The Urgent Case for Replacing Three Long-Tenured Members of Hasbro's 13-Member Board - May 2022 - SEC.gov

The Urgent Case for Replacing Three Long-Tenured
     Members of Hasbro's 13-Member Board

                      May 2022

               www.StrengthenHasbro.com
                                                   1

Disclaimer
•        The materials contained herein (the “Materials”) represent the opinions of Alta Fox Opportunities Fund, LP and the other participants named in this proxy solicitation (collectively, “Alta Fox”) and are
based on publicly available information with respect to Hasbro, Inc. (the “Company”). Alta Fox recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the Company that could lead it or
others to disagree with Alta Fox’s conclusions. Alta Fox reserves the right to change any of its opinions expressed herein at any time as it deems appropriate and disclaims any obligation to notify the market
or any other party of any such changes. Alta Fox disclaims any obligation to update the information or opinions contained herein. Certain financial projections and statements made herein have been derived
or obtained from filings made with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or other regulatory authorities and from other third party reports. There is no assurance or guarantee with respect to the
prices at which any securities of the Company will trade, and such securities may not trade at prices that may be implied herein. The estimates, projections and potential impact of the opportunities identified
by Alta Fox herein are based on assumptions that Alta Fox believes to be reasonable as of the date of the Materials, but there can be no assurance or guarantee that actual results or performance of the
Company will not differ, and such differences may be material. The Materials are provided merely as information and are not intended to be, nor should they be construed as, an offer to sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy any security.

•       Certain members of Alta Fox currently beneficially own, and/or have an economic interest in, securities of the Company. It is possible that there will be developments in the future (including changes
in price of the Company’s securities) that cause one or more members of Alta Fox from time to time to sell all or a portion of their holdings of the Company in open market transactions or otherwise
(including via short sales), buy additional securities (in open market or privately negotiated transactions or otherwise), or trade in options, puts, calls or other derivative instruments relating to some or all of
such securities. To the extent that Alta Fox discloses information about its position or economic interest in the securities of the Company in the Materials, it is subject to change and Alta Fox expressly
disclaims any obligation to update such information.

•        The Materials contain forward-looking statements. All statements contained herein that are not clearly historical in nature or that necessarily depend on future events are forward-looking, and the
words “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “potential,” “opportunity,” “estimate,” “plan,” “may,” “will,” “projects,” “targets,” “forecasts,” “seeks,” “could,” and similar expressions are generally intended to
identify forward-looking statements. The projected results and statements contained herein that are not historical facts are based on current expectations, speak only as of the date of the Materials and involve
risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such
projected results and statements. Assumptions relating to the foregoing involve judgments with respect to, among other things, future economic, competitive and market conditions and future business
decisions, all of which are difficult or impossible to predict accurately and many of which are beyond the control of Alta Fox. Although Alta Fox believes that the assumptions underlying the projected results
or forward-looking statements are reasonable as of the date of the Materials, any of the assumptions could be inaccurate and therefore, there can be no assurance that the projected results or forward-looking
statements included herein will prove to be accurate. In light of the significant uncertainties inherent in the projected results and forward-looking statements included herein, the inclusion of such information
should not be regarded as a representation as to future results or that the objectives and strategic initiatives expressed or implied by such projected results and forward-looking statements will be achieved. Alta
Fox will not undertake and specifically declines any obligation to disclose the results of any revisions that may be made to any projected results or forward-looking statements herein to reflect events or
circumstances after the date of such projected results or statements or to reflect the occurrence of anticipated or unanticipated events.

•        Unless otherwise indicated herein, Alta Fox has not sought or obtained consent from any third party to use any statements, photos or information indicated herein as having been obtained or derived
from statements made or published by third parties. Any such statements or information should not be viewed as indicating the support of such third party for the views expressed herein. No warranty is made
as to the accuracy of data or information obtained or derived from filings made with the SEC by the Company or from any third-party source. All trade names, trademarks, service marks, and logos herein are
the property of their respective owners who retain all proprietary rights over their use.

                                                                                                                                                                                                       2

Today’s Agenda

                                          Introduction

                                     Executive Summary

                              The Case for Boardroom Change

                 Persistent Strategic Missteps Driving Significant Underperformance

                    Lack of Relevant Board Skills Hampering Effective Oversight

                 Our Solution: Highly Qualified, Independent Nominees

                                            Appendix

                                                                                      3

Why We Are Here: It Is the Right Time to Refresh Hasbro’s Board

Hasbro is a global play and entertainment conglomerate ™‹–Š –Š”‡‡ †‹•–‹ – •‡‰‡–• ƒ† ƒ ˆ‹”•–Ǧ–‹‡ 
–Šƒ– ™ƒ• ”‡ ‡–Ž› ’”‘‘–‡† ˆ”‘ ™‹–Š‹ „› –Š‡ —””‡– ‘ƒ”†Ǥ
 Alta Fox, which has a ~2.5% stake in Hasbro, is a top 10 shareholder –Šƒ– „‡Ž‹‡˜‡• –Š‡ ‘’ƒ›
 Šƒ• ‡š ‡’–‹‘ƒŽ „”ƒ†•ǡ —•–‘‡”•ǡ ‡’Ž‘›‡‡• ƒ† Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡” ’‘–‡–‹ƒŽǤ
 Hasbro is currently lagging peers, losing market share and trading at a steep discount †—‡ –‘ǡ ‹
 ‘—” ˜‹‡™ǡ –Š‡ —””‡– ‘ƒ”†ǯ• †‡ ‹•‹‘• ™‹–Š ”‡•’‡ – –‘ ƒ’‹–ƒŽ ƒŽŽ‘ ƒ–‹‘ǡ ‘”’‘”ƒ–‡ ‰‘˜‡”ƒ ‡ǡ
 ‹˜‡•–‘” ‘—‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡ Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Š‹’ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ƒ† •–”ƒ–‡‰‹ ’Žƒ‹‰Ǥ
 Hasbro has unfortunately been underperforming peers and relevant indices in terms of total
 shareholder returns for many years —†‡”–Š‡Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡—”‡††‹”‡ –‘”•™‡™ƒ––‘”‡’Žƒ ‡Ǥ

 With a properly refreshed Board and properly incentivized management teamǡ ™‡ •‡‡ ƒ Ž‡ƒ”
 ’ƒ–Š –‘ ƒ Š‹‡˜‹‰ ‰‘˜‡”ƒ ‡ ƒ† ‘’‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‹’”‘˜‡‡–• –Šƒ– ƒ †”‹˜‡ Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡” ˜ƒŽ—‡Ǥ

 We have engaged with the current Board –‘ ”‡ƒ Š ƒ •‡––Ž‡‡– –Šƒ– ƒ „‡‡ˆ‹– ƒŽŽ •–ƒ‡Š‘Ž†‡”•Ǥ
 ˆ‘”–—ƒ–‡Ž›ǡ Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡—”‡† ‹ —„‡–• ƒ’’‡ƒ” —™‹ŽŽ‹‰ –‘ ‘‹– –‘ ƒ –”—‡ ”‡ˆ”‡•Š ƒ† ”‡ ‡–Ž›
 ‹‹–‹ƒ–‡† ƒ †‡ˆ‡•‹˜‡ ‡š’ƒ•‹‘ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”† ˆ”‘ ͳͳ ‡„‡”• –‘ ͳ͵ ‡„‡”•Ǥ

                                                                                                     4

What This Contest Is About : The Urgent Need for a Credible Board Refresh
    Before Insular Governance Permanently Impairs Value
              What This Contest Is NOT About                                                            What This Contest IS About
         This is NOT about Hasbro’s previous CEO or the new CEO.                 This IS about holding the Board and three long-tenured directors accountable for
                                                                                  severe underperformance before an iconic American company erodes further.
•    ‡ „‡Ž‹‡˜‡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘ƒ”†ǦŽ‡˜‡Ž ’”‘„Ž‡• –”ƒ• ‡† ƒ› ‘‡ ‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽǤ
                                                                                 •        ƒ•„”‘ǯ• •–‘  Šƒ• ‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡† ƒ •‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ– †‡ Ž‹‡ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ ’ƒ•– ‘‡ǡ –Š”‡‡ ƒ†
                         This is NOT about Alta Fox.                                    ˆ‹˜‡ ›‡ƒ”•ǡ —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‹‰ –Š‡ Ƭ ͷͲͲ „› ‡ƒ”Ž› ͳͲͲΨ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– ˆ‹˜‡ ›‡ƒ”•Ǥ
•     ƒ•„”‘ Šƒ• ƒ––‡’–‡† –‘ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹œ‡ Ž–ƒ ‘š ƒ• ƒ DzˆŽ› „› ‹‰Š–dz ƒ –‹˜‹•–    •        ƒ•„”‘ Šƒ• ‡†‡† •‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ– ƒ”‡– •Šƒ”‡ ‹ –Š‡ –‘› ‹†—•–”› ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– †‡ ƒ†‡ǡ
     —•‹‰ –Š‹• ˆ‘” „”ƒ†Ǧƒ‡ ’—”’‘•‡•Ǥ                                                ‹ Ž—†‹‰ Ž‘•‹‰ ‡› ‘–”ƒ –• ƒ† „—•‹‡•• –‘ ”‹˜ƒŽ ƒ––‡ŽǤ
•     –Š‡ ‘–”ƒ”›ǡ Ž–ƒ ‘š Šƒ• ƒ •–”‘‰ –”ƒ  ”‡ ‘”† ‘ˆ ‘ŽŽƒ„‘”ƒ–‹‰ ™‹–Š
                                                                                 •      Š‡ ‘ƒ”† Šƒ• ‘˜‡”•‡‡ ’‘‘” ƒ’‹–ƒŽ ƒŽŽ‘ ƒ–‹‘ ƒ† Ƭ †‡ ‹•‹‘• †—‡ –‘ǡ ™Šƒ–
     ’‘”–ˆ‘Ž‹‘ ‘’ƒ‹‡• ƒ† –Š‘—‰Š–ˆ—ŽŽ› –ƒ‹‰ ƒ ‘”‡ ƒ –‹˜‡ ƒ’’”‘ƒ Š ™Š‡
                                                                                        ƒ’’‡ƒ”• –‘ „‡ǡ ƒ Žƒ  ‘ˆ ˆ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽ †‹• ‹’Ž‹‡Ǥ
     ™ƒ””ƒ–‡† ‘ „‡ŠƒŽˆ ‘ˆ ƒŽŽ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•Ǥ
•    ˜‡” –Š‡ ‘—”•‡ ‘ˆ –Š‹• ƒ’ƒ‹‰ǡ ™‡ Šƒ˜‡ „‡‡ ‡ ‘—”ƒ‰‡† „› –Š‡ •—’’‘”–          This IS about adding deeply-informed and objective perspectives to the Board to
     ™‡ Šƒ˜‡ ”‡ ‡‹˜‡† ˆ”‘ ‘—” ˆ‡ŽŽ‘™ ƒ•„”‘ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•ǡ ™Š‹ Š ‹ Ž—†‡† Ͷ͵Ͳ                  improve its focus on driving sustainable value for shareholders.
     „ƒ•‹• ’‘‹–• ‘ˆ ‘—–’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡ ‘ –Š‡ †ƒ› ™‡ ’—„Ž‹ Ž› Žƒ— Š‡† ‘—”          •      —” †‹”‡ –‘”• ™‹ŽŽ •—’’‘”– –Š‡ ‡™  ƒ• Š‡ Šƒ”–• ƒ ‡™ ’ƒ–Šǡ „”‹‰‹‰
     ’Žƒ–ˆ‘” ˆ‘” Šƒ‰‡Ǥ                                                                ‹†‡’‡†‡–ǡ Š‹‰ŠŽ›Ǧ”‡Ž‡˜ƒ– ’‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡• –Šƒ– ƒ”‡ —–‡–Š‡”‡† –‘ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”†ǯ•
•    Š‡ ‘’ƒ›ǯ• •‡ƒ” ƒ’ƒ‹‰ ƒ‰ƒ‹•– Ž–ƒ ‘š ƒ† ‘‘” ƒŽ‡› •Š‘™                   Š‹•–‘”‹ •–”ƒ–‡‰‹ ˆƒ‹Ž—”‡•Ǥ
      ƒ•„”‘ǯ• —™‹ŽŽ‹‰‡•• –‘ †‡„ƒ–‡ –Š‡ ‘”‡ ‡”‹–• ‘ˆ –Š‹• ƒ’ƒ‹‰Ǥ
                                                                                 This IS about holding the Board, especially long-tenured incumbents, accountable
    This is NOT even about whether shareholder value is maximized with                                 for egregious compensation practices.
          Wizards of the Coast (“WOTC”) inside or outside of Hasbro.
                                                                                 •        –Š‡ Žƒ•– ˆ‹˜‡ ›‡ƒ”•ǡ ƒ•„”‘ ’ƒ‹† ‘—– ‘”‡ –Šƒ ̈́ʹͳͷ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ –‘
•    ‡ ‹†‡–‹ˆ‹‡† –Š‡ ˜ƒŽ—‡ ‘ˆ –Š‡  „—•‹‡••ǡ ™Š‹ Š Šƒ† „‡‡ ‘„• —”‡† –‘           ‡š‡ —–‹˜‡• †‡•’‹–‡ ’‘‘” ’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡Ǥ ‘’ƒ”‡† –‘ •‹‹Žƒ”Ž›Ǧ•‹œ‡† ‘•—‡”
     –Š‡ ’—„Ž‹ ƒ”‡–•Ǥ – –Š‡ –‹‡ǡ ™‡ ‡ ‘—”ƒ‰‡† –Š‡ ‘ƒ”† –‘ ‘„Œ‡ –‹˜‡Ž›              ‘’ƒ‹‡• ‹ ”‡ ‡– ›‡ƒ”•ǡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ‹• ƒ‘‰ –Š‡ ‘•– ‰‡‡”‘—•
     ‡šƒ‹‡ –Š‡ ‡”‹–• ‘ˆ ƒ •’‹Ǧ‘ˆˆǤ                                                  †‡•’‹–‡ Šƒ˜‹‰ •‘‡ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ™‘”•– •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡” ”‡–—”•Ǥ
•    —” ‹†‡’‡†‡– ‘‹‡‡• ƒ‘– ˆ—ŽŽ› ƒ••‡•• –Š‡ „‡•– ’ƒ–Š –‘ ”‡ƒ–‹‰        •      ‡ ƒ”‡ •‡‡‹‰ –‘ ”‡’Žƒ ‡ „‘–Š –Š‡ Šƒ‹” ȋ‹•ƒ ‡”•ŠȌ ƒ† –Š‡ ‡šǦŠƒ‹” ȋ‡† Š‹Ž‹’Ȍ
     Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡” •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡” ˜ƒŽ—‡ ™‹–Š‘—– „‡‹‰ ‹ –Š‡ „‘ƒ”†”‘‘ǡ „—– –Š‡                ‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ‘‹––‡‡Ǥ
     ‘’ƒ›ǯ• •™‹ˆ– †‹•‹••ƒŽ ‘ˆ ‘—” •—‰‰‡•–‹‘ ˆ‘” —Ž‘ ‹‰ ˜ƒŽ—‡ ‘ „‡ŠƒŽˆ
     ‘ˆ ƒŽŽ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”• •—‰‰‡•–• ‹– ™ƒ• ‘– •‡”‹‘—•Ž› ‘•‹†‡”‡†Ǥ

                                                                                                                                                                  5

About Alta Fox

Alta Fox is a Texas-based alternative asset management                                                                        šƒ’Ž‡•‘ˆ‘‰Ǧ‡” ˜‡•–‡–•ǣ
firm that intends to be a long-term shareholder of Hasbro.
‡‡’Ž‘›ƒŽ‘‰Ǧ–‡”Ǧˆ‘ —•‡†‹˜‡•–‡–•–”ƒ–‡‰›–‘’—”•—‡
‡š ‡’–‹‘ƒŽ”‹•Ǧƒ†Œ—•–‡†”‡–—”•ˆ‘”ƒ†‹˜‡”•‡‰”‘—’‘ˆ
                                                                                                                                  ˜‡•–‡†ǣʹͲͳͺ                    ˜‡•–‡†ǣʹͲͳͻ
‹•–‹–—–‹‘•ƒ†“—ƒŽ‹ˆ‹‡†‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽ Ž‹‡–•Ǥ ‘—†‡†‹ʹͲͳͺǡ                                                            Šƒ”‡’”‹ ‡+1304% •‹ ‡        Šƒ”‡’”‹ ‡+408% •‹ ‡
                                                                                                                                ‹‹–‹ƒŽ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘            ‹‹–‹ƒŽ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘
Ž–ƒ ‘šˆ‘ —•‡•‘‹†‡–‹ˆ›‹‰‘ˆ–‡‘˜‡”Ž‘‘‡†ƒ†—†‡”Ǧ–Š‡Ǧ
”ƒ†ƒ”‘’’‘”–—‹–‹‡•ƒ ”‘••ƒ••‡– Žƒ••‡•ǡƒ”‡– ƒ’‹–ƒŽ‹œƒ–‹‘
”ƒ‰‡•ƒ†•‡ –‘”•Ǥ
                         Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ•”ƒ ‡ ‘”†  ‡’–‹‘–‘ƒ–‡                                                                                   ˜‡•–‡†ǣʹͲʹͲ
                                                                              Total Shareholder Return                                          Šƒ”‡’”‹ ‡+93% •‹ ‡
  ƬͷͲͲ †‡š‘–ƒŽ‡–—”                                                                 ͺ͵ǤͲΨ                                                 ‹‹–‹ƒŽ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘
  Alta Fox Net Return After Fees                                                            407.1%

  ƬͷͲͲ—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”                                                                  ͳ͹ǤͲΨ                      Alta Fox has an excellent track record of creating value in
  Alta Fox Annualized Net Return After Fees                                                  51.4%
‘—” ‡ǣ‡–—”†ƒ–ƒˆ”‘ͶȀͳȀʹͲͳͺǦͳȀ͵ͳȀʹͲʹʹȋŽƒ•–ˆ—ŽŽ‘–Š‘ˆˆ—†”‡–—”•’”‹‘”–‘ƒ –‹˜‹•–‹˜‘Ž˜‡‡–‹ ƒ•„”‘Ȍ                           the public markets.

                     All investments shown above (ǡ ǡ  Ȍ are current portfolio holdings
                     Share price change calculated from date of research publication through 2/16/22, the launch date of Alta Fox’s campaign.                                     6

Alta Fox’s History of Reluctant Activism
   Alta Fox is not an “activist fund.” We prefer to work collaboratively with management teams and take a long-term view of
       our public market investments. However, in two instances prior to Hasbro, Alta Fox was compelled to stand up for
                      shareholders to improve value creation and succeeded in unlocking significant value.

                       Collectors Universe (CLCT)                                                                                            Enlabs (NLAB)

• Collectors Universe (CLCT) Šƒ† ‹–• ‘•– ‡š ‡’–‹‘ƒŽ ’‡”‹‘† ‘ˆ                                              •     Enlabs (NLAB) •ƒ™ ‹–• •–‘  ’”‹ ‡ ‘”‡ –Šƒ †‘—„Ž‡ Ž‡•• –Šƒ ƒ
  •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡” ”‡–—”• ƒˆ–‡” Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ• ‹˜‘Ž˜‡‡–Ǥ                                                                 ›‡ƒ” ƒˆ–‡” Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ• ‹‹–‹ƒŽ ‹˜‡•–‡–Ǥ
                                                                                                             •       ƒ—ƒ”› ʹͲʹͲǡ –ƒ‹ ’Ž ƒ†‡ ƒ ‘ˆˆ‡” –‘ „—› –Š‡ „—•‹‡•• ˆ‘” ƒ
• ˆ–‡” ‡‰ƒ‰‹‰ ™‹–Š –Š‡ ‘’ƒ›ǡ Ž–ƒ ‘š ‘‹ƒ–‡† ƒ ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡
  •Žƒ–‡ ‘ˆ †‹”‡ –‘”• ƒ† —Ž–‹ƒ–‡Ž› •‡––Ž‡† ˆ‘” ‘‡ •‡ƒ–Ǥ Ž–ƒ ‘š Žƒ–‡”                                            ‡‰Ž‹‰‹„Ž‡ ’”‡‹—Ǥ Ž–ƒ ‘š ’—„Ž‹ Ž› ‘’’‘•‡† –Š‡ †‡ƒŽ ƒ† ™ƒ•
  ’—„Ž‹ Ž› ‘’’‘•‡† ƒ „—›‘—– †‡ƒŽ ˆ‘” Ǥ Š‡ ‘ˆˆ‡” –Š‡ ‹ ”‡ƒ•‡† „›                                             ƒ„Ž‡ –‘ ‰ƒ”‡” •—ˆˆ‹ ‹‡– •—’’‘”– –‘ „‘–Š „Ž‘  –Š‡ †‡ƒŽ ƒ†
  ʹ͵Ψǡ ™Š‹ Š –Š‡ ƒŒ‘”‹–› ‘ˆ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”• ƒ ‡’–‡†Ǥ                                                                 —Ž–‹ƒ–‡Ž› •‡ —”‡ ƒ ͵ʹΨ ’”‡‹— ˆ‘” ƒŽŽ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•Ǥ
• The stock returned 240% from Alta Fox’s first involvement to the                                           •     The stock returned 132% from Alta Fox’s first involvement to
  final sale of the company.                                                                                       the final sale of the company.
• Ž–ƒ ‘š •‘Ž† œ‡”‘ •Šƒ”‡• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ ‹–• ƒ –‹˜‹•– ‹˜‘Ž˜‡‡– —–‹Ž –Š‡                                      •     Ž–ƒ ‘š •‘Ž† œ‡”‘ •Šƒ”‡• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ ‹–• ƒ –‹˜‹•– ‹˜‘Ž˜‡‡– —–‹Ž –Š‡
  ˆ‘” ‡† •ƒŽ‡Ǥ                                                                                                     •ƒŽ‡Ǥ
                                                                             Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ• ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ‡Ž— –ƒ– –‹˜‹•
                                                                                                          Initial Acquisition         Revised Acquisition    Did Alta Fox Tender Shares at
      Ticker:       Date of Activist Involvement             Stock Price at Publication
                                                                                                                  Offer                      Offer                  Revised Offer?
                             —‡ʹͲʹͲ                                 ̈́ʹ͹Ǥͳͺ                                 ̈́͹ͷǤʹͷ                     ̈́ͻʹǤͲͲ                         ‘
                             —Ž›ʹͲʹͲͳ                              ʹʹǤͲͲ                                ͶͲǤͲͲ                 ͷ͵ǤͲͲ                      ‡•

                ͳǤ‡ˆ‡”‡ ‡•ǯ••–‘ ’”‹ ‡ƒ––Š‡†ƒ–‡‘ˆŽ–ƒ ‘šǯ•‹‹–‹ƒŽ”‡•‡ƒ” Š’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘
                                                                                                                                                                                7

Today’s Agenda

                                          Introduction

                                     Executive Summary

                              The Case for Boardroom Change

                 Persistent Strategic Missteps Driving Significant Underperformance

                    Lack of Relevant Board Skills Hampering Effective Oversight

                 Our Solution: Highly Qualified, Independent Nominees

                                            Appendix

                                                                                      8

About Hasbro
          ƒ•„”‘‹•‡••‡–‹ƒŽŽ›ƒŠ‘Ž†‹‰ ‘’ƒ›–Šƒ–Š‘—•‡•–Š”‡‡†‹•–‹ –ǡ—†‡”Ž›‹‰„—•‹‡••Ž‹‡•™‹–Šˆ‡™•›‡”‰‹‡•Ǥ

                 Consumer Products: 43% of FY21 EBITDA                                                                         Wizards of the Coast: 46% of FY21 EBITDA
•         ƒ•„”‘ ’”‘†— ‡† ‹–• ˆ‹”•– –‘› ‹ ͳͻͶʹǤ                                                                 •       ‘—†‡† ‹ ͳͻͻͲǤ
•        ‡› owned ˆ”ƒ Š‹•‡ ‹–‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ ’”‘’‡”–› ȋDz dzȌ ‹ Ž—†‡ǣ › ‹––Ž‡ ‘›ǡ                              •       “—‹”‡† „› ƒ•„”‘ ‹ ͳͻͻͻ ˆ‘” ̱̈́ͶͲͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ
         ”ƒ•ˆ‘”‡”•ǡ ‡”ˆǡ ‘™‡” ƒ‰‡”•ǡ ‡’’ƒ ‹‰ ƒ†  ƒ••Ǥ                                              •      ‡› ˆ”ƒ Š‹•‡• ‹ Ž—†‡ǣ
•          ‘‹ owned ‰ƒ‡•ǣ ‘‘’‘Ž›ǡ Ž—‡ǡ ƒ„‘‘ǡ ƒ––Ž‡•Š‹’ǡ ‹ˆ‡ǡ ƒ†›                                               • ƒ‰‹ ǣ Š‡ ƒ–Š‡”‹‰ ȋDz dzȌ Ȃ ‹†—•–”› Ž‡ƒ†‹‰ –”ƒ†‹‰ ƒ”†
         ƒ†ǡ ‘‡ – ‘—”ǡ ™‹•–‡”ǡ ‘””›Ǩǡ —‰”› —‰”› ‹’’‘• ƒ†                                                           ‰ƒ‡ founded in 1993Ǥ
         ’‡”ƒ–‹‘Ǥ                                                                                                      • —‰‡‘• Ƭ ”ƒ‰‘• ȋDzƬdzȌ Ȃ ‹†—•–”› Ž‡ƒ†‹‰ ˆƒ–ƒ•› ”‘Ž‡
                                                                                                                             ’Žƒ›‹‰ ‰ƒ‡ founded in 1974Ǥ

                      Entertainment: 12% of FY21 EBITDA                                                                                 Hasbro’s Hassenfeld Family History
     •     ‘—†‡† ‹ ͳͻ͹Ͳ ƒ• ƒ —•‹ †‹•–”‹„—–‘”Ǥ                                                                •        ƒ•„”‘ ™ƒ• ˆ‘—†‡† ƒ† ‘™‡† „› –Š‡ ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž† ˆƒ‹Ž›Ǥ
     •    š’ƒ†‡† ‹–‘ ˆ‹ŽȀ †‹•–”‹„—–‹‘ ‹ ʹͲͲͷ –Š”‘—‰Š –Š‡ ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘                                    •      ‹ ‡ ͳͻ͹Ͳǡ ƒ•„”‘̵• Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Š‹’ Šƒ• ‘•‹•–‡–Ž› ‹ Ž—†‡† •‡˜‡”ƒŽ
          ‘ˆ ‘ Š –‡”–ƒ‹‡–Ǥ                                                                                       ‡„‡”• ‘ˆ –Š‡ ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž† ˆƒ‹Ž›ǡ ‹ Ž—†‹‰ —””‡– Šƒ‹”ƒ ‡”‹–—•
     •    ‡˜‡Ž‘’‡† ‹ǦŠ‘—•‡ ‘–‡– †‡˜‡Ž‘’‡– ‡š’‡”–‹•‡ –Š”‘—‰Š –Š‡                                                  ƒ† ˆ‘”‡” ǡ Žƒ ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž†Ǥ
          ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘ ‘ˆ •‡˜‡”ƒŽ ’”‘†— –‹‘ •–—†‹‘•Ǥ                                                            •      ‘†ƒ›ǡ 10 out of 13 current Board members were appointed while Mr.
     •      ƒ•„”‘ „‘—‰Š– –‡”–ƒ‹‡– ‡ ȋDz‡‡dzȌ ‹ ʹͲͳͻ ˆ‘” $4.6 billionǤ                                          Hassenfeld ™ƒ• Šƒ‹” ‘ˆ –Š‡ š‡ —–‹˜‡ ‘‹––‡‡ ƒ† ƒ –‹˜‡Ž› ‹˜‘Ž˜‡†
     •    ‘†ƒ›ǡ ‹– ’”‹ƒ”‹Ž› ˆ‘ —•‡• ‘ ˆ‹”•–Ǧ’ƒ”–› ƒ† –Š‹”†Ǧ’ƒ”–›  ƒ† ˆ‹Ž                                       ‹ •‡˜‡”ƒŽ ‘–Š‡” ‘‹––‡‡•ǡ Ž‡ƒ†‹‰ —• –‘ “—‡•–‹‘ –Š‡‹” ‘„Œ‡ –‹˜‹–›Ǥ
          ’”‘†— –‹‘ ƒ† †‹•–”‹„—–‹‘Ǥ

    Source: public filings. FY2021 EBITDA representation exceeds 100% due to exclusion of corporate overhead.       ͳǤŠ––’•ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥˆƒ‹Ž›„—•‹‡••ƒ‰ƒœ‹‡Ǥ ‘Ȁ†‡ƒ–ŠǦ„—•‹‡••

                                                                                                                                                                                  9

The Current Board Has Overseen Long-Term Underperformance
 ƒ•„”‘Šƒ• ‘•‹•–‡–Ž›—†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‡†„‘–Š–Š‡ƬͷͲͲƒ†‹–• Š‘•‡ ‘•—‡”„‡ Šƒ”‘˜‡”–Š‡Žƒ•–ˆ‹˜‡›‡ƒ”•Ǥ
                                                          Hasbro’s Annualized Returns Have Underperformed
                ʹͷΨ
                                                                                                                   ʹͳǤͳΨ
                                                                                                       ͳͻǤʹΨ
                ʹͲΨ                                       ͳͺǤʹΨ

                                               ͳͷǤͲΨ                                                                                                        ͳͷǤͶΨ
                ͳͷΨ
                                                                                                                                                ͳͳǤ͸Ψ

                ͳͲΨ
                                                                                             ͹ǤͲΨ

                 ͷΨ
                                    ʹǤ͹Ψ
                                                                                                                                                                       ͳǤͻΨ

                 ͲΨ
                                             ͷǦ‡ƒ”                                              ͵Ǧ‡ƒ”                                           ͳǦ‡ƒ”

                                   ƒ•„”‘—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”             ƬͷͲͲ—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”               —••‡ŽŽͳͲͲͲ‘•—‡”‹• ”‡–‹‘ƒ”› †‡š—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”

                                                                  ƒ•„”‘‘–ƒŽŠƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”‡–—”ƒŽ›•‹•ȋDzdzȌ
                                                                                                                                   5-Year TSR      3-Year TSR          1-Year TSR

                      Underperformance vs. S&P 500 Annualized Return                                                                  -94.6%            -47.1%            -3.8%

                      Underperformance vs. Russell 1000 Consumer Discretionary Index Annualized Return                                -116.8%           -69.4%            9.8%

Source: Bloomberg. HAS and S&P 500 returns assume dividends are reinvested. Data through 2/16/22, the launch date of Alta Fox’s campaign.

                                                                                                                                                                                    10

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰Ǥ͹͵Ǥ

   The Current Board’s “Brand Blueprint” Strategy Has Failed to Deliver for Both
   Shareholders and the Company’s Most Valuable Franchise
    •    ‘” ‘˜‡” ƒ †‡ ƒ†‡ǡ ƒ•„”‘ Šƒ• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡† ‹–• DzBrand Blueprintdz
                                                                                                Total Shareholder Return Since Brand Blueprint
        •–”ƒ–‡‰› Ȃ ‡š’ƒ†‹‰ „”ƒ†• ƒ ”‘•• ’Žƒ–ˆ‘”• –‘ †”‹˜‡
                                                                                                               Announcement
        ‘‹ Šƒ‡Ž ‡‰ƒ‰‡‡– ƒ† ‹ ”‡ƒ•‡† ”‡˜‡—‡•Ǥ
                                                                               400%
    •     ”‡ƒŽ‹–›ǡ ‹– •‡‡• –Š‡ •–”ƒ–‡‰› Šƒ• •‡”˜‡† ƒ• –Š‡ „ƒ•‹• –‘ justify   350%
        expensive, value-destructive acquisitions ™Š‹ Š Šƒ˜‡ ƒ•‡†            300%
                                                                                       ”ƒ†Ž—‡’”‹–
        —†‡”Ž›‹‰ ’‘‘” ’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡Ǥ                                                   ˆ‹”•–ƒ‘— ‡†
                                                                               250%       ȋͳͳȀͻȀͳͲȌͳ
    • Š‡ Dz”ƒ† Ž—‡’”‹–dz Šƒ• ˆƒ‹Ž‡† –‘ †‡Ž‹˜‡” Ȃ ’— –—ƒ–‡† „› ill-         200%
      advised acquisitionsǡ haphazard execution ƒ† poor                       150%
      disclosure practices with no oversight or accountability.
                                                                               100%
    • Despite disappointing returns, the Board and management                   50%
      continue to double down on the strategyǡ ™Š‹ Š Šƒ•                         0%
      —†‡”‹˜‡•–‡† ‹ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘•– ˜ƒŽ—ƒ„Ž‡ •‡‰‡–ǡ  Ȃ
      ˆ—”–Š‡” ‘ˆ‹”‹‰ –Š‡ •–”ƒ–‡‰›ǯ• ˜ƒŽ—‡ †‡•–”— –‹‘ ‹ ‘—” ˜‹‡™Ǥ          -50%

                                                                               -100%
    •    ‹˜‡ ‹–• ‘‹–‡– –‘ –Š‡ Dz”ƒ† Ž—‡’”‹–dz •–”ƒ–‡‰›ǡ ™‡
        „‡Ž‹‡˜‡ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”† Šƒ• ˆƒ‹Ž‡† –‘ ”‹–‹ ƒŽŽ› ”‡˜‹‡™ „—•‹‡••
         ‘’‘‡–• –‘ †‡–‡”‹‡ ™Š‡–Š‡” –Š‡› •–‹ŽŽ ƒ†† ˜ƒŽ—‡ ‹
         ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘‰Ž‘‡”ƒ–‡ •–”— –—”‡Ǥ                                                                         HAS    S&P 500

    We believe the “Brand Blueprint” strategy is little more than a cover for “empire-building” without financial
                        discipline, and significant change in strategic direction is needed.

                                                                                                                                           11

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰Ǥ͹͸Ǥ

    The Current Board Has Failed to Stem Long-Term Market Share Losses
•   ‡•’‹–‡ ‹˜‡•–‹‰ ‘”‡ –Šƒ ̈́ͷ „‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– ˆ‘—” ›‡ƒ”• ‹                                                                                             —ƒ”›‘ˆʹͲͳͺǦʹͲʹͳ‡•—Ž–•
    –Š‡ ‘•—‡” „—•‹‡•• ƒ† •’‡†‹‰ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡” ƒ’‹–ƒŽ ‘
                                                                                                                                                               Annualized                    2018 EBITDA                   2021 EBITDA
    —‡”‘—•       ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘•ǡ  Hasbro        has      significantly                                                                    Company:
                                                                                                                                                             Revenue Growth                    Margins                       Margins
    underperformed against Mattel since 2019 on both top-line                                                                                ƒ•„”‘ͳ                   -0.9%                         12.0%                         11.3%
    and bottom-line results.
                                                                                                                                           ƒ––‡Ž                      6.5%                          1.9%                         18.5%

                                                                                                                                        Note that these numbers reflect organic revenues of both businesses since 2018.
•     ‘—” ˜‹‡™ǡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘•—‡” „—•‹‡•• Šƒ• —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‡† ‘ ƒ
    ƒ ”‘ǦŽ‡˜‡Žǡ †‡ Ž‹‹‰ „‘–Š ‹ ”‡˜‡—‡• ƒ† ‡ƒ”‹‰•ǡ ™Š‹Ž‡                                                                                       Hasbro Toy & Games Sales vs Industry Growth2
                                                                                                                                                                                      (Indexed to 100)
    ‹†—•–”› ”‡–ƒ‹Ž –‘› •ƒŽ‡• Šƒ˜‡ ‰”‘™ ƒ– ̱ͶΨ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– †‡ ƒ†‡Ǥ                                                               ͳ͸Ͳ

                                                                                                                                    ͳͶͲ
     Urgent change is neededǣ ‹ –Š‡ Žƒ•– –Š”‡‡ ‘–Š•ǡ                                                                             ͳʹͲ
       ƒ•„”‘ •ƒ™ ‹•‡› ‘˜‡ –™‘ ‘ˆ ‹–• ‡› Ž‹ ‡•‹‰                                                                               ͳͲͲ
      ‘–”ƒ –• –‘ ƒ––‡Žǡ ”‡•—Ž–‹‰ ‹ –Š‡ Ž‘•• ‘ˆ ‘”‡ –Šƒ                                                                         ͺͲ
     ̈́͵ͲͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‘ˆ ”‡˜‡—‡ ȋ‡ƒ”Ž› ͳͲΨ ‘ˆ ‘•—‡”
     ”‡˜‡—‡ȌǤ Š‡ Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡” –”‡† ‹• ’‘‘” ƒ† ƒ”‡– •Šƒ”‡
     Ž‘••‡• ƒ”‡ ƒ ‡Ž‡”ƒ–‹‰Ǥ                                                                                                                                     ƒ•„”‘‘•—‡”‡˜‡—‡ȋ‡š Ž—†‹‰ƒ†‡‡Ȍ
                                                                                                                                                               ‘› †—•–”›ƒŽ‡•ƒ–‡–ƒ‹Ž

                   ͳǤŽ–ƒ ‘š‡•–‹ƒ–‡•ˆ‘” ‘•—‡”•‡‰‡–ǡ‡š Ž—†‹‰‡‡ ‘–”‹„—–‹‘ǤŠ‹•   ʹǤŠ‹•ƒƒŽ›•‹•†‘‡•ƒ†Œ—•–ˆ‘”–Š‡̈́͵ͲͲΪ‹’ƒ”–‡”„”ƒ†”‡˜‡—‡ ƒ•„”‘™‹ŽŽ„‡Ž‘•‹‰‹ʹͲʹ͵ˆ‘”‹•‡›”‹ ‡•• ”‘œ‡ǡ
                   †‘‡•‘–ƒ†Œ—•–‘—– ƒ•„”‘ǯ•̈́ͷʹ͵ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘‘ˆ‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”•Ǥ‡‡ƒ’’‡†‹š   ”‘ŽŽ•ǡƒ†‡•ƒ‡‘”•Š‘’ȋ‡ƒ”Ž›ͳͲΨ‘ˆ‘•—‡””‡˜‡—‡•ȌǤ –ƒŽ•‘†‘‡•ƒ†Œ—•–‘—–ˆ‘” ƒ•„”‘ǯ•̈́ͷʹ͵ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘‘ˆ
                   •Ž‹†‡͹ʹˆ‘”‘”‡†‡–ƒ‹Ž•Ǥ                                                       ‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”•Ǥ‡‡ƒ’’‡†‹š•Ž‹†‡͹ʹˆ‘”‘”‡†‡–ƒ‹Ž•Ǥ                                                                               12
                   ‘—” ‡ǣŽ–ƒ ‘šǡ’—„Ž‹ ˆ‹Ž‹‰•Ǥ                                                ‘—” ‡ǣǡ—”‘‘‹–‘”

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰•Ǥ͸͹Ǧ͸ͻǤ

     The Current Board Has a Record of Poor Capital Allocation and M&A
                                         Price Paid /                                                                       Approved by
                          Date
       Investment                          Amount              Multiple Paid                   Deal Rationale                Targeted                               Result?
                        Announced
                                            Spent                                                                            Directors?
                                         ̈́ʹͲͲ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ϊ
                                                                                                                                                            Likely Value-Destructive.
                                              ‘ ‡                                    ƒ‡ƒ˜ƒŽ—ƒ„Ž‡ ‘•—‡”„”ƒ†
    G.I. Joe Video       ‡’–‡„‡”                                                                                                          Š‡ Ǥ Ǥ ‘‡ Šƒ•‘–•— ‡‡†‡†ƒ––Š‡„‘š‘ˆˆ‹ ‡ƒ†
                                         ˆ‹‹•Š‡† ‰‹˜‡    ‡”•‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†Ǥ        ƒ†–—”‹–‹–‘ƒ˜‹†‡‘‰ƒ‡         3/3
    Game                   ʹͲʹͳ                                                                                                           ˜‹†‡‘‰ƒ‡•ƒ”‡ƒ‡š–”‡‡Ž› ‘’‡–‹–‹˜‡ ƒ–‡‰‘”›
                                                                                              ’”‘’‡”–›Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                           Šƒ•‘–Šƒ†— Š•— ‡••‹Ǥ
                                           „”ƒ†‹‰ǫͳ
    Transformers,
                                                                                                                                                           Likely Value-Destructive.
    Micronauts, Ouija      ‡„”—ƒ”›                             ȀǤ –‡”ƒŽ         •‡”‡•‘—” ‡• –‘ †‡˜‡Ž‘’
                                         ‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†Ǥ                                                                        3/3         ‹‡™‹–Š Ǥ Ǥ ‘‡ǡ ƒ•„”‘Šƒ•–”‹‡†–‘•“—‡‡œ‡–‘‘— Š
    Board Video            ʹͲʹͳ                                 ‹˜‡•–‡–Ǥ              ‰ƒ‡•ˆ‘”  ‹ǦŠ‘—•‡Ǥ
                                                                                                                                          ‘—–‘ˆ–‹”‡† ƒ†™‹ŽŽŽ‹‡Ž›Šƒ˜‡’‘‘””‡–—”•‘ˆ ƒ’‹–ƒŽǤ
    Games
                                                                                                                                                             Value-Destructive.
                                                           ̱ͳͺš”ƒ‹Ž‹‰™‡Ž˜‡
                                                                                      ‡˜‡Ž‘’•Š‘™•ƒ†‘˜‹‡•‹Ǧ          3/3          ƒ•„”‘ǯ••–‘ †‡ Ž‹‡†ͻΨ–Š‡†ƒ›‘ˆ–Š‡†‡ƒŽƒ†‹••–‹ŽŽ
    eOne                —‰—•–ʹͲͳͻ       ̈́ͶǤ͸„‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ      ‘–ŠȋDzdzȌ
                                                                                         Š‘—•‡ˆ‘”‡š‹•–‹‰„”ƒ†•Ǥ                         „‡Ž‘™–Š‡’”‡Ǧ†‡ƒŽ’”‹ ‡„‡ ƒ—•‡ ƒ•„”‘•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–Ž›
                                                                 Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                                  ‘˜‡”’ƒ‹†Ǥ
                                                            ‡”•‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†ǡ
                                                                                                                                                           Value-Destructive.
                                                            „—– ‡–‹‘‡†        ‡ŽŽ–‘›•”‡Žƒ–‡†–‘‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”•
                                                                                                                               3/3           ƒ•„”‘’ƒ‹†‘”‡–ŠƒŠƒŽˆƒ„‹ŽŽ‹‘ˆ‘”ƒ†‡ƒŽ™‹–Š
    Power Rangers         ƒ›ʹͲͳͺ       ̈́ͷ͵Ͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ       –Šƒ––Š‡‡ƒ”‹‰•              ƒ†‡š’ƒ†–Š‡‡†‹ƒ
                                                                                                                                           ‹ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ‡ƒ”‹‰•‹’ƒ –Ǥ‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”• ‘•—‡”
                                                           ‹’ƒ –‹ ʹͲͳͺ™‘—Ž†                 ‘’’‘”–—‹–‹‡•Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                   ‹–‡”‡•–Šƒ•†‡ Ž‹‡†•‹ ‡–Š‡†‡ƒŽǤ
                                                               „‡‹ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽǤ
                                                                                                                                                             Value-Destructive.
    Transformers                                                ȀǤ –‡”ƒŽ        •‡”‡•‘—” ‡•–‘†‡˜‡Ž‘’ƒ
                            ʹͲͳ͹         ‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†Ǥ                                                                        3/3         ˆ–‡”•’‡†‹‰•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹–‡”ƒŽ”‡•‘—” ‡•–‘†‡˜‡Ž‘’
    Card Game                                                   ‹˜‡•–‡–Ǥ           ”ƒ•ˆ‘”‡”•–”ƒ†‹‰ ƒ”†‰ƒ‡Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                        –Š‡‰ƒ‡ǡ‹–‹•‘Ž‘‰‡”•‘Ž†Ǥ
                                                            ‡”•‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†ǡ
                                                                                                                                                            Value-Destructive.
                                                               „—–ƒ ˆŽ‹’ǯ•
    Backflip              —Ž›ʹͲͳ͵       ̈́ͳͳʹ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ                                 ‡˜‡Ž‘’‘„‹Ž‡‰ƒ‡•‹ǦŠ‘—•‡Ǥ          2/3*        ƒ•„”‘™”‘–‡–Š‡ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘†‘™–‘œ‡”‘Ž‡••–Šƒ–Š”‡‡
                                                            ‘’‡”ƒ–‹‰’”‘ˆ‹–™ƒ•
                                                                                                                                                                ›‡ƒ”•Žƒ–‡”Ǥ
                                                             ‡‰ƒ–‹˜‡‹ʹͲͳͶǤ

                        Source: public filings.                                                                                              *Stoddart was not on the Board when         13
                        1. Alta Fox estimate based on industry checks for AAA video game budgets                                             investment was made

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰Ǥ͹ͲǤ

   Case Study: Entertainment One Ltd. (“eOne”) Acquisition
       ™Šƒ–™‡„‡Ž‹‡˜‡™ƒ•„‘–Š–Š‡†‡ˆ‹‹‰‘‡–ƒ†–Š‡‰”‡ƒ–‡•–ˆƒ‹Ž—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡Dz”ƒ†Ž—‡’”‹–dz•–”ƒ–‡‰›ǡ ƒ•„”‘ƒ “—‹”‡†‡‡
                  ‹‡ ‡„‡”ʹͲͳͻˆ‘” $4.6 billion, nearly 1/3 of the Company’s entire enterprise value at the time.

   •     ƒ•„”‘ ’ƒ‹† ƒ ͵ͳΨ ’”‡‹— –‘ ‡‡ǯ• ’”‡Ǧ†‡ƒŽ •Šƒ”‡ ’”‹ ‡ǡ nearly 18x TTM EBITDA, –‘
        ƒ “—‹”‡ ‡‡Ǥ
   • ‘ ˆ—† –Š‡ ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘ǡ ƒ•„”‘ ‹••—‡† ‘”‡ –Šƒ ͳͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ •Šƒ”‡• ‘ˆ ‘‘ •–‘ ǡ
     diluting shareholders by more than 8%ǡ ƒ† added more than $3 billion of debt –‘ –Š‡
     „ƒŽƒ ‡ •Š‡‡–Ǥ
          • ‡‡ǯ•  ™ƒ• ƒ™ƒ”†‡† ̈́ͳʹ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ ‡–‹”‡Ž› –‹‡Ǧ„ƒ•‡† ‡“—‹–› ‰”ƒ–• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ –Š‡                                                                       ‹ ‡‡‡ ‡ƒŽ
             ‘’Ž‡–‹‘ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                                          ‘— ‡‡–͵
   • Hasbro’s shares declined 9% the day the deal was announced ƒ† Šƒ˜‡ ‘–‹—‡† –‘
     —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘” •‹ ‡Ǥ                                                                                                                                                         -8.4%
   •      ƒ•„”‘ Žƒ‹‡† –Šƒ– „› ʹͲʹʹǡ ‡‡ ™‘—Ž† †”‹˜‡ ̈́ͳ͵Ͳ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ ‹ ”‡‡–ƒŽ ”—Ǧ”ƒ–‡                                                                    Ƭ
          •›‡”‰‹‡• „‡–™‡‡ ‘•—‡” ƒ† –‡”–ƒ‹‡– Æ ‹•–‡ƒ†ǡ ™‡ ‡•–‹ƒ–‡ that                                                                                         59.5%
        Consumer and Entertainment EBITDA will have declined by 10% or $79 million over                                                                       ͷͲͲ
        that period.1
                                                                                                                                                          EBITDA by Segment1         2019        2022E
   •     ‘”†‹‰ –‘ ƒƒ‰‡‡–ǡ –Š‡ ƒŒ‘”‹–› ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‡‡ •›‡”‰‹‡• Šƒ˜‡ ƒŽ”‡ƒ†› „‡‡                                         ”‡ƒŽ‹œ‡†Ǥʹ                   Consumer                   $587        $607
        ‡ „‡Ž‹‡˜‡ ‡‹–Š‡” ͳȌ ƒ•„”‘ ‹• Ž›‹‰ ƒ„‘—– –Š‡ •›‡”‰‹‡• ‡š–”ƒ –‡† ˆ”‘ –Š‡ †‡ƒŽ ‘” ʹȌ ‹–•                                                         Entertainment              $148        $141
         ‘”‡ „—•‹‡•• ‹• †‡–‡”‹‘”ƒ–‹‰ ‡˜‡ ˆƒ•–‡” –Šƒ ™‡ –Š‘—‰Š– —†‡” ‹–• Dz”ƒ† Ž—‡’”‹–dz                                                            Corporate and Other        $77          -$15
        •–”ƒ–‡‰›Ǥ                                                                                                                                         Total EBITDA ex-WOTC       $812        $733
                                                                                                                                                          Change in EBITDA ex-WOTC                -$79
                                                                                                                                                          Decline in EBITDA %                    -10%

                    We believe the costly and ill-advised eOne deal destroyed significant shareholder value.
                        1. Alta Fox estimates cited in initial Hasbro presentation, including   Source: Bloomberg normalized share price performance, public filings.
                        corporate and other expense.                                            3. Source: Bloomberg. Data through 2/16/22                                                  14
                        2. Hasbro Q1 2022 conference call

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰•Ǥ͸ͷǦ͸͸Ǥ

     We Believe Hasbro’s Track Record of Rejecting Value-Maximizing
     Opportunities Stems from a Pervasive Hassenfeld Family Influence
     In addition to spending significant shareholder capital on ill-advised acquisitions, Hasbro’s insular Board has also refused
                        to pursue value-maximizing transactions and allowed management to underperform.

                                 Buyout Offer #1: Mattel                                                               Buyout Offer #2: Providence Equity Partners

         ͳͻͻ͸ǡ Mattel offered to buy Hasbro for a 73% premiumǤ ”Ǥ                                              —‡ʹͲͳͲǡ”‘˜‹†‡ ‡“—‹–›ƒ”–‡”•ƒ’’”‘ƒ Š‡† ƒ•„”‘ǯ•
         ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž† ƒ† –Š‡ ‘ƒ”† ”‡Œ‡ –‡† –Š‡ ‘ˆˆ‡” ƒ† „Ž‘ ‡† ƒ––‡Ž                                      ‘ƒ”†™‹–Š‹–‡”‡•–‹ƒ “—‹”‹‰–Š‡„—•‹‡••ǤŠ‡‘ƒ”†”‡Œ‡ –‡†
       ˆ”‘ ƒŽŽ‹‰ ƒ •’‡ ‹ƒŽ ‡‡–‹‰ ‘ˆ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•Ǥ This decision cost                                    –Š‡•—‹–‘”ǡ”‡•—Ž–‹‰‹•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–˜ƒŽ—‡†‡•–”— –‹‘ˆ‘”Hasbro
       shareholders billions. › –Š‡ ‡† ‘ˆ ”Ǥ                   ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž†ǯ• –‡—”‡ ‹                     shareholders as Hasbro’s stock went on to underperform the
       ʹͲͲ͵ǡ Hasbro’s stock price was more than 30% below Mattel’s                                          S&P 500 by more than 200%.
       1996 offer.

          Alta Fox believes the current Board maintains the same insular culture and unwillingness to seriously
                                 evaluate value-enhancing opportunities for shareholders.
                     1. https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/03/business/mattel-ends-bid-to-merge-with-hasbro.html
                     2. http://theswca.com/index.php?action=disp_item&item_id=53124                                                                                        15
                     3. https://toynewsi.com/news.php?itemid=16035

Hasbro Has a History of Putting Inside Interests Before Shareholders In Our View

     The Hassenfeld family’s influence promoted an insular, controlled-company culture that we believe remains today.

 •    10 ‘—– ‘ˆ 13 —””‡– ‘ƒ”† ‡„‡”• ™‡”‡ ƒ’’‘‹–‡† ™Š‹Ž‡ Žƒ ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž† ™ƒ• Šƒ‹” ‘ˆ –Š‡ š‡ —–‹˜‡ ‘‹––‡‡Ǥ

 •     ‹˜‡ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”†ǯ• Š‹•–‘”› ‘ˆ ’”‹‘”‹–‹œ‹‰ –Š‡ ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž† ˆƒ‹Ž›ǯ• ‹–‡”‡•–• ƒŠ‡ƒ† ‘ˆ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•ǡ we question if these
      directors possess the objectivity necessary to properly evaluate the Company's performance and go-forward
      strategy.

 •    The consequences of the legacy of entrenchment are clear todayǣ ‹ ’”‹Ž ʹͲʹʹǡ ƒ––‡Ž ™ƒ• ”‡’‘”–‡† –‘ Šƒ˜‡ ”‡ ‡‹˜‡†
       ”‡†‹„Ž‡ „—›‡” ‹–‡”‡•–Ǥ

        •     ƒ•„”‘ǡ ™Š‹ Š ™‡ „‡Ž‹‡˜‡ ‹• ƒ ‘”‡ ƒ––”ƒ –‹˜‡ ‘’ƒ›ǡ Šƒ• ‘– ”‡ ‡‹˜‡† •‹‹Žƒ” ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘ ‹–‡”‡•– †—‡ –‘ –Š‡
            ƒ””ƒ–‹˜‡ ’‡”’‡–”ƒ–‡† „› –Š‡ ‘ƒ”†ǯ• Š‹•–‘”› ‘ˆ ”‡Œ‡ –‹‰ ‘—–•‹†‡ ‹–‡”‡•– ƒ† ‡–”‡ Š‡† ‹†•‡– Ȃ ™Š‹ Š •–‡ ˆ”‘
            –Š‡ ƒ••‡ˆ‡Ž† ˆƒ‹Ž›ǯ• ‹ˆŽ—‡ ‡Ǥ

       Alta Fox believes the current Board is not committed to objectively evaluating all value-enhancing
                               opportunities and fresh perspectives are required.

             1.   https://www.wsj.com/articles/mattel-has-held-talks-with-buyout-firms-11651014437                       16

Hasbro’s Undisciplined Approach to Capital Allocation
 Hasbro’s seemingly reckless approach to capital allocation has emphasized empire-building over shareholder returns,
     resulting in significant balance sheet exposure to hyper-competitive, low ROIC categories compared to Mattel.

• On eOne, Hasbro pursued a transformational                                                    ‡ƒ”            “—‹•‹–‹‘ƒ”‰‡–                        ‡–ƒ‹Ž•

  entertainment acquisition at all costs for over                                        ʹͲͳͶ                ”‡ƒ™‘”•                 ƒ•„”‘ǯ••–‘ ™ƒ•†‘™͸Ψ‹–Š‡–™‘
                                                                                                                                      †ƒ›•ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰–Š‡†‹• —••‹‘–Šƒ–‡”‰‡”
  half a decade despite serious investor                                                                                              –ƒŽ•™‡”‡‡•—‹‰Ǥ
  concerns.
                                                                                         ʹͲͳ͹                ‹‘•‰ƒ–‡ˆ‘”ε̈́ͶͲ       ‘†ƒ›ǡ‹‘•‰ƒ–‡–”ƒ†‡•ˆ‘”̱̈́ͳ͵ǤͷͲǤ
                                                                                         ʹͲͳͻ                ‡‡ ˆ‘”̈́ͶǤ͸„‹ŽŽ‹‘   ‘’Ž‡–‡†‹ƒŠ‹‰ŠŽ›†‹Ž—–‹˜‡†‡ƒŽǤ
• Hasbro’s capital-intensive strategy contrasts
  starkly vs. Mattel’s capital-light approach.                                           “We have a Capital Light strategy to content that allows us to work with
                                                                                         the right studio and the right distribution partner on the right project, on
    •   †‡”‡™‘”‡‹œǡƒ––‡ŽŠƒ•’—”•—‡†ƒ                                  the right terms. And this allows us to develop and produce multiple projects
        ’‘Žƒ”‘’’‘•‹–‡Dzcapital lightdz•–”ƒ–‡‰›ƒ†Šƒ•                                 concurrently at scale. We believe we have in place the right economic
        outperformed Hasbro by nearly 100% during                                        model, which is not dependent on capital investment for Mattel. Film
                                                                                         financing can be a risky business, and this is not our area of core expertise.”
        his tenureǤ
                                                                                                                                - Ynon Kreiz, Mattel CEO, 3.11.21
                                                                                         D.A. Davidson Conference

    Hasbro immediately rejected our calls to re-examine its corporate structure and capital allocation,
               providing no detailed explanation or open-mindedness on the subject.
          1. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/dreamworks-animation-hasbro-end-merger-749215/
          2. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/27/lionsgate-shares-jump-after-report-toymaker-hasbro-nearly-acquired-it-last-year.html                                       17
          3. https://investor.hasbro.com/news-releases/news-release-details/hasbro-board-directors-issues-letter-shareholders

The Alta Fox Slate Approach to Capital Allocation
When market environments change, optimal pathways for creating shareholder value change as well. Alta Fox’s nominees
                have several examples of exercising this mentality to the benefit of all shareholders.

                       Marcelo Fischer                                          Carolyn Johnson

  NEWARK, NJ, May 05, 2022 -- IDT Corporation                 NEW YORK, DEC. 21, 2017 -- Voya Financial, Inc.
  (NYSE: IDT), a global provider of fintech, cloud            (NYSE:VOYA), announced today that it will divest
  communications, and traditional communications              substantially all of its Closed Block Variable Annuity
  services, announced today that, in light of current         (CBVA) segment and its individual fixed and fixed
  market conditions, its Board of Directors has               indexed annuity business through an agreement with
  postponed the spinoff of its net2phone cloud                a consortium of investors led by affiliates of Apollo
  communications segment, which it had been                   Global Management, LLC Crestview Partners and
  preparing to spin off on or before July 31st, 2022.         Reverence     Capital    Partners.  In   addition    to
                                                              significantly reducing market and insurance risk,
                                                              the agreement will enable Voya to focus on its
                                                              higher-growth,         higher-return,     capital-light
                                                              Retirement,       Investment      Management       and
                                                              Employee Benefits businesses.

           ‘—” ‡ǣˆ‹Ž‹‰•                                                                                 18

The Current Board Has Overseen Concerning Governance Practices
 We believe there are significant governance issues at Hasbro, many of which can be traced back to what appears to be the
              Board’s historic prioritization of the Hassenfeld family’s interests over those of shareholders.

               Highly Questionable             Insular, Private Company              Misaligned Executive
                Chairman (pg. 39)                  Culture (pg. 40)                Compensation (pgs. 41-44)

                                                                    Unwillingness to
Lack of Effective Oversight       Insufficient Investor                                         Defensive and Reactionary
                                                                    Collaborate with
   of Strategy (pg. 45)          Disclosure (pg. 46-47)                                         Board Expansion (pg. 49)
                                                                  Shareholders (pg. 48)

                                                                                                                  19

History of Egregious Compensation and Lack of Shareholder Alignment
Under the Hasbro Board
                                                                          ͷǦ‡ƒ” ƒ•„”‘‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡˜•Ǥƒ›
   Cumulative 5-Year Hasbro Total                   Cumulative 5-Year Hasbro Total CEO                      Cumulative 5-Year Hasbro Total                      Cumulative 5-Year S&P 500 Total
 Management & Board Compensation                              Compensation                                      Shareholder Return                                   Shareholder Return
               $218,267,017                                        $78,679,581                                                14.1%                                        108.7%

                  Hasbro Total CEO Compensation                                                        Hasbro Total Management & Board                                        ”‹‘”–‘Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ•
 ̈́͵ͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                                                    Compensation                                                 ‡‰ƒ‰‡‡–ǡnone
 ̈́ʹͷǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ
                                                                                     ̈́͹ͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                                of the current
                                                                                     ̈́͸ͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                             Directors Šƒ†‡˜‡”
 ̈́ʹͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                                                                                                                   „‘—‰Š–ƒ•‹‰Ž‡
                                                                                     ̈́ͷͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ
                                                                                                                                                                               •Šƒ”‡‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘
 ̈́ͳͷǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                         ̈́ͶͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                              •–‘ ‘–Š‡‘’‡
                                                                                     ̈́͵ͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                             ƒ”‡–Ȃ ‹†‹ ƒ–‹‰
 ̈́ͳͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ
                                                                                                                                                                                    ƒ Ž‡ƒ”
                                                                                     ̈́ʹͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ
  ̈́ͷǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ
                                                                                                                                                                             ‹•ƒŽ‹‰‡–™‹–Š
                                                                                     ̈́ͳͲǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ                                                                                   •—ˆˆ‡”‹‰
         ̈́Ͳ                                                                                    ̈́Ͳ                                                                            •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•‹‘—”
                 ʹͲͳ͹          ʹͲͳͺ         ʹͲͳͻ          ʹͲʹͲ          ʹͲʹͳ                            ʹͲͳ͹           ʹͲͳͺ          ʹͲͳͻ          ʹͲʹͲ           ʹͲʹͳ               ˜‹‡™Ǥͳ

      Alta Fox has no confidence in the Board’s ability to align executive compensation with the success of
         shareholders and believes the Compensation Committee needs to be meaningfully refreshed.

               Source: Proxy filings, Bloomberg. HAS and S&P 500 returns assume dividends are reinvested. Data through 2/16/22, the launch date of Alta Fox’s campaign.
                                                                                                                                                                                          20
               1. Filings show that Michael Burns and Chris Cocks recently purchased shares following our criticism of the Board’s lack of open market purchases.

History of Egregious Compensation and Lack of Shareholder Alignment
Under the Hasbro Board (Continued)
  Hasbro’s Compensation Committee – chaired by Ms. Gersh – has consistently lowered performance targets despite
       declining performance, allowing management compensation to rise while shareholders have suffered.

                                                               Annual Executive Compensation Targets
                                           Revenue                           y/y %    EBIT Margin           FCF       y/y %

                    2018                 $5,329,612                           1%        ͳͷǤͻͲΨ          ̈́͸ͳͷǡ͹͵͹       17%

                    2019                  ̈́Ͷǡ͹ͻͳǡͳ͵ʹ                         -10%       ͳͶǤͲͲΨ          ̈́ͷ͵Ͷǡ͹͸ʹ       -13%

                    2020                  ̈́͸ǡʹͺ͵ǡͲ͹͹                         4%*        ͳͶǤ͹ͲΨ          ̈́Ͷ͸͹ǡ͸Ͳ͸       -13%

                    2021                 $5,969,053                          -5%        ͳ͵Ǥ͹ͲΨ          ̈́ͶͷͳǡͲͲͲ       -4%

        ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘™ƒ• 279% Š‹‰Š‡”‹ ʹͳ–Šƒ‹ ͳͺǡ†‡•’‹–‡‘”‰ƒ‹ ”‡˜‡—‡–ƒ”‰‡–•„‡‹‰11.7%
                                               Ž‘™‡”–ŠƒʹͲͳͺŽ‡˜‡Ž•Ǥ

            Hasbro 2021 Organic Revenue Target Analysis                                   Hasbro CEO Comp          Total Compensation

                                                                                                 FY18                 $8,499,623
     2018 Organic Revenue Target                                  $5,329,612                      ͳͻ                 ̈́ͳ͹ǡͻ͸Ͳǡͺ͹ͺ
                                                                                                  ʹͲ                 ̈́ͳ͸ǡ͸͸ͺǡͲͳͲ
     ʹͲʹͳ”‰ƒ‹ ‡˜‡—‡ƒ”‰‡–                                   ̈́Ͷǡ͹Ͳͺǡ͵Ͷ͸                    FY21                 $23,714,681

        ȗ‰”‘™–Š”ƒ–‡‹•ƒ†Œ—•–‡†ˆ‘”‡‡̵• ‹‘”‰ƒ‹ ”‡˜‡—‡ ‘–”‹„—–‹‘
        ‘—” ‡ǣˆ‹Ž‹‰•
                                                                                                                                        21

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰Ǥ͹ͳǤ

   History of Egregious Compensation and Lack of Shareholder Alignment
   Under the Hasbro Board (Continued)
          Hasbro’s CEO position receives the third-highest compensation among peers of immediately similar size, yet the
                              Company’s three-year cumulative TSR was fourth-lowest in the group.

                      FY21 CEO                      Hasbro Rank Out of 31
                   Compensation 3-Year TSR                                                                                                                Total FY21 CEO Comp vs 3-Year TSR
 Minimum             $4,162,400    18%             Companies (High to Low)                                                                              (For Peers of Immediately Similar Size)
 ͳ•–“—ƒ”–‹Ž‡       ̈́ͳͲǡͳͳͳǡ͵ʹ͸    ͸ͶΨ
                                                  Š”‡‡Ǧ‡ƒ”     ʹ͹–Š ‘—–‘ˆ͵ͳ                                                  350%
 ʹ†“—ƒ”–‹Ž‡       ̈́ͳ͵ǡͶͳͲǡ͹͹Ͷ    ͳͶͶΨ
                                                                                                                                                           LAD

                                                                                     3-Year Cumulative Total Shareholder Return
 ͵”†“—ƒ”–‹Ž‡       ̈́ͳ͸ǡ͸ͲͲǡͶͺʹ    ʹͲ͸Ψ                                                                                                          POOL
                                                                                                                                  300%
 Maximum            $68,090,432   1117%
                                                    ʹͳ       ͵”† ‘—–‘ˆ͵ͳ                                                                                                 BBWI     WSM

 Hasbro                $26,844,914    37%            ‘’                                                                         250%
                                                                                                                                                                                                              DHI
                                                                                                                                                               TSCO
           •‹‰Ž‘‘„‡”‰ǡ™‡”ƒƒ’—„Ž‹ • ”‡‡ˆ‘” ‘•—‡” ‘’ƒ‹‡•–‘                                                     200%               FBHS
                                                                                                                                                 RACE                    APTV
           ‡šƒ‹‡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ•”‡Žƒ–‹˜‡ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘Ǥ                                                                                                        LKQ
                                                                                                                                                                                                      Three-Year S&P
                                                                                                                                              NVR                      MAS      WHR
                                                                                                                                  150%                                                                500 TSR of 100%
                                   Bloomberg Screen Criteria:                                                                                              KMX BBY                       PHM
                        US listed Consumer Discretionary Subcategories:                                                           100%                                 BURL
                                                                                                                                                                                   MAT

                  ͳǤ     ‘•—‡”‹• ”‡–‹‘ƒ”›”‘†— –•                                                                                         MHK         AAP GPC
                                                                                                                                                                          ULTA
                  ʹǤ     ‘•—‡”‹• ”‡–‹‘ƒ”›‡–ƒ‹Ž                                                                                                                        ROSTBWA           HAS
                                                                                                                                  50%
                  ͵Ǥ     ‘•—‡”‹• ”‡–‹‘ƒ”›Š‘Ž‡•ƒŽ‡                                                                                                   NWL
                                                                                                                                                                        VFC
                                                                                                                                   0%
           ‡ •‘”–‡† –Š‡ ‘—–’—– „› ƒ”‡– ƒ’‹–ƒŽ‹œƒ–‹‘ ƒ† ‘’ƒ”‡† ƒ•„”‘ǯ•                                                           $0   $5,000,000 $10,000,000 $15,000,000 $20,000,000 $25,000,000 $30,000,000 $35,000,000
            ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ƒ†  ™‹–Š –Š‡ ͳͷ ‘•—‡” ‘’ƒ‹‡• ‘ˆ ‹‡†‹ƒ–‡Ž›                                                                                         FY21 CEO Compensation (USD)
           ‰”‡ƒ–‡” •‹œ‡ ƒ† ͳͷ ‘•—‡” ‘’ƒ‹‡• ‘ˆ ‹‡†‹ƒ–‡Ž› •ƒŽŽ‡” •‹œ‡Ǥ
            ƒ•„”‘ • ‘”‡† ‹ –Š‡ Š‹‰Š‡•– “—ƒ”–‹Ž‡ ‘ˆ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ǡ „—– –Š‡ ™‘”•–                                 ƒ–‡•ˆ‘”ǣͳʹȀ͵ͳȀʹͲͳͺǦͳʹȀ͵ͳȀʹͲʹͳ
           “—ƒ”–‹Ž‡ ˆ‘” –Š”‡‡Ǧ›‡ƒ” Ǥ                                            ”ƒ’Š”‡‘˜‡• ǡǡǡƒ†ˆ‘”˜‹•—ƒŽ‹œƒ–‹‘’—”’‘•‡•ǤŽŽƒ”‡–‘’“—ƒ”–‹Ž‡’‡”ˆ‘”‡”•Ǥ

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    22

History of Egregious Compensation and Lack of Shareholder Alignment Under
the Hasbro Board (Continued)
While CEO compensation for Mattel is also high vs. peers, Mattel’s performance targets have increased meaningfully over
                               time, while Hasbro’s have been consistently lowered.
•   ͸ͷΨ ‘ˆ ƒ––‡Žǯ• ƒ—ƒŽ ƒ•Š ‹ ‡–‹˜‡ ‹• –‹‡† –‘                           •     ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ †”ƒƒ–‹ ƒŽŽ› ‡š ‡‡†‡† ƒ––‡Žǯ• ‹ ʹͳ
    ‰”‘™–ŠǤ ‘”‡ •‘ –Šƒ ”‡˜‡—‡ǡ ƒ”‰‹• ‘” ˆ”‡‡ ƒ•Š ˆŽ‘™                             †‡•’‹–‡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡ –ƒ”‰‡–• „‡‹‰ ‘–‹—‘—•Ž› Ž‘™‡”‡† ƒ†
    ȋ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• –ƒ”‰‡–•Ȍǡ ™‡ „‡Ž‹‡˜‡ ‘”‰ƒ‹   ‹• ƒ ‰‘‘†                             ‹–• •–‘  ’”‹ ‡ •‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–Ž› —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‹‰ „‘–Š –Š‡ Ƭ ͷͲͲ ƒ†
    „ƒ”‘‡–‡” ˆ‘” ‰”‘™–Š ‹ ‹–”‹•‹ ˜ƒŽ—‡ ƒ• ‹– ‹• ‘’ƒ”ƒ–‹˜‡Ž›                       ƒ––‡ŽǤ
    †‹ˆˆ‹ —Ž– –‘ ƒ‹’—Žƒ–‡Ǥ
       Mattel Annual Executive Compensation Targets                                CEO Compensation             2019            2020             2021
         Revenue            y/y %        Gross Margin EBITDA               y/y %   HAS                       $17,960,878     $16,668,010      $23,714,681
2018    ̈́ͶǡͷͲ͵ǡͲͲͲ                           ͶͳǤͺͲΨ       ̈́ͳʹ͹ǡͲͲͲ                 MAT                       $15,514,997     $15,623,432      $16,128,895
2019    ̈́ͶǡͷͲ͸ǡͲͲͲ           0%              ͶʹǤʹͲΨ       ̈́͵ͷͺǡͲͲͲ         182%
                                                                                   HAS (-) MAT               $2,445,881      $1,044,578       $7,585,786
2020    ̈́͵ǡͻͺ͹ǡͲͲͲ          -12%             ͶͷǤͺͲΨ       ̈́ͶͲʹǡͲͲͲ         12%
2021    ̈́Ͷǡͺ͸ͷǡͲͲͲ          22%              ͶͺǤͳͲΨ       ̈́ͷͳ͸ǡͲͲͲ         28%
                                                                                   Annual TSR
       Hasbro Annual Executive Compensation Targets
                                                                                   HAS                         33.42%           -8.40%          11.90%
         Revenue            y/y %        EBIT Margin        FCF            y/y %
2018    $5,329,612                         ͳͷǤͻͲΨ         ̈́͸ͳͷǡ͹͵͹                 MAT                         35.60%           28.80%          23.70%
2019    ̈́Ͷǡ͹ͻͳǡͳ͵ʹ          -10%           ͳͶǤͲͲΨ         ̈́ͷ͵Ͷǡ͹͸ʹ         -13%    HAS (-) MAT                 -2.18%          -37.20%         -11.80%
2020    ̈́͸ǡʹͺ͵ǡͲ͹͹           4%*           ͳͶǤ͹ͲΨ         ̈́Ͷ͸͹ǡ͸Ͳ͸         -13%
2021    $5,969,053           -5%           ͳ͵Ǥ͹ͲΨ         ̈́ͶͷͳǡͲͲͲ          -4%

    We Believe the superior alignment of management and shareholder incentives is demonstrated in both
                                 Mattel’s TSR and fundamental performance.

             ȗ‰”‘™–Š”ƒ–‡‹•ƒ†Œ—•–‡†ˆ‘”‡‡̵• ‹‘”‰ƒ‹ ”‡˜‡—‡ ‘–”‹„—–‹‘
             ‘—” ‡ǣˆ‹Ž‹‰•ǤŽ‘‘„‡”‰Ǥ                                                                                                     23

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰ǤͶ͸ǦͶ͹Ǥ

    Poor Disclosure Practices Have Hurt Hasbro’s Valuation
    Hasbro’s opaque disclosures under the incumbent Board have, in our view, made it impossible for investors or the market
                                      to understand the Company’s full financial picture.

    •    ƒ”‹‘—• †‹• Ž‘•—”‡ ‹••—‡•ǡ ‹ Ž—†‹‰ Ž‹––Ž‡ –”ƒ•’ƒ”‡ › ”‡‰ƒ”†‹‰ —†‡”Ž›‹‰ ‘”‰ƒ‹
                                                                                                                       SEC Letter to Hasbro
         ‰”‘™–Š ”‡Žƒ–‡† –‘ ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘• ƒ† –Š‡ ’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡ ‘ˆ ‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽ „”ƒ†• —†‡” –Š‡
                                                                                                   We note your chart disclosing the change in net revenues by brand
         ‘•—‡” ƒ†  •‡‰‡–• Šƒ˜‡ ƒ†‡ ‹– extremely difficult to assess the strength        portfolio for each year in the three years ended December 29, 2019. In
                                                                                                   the accompanying discussion of the variances, by portfolio, you
         of business segments or value them appropriately.
                                                                                                   identify component product brands and discuss the general impact they
                                                                                                   had on the growth, or decline, in net revenues but do not otherwise
    •    Š‡  Šƒ• ƒŽ•‘ –ƒ‡ ‹••—‡ ™‹–Š ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ’‘‘” †‹• Ž‘•—”‡Ǥ  ‡’–‡„‡” ʹͲʹͲǡ –Š‡       quantify their impact. In future filings, please revise your disclosures
                                                                                                   to quantify the reasons for the change in order for an investor to discern
         •‡– ƒ Ž‡––‡” –‘ ƒ•„”‘ ”‡“—‡•–‹‰ ‘”‡ †‹• Ž‘•—”‡ •—””‘—†‹‰  ”‡ƒ ƒ† ƒ•„”‘ǯ•
                                                                                                   the relative contribution of each of the multiple components cited to the
          ‘”‡ ˆ”ƒ Š‹•‡•Ǥ                                                                          total change. The impacts of material variances in identified
                                                                                                   components that offset each other should be separately disclosed,
                                                                                                   quantified, and discussed rather than netting them. Please provide us
    •    At the heart of its disclosure issue, we believe Hasbro has a cultural problem with
                                                                                                   with examples of your intended disclosures based on current financial
         accountability.                                                                           results. Refer to FR-72 for additional guidance.

    •    › ”‡ˆ—•‹‰ –‘ ”‡Ž‡ƒ•‡ ‡› ’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡ ‡–”‹ •ǡ ƒ•„”‘ Šƒ• ƒ†‡ ‹– ‡ƒ”Ž› ‹’‘••‹„Ž‡ ˆ‘”
         ‹˜‡•–‘”• –‘ Š‘Ž† ƒƒ‰‡‡– ƒ ‘—–ƒ„Ž‡Ǥ

                  Shareholders deserve the opportunity to comprehensively evaluate Hasbro while holding
                                               management accountable.

                                                                                                                                                             24

The Current Board Has Not Engaged with Alta Fox in Good Faith In Our View
       Ž–ƒ ‘š ƒ†‡ ”‡ƒ•‘ƒ„Ž‡ •‡––Ž‡‡– ‘ˆˆ‡”• –‘ ƒ•„”‘ǡ ‹ Ž—†‹‰ ƒ ‘ˆˆ‡” ˆ‘” ‘‡ ‘ˆ Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ•
       ‹†‡’‡†‡– ‘‹‡‡• ƒ† –Š‡ ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ ƒ ƒ’‹–ƒŽ ƒŽŽ‘ ƒ–‹‘ ‘‹––‡‡ –‘ ‘˜‡”•‡‡ ‹˜‡•–‡–•Ǥ
         ƒ•„”‘ ‘– ‘Ž› ”‡ˆ—•‡† Ž–ƒ ‘šǯ• ‘ˆˆ‡”•ǡ „—– ‡˜‡” ‡˜‡ •‡– ƒ ”‡†ǦŽ‹‡ ˜‡”•‹‘ „ƒ  ‘ˆ ƒ› ‘ˆ ‘—” –‡”
       •Š‡‡–•Ǥͳ
                                                                                                                                           “    By refusing to settle or
                                                                                                                                                take them seriously at all
                                                                                                                                                the mgmt. team is
                                                                                                                                                arguably      confirming
                                                                                                                                                the activists point that
        •–‡ƒ†ǡ ƒ•„”‘ ’”‘’‘•‡† Ž–ƒ ‘š ’—„Ž‹ Ž› ‡†‘”•‡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• †‡ˆ‡•‹˜‡ ƒ††‹–‹‘• ‘ˆ –™‘ ‡™ ‘‹‡‡•                                         they are an entrenched
       ƒ’’‘‹–‡† „› –Š‡ ‘ƒ”†ǡ ƒ ’”‘ ‡•• ™Š‹ Š —Ž–‹ƒ–‡Ž› ˆƒ‹Ž‡† –‘ ”‡‘˜‡ ƒ› Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡—”‡† †‹”‡ –‘”•Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                and      “family     run”
                                                                                                                                                company/board         that
      Ž–ƒ ‘š ƒ†‡ –™‘ ‘‹‡‡• ƒ˜ƒ‹Žƒ„Ž‡ ˆ‘” ‹–‡”˜‹‡™•Ǥ ƒ–Š‡” –Šƒ ƒ••‡•• –Š‡ “—ƒŽ‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹‘• ‘ˆ ‘—”                                          believes     they      are
       ƒ†‹†ƒ–‡•ǡ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”† –”‹‡† –‘ ‘˜‹ ‡ ‘—” ‘‹‡‡• –Šƒ– ƒ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘ ™‹–Š ƒ –‹˜‹• ™‘—Ž† „‡ †‹•ƒ•–”‘—•                                    “protected” and don’t
                                                                                                                                                          “
      ˆ‘” –Š‡‹” ’”‘ˆ‡••‹‘ƒŽ ƒ”‡‡”•Ǥ                                                                                                            care     about    outsider
                                                                                                                                                views.
      Š‡ ‘ƒ”† †‹•‹••‡† ‘’”‘‹•‡ ‹ ˆƒ˜‘” ‘ˆ Š‹”‹‰ ƒ ƒ”› ‘ˆ ‡š’‡•‹˜‡ ƒ†˜‹•‘”• –Šƒ– ‹ Ž—†‡• –™‘ Žƒ™                                     Ǧ ‡ˆˆ‡”‹‡• ”‘—’ǡƒ” Š͵ͳǡʹͲʹʹ
      ˆ‹”•ǡ –™‘ ’”‘š› •‘Ž‹ ‹–ƒ–‹‘ ˆ‹”• ƒ† –™‘ ‹˜‡•–‡– „ƒ• ˆ‘” †‡ˆ‡•‡ •—’’‘”– Ȃ ›‡– ƒ‘–Š‡” ‡šƒ’Ž‡
      ‘ˆ ‘”’‘”ƒ–‡ ™ƒ•–‡Ǥ

The fact that the Board decided to drag shareholders into a long, expensive proxy fight instead of settle for a
 modest Board refresh and a capital allocation review committee is concerning and, in our view, suggests
                                      extreme levels of entrenchment.

          ͳǤ   Š––’•ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ”‡—–‡”•Ǥ ‘Ȁ„—•‹‡••Ȁ‡š Ž—•‹˜‡ǦŠƒ•„”‘Ǧ•—„•ǦƒŽ–ƒǦˆ‘šǦ„‘ƒ”†Ǧ‘‹‡‡Ǧ‘ˆˆ‡”Ǧ•‡––Ž‡‡–Ǧ–ƒŽ•Ǧ•‘—” ‡•ǦʹͲʹʹǦͲ͵Ǧʹ͹Ȁ                              25

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰•ǤͷͲǦͷʹǤ

    We Are Seeking to Replace Three Long-Tenured Incumbents
       We are seeking to replace the Chairman of the Board, the Chair of the Compensation Committee and the longest-tenured
        member of Hasbro’s Board – who previously served as the Chair of the Compensation Committee. In our view, these
         incumbents are key parts of the culture of entrenchment and operational mediocrity that pervades Hasbro today.

                              Rich Stoddart                                                              Lisa Gersh                                                      Edward Philip
                            Chairman of the Board                                                  Chair of Compensation                                             Longest-Tenured Director
                            Board Tenure: 8 years                                                        Committee                                                    Board Tenure: ~20 years
                                                                                                  Board Tenure: ~12 years

   š    ”‹‘” –”ƒ  ”‡ ‘”† ‘ˆ •‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ– ˜ƒŽ—‡ †‡•–”— –‹‘ǡ             š      ƒ• ‘˜‡”•‡‡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‡š ‡••‹˜‡ ƒ†ǡ ‹ ‘—” ˜‹‡™ǡ                   š     ƒ‹Ž‡† –‘ •–‡’ †‘™ ƒ• ’ƒ”– ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”†ǯ• ”‡ ‡–
        ‹ Ž—†‹‰ Ǧ͸ͺǤͶͻΨ ”‡–—” ƒ•  ‘ˆ ‡”™‘”‹‰•                        —Œ—•–‹ˆ‹ƒ„Ž‡ ‡š‡ —–‹˜‡ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ’”ƒ –‹ ‡•Ǥ                          †‡ˆ‡•‹˜‡     ‡š’ƒ•‹‘ǡ   •—‰‰‡•–‹‰     •‡”‹‘—•
        ƒ† –Š‡ Ž‘•• ‘ˆ ƒŒ‘” ƒ ‘—–• ƒ•  ‘ˆ ‡‘ —”‡––Ǥ                                                                                           ‡–”‡ Š‡– ‹••—‡•Ǥ
                                                                         š     ”ƒ  ”‡ ‘”† ‘ˆ ˜ƒŽ—‡ †‡•–”— –‹‘ǡ ‹ Ž—†‹‰ ƒ–
   š    ’’ƒ”‡– Žƒ  ‘ˆ ƒ’‹–ƒŽ ƒŽŽ‘ ƒ–‹‘ǡ –‡ Š‘Ž‘‰› ƒ†                     ƒ”–Šƒ –‡™ƒ”– ‹˜‹‰ ‹‡†‹ƒǡ  Ǥ ȋDzƒ”–Šƒ                      š    Šƒ‹” ‘ˆ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ‘‹––‡‡ ˆ”‘ ʹͲͳͶǦ
        •–”ƒ–‡‰‹ ’Žƒ‹‰ ‡š’‡”–‹•‡Ǥ                                           –‡™ƒ”–dzȌǡ ™Š‹ Š †‡Ž‹˜‡”‡† ƒ Ǧ͵ͲΨ ƒ—ƒŽ‹œ‡†                            ʹͲͳͻ ƒ† ‡„‡” •‹ ‡ ʹͲͳͲǡ ‘˜‡”•‡‡‹‰
                                                                               ”‡–—” ˆ‘” •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”• †—”‹‰ •Ǥ ‡”•Šǯ• –‹‡                           ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‡š ‡••‹˜‡ ƒ† —Œ—•–‹ˆ‹ƒ„Ž‡ ‡š‡ —–‹˜‡
   š    —‡•–‹‘ƒ„Ž‡ ƒ’’‘‹–‡– –‘ –Š‡ ‘ƒ”†Ǥ                                 ƒ• ”‡•‹†‡– ƒ† Žƒ–‡” Ǥ                                              ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ’”ƒ –‹ ‡•Ǥ

   š    ˜‡”•ƒ™ ‘–‹—‡† —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡ ƒ• ‹–‡”‹                     š     ‘ƒ”† ‡„‡” ƒ– ‘‡›‹‘ ™Š‹ Š ™‡– ’—„Ž‹                         š    —””‡–Ž› •‡”˜‡• ‘ –Š‡ „‘ƒ”†• ‘ˆ ˆ‹˜‡ ‘–Š‡”
         ‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘ǡ ‹ Ž—†‹‰ –Š‡ †‡˜ƒ•–ƒ–‹‰ Ž‘•• ‘ˆ –Š‡                    –Š”‘—‰Š ƒ  ‹ ʹͲʹͳ ƒ† Šƒ• •‹ ‡ •‡‡ ‹–•                            ‘’ƒ‹‡•ǡ ƒ› ‘ˆ ™Š‹ Š Šƒ˜‡ ƒŽ•‘ •‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–Ž›
        ‹•‡› ”‹ ‡••Ȁ ”‘œ‡ ‘–”ƒ – –‘ ƒ––‡ŽǤ                              ˜ƒŽ—‡ †‡ Ž‹‡ „› ‘˜‡” ͺͷΨ ‹ Ž‡•• –Šƒ ‘‡ ›‡ƒ”Ǥ                        —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‡† †—”‹‰ Š‹• –‡—”‡•Ǥ

   š     ƒ• never „‘—‰Š– •Šƒ”‡• ‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘ •–‘ Ǥ                          š      ƒ• never „‘—‰Š– •Šƒ”‡• ‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘ •–‘ Ǥ                            š      ƒ• never „‘—‰Š– •Šƒ”‡• ‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘ •–‘ Ǥ

                   ͳǤ Š––’•ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ’”‡••”‡ƒ†‡”Ǥ ‘Ȁ—•ƒȀ Š‹ ƒ‰‘Ǧ•—Ǧ–‹‡•ȀʹͲͲ͹ͲͳͲͻȀʹͺʹͳͶͲ͸ͻ͸ͺͻͺ͹ͻͺ
                   ʹǤ ‹‹Žƒ”Ž›ǡ–‘††ƒ”–™ƒ••‡”˜‹‰ƒ•‹–‡”‹‘ˆ ƒ•„”‘™Š‡ ƒ•„”‘Ž‘•–‹–••‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹•‡›”‹ ‡••Ȁ ”‘œ‡ ‘–”ƒ –•–‘ ƒ––‡Ž                                  26
                   ‘—” ‡ǣŽ‘‘„‡”‰ǡˆ‹Ž‹‰•

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰•ǤͷͶǦ͸ͳǤ

    Our Solution: Highly Qualified and Unaffiliated Candidates
      We Believe our nominees will bring independent, skilled perspectives and strong track records of value creation to help
       effectively oversee management and collegially work with new CEO Chris Cocks to develop and execute his strategy.

                        Marcelo Fischer
                        Ma                                                Carolyn Johnson                                 Rani Hublou

                                                                       ǣͺͶΨȋʹͲͳͻǦʹͲʹͲȌ                       ǣ͹ΨȋʹͲʹͲǦ’”‡•‡–Ȍ
                      ǣʹǡͷͶ͵ΨȋʹͲͲ͹Ǧ’”‡•‡–Ȍ

                                                       9    ‘”‡”Š‹‡ˆ”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ˆˆ‹ ‡”‘ˆ      9    ‘”‡”Š‹‡ˆƒ”‡–‹‰ˆˆ‹ ‡”‘ˆͺšͺǡ  Ǥ
       9 Š‹‡ˆ ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽˆˆ‹ ‡”‘ˆ ‘”’‘”ƒ–‹‘
                                                           ‡”‹ ƒ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ”‘—’ǡ  Ǥȋǣ       ȋǣ Ȍǡ™Š‡”‡•Š‡Š‡Ž’‡†–Š‡
         ȋǣ ȌǤ
                                                            Ȍǡ™Š‡”‡Š‡”‡ˆˆ‘”–•”‡•—Ž–‡†‹̱̈́ͳ          ‰‘Ǧ–‘Ǧƒ”‡–•–”ƒ–‡‰›‹ ”‡ƒ•‡”‡˜‡—‡„›
       9 ƒ’‹–ƒŽƒŽŽ‘ ƒ–‹‘‡š’‡”–™‹–Šƒ–”ƒ                                                             ʹš‹Š‹‰Š‡•–ƒ”‰‹„—•‹‡••—‹–ƒ†
                                                           „‹ŽŽ‹‘‹ ‘•–•ƒ˜‹‰•Ǥ
         ”‡ ‘”†‘ˆ†‹• ‹’Ž‹‡†ǡˆ‘ —•‡†‹˜‡•–‡–•                                                        ”‡†— ‡ ‘•–•„›ʹͲΨΪ‹Ž‘™‡•–ƒ”‰‹
         ‹ ǯ••—„•‹†‹ƒ”‹‡•Ǥ                       9 ”‘˜‡•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–˜ƒŽ—‡ˆ‘”•Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•          „—•‹‡••—‹–Ǥ
                                                         †—”‹‰Š‡”„‘ƒ”†–‡—”‡ƒ–ƒŒ‡• ‘ǡ
       9 ‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡‡˜ƒŽ—ƒ–‹‰ƒ†                                                         9 —””‡–†‹”‡ –‘”‘ˆ‡ •›•  ǤȋǣȌǡ
                                                         ȋˆ‘”‡”Ž›ǣ ȌǤ
         ƒ ‘’Ž‹•Š‹‰ ‘”’‘”ƒ–‡”‡•–”— –—”‹‰•Ǥ                                                           ƒ•—’’Ž› Šƒ‹•‘ˆ–™ƒ”‡ ‘’ƒ›ǡŠ‡Ž’‹‰
                                                       9 ‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡•—’’‘”–‹‰‡™•      ‘˜‡”•‡‡ƒ„—•‹‡••‘†‡Ž•Š‹ˆ–ˆ”‘
       9 —”‹‰Š‹•ͳͷǦ›‡ƒ”–‡—”‡ƒ• ǡ 
                                                         ƒ†ƒŽ‹‰‹‰‹ ‡–‹˜‡•‰‹˜‡ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘      ’‡”’‡–—ƒŽ–‘•—„• ”‹’–‹‘Ž‹ ‡•‡•ƒŽ‡•Ǥ
         ȋ‹ Ž—†‹‰ƒŽŽ•’‹Ǧ‘ˆˆ•ȌŠƒ• ‘’‘—†‡†
                                                          ‘‹––‡‡‡š’‡”–‹•‡Ǥ
         •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”˜ƒŽ—‡ƒ–ʹͷΨƒ›‡ƒ”                                                               9 š’‡”‹‡ ‡•‡––‹‰ƒŽ‹‰‡† ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘
          ‘’ƒ”‡†–‘–Š‡ƬͷͲͲƒ–Ž‡••–ŠƒͳͲΨ     9 ‡†—‹–‹‡•ƒ† †‹˜‹†—ƒŽ‹ˆ‡ƒ–‘›ƒ       ’‘Ž‹ ‹‡•ƒ•ƒ‡„‡”‘ˆ‡ •›•ǯ
         ƒ—ƒŽ‹œ‡†Ǥ                                     ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽǡ  ǤȋǣȌǡ‹ Ž—†‹‰‹–•      ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ ‘‹––‡‡Ǥ
                                                         •ƒŽ‡–‘’‘ŽŽ‘‹ʹͲͳͺˆ‘”̈́ͳǤͳ„‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ

                      ‘—” ‡ǣŽ‘‘„‡”‰ǡˆ‹Ž‹‰•                                                                                          27

We Believe Our Nominees Will Bring the Right Skillsets and Expertise to the
 Hasbro Boardroom
                                                                                                                                 History of
                                                                                   Total                Appointed                                         Buyer of                    Capital
                                                          HAS Board                                                          Outperformance
                         Director                          Tenure
                                                                               Compensation               Under
                                                                                                                              at Other Public
                                                                                                                                                           Hasbro                    Allocation
                                                                                 from HAS               Hassenfeld                                      Common Stock                 Expertise
                                                                                                                               Companies?

            Marcelo Fischer                                  N/A                     N/A                    N/A

            Rani Hublou                                      N/A                     N/A                    N/A

            Carolyn Johnson                                  N/A                     N/A                    N/A

            Rich Stoddart                                      8               $5,325,253                   YES

            Lisa Gersh                                         12              $3,925,755                   YES

            Edward Philip                                      20              $6,794,241*                  YES

*2003-2005 compensation is not reported in Hasbro’s historical proxy statements. Alta Fox estimated compensation for 2003-2005 by taking an average of 2006 and 2007 compensation.

                      ‘—” ‡ǣˆ‹Ž‹‰•                                                                                                                                                         28

Our Solution: A Vision for Better Governance, Capital Allocation and
Strategic Planning

             Establish a Disciplined Capital              Improve Disclosure to Ensure
                 Allocation Framework                  Shareholders Can Properly Evaluate
                                                                    Hasbro
           –”— –—”‡†™‹–Š‡’Šƒ•‹•‘”‡–—”•Ǧ
          ‘”‹‡–‡†‡–”‹ •–‘‡•—”‡ ƒ’‹–ƒŽˆŽ‘™•     ”‡ƒ•‡††‹• Ž‘•—”‡‘ˆ”‡Ž‡˜ƒ– •ˆ‘”
             –‘–Š‡Š‹‰Š‡•–”‹•Ǧƒ†Œ—•–‡†”‡–—”     ƒŽŽ‘’‡”ƒ–‹‰•‡‰‡–•ƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•”‡Ž‡˜ƒ–
                        ‘’’‘”–—‹–‹‡•Ǥ                    ‡–”‹ •ˆ‘”ƒ‘— ‡†ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘•Ǥ

         Introduce Capital Allocation Discipline      Align Executive Compensation with All
              and Strategic Transformation                        Shareholders
             Experience to Enhance Board’s
                        Oversight                       ”‡ƒ•‡†ƒƒ‰‡‡–ƒ ‘—–ƒ„‹Ž‹–›
                                                         ™‹–Š ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘–‹‡†–‘˜ƒŽ—‡Ǧ
         †‡’‡†‡–ƒ†‡‰ƒ‰‡††‹”‡ –‘”•ƒ –‹‰     ‡Šƒ ‹‰‡–”‹ •ǡ”‹‰‘”‘—•–ƒ”‰‡–•ƒ†
          –‘ƒš‹‹œ‡˜ƒŽ—‡ˆ‘”ƒŽŽ•Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”•Ǥ            –‘–ƒŽ•Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡””‡–—”Ǥ

                                                                                          29

Today’s Agenda

                                          Introduction

                                     Executive Summary

                              The Case for Boardroom Change

                 Persistent Strategic Missteps Driving Significant Underperformance

                    Lack of Relevant Board Skills Hampering Effective Oversight

                 Our Solution: Highly Qualified, Independent Nominees

                                            Appendix

                                                                                      30

The Current Board Has Overseen Long-Term Underperformance
 ƒ•„”‘Šƒ• ‘•‹•–‡–Ž›—†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‡†„‘–Š–Š‡ƬͷͲͲƒ†‹–• Š‘•‡ ‘•—‡”„‡ Šƒ”‘˜‡”–Š‡Žƒ•–ˆ‹˜‡›‡ƒ”•Ǥ
                                                          Hasbro’s Annualized Returns Have Underperformed
                ʹͷΨ
                                                                                                                   ʹͳǤͳΨ
                                                                                                       ͳͻǤʹΨ
                ʹͲΨ                                       ͳͺǤʹΨ

                                               ͳͷǤͲΨ                                                                                                        ͳͷǤͶΨ
                ͳͷΨ
                                                                                                                                                ͳͳǤ͸Ψ

                ͳͲΨ
                                                                                             ͹ǤͲΨ

                 ͷΨ
                                    ʹǤ͹Ψ
                                                                                                                                                                       ͳǤͻΨ

                 ͲΨ
                                             ͷǦ‡ƒ”                                              ͵Ǧ‡ƒ”                                           ͳǦ‡ƒ”

                                   ƒ•„”‘—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”             ƬͷͲͲ—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”               —••‡ŽŽͳͲͲͲ‘•—‡”‹• ”‡–‹‘ƒ”› †‡š—ƒŽ‹œ‡†‡–—”

                                                                        ƒ•„”‘‘–ƒŽŠƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”‡–—”ƒŽ›•‹•
                                                                                                                                   5-Year TSR      3-Year TSR          1-Year TSR

                      Underperformance vs. S&P 500 Annualized Return                                                                  -94.6%            -47.1%            -3.8%

                      Underperformance vs. Russell 1000 Consumer Discretionary Index Annualized Return                                -116.8%           -69.4%            9.8%

Source: Bloomberg. HAS and S&P 500 returns assume dividends are reinvested. Data through 2/16/22, the launch date of Alta Fox’s campaign.

                                                                                                                                                                                    31

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰Ǥ͹͸Ǥ

    The Current Board Has Failed to Stem Long-Term Market Share Losses
•   ‡•’‹–‡ ‹˜‡•–‹‰ ‘”‡ –Šƒ ̈́ͷ „‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– ˆ‘—” ›‡ƒ”• ‹                                                                                             —ƒ”›‘ˆʹͲͳͺǦʹͲʹͳ‡•—Ž–•
    –Š‡ ‘•—‡” „—•‹‡•• ƒ† •’‡†‹‰ •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡” ƒ’‹–ƒŽ ‘
                                                                                                                                                               Annualized                    2018 EBITDA                   2021 EBITDA
    —‡”‘—•       ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘•ǡ  Hasbro        has      significantly                                                                    Company:
                                                                                                                                                             Revenue Growth                    Margins                       Margins
    underperformed against Mattel since 2019 on both top-line                                                                                ƒ•„”‘ͳ                   -0.9%                         12.0%                         11.3%
    and bottom-line results.
                                                                                                                                           ƒ––‡Ž                      6.5%                          1.9%                         18.5%

                                                                                                                                        Note that these numbers reflect organic revenues of both businesses since 2018.
•     ‘—” ˜‹‡™ǡ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘•—‡” „—•‹‡•• Šƒ• —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”‡† ‘ ƒ
    ƒ ”‘ǦŽ‡˜‡Žǡ †‡ Ž‹‹‰ „‘–Š ‹ ”‡˜‡—‡• ƒ† ‡ƒ”‹‰•ǡ ™Š‹Ž‡                                                                                       Hasbro Toy & Games Sales vs Industry Growth2
                                                                                                                                                                                      (Indexed to 100)
    ‹†—•–”› ”‡–ƒ‹Ž –‘› •ƒŽ‡• Šƒ˜‡ ‰”‘™ ƒ– ̱ͶΨ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– †‡ ƒ†‡Ǥ                                                               ͳ͸Ͳ

                                                                                                                                    ͳͶͲ
     Urgent change is neededǣ ‹ –Š‡ Žƒ•– –Š”‡‡ ‘–Š•ǡ                                                                             ͳʹͲ
       ƒ•„”‘ •ƒ™ ‹•‡› ‘˜‡ –™‘ ‘ˆ ‹–• ‡› Ž‹ ‡•‹‰                                                                               ͳͲͲ
      ‘–”ƒ –• –‘ ƒ––‡Žǡ ”‡•—Ž–‹‰ ‹ –Š‡ Ž‘•• ‘ˆ ‘”‡ –Šƒ                                                                         ͺͲ
     ̈́͵ͲͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‘ˆ ”‡˜‡—‡ ȋ‡ƒ”Ž› ͳͲΨ ‘ˆ ‘•—‡”
     ”‡˜‡—‡ȌǤ Š‡ Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡” –”‡† ‹• ’‘‘”ǡ „—– ƒ”‡– •Šƒ”‡
     Ž‘••‡• ƒ”‡ ƒ ‡Ž‡”ƒ–‹‰Ǥ                                                                                                                                     ƒ•„”‘‘•—‡”‡˜‡—‡ȋ‡š Ž—†‹‰ƒ†‡‡Ȍ
                                                                                                                                                               ‘› †—•–”›ƒŽ‡•ƒ–‡–ƒ‹Ž

                   ͳǤŽ–ƒ ‘š‡•–‹ƒ–‡•ˆ‘” ‘•—‡”•‡‰‡–ǡ‡š Ž—†‹‰‡‡ ‘–”‹„—–‹‘ǤŠ‹•   ʹǤŠ‹•ƒƒŽ›•‹•†‘‡•ƒ†Œ—•–ˆ‘”–Š‡̈́͵ͲͲΪ‹’ƒ”–‡”„”ƒ†”‡˜‡—‡ ƒ•„”‘™‹ŽŽ„‡Ž‘•‹‰‹ʹͲʹ͵ˆ‘”‹•‡›”‹ ‡•• ”‘œ‡ǡ
                   †‘‡•‘–ƒ†Œ—•–‘—– ƒ•„”‘ǯ•̈́ͷʹ͵ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘‘ˆ‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”•Ǥ‡‡ƒ’’‡†‹š   ”‘ŽŽ•ǡƒ†‡•ƒ‡‘”•Š‘’ȋ‡ƒ”Ž›ͳͲΨ‘ˆ‘•—‡””‡˜‡—‡•ȌǤ –ƒŽ•‘†‘‡•ƒ†Œ—•–‘—–ˆ‘” ƒ•„”‘ǯ•̈́ͷʹ͵ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘‘ˆ
                   •Ž‹†‡͹ʹˆ‘”‘”‡†‡–ƒ‹Ž•Ǥ                                                       ‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”•Ǥ‡‡ƒ’’‡†‹š•Ž‹†‡͹Ͳˆ‘”‘”‡†‡–ƒ‹Ž•Ǥ                                                                               32
                   ‘—” ‡ǣŽ–ƒ ‘šǡ’—„Ž‹ ˆ‹Ž‹‰•Ǥ                                                ‘—” ‡ǣǡ—”‘‘‹–‘”

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰•Ǥ͸͹Ǧ͸ͻǤ

     The Current Board Has a Record of Poor Capital Allocation and M&A
                                         Price Paid /                                                                       Approved by
                          Date
       Investment                          Amount              Multiple Paid                   Deal Rationale                Targeted                               Result?
                        Announced
                                            Spent                                                                            Directors?
                                         ̈́ʹͲͲ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ϊ
                                                                                                                                                            Likely Value-Destructive.
                                              ‘ ‡                                    ƒ‡ƒ˜ƒŽ—ƒ„Ž‡ ‘•—‡”„”ƒ†
    G.I. Joe Video       ‡’–‡„‡”                                                                                                          Š‡ Ǥ Ǥ ‘‡ Šƒ•‘–•— ‡‡†‡†ƒ––Š‡„‘š‘ˆˆ‹ ‡ƒ†
                                         ˆ‹‹•Š‡† ‰‹˜‡    ‡”•‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†Ǥ        ƒ†–—”‹–‹–‘ƒ˜‹†‡‘‰ƒ‡         3/3
    Game                   ʹͲʹͳ                                                                                                           ˜‹†‡‘‰ƒ‡•ƒ”‡ƒ‡š–”‡‡Ž› ‘’‡–‹–‹˜‡ ƒ–‡‰‘”›
                                                                                              ’”‘’‡”–›Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                           Šƒ•‘–Šƒ†— Š•— ‡••‹Ǥ
                                           „”ƒ†‹‰ǫͳ
    Transformers,
                                                                                                                                                           Likely Value-Destructive.
    Micronauts, Ouija      ‡„”—ƒ”›                             ȀǤ –‡”ƒŽ         •‡”‡•‘—” ‡• –‘ †‡˜‡Ž‘’
                                         ‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†Ǥ                                                                        3/3         ‹‡™‹–Š Ǥ Ǥ ‘‡ǡ ƒ•„”‘Šƒ•–”‹‡†–‘•“—‡‡œ‡–‘‘— Š
    Board Video            ʹͲʹͳ                                 ‹˜‡•–‡–Ǥ              ‰ƒ‡•ˆ‘”  ‹ǦŠ‘—•‡Ǥ
                                                                                                                                          ‘—–‘ˆ–‹”‡† ƒ†™‹ŽŽŽ‹‡Ž›Šƒ˜‡’‘‘””‡–—”•‘ˆ ƒ’‹–ƒŽǤ
    Games
                                                                                                                                                             Value-Destructive.
                                                           ̱ͳͺš”ƒ‹Ž‹‰™‡Ž˜‡
                                                                                      ‡˜‡Ž‘’•Š‘™•ƒ†‘˜‹‡•‹Ǧ          3/3          ƒ•„”‘ǯ••–‘ †‡ Ž‹‡†ͻΨ–Š‡†ƒ›‘ˆ–Š‡†‡ƒŽƒ†‹••–‹ŽŽ
    eOne                —‰—•–ʹͲͳͻ       ̈́ͶǤ͸„‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ      ‘–ŠȋDzdzȌ
                                                                                         Š‘—•‡ˆ‘”‡š‹•–‹‰„”ƒ†•Ǥ                         „‡Ž‘™–Š‡’”‡Ǧ†‡ƒŽ’”‹ ‡„‡ ƒ—•‡ ƒ•„”‘•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–Ž›
                                                                 Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                                  ‘˜‡”’ƒ‹†Ǥ
                                                            ‡”•‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†ǡ
                                                                                                                                                           Value-Destructive.
                                                            „—– ‡–‹‘‡†        ‡ŽŽ–‘›•”‡Žƒ–‡†–‘‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”•
                                                                                                                               3/3           ƒ•„”‘’ƒ‹†‘”‡–ŠƒŠƒŽˆƒ„‹ŽŽ‹‘ˆ‘”ƒ†‡ƒŽ™‹–Š
    Power Rangers         ƒ›ʹͲͳͺ       ̈́ͷ͵Ͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ       –Šƒ––Š‡‡ƒ”‹‰•              ƒ†‡š’ƒ†–Š‡‡†‹ƒ
                                                                                                                                           ‹ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ‡ƒ”‹‰•‹’ƒ –Ǥ‘™‡”ƒ‰‡”• ‘•—‡”
                                                           ‹’ƒ –‹ ʹͲͳͺ™‘—Ž†                 ‘’’‘”–—‹–‹‡•Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                   ‹–‡”‡•–Šƒ•†‡ Ž‹‡†•‹ ‡–Š‡†‡ƒŽǤ
                                                               „‡‹ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽǤ
                                                                                                                                                             Value-Destructive.
    Transformers                                                ȀǤ –‡”ƒŽ        •‡”‡•‘—” ‡•–‘†‡˜‡Ž‘’ƒ
                            ʹͲͳ͹         ‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†Ǥ                                                                        3/3         ˆ–‡”•’‡†‹‰•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹–‡”ƒŽ”‡•‘—” ‡•–‘†‡˜‡Ž‘’
    Card Game                                                   ‹˜‡•–‡–Ǥ           ”ƒ•ˆ‘”‡”•–”ƒ†‹‰ ƒ”†‰ƒ‡Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                        –Š‡‰ƒ‡ǡ‹–‹•‘Ž‘‰‡”•‘Ž†Ǥ
                                                            ‡”•‘–†‹• Ž‘•‡†ǡ
                                                                                                                                                            Value-Destructive.
                                                               „—–ƒ ˆŽ‹’ǯ•
    Backflip              —Ž›ʹͲͳ͵       ̈́ͳͳʹ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ                                 ‡˜‡Ž‘’‘„‹Ž‡‰ƒ‡•‹ǦŠ‘—•‡Ǥ          2/3*        ƒ•„”‘™”‘–‡–Š‡ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘†‘™–‘œ‡”‘Ž‡••–Šƒ–Š”‡‡
                                                            ‘’‡”ƒ–‹‰’”‘ˆ‹–™ƒ•
                                                                                                                                                                ›‡ƒ”•Žƒ–‡”Ǥ
                                                             ‡‰ƒ–‹˜‡‹ʹͲͳͶǤ

                        Source: public filings.                                                                                              *Stoddart was not on the Board when         33
                        1. Alta Fox estimate based on industry checks for AAA video game budgets                                             investment was made

††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘’‰Ǥ͹ͲǤ

   Case Study: eOne Acquisition
       ™Šƒ–™‡„‡Ž‹‡˜‡™ƒ•„‘–Š–Š‡†‡ˆ‹‹‰‘‡–ƒ†–Š‡‰”‡ƒ–‡•–ˆƒ‹Ž—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡Dz”ƒ†Ž—‡’”‹–dz•–”ƒ–‡‰›ǡ ƒ•„”‘ƒ “—‹”‡†‡‡
                  ‹‡ ‡„‡”ʹͲͳͻˆ‘” $4.6 billion, nearly 1/3 of the Company’s entire enterprise value at the time.

   •     ƒ•„”‘ ’ƒ‹† ƒ ͵ͳΨ ’”‡‹— –‘ ‡‡ǯ• ’”‡Ǧ†‡ƒŽ •Šƒ”‡ ’”‹ ‡ǡ nearly 18x TTM EBITDA, –‘
        ƒ “—‹”‡ ‡‡Ǥ
   • ‘ ˆ—† –Š‡ ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘ǡ ƒ•„”‘ ‹••—‡† ‘”‡ –Šƒ ͳͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ •Šƒ”‡• ‘ˆ ‘‘ •–‘ ǡ
     diluting shareholders by more than 8%ǡ ƒ† added more than $3 billion of debt –‘ –Š‡
     „ƒŽƒ ‡ •Š‡‡–Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                                        ‹ ‡‡‡ ‡ƒŽ
          • ‡‡ǯ•  ™ƒ• ƒ™ƒ”†‡† ̈́ͳʹ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ ‡–‹”‡Ž› –‹‡Ǧ„ƒ•‡† ‡“—‹–› ‰”ƒ–• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ –Š‡
             ‘’Ž‡–‹‘ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘Ǥ                                                                                                                                ‘— ‡‡–͵
   • Hasbro’s shares declined 9% the day the deal was announced ƒ† Šƒ˜‡ ‘–‹—‡† –‘                                                                                             -8.4%
     —†‡”’‡”ˆ‘” •‹ ‡Ǥ
                                                                                                                                                              Ƭ
   •      ƒ•„”‘ Žƒ‹‡† –Šƒ– „› ʹͲʹʹǡ ‡‡ ™‘—Ž† †”‹˜‡ ̈́ͳ͵Ͳ ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ ‹ ”‡‡–ƒŽ ”—Ǧ”ƒ–‡                                                                                      59.5%
          •›‡”‰‹‡• „‡–™‡‡ ‘•—‡” ƒ† –‡”–ƒ‹‡– Æ ‹•–‡ƒ†ǡ ™‡ ‡•–‹ƒ–‡ that                                                                       ͷͲͲ
        Consumer and Entertainment EBITDA will have declined by 10% or $79 million over                                                                   EBITDA by Segment1         2019        2022E
        that period.1                                                                                                                                     Consumer                   $587        $607
                                                                                                                                                          Entertainment              $148        $141
   •     ‘”†‹‰ –‘ ƒƒ‰‡‡–ǡ –Š‡ ƒŒ‘”‹–› ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‡‡ •›‡”‰‹‡• Šƒ˜‡ ƒŽ”‡ƒ†› „‡‡ ”‡ƒŽ‹œ‡†Ǥʹ                                                           Corporate and Other        $77          -$15
        ‹–Š‡” ͳȌ ƒ•„”‘ ‹• Ž›‹‰ ƒ„‘—– –Š‡ •›‡”‰‹‡• ‡š–”ƒ –‡† ˆ”‘ –Š‡ †‡ƒŽ ‘” ʹȌ ‹–• ‘”‡ „—•‹‡••                                                       Total EBITDA ex-WOTC       $812        $733
        ‹• †‡–‡”‹‘”ƒ–‹‰ ‡˜‡ ˆƒ•–‡” –Šƒ ™‡ –Š‘—‰Š– —†‡” ‹–• Dz”ƒ† Ž—‡’”‹–dz •–”ƒ–‡‰›Ǥ                                                                Change in EBITDA ex-WOTC                -$79
                                                                                                                                                          Decline in EBITDA %                    -10%

                    We believe the costly and ill-advised eOne deal destroyed significant shareholder value.
                        1. Alta Fox estimates cited in initial Hasbro presentation, including   Source: Bloomberg normalized share price performance, public filings.
                        corporate and other expense.                                            3. Source: Bloomberg. Data through 2/16/22                                                  34
                        2. Hasbro Q1 2022 conference call

Shares Trade at a Punishing Discount to Five-Year Averages
        Hasbro’s NTM EV/EBITDA multiple trades at a significant discount to its five-year average of 12.5x, despite WOTC,
          Hasbro’s most valuable business, more than doubling its EBITDA contribution to the group over that period.

                                                                                                          WOTC EBITDA (as % of HAS Total)
                                              Hasbro’s NTM EV/EBITDA
                                                                                               16

                                                                                               15   50%
                                                                                                                                      46%

                                                                                               14                         42%
                                                                                                    40%
                                                                                               13

                                                                                               12
                                                                                                    30%       28%
                                                                                               11

                                                                                               10
                                                                                                    20%
                                                                                               9

                                                                                               8
                                                                                                    10%

                                                                                                    0%
                                                 NTM EV / EBITDA          5-Year Average                      2019        2020        2021

Source: Bloomberg. Public filings. Note that Hasbro only disclosed WOTC EBITDA through 2019.

                                                                                                                                        35

Today’s Agenda

                                          Introduction

                                     Executive Summary

                              The Case for Boardroom Change

                 Persistent Strategic Missteps Driving Significant Underperformance

                    Lack of Relevant Board Skills Hampering Effective Oversight

                 Our Solution: Highly Qualified, Independent Nominees

                                            Appendix

                                                                                      36

The Current Board Apparently Refuses to Face Reality
    ‡•’‹–‡Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡”—†‡”’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡ǡƒ•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–™ƒ•–‡‘ˆ•Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡” ƒ’‹–ƒŽƒ†‡‰ƒ–‹˜‡•Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”ˆ‡‡†„ƒ ǡthe
 incumbent Board seemingly refuses to assume accountability for its apparent failings and instead plans to spend $12
                                 million fighting a significant shareholder. 1 We believe:

          Š‡ ‘ƒ”† ”‡ˆ—•‡• –‘ –ƒ‡ ƒ ‘—–ƒ„‹Ž‹–› ˆ‘” –Š‡ ˆƒ – –Šƒ– –Š‡ Dz”ƒ† Ž—‡’”‹–dz •–”ƒ–‡‰› Šƒ• ˆƒ‹Ž‡† –‘ †‡Ž‹˜‡” ƒ†‡“—ƒ–‡
          ˜ƒŽ—‡ ˆ‘” •Šƒ”‡Š‘Ž†‡”• —†‡” ‹–• Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Š‹’Ǥ

          Š‡ ‘ƒ”† ”‡ˆ—•‡• –‘ ƒ ‘™Ž‡†‰‡ –Šƒ– –Š‡ Dz”ƒ† Ž—‡’”‹–dz •–”ƒ–‡‰› Šƒ• ˆƒ‹Ž‡† –‘ •Š‘™ ”‡˜‡—‡ ƒ† ‡ƒ”‹‰• ‰”‘™–Š
          ‹ ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘•—‡” „—•‹‡•• ȋ–Š‡ ’”‹‡ „‡‡ˆ‹ ‹ƒ”› ‘ˆ –Š‹• •–”ƒ–‡‰›Ȍ —†‡” ‹–• Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Š‹’Ǥ

          Š‡ ‘ƒ”† ”‡ˆ—•‡• –‘ ”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡ –Šƒ– ƒ•„”‘ǯ• ‘Ž› •‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ– ‘”‰ƒ‹ ‡ƒ”‹‰• ‰”‘™–Š ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Žƒ•– †‡ ƒ†‡ Šƒ• ‘‡
          ˆ”‘ ǡ ™Š‹ Š Šƒ• „‡‡ Š‹†‡”‡† Ȃ ”ƒ–Š‡” –Šƒ Š‡Ž’‡† „› –Š‹• •–”ƒ–‡‰›Ǥ

          Š‡ ‘ƒ”† ”‡ˆ—•‡• –‘ ƒ••—‡ ƒ ‘—–ƒ„‹Ž‹–› ˆ‘” ‘”–‰ƒ‰‹‰ ǯ• ƒ•Š ˆŽ‘™ ˆ‘” ‡š’‡•‹˜‡ǡ ˜ƒŽ—‡Ǧ†‡•–”— –‹˜‡
          ƒ “—‹•‹–‹‘• –Šƒ– –‘ †ƒ–‡ Šƒ˜‡ ”‡•—Ž–‡† ‹ ‘ „‡‡ˆ‹–• –‘ Ǥ

 Shareholders have an opportunity to install new directors with the requisite objectivity, track records of
         value creation and relevant skillsets to create enduring value and strengthen Hasbro.

           ͳǤ   Š––’•ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ•‡ Ǥ‰‘˜Ȁ” Š‹˜‡•Ȁ‡†‰ƒ”Ȁ†ƒ–ƒȀͲͲͲͲͲͶ͸ͲͺͲȀͲͲͲͳͳͻ͵ͳʹͷʹʹͳͳ͸͵͹ͳȀ†ʹ͵ͷ͸͸ͳ††‡ˆ ͳͶƒǤŠ–
                                                                                                                        37

The Current Board Has Overseen Concerning Governance Practices
 We believe there are significant governance issues at Hasbro, many of which can be traced back to what appears to be the
              Board’s historic prioritization of the Hassenfeld family’s interests over those of shareholders.

               Highly Questionable             Insular, Private Company              Misaligned Executive
                Chairman (pg. 39)                  Culture (pg. 40)                Compensation (pgs. 41-44)

                                                                    Unwillingness to
Lack of Effective Oversight       Insufficient Investor                                         Defensive and Reactionary
                                                                    Collaborate with
   of Strategy (pg. 45)          Disclosure (pg. 46-47)                                         Board Expansion (pg. 49)
                                                                  Shareholders (pg. 48)

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