking a closer look • From one Facebook post, we are beginning to build a picture of: > Identities of militant separatists > Their armed capabilities > Their geographical location > Their online support network (i.e. the blog carrying their statements) • But who is behind the Facebook network?
Investigating international support for Papuan separatism on
Facebook
• Looking at the follower counts of the Free Papua Movement branches on Facebook, we can see
they are attracting attention worldwide
Follower count of Free Papua Movement branches on Facebook, February 2020
40,000
35,986
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
Followers
15,000
12,433
10,000 8,187
5,486
5,000 3,368 2,961
2,159
1,275
324 107
0
Australia PNG Vanuatu Japan US Fiji Ireland Canada Singapore GermanyInvestigating international support for Papuan separatism on Facebook • But if we drill down into some of these accounts, we see that they are largely run from the UK • We can drill down by using Facebook’s transparency feature, which can tells us the primary location of individuals managing specific Facebook pages
Investigating international support for Papuan separatism on Facebook • The Free Papua Movement network on Facebook gives us more insight in the separatist connection in the UK • The movement’s US branch posts information of a Papuan separatist presence in Oxford, UK. • The post includes some hashtags that will we can use as search terms going forward
Using Facebook’s search filters • These basic filters are a quick way of finding individuals who are associated with any organisation on Facebook • Using these filters, we’ve identified individuals associated with the West Papua National Liberation Army on Facebook
Using acronyms • Always try to vary your searches to build information on your target • If we use the acronym for the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPN.PB), and search Facebook, we get more leads • Using Facebook’s search, we can filter by groups to reveal some public Facebook groups linked to TPN.PB
Using acronyms
• These Facebook groups reveal more individuals of interest, who are posting photos of TPN.PB
militants and their weapons
Images appear to have been uploaded on the 7th February 2020Verifying images • We can reverse search these images to give us an indication of their age • A useful tool for doing this is Image Search Options, a Chrome/Firefox browser plug-in that allows us to run an image through several reverse image search engines • A search on TinEye for one of the previous images indicates it is new, which gives an indication that we are looking at current militant capability
Facebook chat groups • Investigations into pro-separatist chat groups on Facebook allows us to identify more pro-separatist individuals (right) • It also allows us to identify the individuals running these chat groups (below)
Facebook chat groups • We can also extract all the Facebook usernames associated with separatist chat groups, by using another free Chrome/Firefox plug-in called Link Gopher • Instead of clicking through each profile and copying its username, Link Gopher extracts each profile link automatically, for your future research
Hashtags: The key to searching social media • Building up knowledge of key hashtags on any specific topic is so important when trying to find relevant information on social media • To do this for our topic, we will use a free tool called PicPanzee (no log-in required) • PicPanzee is primarily a tool for investigating Instagram
Finding relevant hashtags • We typed “Free West Papua” into PicPanzee, it gives us a range of pro-separatist hashtags and their popularity online • This even picks up hashtags that use emojis, which can be easy to miss if we are just searching with text
Finding relevant accounts on Instagram • PicPanzee also helps us build a picture of the pro-separatist network on Instagram • Here’s we’ve typed “Free West Papua” into the search and found these results • From here, we can conduct further investigation into specific profiles
Finding relevant accounts on Instagram • Investigation of one account reveals links between Indonesian anti-fascists and Papuan separatists, which gives us insight into an adversary’s alliances
Using PicPanzee to conduct remote reconnaissance of targets • PicPanzee allows us to view the followers of any public Instagram account, without having to create our own Instagram profile or even access the Instagram website • To the right are the followers of a pro- separatist Instagram account, as viewed on PicPanzee • This reduces our own online footprint and also saves us time, because it means we do not have to set up fake profiles to undertake our research
Searching Instagram bios • Another useful free tool for Instagram is Search My Bio, which can be accessed via its own website • The tool searches Instagram bios for mentions of key words • The following search for “Free West Papua” brought back three influencers in relation to this search. This helps us identify the key cogs in the pro-separatist Instagram network that we can use for further investigation.
Investigations on Twitter • We will use the hashtag search we conducted earlier with PicPanzee, and apply that to Twitter • A useful tool for investigating Twitter networks is Mentionmapp • Mentionmapp is free, but you are required to be logged in to Twitter for it to work
Identifying pro-separatist Twitter networks • If we input #PapuaMerdeka into Mentionmapp, we get this network map • This gives us a picture of accounts that have been most linked with this hashtag. • Some of these accounts are individual activists associated with the “Free West Papua” campaign, and they are based outside of Indonesia in the Netherlands and UK.
Identifying pro-separatist Twitter networks • We can then use Mentionmapp to dive deeper into the Twitter networks of these specific accounts • This pro-separatist account has been interacting with: > An international legal firm in the UK > An anti-corruption NGO in Indonesia > A West Papua media organisation > A Papua separatist activist organisation > President Joko Widodo
Identifying pro-separatist Twitter networks • Mentionmapp can be used to reveal the substance of interactions between users • For example, the target account is attempting to build international support for separatism by disseminating pro-separatist narratives to a range of international accounts, including: > A UK-based law firm > The Foreign Minister of Vanuatu
Analysing an account’s followers on Twitter • A free tool called Followerwonk allows us to analyse a specific account’s followers (Twitter log- in required) • Followerwonk scans the bios of Twitter accounts to gain an indication of where that account may be based • This is an indication and verification is always required, but the tool nevertheless gives us an overall picture of where an account’s support is coming from • If we look at the pro-separatist account, FRI-West Papua, we can see the majority of its followers claim to be from Indonesia or Papua New Guinea, but there is also a global network, with hubs in India, the UK and the US. This gives us a good starting off point for our research into specific geolocations.
Analysing an account’s followers on Twitter • If we use Followerwonk to analyse the pro-separatist account, FRI-West Papua, we can see the majority of its followers claim to be from Indonesia or Papua New Guinea, but there is also a global network, with hubs in India, the UK and the US. This gives us a good starting off point for our research into separatist sentiment in specific geolocations.
Reducing your footprint on Twitter • Twitter lists are a good way of tracking sentiment on Twitter without revealing your presence on the platform • Essentially, Twitter lists allow us to follow accounts, without us having to hit the “follow” button!
Twitter lists • Here is a snapshot of a Twitter list of pro-separatist accounts focusing on Papua. • We have not followed these accounts, instead we have jut added them to a Twitter list • Our attribution is reduced – these accounts are not aware they are being followed • The Twitter list will automatically update whenever a member of the list posts an update
Preliminary results of Janes research into online separatist sentiment in Papua • Using the OSINT methods and tools outline in this briefing, Janes Intelligence Unit has built up a picture of online separatist sentiment focused on Papua • We were able to draw preliminary conclusions into this online sentiment, with research ongoing
Where are pro-separatist accounts located online? • The majority of online pro- separatist activity was found on Facebook, followed by Twitter • Smaller pockets of separatist communities were found on Instagram and YouTube
Tip: Always be on the look for the next platform! • The fast-moving world of social media sees new platforms appearing regularly • Your target community may decide to shift to a completely new platform, as happened recently with Islamic State • It is always useful to keep a look out for what platform may be on the horizon for your target community • We detected very small pockets of separatist support on Tik Tok and Telegram
What type of pro-separatist accounts are found online?
• The majority of accounts
were aimed at peaceful
activism
• A small core of accounts
showed support for or
involvement in militant
separatism, with the
majority of these accounts
on FacebookMilitant vs. activist accounts: Which attracts more attention? • Across all platforms, accounts that were focused on peaceful activism attracted the majority of attention
Support for pro-separatist accounts across platforms • In terms of interest in Papuan separatism across platforms, the majority of interest was found on Facebook
Leveraging Janes OSINT How Janes tools and content can be used to assess trends, capability and equipment identification
Leveraging Janes to track Terrorist and Insurgent Activity
Janes Terrorism & Insurgency Centre
covers any events, violent or non-violent,
conducted by non-state armed groups
with a political or ideological motivation,
in addition to state actions conducted
against such groups and relevant
statements by both state and non-state
actors. Leveraging Janes to track Terrorist and Insurgent Activity
Indonesian Activity
Non State Armed Group Attacks
Non State Armed Group Actions
Non State Armed Group Statements
Counter Terror Operations
Counter Terror Judicial
Counter Terror StatementLeveraging Janes to track Terrorist and Insurgent Activity Indonesian Activity
Leveraging Janes to track Terrorist and Insurgent Activity Indonesian Activity – Geospatially represented
Leveraging Janes to track Terrorist and Insurgent Activity Indonesian Activity – OPM
Leveraging Janes to track Civil Unrest (Protests & Riots) Indonesian Activity
Leveraging Janes to track Civil Unrest (Protests & Riots) Indonesian Activity
Leveraging Janes to determine capability…
Small Arms Identification
• M4 Carbine
• Believed to be a copy with a custom muzzle device and handguard
• M16 Clone
• Similar to the M16A2 which is used by the PNG Defence Force
• FN Minimi (M249 SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon) in US Service)
• Furniture matches the production models but could be a clone
• It looks like the earlier model minimi’s.
• FN FNC Clones
• There is a rough assortment of FN FNC copies/derivatives, of particular note, PT Pindad (an Indonesian manufacturing
company) make a locally produced set of versions of the FN FNC, which have the general prefixes of SS1 or SS2 with a
suffix denoting the specific variant (changes in barrel length etc.) Therefore its fairly likely these are regionally/locally
made/captured rifles.
• M14 rifle
• US service rifle shortly before Vietnam - 7.62mm semi-automatic weapon
• M1 carbine
• US armed forces during WW2
• M1911 Pistol
• Browning hi-powerLeveraging Janes to determine capability…
Small Arms Identification
• Browning hi-power pistols.
• FN FNC copies
• Most likely Pindad made missing their handguards.
• FN FNC copy,
• M203 style under barrelled grenade launcher which gives anti vehicle capabilities depending on the availability of
appropriate ammunition.
• The presence of the grenade launcher may be an explanation of the lack of handguards on the other rifles, and the
insurgents may be removing the handguards to strap the UGL’s directly to the barrels of the weapons.
Janes Assessment…
Overall the variety of the build quality, the differences in ‘generations’ of weapons, and the mix of conditions
they appear to be in suggests a multitude of sources for weapons as opposed to one single coup of a big
seizureLeveraging Janes to determine capability… Small Arms Identification
Concluding points • Janes Intelligence Unit continues to track a range of militancy in Southeast Asia, producing analysis on Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand • Janes Intelligence Unit can provide outsourced intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities… > OSINT Training > Janes Liason Officer > RFI “As a Service” (AaS)
Concluding points • A range of OSINT courses from Janes Intelligence Unit offer a deeper dive into the methods and tools outlined in this presentation – please reach out to myself or a colleague to learn more
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Thank you
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