The Shift in Turkey's Foreign Policy - Sofia Maria Satanakis, Katrin Süss
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Sofia Maria Satanakis, Katrin Süss
FOKUS | 3/2021
The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy
Introduction to the Alliance. As a result, the US reacted For the EU, a fully functioning transatlantic
by removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter Alliance – which Turkey is an integral part
For almost 20 years, President Recep Tayyip jet program.2 The country’s military actions of - is of paramount importance because
Erdoğan and his Justice and Development in northern Syria in the autumn of 2019 NATO will continue to represent the main
Party (AKP) have dominated Turkey’s were also heavily criticised by the Alliance. framework for European security. The
political scene. Under the “zero problems” Furthermore, President Erdoğan repeated- importance of close EU-NATO cooperation
doctrine, initiated by former foreign ly threatened to reject defence plans for on all defence-related issues and the ef-
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ankara’s initial Poland and the Baltic countries (also known fective addressing of the complex security
objective was to improve relations with as Eagle Defender), if the Alliance did not challenges facing both sides of the Atlantic
all its neighbours. While the country was classify the Kurdish People’s Protection Units cannot be overstated.
considered an example of a moderate and (YPG militia) as a terrorist organisation.3 Fi-
modern Muslim state, merely a decade nally, the opening of Turkey’s borders to the The gas dispute in the Eastern Mediterra-
ago, during the so-called “Arab Spring”, the European Union (EU) back in February 2020, nean
situation began to change, especially after causing a new influx of migrants trying to
the failed coup attempt in 2016. A nowa- cross into neighbouring Greece, led to addi- Greek-Turkish relations are especially
days more assertive and nationalist Turkey tional tensions between the two NATO allies, difficult and have been marked by various
is increasingly at odds with its Western who already share a complicated past. crises over the past decades, one of them
allies over Libya, Syria, the South Caucasus, concerning natural oil and gas reserves
and in the Eastern Mediterranean.1 The Tensions further intensified when the US and maritime rights in the Mediterranean
shift in Turkey’s foreign policy as well as imposed sanctions against Turkey over region. Tensions between the two neigh-
its increasing military assertiveness is best the S-400 purchase under the Countering bours ran high with Turkey surveying for
seen in the country’s involvement in the America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions potential energy reserves in an area Greece
gas dispute with Greece, the Libyan crisis, Act (CAATSA).4 The sanctions put a ban on claims to be part of its continental shelf.7
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between all US export licenses and authorisations The EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF)8, establis-
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and not least in to Turkey’s Defence Industry Directorate as hed by Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Egypt, Israel,
its troubled relationship with NATO. The well as an asset freeze and visa restrictions and Jordan in order to create a regional
aim of this paper is to provide a compre- on the organisation’s president, Ismail gas market, and Turkey’s exclusion from
hensive overview of the aforementioned Demir, and other high ranking officials.5 the negotiations, as well as the maritime
shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. The timing of the sanctions (more than deal between Turkey and the Government
a year after the delivery of the missile of National Accord (GNA) in Libya9, further
Relations with NATO and the US system) could further complicate relations inflamed Mediterranean geopolitical tensi-
with Ankara for the new US administrati- ons. After a brief easing of relations, where
Turkey is one of NATO’s oldest member on – Joe Biden has often been critical of both sides expressed their readiness to
states and the most important troop Erdoğan’s policies in the past. Nonetheless, take up talks under the NATO umbrella, the
contributor to missions and operations appreciating Turkey’s geostrategic value dispute intensified again. In autumn 2020,
next to the United States (US). Due to its and in an attempt to avoid additional Turkey announced that the Oruc Reis sur-
special geographic location - being at the confrontation, President Biden is expected vey vessel would continue operations near
crossroads between Europe and Asia - the to explore areas of potential US-Turkish the Greek island of Kastellorizo, which is
country is also of considerable strategic cooperation, particularly against Russia. In located just two kilometres from the Tur-
importance to the Alliance. Although close coordination with the EU, he might kish mainland.10 Eventually, both Greece
NATO would undoubtedly be weaker try to alter Turkey’s foreign policy course in and Turkey have been conducting military
without Turkey, the country is increasingly an attempt to preserve a solid diplomatic drills and sending war ships to the region,
turning into a source of insecurity. and security relationship.6 Efforts to restore and the Mediterranean quickly became
relations with NATO allies (which have a multi-stage theatre for demonstrating
In recent years, Turkey’s foreign policy has been strained during the term of Donald military power and engaging in geopoliti-
become more independent and confron- Trump) will be high on Biden’s agenda - cal competition, confronting the EU with a
tational: Turkey procured the Russian air and Turkey is one of those allies. However, particularly difficult mediator role.11
defence system S-400 (2017), which, if with topics like human rights and the rule
deployed, might give Russia access to in- of law expected to return to the centre The crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean will
formation about NATO air defence systems of US foreign policy, friction with Ankara remain a pressing issue for various reasons:
and could thus pose a considerable risk seems almost inevitable. With energy taking up the largest share in
1The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy
FOKUS | 3/2021
the country’s overall imports12, Turkey sees panies responsible for drilling in contested The reasons why Turkey is actively
securing its share in a growing contest waters in the Mediterranean.16 The main engaged in the civil war in Libya are of
over this region as vital.13 Additionally, reasons for this are concerns that President geostrategic as well as of economic nature.
even though the dispute between Turkey Erdoğan would retaliate by reinforcing ties While Turkey is increasingly isolated in the
and Greece over exclusive economic zones with Moscow, reducing counter-terrorism Eastern Mediterranean, its involvement in
(EEZ) is long-standing, the mounting cooperation or even by encouraging more Libya poses the possibility of an advanta-
tensions during 2020 clearly showed that migrants to pass through to Europe –the geous geostrategic repositioning of the
a military collision between NATO allies continued Turkish adherence to the mig- country.22 Moreover, economic ties bet-
is not just a remote possibility. Regarding ration deal of 2016 remains of paramount ween Libya and Turkey have been strong
Cyprus, Ankara argues that it should not importance to the EU. in the past. Not only the vast natural re-
be allowed to exploit its gas resources until sources, such as oil and gas reserves, made
a deal with the Turkish Cypriots is reached. Turkey and Libya Libya an appealing economic partner,
However, the possibility of a mutually sa- but also the potential in the construction
tisfactory agreement regarding the status Turkey’s engagement in Libya is yet market has attracted Turkish firms during
of the divided island remains very slim. In another example of the shift in Ankara’s the Muammar al-Ghaddafi era.23 However,
case of a renewed escalation of the gas foreign policy, stretching from Eurasia to after the fall of Ghaddafi and due to the
dispute, a deadlock situation could arise, the Eastern Mediterranean.17 In Novem- “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, Turkey
which would have a negative impact on ber 2019, President Erdoğan convinced had to withdraw from the majority of its
both EU-NATO relations and on Turkey’s the UN-backed GNA to sign a maritime economic projects in Libya, which resulted
bilateral relations with individual states. agreement, declaring the naval corridor in an estimated loss of $19 billion.24 Since
between Northeast Libya and Southwest then, Turkey has repeatedly tried to resu-
The diverging interests of the EU member Turkey an exclusive economic zone, me negotiations and took advantage of
states vis-à-vis Turkey have revealed once which violates the maritime boundaries the precarious situation in Libya in 2018,
more the difficulties the Union faces in of Greece and Cyprus.18 In return, Ankara which ultimately led to an agreement
adopting a unified and solid approach promised to provide the GNA with mili- between the two countries. In the face of
towards Ankara. Pushing for a more tary equipment and training personnel. the current Turkish national crisis, with a
independent European security policy and However, this was not the first time that declining foreign direct investment (FDI),
strategic autonomy, France insisted on Turkey pursued an agreement with Libya a plummeting lira, as well as the inaction
showing solidarity with Greece and Cyprus that would define the boundaries of both of the government during the COVID-19
(France’s joint military training exercises countries’ continental shelves. Ankara has pandemic, the active involvement in Libya
with Greece, Italy and Cyprus are a case in tried to reach such an agreement already could potentially offer Turkey significant
point).14 Paris is concerned that President in 2010, which was then rejected by Libya. medium-term economic advantages.
Erdoğan’s reinsertion of Islam into politics Turkey continued to pursue its ambitions These include possible lucrative gas disco-
could spread in North Africa, encourage and used the unstable situation in 2018 to veries as well as opportunities to establish
Islamist militias, and consequently damage its advantage, widening its interests and a long-term exclusive relationship with
the French sphere of influence. Germany, influence in the region. It was not until Libya’s Central Bank. The latter would turn
home to Europe’s largest Turkish diaspora, November 2019, when Libya agreed to the Istanbul into a hub for regular and irregu-
is encouraging a constructive dialogue- demands in return for military support.19 lar financial services linked to the Libyan
based approach, whereas the Baltics are economy.25
in favour of a smooth relationship with In early January 2020, shortly after signing
Turkey; being a long-standing NATO ally, the agreement, the Turkish parliament de- Although Turkey sets high hopes on the
Ankara plays an important role in their cided in an emergency session to deploy cooperation with Libya, it remains ques-
national security. Other EU member states troops to Libya, despite harsh criticism tionable whether it will yield the much-
like Spain or Italy seem to prefer a more from the European Union and NATO that needed strategic leverage. Moreover, the
balanced approach. The latter has, for such a military involvement could further growing impatience of various internatio-
example, conducted separate military destabilise the country.20 The operation’s nal actors such as France is putting further
drills in the Eastern Mediterranean not first and foremost objective was to put an pressure on Turkey.26 However, not all
only with Greece and France but, also with end to the enduring attacks by the Libyan European states are as sceptical towards
Turkey.15 National Army (LNA) and their attempt to Turkey. Italy, for example, is aware of the
overthrow Tripoli, the capital of Libya.21 need to protect its economic and security
Therefore, although Greece and Cyprus In late spring 2020, the Turkish forces, as interests in Libya, which is why it sets a
have the theoretical backing of the EU, the well as Syrian militants that were deployed more conciliating tone towards Turkey. The
bloc has so far refrained from stringent by Turkey to fight in the Libyan conflict, separate military drills Rome conducted
action against Ankara, apart from limited together with the GNA succeeded and with Ankara, as well as with Athens and
sanctions targeting individuals and com- ended the struggle over Tripoli. Paris, being a case in point.27
2The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy
FOKUS | 3/2021
Turkey’s involvement in the Nagorno- Azerbaijan puts Ankara in the position of a conflict into zones of influence. Further-
Karabakh Conflict direct opponent to the Armenian sup- more, the fact that the pipelines, which
porters, which are, from the Turkish point connect Azerbaijan with Turkey and supply
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been en- of view, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk the European Union with oil and natural
gaged in conflict for more than 30 years, Group – the US, France, and Russia. Additi- gas, closely pass by the conflict zone raises
dating back to the collapse of the USSR.28 onally, Turkey shows ambitions to become additional international interest and draws
Prior to that, in the Joseph Stalin era, the an influential international actor alongside, once more Brussels attention on Turkey’s
region of Nagorno-Karabakh had been and competing with, the United States and actions.40 However, the EU’s engagement
placed in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Russia. A Mutual Assistance Agreement in this conflict should not be determined
Republic, although the majority of its as well as the establishment of a Strategic by its troublesome relations with Turkey,
population was, and remains, Armenian.29 Partnership between Ankara and Baku but rather through the resolutions of the
Later, in 1991, the Armenians of Nagorno- signed in 2010 settled the legal aspects UN Security Council.41
Karabakh declared their independence, of the involvement. These documents lay
which resulted in a war with Azerbaijan, as down that both countries can conduct What is particularly alarming with regard
the latter refused to alter its borderlines. joint military exercises and show active to Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy,
The war was won by the enclave with support in case of an intrusive intervention is that Ankara decides to send foreign
Armenian support and was temporarily by a third party. Similar agreements exist militants, namely Syrian proxy fighters, to
brought to a hold by a cease-fire in 1994. also between Russia and Armenia.35 act on their behalf in foreign battles. This
Nonetheless, the region was never recog- bluntly illustrates the country’s growing
nised as an independent country – not The battle came to a halt when a peace ag- influence in Syria, where Ankara is in direct
even by Armenia – and is up until today reement, initiated by Moscow, was signed opposition to Moscow. This competitive
considered as part of Azerbaijan by the by the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders. constellation was observed repeatedly
United Nations.30 Nonetheless, Baku left the battlefield as a during the past year. The conflicts in Libya
clear victor, while Armenia has suffered a and the South Caucasus, for example, can
On July 12th, 2020, the combat flared up bitter defeat. However, the real winner of be interpreted as an expansion of the dis-
again when the Armenian military atta- this war is Turkey.36 This triumph represents pute between Ankara and Moscow in Sy-
cked Azerbaijani troops causing several a substantial geopolitical shift for Ankara, ria. The active involvement of Turkey in the
causalities.31 More than two months later, which is not least due to the establishment Libyan crisis can be connected to Russian
fighting between the two opponents star- of a road between Nakhicivan (an Azerbai- airstrikes in Syria, which caused fatalities in
ted once again and lasted for six weeks. jani enclave) and Azerbaijan that crosses the Turkish camp in early 2020.42 However,
This time, however, the military conflict Armenia and therefore creates a direct way in Syria as well as in other conflicts where
was different. Turkey actively supported of transportation between Ankara and they are opposing parties, both countries
Azerbaijan and remained consistent with Baku.37 While Turkey has gained signifi- are aware of the necessity to maintain
its recent battle strategy, as demonstrated cant influence in this region, especially constructive cooperation. In the South
in the Libyan conflict – providing military in Azerbaijan, the peace agreement and Caucasus, for instance, both Ankara and
equipment, especially high-tech drones, in particular the way it took place was a Moscow have overlapping interests, such
training, and deploying Syrian militants. diplomatic success for the Kremlin. About as establishing a new, more cooperative,
The counter party, Armenia, was suppor- 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are deploy Armenian government. Moreover, Turkey’s
ted by Russia through military assistance,32 ed to protect the remaining Armenian involvement in the conflict helped Russia
such as a military base in Gyumri, an population, as well as to patrol the corridor gain more influence in Armenia, as it has
Armenian city.33 This active involvement that was established to connect Armenia pursued since 2018. Another aspect of this
transformed the local dispute into a regio- to Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the treaty unique partnership is the fact that both
nal one.34 expires after five years and then both countries aim to disassociate themselves
Armenia and Azerbaijan are able to voice from the West. For Russia, strengthening
Turkish interests in the conflict are mani- their withdrawal.38 Turkey is a risk it is willing to take, espe-
fold. Ties between Ankara and Baku have cially when this in return means excluding
always been strong based on a shared The involvement of Turkey in yet another the US from its battlefields.43 The above
culture and Turkic language, as well as the war once again demonstrates the shift in briefly illustrates the complexity of the
fact that Turkey has actively supported Turkey’s foreign policy and puts the coun- rivalry between Ankara and Moscow.
Azerbaijan after the separation from the try at odds with Russia.39 It is not the first
Soviet Union and with its integration into time for Ankara to find itself as the rival in Conclusion
international organisations. Moreover, an a foreign (proxy) war against the Kremlin.
active interference in the conflict is also This is also the case in Libya as well as in There has been a striking shift from
in alignment with the new Turkish foreign Syria, where Russia and Turkey (similar to Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors”
policy strategy. The effective support of Nagorno-Karabakh) have split the areas of approach to an overtly confrontatio-
3The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy
FOKUS | 3/2021
nal foreign policy over the last couple Even though nowadays Turkey is pursuing 15) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey, the EU
and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis (2020), https://www.
of years. Nowadays, Ankara seems to a more resolute and dangerous foreign swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-the-eu-and-the-eastern-
reject the regional status quo ante and policy strategy, it remains an important mediterranean-crisis/
16) Ekathimerini: EU to toughen sanctions on Turkish drilling,
is pursuing an expansion of its sphere player on many current global challen- draft summit statement says (2020), https://www.ekathimerini.
of influence. This significant change in ges, like migration and regional stability. com/260080/article/ekathimerini/news/eu-to-toughen-sanc-
Turkey’s foreign policy can be traced back Therefore, the EU should engage more tions-on-turkish-drilling-draft-summit-statement-says
17) Lowy Institute: What is Turkey’s endgame in Libya? (2020),
to two main points: Especially after the actively and steer its relationship with https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-turkey-s-
limited solidarity in relation to the 2016 Ankara in a constructive direction, in order end-game-libya
18) Foreign policy Research Institute: Why Turkey Intervened in
failed coup attempt, Ankara established to find common ground instead of simply Libya (2020), https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/why-turkey-
the narrative that it can no longer trust its downplaying Turkish concerns. intervened-in-libya/
19) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Comment:
Western partners.44 It also perceives the
Turkey Shifts the Focus of Its Foreign Policy, https://www.
West to be in (geopolitical) decline, largely AIES Authors swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C06/https://www.swp-berlin.
due to the power vacuum created by the Sofia Maria Satanakis, M.E.S org/10.18449/2020C06/
20) Politico: Turkish parliament approves troop deployment to
US withdrawal from various multilateral Katrin Süss, MSc. Libya (2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-parliament-
commitments under the Trump admi- approves-troop-deployment-to-libya/
21) Foreign policy Research Institute: Why Turkey Intervened in
nistration. Additionally, a more assertive Libya (2020), https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/why-turkey-
foreign policy deflects domestic attention intervened-in-libya/
from the country’s deteriorating economy. 22) Middle East Institute: Turning the Tide. How Turkey won
the War for Tripoli (2020), https://www.mei.edu/publications/
Although Ankara’s actions can be interpre- turning-tide-how-turkey-won-war-tripoli
ted as an attempt to establish Turkey as 23) Foreign policy Research Institute: Why Turkey Intervened in
Libya (2020), https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/why-turkey-
a major regional power with an autono- Endnotes intervened-in-libya/https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpre-
mous foreign policy, at the same time ter/what-turkey-s-end-game-libya
1) The New York Times: Turkish Aggression is NATO’s ‘Elephant in 24) VOA News: Why is Turkey involved in Libyan conflict? (2020),
they also expose the country’s increasing
the Room’ (2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/world/ https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/why-turkey-
international isolation.45 europe/turkey-nato.html involved-libyan-conflict
2) BBC News: US removes Turkey from F-35 fighter jet 25) Middle East Institute: Turning the Tide. How Turkey won
programme (2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us- the War for Tripoli (2020), https://www.mei.edu/publications/
From a European perspective, a (future) canada-49023115 turning-tide-how-turkey-won-war-tripoli
common line regarding Turkey seems un- 3) Reuters: NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into 26) Lowy Institute: What is Turkey’s endgame in Libya? (2020),
action, officials say (2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us- https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-turkey-s-
likely – as it is the case also with Syria and nato-baltics-turkey-idUSKBN24320B end-game-libya
Libya. Some European countries, such as 4) U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Greece: The United States Sanc- 27) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey, the EU
Germany, follow a more cautious policy to- tions Turkey Under CAATSA 231 (2020), https://gr.usembassy. and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis (2020), https://www.
gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/ swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-the-eu-and-the-eastern-
wards Ankara, while others, like France and 5) BBC News: US imposes sanctions on Turkey over Russian mediterranean-crisis/
Austria, resolutely call for heavy sanctions weapons (2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-cana- 28) Politico: The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict explained (2020):
da-55311099 https://www.politico.eu/article/the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-
or are in favour of officially terminating 6) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Problema- explained-armenia-azerbaijan/
the EU accession process.46 Events like the tic Prospects for US-Turkish Ties in the Biden Era (2020), 29) Ibid.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 30) Ibid.
gas dispute in the Mediterranean or the
comments/2020C60_USTurkishTies.pdf 31)‘ Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM):
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have clearly 7) BBC News: Turkey-Greece tensions escalate over Turkish Resuming a Frozen Conflict: Escalating Tensions on the
shown how vulnerable peace and stability Med drilling plans (2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Azerbaijani-Armenian border, https://edam.org.tr/en/resuming-
europe-53497741 of-a-frozen-conflict-escalating-tensions-on-the-azerbaijani-
really are. Although the relationship bet- 8) Ekathimerini: Seven countries launch East Med gas forum armenian-border/
ween Turkey and the EU has been strained (2020), https://www.ekathimerini.com/248562/article/ekathime- 32) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Escalating
rini/business/seven-countries-launch-east-med-gas-forum violence in Nagorno-Karabakh: Local solutions offer the main
during the past year due to several rifts, 9) European Parliament: Parliamentary Questions; Con- hope (2020), https://www.sipri.org/commentary/expert-
Ankara is currently trying to set a more sequences of the agreement between Turkey and Libya comment/2020/escalating-violence-nagorno-karabakh-local-
conciliating tone. Despite the fact that [GNA] (2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/ solutions-offer-main-hope
document/E-9-2019-004522_EN.html 33) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey-Russia
talks, which are aimed to resolve the dis- 10) Euronews: Turkish research ship at centre of drilling row Partnership in the War over Nagorno-Karabakh (2020), https://
agreement between Ankara and Athens, with Greece set to return to Mediterranean (2020), https://www. www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C53/
euronews.com/2020/10/12/turkish-research-ship-at-the-centre- 34) New York Times: Armenia And Azerbaijan: What Sparked
have restarted on January 25th this year, of-drilling-row-with-greece-set-to-return-to-mediterra War and Will Peace Remain? (2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
Turkey still shows latent hostility. This was 11) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey, the EU article/armenian-azerbaijan-conflict.html
and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis (2020), https://www. 35) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey-Russia
made clear by the warning it voiced to-
swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-the-eu-and-the-eastern- Partnership in the War over Nagorno-Karabakh (2020), https://
wards Greece to avoid any steps that could mediterranean-crisis/ www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C53/
cause further escalation.47 Therefore, it is 12) Hürriyet Daily News: Energy import bill down more than four 36) BBC News: Viewpoint: Russia and Turkey – unlikely victors
percent (2020), https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/energy- of Karabakh conflict (2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
imperative that the EU pursues a careful import-bill-down-more-than-4-percent-151819 europe-54903869
balancing act between successfully con- 13) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey, the EU 37) Middle East Eye: Why Turkey returned to the Caucasus after
and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis (2020), https://www. a hundred years (2020), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/
fronting Turkey’s unilateralism and at the swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-the-eu-and-the-eastern- turkey-azerbaijan-armenia-caucasus-return-why
same time preventing bilateral tensions mediterranean-crisis/ 38) BBC News: Viewpoint: Russia and Turkey – unlikely victors
from influencing effective policymaking at 14) Deutsche Welle: France joins Greece’s naval exercises amid of Karabakh conflict (2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
Turkey row (2020), https://www.dw.com/en/france-joins- europe-54903869
the EU level. greeces-naval-exercises-amid-turkey-row/a-54700105 39) New York Times: Turkey Jumps Into Another Foreign
4The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy
FOKUS | 3/2021
Conflict, This Time in the Caucasus (2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/10/01/world/middleeast/turkey-azerbaijan-armenia-
war.html
40) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Escalating
violence in Nagorno-Karabakh: Local solutions offer the main
hope (2020), https://www.sipri.org/commentary/expert-
comment/2020/escalating-violence-nagorno-karabakh-local-
solutions-offer-main-hope
41) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey-Russia
Partnership in the War over Nagorno-Karabakh (2020), https://
www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C53/
42) New York Times: Turkey Jumps Into Another Foreign
Conflict, This Time in the Caucasus (2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/10/01/world/middleeast/turkey-azerbaijan-armenia-
war.html
43) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey-Russia
Partnership in the War over Nagorno-Karabakh (2020), https://
www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C53/
44) Reuters: Turkey’s Erdogan slams West for failure to show
solidarity over coup attempt (2016), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN10912T
45) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Turkey, the EU
and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis (2020), https://www.
swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-the-eu-and-the-eastern-
mediterranean-crisis/
46) Deutsche Welle: EU foreign ministers eye sanctions against
Turkey, ahead of summit (2020), https://www.dw.com/en/
eu-foreign-ministers-eye-sanctions-against-turkey-ahead-of-
summit/a-55848511
47) ABC News: Turkey says its ready to repair frayed ties with
Europe (2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/
turkey-ready-repair-frayed-ties-europe-75197845
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