Ukraine's Membership Bid Puts Pressure on the European Union
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NO. 21 MARCH 2022 Introduction Ukraine’s Membership Bid Puts Pressure on the European Union A Security Policy Flanking, Not a Revision of EU Enlargement Policy, Is Advisable Barbara Lippert As Russian tanks and artillery advanced on Kharkiv and Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an application to join the European Union. He called for a special admission procedure to secure swift accession for Ukraine, yet Ukraine did not first aspire to EU membership under missile fire. Much like Moldova and Georgia, it sees its current status of association with the EU as a precursor to accession. The 28 Feb- ruary application was a call for help from the dreadful war. Initial responses from the European Commission and the European Parliament indicated much political sym- pathy for Ukraine’s urgent call, but the EU leaders do not hold forth the prospect of swift accession. This restraint results from the experience that membership negotia- tions are generally challenging and protracted and that there are no short cuts to the goal. There are, indeed, EU interests that run counter to an explicit memership per- spective. The EU should in any case add a security component flanking its policy of integration and cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries. In response to Ukraine’s membership breakaway territories of Abkhazia and application Commission President Ursula South Ossetia, and the the EU’s initiation von der Leyen replied promptly to President of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009, the Zelensky that “We want them [Ukraine] in”. Baltic states, Poland and Sweden have more That went beyond the EU’s internal con- and more openly favoured an explicit acces- sensus formula according to which the EU sion offer to the so-called Associated Trio acknowledges Ukraine’s aspirations and its (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). But neither choice for Europe but is not itself politically France nor Germany have followed suit. committed to that goal. While the Commis- Even after the Euromaidan in 2013/14 and sion in Brussels is the ever benevolent Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 they manager of the enlargement process, it is both insisted that in the medium term suc- the EU’s member states that determine the cessful implementation of the association course and pace of progress. Since Ukraine’s agreements, including the deep and com- 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2008 Russo- prehensive free trade area (DCFTA), and not Georgian war, Russia’s recognition of the EU membership, headed the agenda.
The EU sees Putin’s war against Ukraine model, that the future of Ukraine, Moldova
as a turning point, however. What does this and Georgia is within the European Union.
mean for its policy towards Ukraine? What In 2003, the EU sent a political signal of that
possibilities for action does the EU have and kind to the Western Balkan states, of which
what are the implications for its enlarge- only one, Croatia, has since (in 2013) joined.
ment policy? There are many reasons on both sides why
The options outlined as follows only that message fizzled out and the credibility
stand a chance of realization if, after the of the accession promise suffered. But Thes-
end of the war, the EU still finds in Kyiv a saloniki did at least harden the EU’s self-com-
legitimate government that has preserved mitment inasmuch as a departure from it
its sovereignty against Moscow. If Russia can be well-nigh ruled out. For the most part,
appoints a proxy regime in Kyiv, the acces- an accession perspective does not yet mean
sion candidate option will be obsolete any- for a country that it will directly become
way. The EU might then face the question an accession candidate. For that the Council
whether and to what extent it can collabo- requires it to be able to demonstrate a cer-
rate with a Ukrainian government in exile tain level of preparation for accession nego-
to uphold the Ukrainians’ European vocation. tiations. The Council must decide unani-
mously, and even that status does not mean
negotiations will follow directly. In respect
Revise the Enlargement of Ukraine, this means that in principle there
Consensus? is scope for a symbolic recognition policy at
(seemingly) low cost. Furthermore, an acces-
The EU acts on the basis of the renewed sion perspective and a membership appli-
2006 enlargement policy consensus and cation are not necessarily closely linked. An
its “three Cs”: consolidation of the enlarge- application is the prerequisite for a meticu-
ment area, strict conditionality as laid down lous examination procedure and a recom-
in the Copenhagen accession criteria, and mendation by the Commission to enter into
communication of the objectives, costs negotiations. Three of the five current mem-
and benefits of admitting new countries in bership candidates – Turkey, Serbia and
order to improve public acceptance of the Montenegro – are involved in accession
enlargement. The “Kyiv effect” (Manfred negotiations while Albania and North Mace-
Weber, MEP) could trigger adjustments to donia are still waiting for the go-ahead and
all three principles: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are only
Consolidation: The principle of consolida- considered to be potential candidates. Every
tion relates to the political commitments little increase in status has hitherto been
the EU has undertaken to countries with an disputed in the EU, partly because it is con-
explicit accession perspective, these being ditional on verifiable progress by the candi-
Turkey and the Western Balkan states. By dates in fulfilment of the accession criteria,
making this objective one of the three en- but also because individual member states
largement process premises, however, the pursue in this context their bilateral quar-
EU indicated to other European states, rels with would-be members and brake
which in principle can apply for member- processes with a veto. From a Brussels view-
ship under Article 49 TEU, that they cannot point, an accession perspective or indeed
per se expect political support from the a candidate status would provide Ukraine
Union. This point was aimed at EaP coun- with an exceptionally quick start. How
tries like Ukraine. Towards them, Brussels swiftly matters then progress is hard to say
drew a line between enlargement and as far as the EU is concerned. The basic rule
neighbourhood policy based exactly on of accession conferences from start to finish
the question of accession perspective. is unanimity. In the entire process there
The EU might now cross this line and are many individual veto and intervention
state, in keeping with the Thessaloniki opportunities for the 27 governments.
SWP Comment 21
March 2022
2Given a suitably strong political will soon disappointed. The central arena of
on the part of all 27 member states the EU action will be Ukraine’s specific pre-acces-
could in principle even enter into symbolic sion progress toward the EU acquis. In this
negotiations at short notice with the Zelen- process the EU can use instruments tried,
sky government in order to send a signal trusted and new to provide support, for
of solidarity and support to the people of monitoring and to interlock with Ukraine’s
Ukraine. That would at the same time make economic and political reconstruction and
it clear to the Russian aggressor that the EU reform programmes. Security policy co-
wanted to relieve Ukraine from its danger- operation is likely in the future, and in
ous in-between status and anchor it firmly contrast to traditional enlargement policy,
in Euro-Atlantic structures. The envisaged to play a much larger role inasmuch as
Ukrainian membership would then be an post-war Ukraine will be a country with a
expression of the incipient bloc-building. permanent political and physical line of
For countries with a considerable back- conflict with Russia, unstable borders and
log in relation to the EU’s acquis and with a fragile peace in an unsettled neighbour-
serious governance deficits, the time that hood. The accession talks may be the politi-
elapses between membership application cal arena on which the wider public is
and membership can easily be ten to focussed, but they mainly reflect progress
twenty years. Only Germany’s new federal and problems in the pre-accession process.
states (Länder) were able to “accede” to the Communication: The EU could argue that
European Communities without delay and some kind of special procedure for the
without membership negotiations by virtue Ukraine was an extraordinary emergency
of their incorporation into the territory measure, but it would need to communi-
governed by the Basic Law. cate the measure as such.
Conditionality: The requirement of strict Emergency admission of European states
fulfilment of the accession criteria was was discussed in the EU in the 1990s im-
made even stricter by the changes to the mediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
methodology of the accession process that Discussion was triggered by precarious
France initiated in 2019. In Ukraine’s case internal developments in East-Central and
and despite the diverse forms of differenti- South-Eastern European countries and by
ated integration that already exist, the EU the hope that a move of this kind might
has very little leeway to reduce the political prevent a dangerous departure from the
and economic requirements or to handle path of democratization or at least open
selectively the rights and duties to adopt up a way out of the hostilities in a disinte-
primary and secondary EU law in the new grating Yugoslavia.
member state. The priorities are protection The Russian war of aggression against
of the Union’s values (political criteria, Ukraine is, like 1989/90, a caesura and a
Article 2 TEU), the uniformity of the judi- turning point. Back then the CSCE states
cial area and the functionality and capacity most confidently laid the foundations for
of the EU (economic and acquis criteria). an all-European architecture of democracy,
Temporary transitional arrangements – peace and unity (Charter of Paris for a New
the traditional adjusting screws – would Europe). The partial order established by
not, in view of Ukraine’s fundamental the European Communities in the west of
shortcomings in respect of the acquis, be the continent was the political centre of
enough to cushion a hasty admission. gravity. In 2022, in contrast, a time is dawn-
Pre-war Ukraine would definitely not ing that will be characterized by geopolitics
have fulfilled the political criteria. On the and the creation of countervailing power
other hand, the EU lowered its sights on and by an interaction mode of containment
the political criteria when entering into and confrontation between Russia on the
negotiations with Turkey. Its leap of faith one hand and the EU and countries ori-
in Ankara’s will and ability to reform was ented toward it on the other. Bearing that
SWP Comment 21
March 2022
3in mind, the hardship Ukrainians face Security and Integration
today is greater than it was for the coun- Policy Aspects
tries of East-Central Europe in the 1990s, so
an emergency admission strategy appears If the EU were to open up an accession
prima facie plausible. perspective for Ukraine, it would be a very
In a nutshell, the EU member states are far-reaching promise. Keeping it would re-
at liberty to offer Ukraine a membership quire a prudent strategy that took foreign,
perspective, to recognize it as an accession security and integration policy dimensions
candidate and even, albeit only symbolical- into account. They will here be touched
ly, to enter into accession negotiations. upon only in brief:
They would thereby express their solidarity EU and NATO: The EU would need to
with the Ukrainian struggle for sovereignty clarify quickly where an enlargement strat-
and democracy and commit themselves egy for EaP countries stands in relation to
politically to Ukraine joining the EU once it NATO and its open door policy. The Atlan-
fulfils the terms and conditions. The main tic alliance does officially adhere to this
difference between this and the pre-war policy, which is supported by EU states that
policy on Ukraine would therefore be that are also NATO members.
it is no longer a question of whether but of The accession of the EFTA states to the
when Ukraine becomes a member of the EU. EU in 1995 and the Mediterranean coun-
These decisions would, however, put the tries Cyprus and Malta in 2004 were the
other two “Cs”, consolidation and condi- last enlargement rounds involving coun-
tionality, on the back burner or undermine tries that were non-aligned. Since the
them. The EU’s efforts to restrengthen the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and
credibility of its enlargement policy, which Finland have been considering joining
took a serious hit in the Western Balkans, NATO more specifically than ever. Only
will be subjected to an even tougher test if Ireland, Austria, Malta and Cyprus would
the number of potential new members was then be neutral or non-aligned EU mem-
extended to include the EaP countries. bers. This means that traditionally member-
Sympathy with Ukraine may be very great ship in NATO precedes membership of the
at the moment and the present circum- EU, as is, for instance, the case among the
stances may make special measures candidates in the Western Balkans with
acceptable, but opening an accession the potential exception of Serbia. If, in
perspective for Kyiv would mean a revision Ukraine’s case, EU membership were to go
of cornerstones of the enlargement policy ahead or even entry into NATO were de
with lasting consequences for the EU27. facto to be ruled out, that would mean the
The EU might therefore feel it advisable EU admitting a geopolitically extremely
to define in the framework of European exposed country in a precarious security
treaties a new status of partial or junior situation. Under Article 42.7 TEU EU mem-
membership or to create a new European ber states would be obliged to provide “aid
political and economic area with a strong and assistance by all means in their power”
security policy component below the to Ukraine as a member state in the event
threshold of membership with and for of an armed aggression on its territory.
associated third states. This could be a Even if the EU and its members possessed
precursor or a permanent alternative to full more robust capacities of its own they
membership. The construct to be developed could not do so without NATO safeguards.
would thus be more an intensified EaP with In perspective, member states’ mutual aid
closer institutional links to the EU than a and assistance would need to be understood
flawed EU membership. more in military and security policy terms
than the current wording of the article
under the CFSP chapter suggests. Irrespec-
tive of membership issues, NATO and the
SWP Comment 21
March 2022
4EU ought to coordinate closely their co- ship make it clear that the enlargement
operation with EaP states in the area of strategy must be embedded transatlantically
security and defence. In the 1990s Yugoslav and in security policy terms. It would have
wars the since disbanded Western Euro- to be implemented in a hostile environ-
pean Union (WEU), as an organization sub- ment that the EU would directly encounter
ordinate to the EU, established a new asso- in its new borders as envisaged.
ciated partner status for non-aligned Cen- The EU’s absorption capacity: Including
tral and Eastern European countries. That Ukraine as an accession candidate would
did not mean the WEU was committed to have considerable implications for the
come to their assistance as it was for its medium-term development of the EU. Even
members, all of which were members of if enlargement is seen primarily as a foreign
NATO and the EC/EU. But the associated policy instrument, a view likely to predomi-
partner countries were thereby regularly nate in Ukraine’s case, the consequences
involved in a security alliance that served for the EU’s system of governance and indi-
inter alia the purpose of consultation and vidual areas of politics must most definitely
defence planning. In addition, there was be taken into consideration. In the years of
the Eurocorps, a brigade under dual EU and polycrisis the EU was already struggling
NATO command that served with the Stabi- with centrifugal tendencies of various
lisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. kinds. In policy formulation and decision-
The EU and NATO might, for example, making processes it shows clear symptoms
set up a joint organization for security of overstretching, the cause of which is not
policy cooperation with the EaP countries. only the number of members but also the
The core group of this spin-off would be the heterogeneous nature of their preferences
countries that make up NATO’s European and starting positions. These signs of over-
pillar. In the best case they would include loading can at best be attenuated by the
the UK, which was, after all, one of the forms of differentiated integration and the
guarantee powers of the 1994 Budapest transition to majority voting. Each enlarge-
Memorandum on Security Assurances. The ment, especially those that involve un-
range of topics could include all aspects of consolidated democracies with weak econo-
defence, including cyberthreats and pro- mies, increases the pressure of problems
tection of critical infrastructure. Above all, and the pressure for reform of the EU. How-
however, the new organization would have ever, capacities for solving difficult tasks,
to deal with security guarantees for Ukraine crises and dealing with conflicts of objec-
and the longstanding conflicts in the seces- tives and priorities in the EU27 do not
sionist territories and de facto states of the increase accordingly. That is why there is
Associated Trio. The EU would need to con- much to suggest that the EU should only
nect this Euro-Atlantic spin-off with other admit new members once it has reformed
cooperation and integration formats, espe- its institutions and decision-making pro-
cially with the Energy Union, and to link the cesses. With existing and new assurances
initiative with the political and economic to ten countries, the EU is conjuring up a
measures to strengthen the resilience of the scenario that exceeds by far its absorption
EaP countries. This new organization would capacity – even taking the next two
be a security policy flanking to EU enlarge- decades into consideration. Accession of
ment and could be a preliminary stage to Ukraine (population approx. 44 million)
NATO membership for EaP countries. and of Turkey (population approx. 84 mil-
How large would the number of new lion), which has not yet been entirely ruled
candidates be? Would the political signal out, would also shift the EU’s geographical
of the accession perspective apply only to focus to its present periphery. The core
Ukraine or to the Associated Trio as a whole Europe around France, Germany and the
or would it extend further? That issue and, founding countries might be less and less
above all, the problem of NATO member- able to hold together such an overextended
SWP Comment 21
March 2022
5EU. Countries might join an EU that was candidate countries in the Western Balkans
arguably even more strongly integrated will probably also step up pressure on the
than today and bring with them an un- EU to bring the ongoing or faltering nego-
broken nineteenth-century sense of national tiations to a conclusion.
sovereignty that, taken to its polemical At the informal EU summit meeting held
extreme, made them feel as dominated by in Versailles at the beginning of March 2022
Brussels as they had been by Moscow. the 27 heads of state and government agreed
Today and for the foreseeable future the on the second option. Acknowledging Kyiv’s
EU is not ripe to admit EaP countries as new application diplomatically (recognizing
members. To effectively be able to secure Ukraine’s “European aspirations” and its
the borders with Russia it would have to “European choice”) and noted that the Coun-
enlarge its military capabilities substantially cil had acted swiftly and invited the Commis-
within the framework of the Common sion to submit its opinion. That triggers the
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and to customary Article 49 TEU procedure. In addi-
deepen its cooperation with NATO. tion, the 27 national parliaments and the
European Parliament are informed about the
application. But an answer to the request is
Dealing with the de facto deferred until the end of war and
Membership Application hostilities in Ukraine. A detailed review or
screening of the application by the Commis-
The European Commission and Council sion, dealing mainly with assessing a coun-
will not simply neglect the accession re- try’s readiness for accession in the light of
quest from Kyiv. The EU will probably not, the Copenhagen criteria, cannot be under-
however, take time to prepare its reply care- taken meaningfully in view of the war and
fully, weighing up different viewpoints in its consequences. That is why at the Ver-
an internal clarification process. European sailles summit the EU27 also announced
Council President Charles Michel had their intention of further deepening their
immediately noted differences between relations with Ukraine until the Commis-
member states on this issue. Commission sion’s opinion is published. The point of
President von der Leyen has called for a reference continues to be the association
“moment of truth for Europe”. agreement (DCFTA). The Council also in-
The EU has at least two combinable ways vited the Commission to submit its opinion
to deal with the membership application. on the applications of Moldova and Geor-
First, the European Council could, after a gia. With regard to Ukraine, the 27 reassured
recommendation by the Commission, grant that it “belongs to our European family”.
Ukraine candidate status directly, as it were, Overall, formulas are used that put a damper
without lead times. This would remain on the high-flying expectations of the pro-
until further notice a purely symbolic act accession forces,including not only Ukraine
and would temporarily earn the EU moral itself but also EU member states like Estonia
repute. It could encourage Ukraine and that are now aggressively advocating candi-
bolster it up in the event of genuine cease- date status for Ukraine. They certainly have
fire and peace negotiations with Russia. solidarity with Ukraine in mind, but at least
That move would surely shunt not only Poland and Hungary, which is more re-
Ukraine but also the Associated Trio onto strained in its support for Ukraine, could
a track of very lengthy accession negotia- make use of the momentum of securitiza-
tions. Georgia and Moldova have already tion that is sweeping the EU to have the con-
jumped on the bandwagon and submitted flict with Brussels over the rule of law and
applications of their own at the beginning democracy dropped from the agenda as
of March – an act the EU had often advised irrelevant.
against because it would be too soon and The EU should also, in view of the course
the response would surely be negative. The set in Versailles, wonder how sustainable
SWP Comment 21
March 2022
6an accession perspective for Ukraine is if Russia, including development opportuni-
a level-headed cost-benefit calculation by ties up to and including membership,
individual member states is set against which the EU has never ruled out.
it and the still unforeseeable geopolitical If the EU embraces the geopolitical logic,
effects are costed in. As in the case of the the war in Ukraine will mark the end of the
2004 eastward enlargement the EU is era of incremental EU enlargement to the
running the risk of ensnaring itself in its east. The end of the Cold War in 1989/90
own political rhetoric (Frank Schimmelfen- opened up an unexpected window of oppor-
nig’s “rhetorical entrapment”) if it espouses tunity to extend the peace zone in Europe
President Zelensky’s moral argumentation. by admitting neighbouring Central and
He called on the EU heads of state and gov- Eastern European states into the European © Stiftung Wissenschaft
ernment and MEPs to back an accession Union. The framework conditions for co- und Politik, 2022
perspective for his country. Such a commit- operation and integration in Europe were All rights reserved
ment would allow decision-makers to show favourable and there was a justified hope of
This Comment reflects
themselves to be Europeans and demon- converging views on political order among
the author’s views.
strate that they were on the side of Ukraine, the CSCE states.
which was fighting for its rights, its free- There is much to suggest that the EU is The online version of
dom and its life, and to become an equal continuing to pursue its enlargement policy this publication contains
member of Europe. He was thereby appeal- under the conditions of the new bloc for- functioning links to other
SWP texts and other relevant
ing to the normative foundations of the EU mation in Europe with the aim of consoli-
sources.
as a peace community and exerting moral dating its membership promises. Emergency
pressure on it. Because Ukraine is the vic- admission is highly unlikely and regular ac- SWP Comments are subject
tim of the Russian war of aggression and cession is a very distant prospect for Ukraine. to internal peer review, fact-
in resisting it is defending those values on That is why the EU should (at least) in respect checking and copy-editing.
which the EU, but also NATO, are founded, of the EaP countries develop integration For further information on
our quality control pro-
it “deserves” (according to the Polish and and cooperation arrangements below the
cedures, please visit the SWP
Lithuanian Presidents speaking in Kyiv on level of EU membership as outlined above website: https://www.swp-
23 February 2022) candidate status. The and improve its own ability to act in all berlin.org/en/about-swp/
more the EU accepts this line of argument, areas in order to be able to assert its values quality-management-for-
the more difficult it will become to set and interests itself. To that extent, ambiva- swp-publications/
other viewpoints and interests (absorption lences with regard to Ukraine and other EaP
SWP
capacity, EU security) against it and refer countries will continue to exist. As long as Stiftung Wissenschaft und
to the technocratic logic of the accession Russia pursues an aggressive and imperial Politik
negotiations. policy toward its neighbours, the EU, to- German Institute for
gether with the United States, must counter- International and
act it by all means and in the longer term. Security Affairs
The Perspectives: Nothing forges a stronger bond than a
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
Ambivalences Remain common foe. The war on Ukraine initiated 10719 Berlin
by Putin could have the effect of the exter- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
The EU has long underestimated or mis- nal threat uniting the EU27 in unprecedented Fax +49 30 880 07-100
judged the geopolitical implications of political cohesion and consistency in action. www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org
enlargement and of the EaP. That was The EU has shown in its reaction to the Rus-
shown in 2013 when Russia’s intervention sian invasion of Ukraine that it is capable ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
against Kyiv’s association agreement with in this exceptional situation of projecting ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
the EU was intended to prevent Ukraine power collectively. The basis for that is its doi: 10.18449/2022C21
from turning towards the conceptions of economic and financial power and a supra-
international order of the West and its national executive that must be deepened Translation by Paul Bewicke
organizations. The EU had/has offered its and secured.
(English version of
eastern neighbours a far-reaching and ever SWP-Aktuell 23/2022)
closer association, if only in a cooperative
environment, i.e. with a non-revisionist
Dr. Barbara Lippert is Director of Research of SWP and member of the Executive Board.
SWP Comment 21
March 2022
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