The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox

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The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox
LECTURES BY
CLEVELAND CLINIC
A N D VISITING
FACULTY

                           The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to
                           learn more about anthrax and smallpox
                           STEVEN M . G O R D O N , M D                                                 clear idea of which of the people in the clinic
                           Department of Infectious Disease, Cleveland Clinic                           are at risk, how to treat those exposed, or how
                                                                                                        to prevent a disease outbreak. However, inter-
                           •     ABSTRACT                                                               national and domestic events are forcing us to
                                Threats of domestic terrorism and interna-                              realize that the possibility of bioterrorism must
                                tional news about germ warfare research                                 be taken seriously.
                                have forced us to recognize the potential                                    The most likely candidates for biological
                                menace of biological weapons. Both small-                               weapons are anthrax and smallpox. Both can
                                pox and anthrax could be used as biological                             be put into stable aerosol form in particles 5
                                                                                                        |im or smaller (the ideal size to be inhaled),
                                weapons. It is important for physicians to
                                                                                                        bypass the oropharynx, and reach the alveoli.
                                reacquaint themselves with these diseases,
                                                                                                        Both have small infective doses: the dose for
                                because if a domestic attack were to occur, it
                                                                                                        anthrax is thought to be fewer than 50,000
                                might first be recognized when patients with                            spores, and the dose for smallpox may be as
                                unusual symptoms began presenting to hos-                               few as 10 to 100 particles. They are inexpen-
                                pitals and primary care physicians. In this                             sive to develop, have a long shelf-life, and
Anthrax and                     article, w e discuss symptoms and treatments                            could cause widespread panic that could com-
                                for smallpox and anthrax, and suggest                                   pound the terror of the disease itself.
smallpox are                    resources for physicians who wish to learn
the most likely                 more about the subject.                                                  •      LESSONS OF THE PLANNED
                                                                                                                PARENTHOOD CASE
candidates for                       A D M I N I S T R A T I V E A S S I S T A N T sitting
                                      N
bioweapons                        alone at her desk at a Planned                                         The case described above actually occurred in
                           Parenthood clinic opens a letter. The enve-                                   Indiana in 1998. Hazardous materials (HAZ-
                           lope contains white powder and a threatening                                  MAT) experts responded to the scene wearing
                           note saying that the powder is anthrax spores.                                full protective gear, including self-contained
                           The assistant immediately dials 911, and                                      respirators. All 31 people in the building were
                           police arrive in minutes. The letter is sealed in                             considered possibly exposed to anthrax. They
                           a plastic bag and collected by the Federal                                    were told to place all clothing and personal
                           Bureau of Investigation.                                                      belongings in labeled plastic bags and take
                               The next phone call is to you as the physi-                               decontamination showers with soap, water,
                           cian on call. While the investigation contin-                                 and a dilute bleach solution in a tent set up on-
                           ues, you are asked for advice about preventive                                site. The administrative assistant underwent
                           health measures for the administrative assis-                                 seven decontamination showers. All were
                           tant, the police and emergency team respon-                                   taken to local emergency departments, where
                           ded, and the 31 adults and children who hap-                                  some had to undergo additional decontamina-
                           pened to be in the clinic when the envelope                                   tion under local hospital policy, and all were
                           was opened.                                                                   started on oral ciprofloxacin. The desktop was
                                What should you do?                                                      washed with full-strength household bleach.1
                                Anthrax occurs so rarely under ordinary                                       The threat was exposed as a hoax after
                           circumstances that few of us would have a                                     both the state health department and a

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The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox
Department of Defense laboratory failed to                 germ warfare program was large and well-
find any evidence of anthrax in the powder or              funded, and with the fall of the Soviet Union
the envelope.                                              and the collapse of the Russian economy, it is
    As we will see later in this article, the              feared that Soviet scientists may be willing to
response to the threat was prompt and thor-                sell their expertise to other nations.
ough, but may actually have been more                           Inspections in Iraq have documented
aggressive than necessary. In my opinion,                  research into biological and chemical
even if the Planned Parenthood hoax had                    weapons.
involved genuine anthrax, the situation                         The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, which
would be frightening but not actually very                 killed 12 and injured 5,000 with a release of
dangerous. A review of the disease's symp-                 sarin nerve gas into a Tokyo subway in 1995,
toms, forms, and therapies will show why.                  had a bioterrorism research program and had
                                                           stockpiled anthrax and botulinum toxins.
•   A BRIEF HISTORY
    OF BIOLOGICAL W E A P O N S                            Recent US incidents
                                                           In 1998, there were 38 anthrax hoaxes affect-
C a t a p u l t e d corpses                                ing 5,000 people in the United States. But
One of the earliest uses of biological weapons             bioterrorism in this country should not be
occurred in 1346 when besieging Tartars cata-              considered only a hoax. A 1984 salmonella
pulted corpses of their own men who had died               outbreak in Oregon was traced to the
of plague, over the walls of the city of Kaffa             Rajneeshee cult, whose members had contam-
(now Feodosia, Ukraine).                                   inated salad bars in at least 10 restaurants in a
       Smallpox-contaminated clothing was                  training exercise for a larger attack designed
deliberately distributed to Native Americans               to influence a local election.1
by European settlers, contributing to devastat-
ing epidemics in both North and South                      •        ANTHRAX
America.
                                                           Anthrax is caused by spore-forming gram-pos-                          In 1998, there
W o r l d War II and t h e Cold War                        itive bacilli, and is primarily a disease of sheep
By World War II, biological weapons were the               and cattle which under natural circumstances                          were 38
focus of nationally supported research in                  infects humans very rarely. Outbreaks in US                           anthrax hoaxes
Japan, Germany, the United States, and other               cattle have declined steadily since 1945. The
countries. By the end of the war, the United               last fatal human case in this country was con-                        in the U.S.
States had stockpiled 5,000 anthrax bombs.                 tracted in 1976 from wool imported from
Research and development continued until                   Pakistan. Since 1988, there has been no more
Richard Nixon closed the program and                       than one human case per year. Thus, a single
ordered the arsenal destroyed by 1973. The                 case of human anthrax is a sentinel event, and
international Biological Weapons Convention                the possibility of bioterrorism should be con-
prohibiting bioweapons use went into effect in             sidered.
1975. However, bioweapons research contin-
ued in many countries that signed the treaty as            Forms of anthrax
well as in others that did not.                                Cutaneous anthrax, which accounts for
      This was dramatically confirmed in 1992              95% of naturally occurring human anthrax
when Boris Yeltsin conceded what epidemio-                 infections, develops when spores encounter
logical evidence had already suggested, that a             traumatized skin, often on the face or hands.
 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now                  A painless black eschar develops and is gener-
Ekaterinburg), Russia, stemmed from an unin-               ally accompanied by marked edema. This
tentional release of aerosolized anthrax from a            form of anthrax, which can occasionally be
military microbiology laboratory. Seventy-                 transmitted by contact, can usually be cured
seven cases occurred downwind of the labora-               with antibiotics. However, untreated cases
tory, and 66 of the victims died. Incubation               may become systemic and fatal. The incuba-
periods ranged from 1 to 43 days.2 The Soviet              tion period can be from 1 to 7 days.

                                CLEVELAND   CLINIC   JOURNAL   OF   MEDICINE   VOLUME   66   •   NUMBER   10   NOVE MBER   / D EC E M B E R   1999   585

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The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox
MEDICAL GRAND ROUNDS

  TABLE 1
        Diagnosis and t r e a t m e n t of a n t h r a x and smallpox
        AGENT             DIAGNOSTIC                   DIAGNOSTIC               PATIENT                 THERAPY                    POSTEXPOSURE                  VACCINE
                          SAMPLES                      ASSAY                    ISOLATION                                          PROPHYLAXIS
                                                                                PRECAUTIONS

        Anthrax          Blood                       Gram stain                Standard                 Ciprofloxacin            Ciprofloxacin                   Licensed vaccine
                         (handled at                 Antigen ELISA             precautions              400 mg IV                500 mg PO                       0.5 mL SC
                         biosafety                   Serology                                           every 8 - 1 2 hr         twice a day                     at 0, 2, 4 weeks
                         level 2)                                                                                                for 4 weeks;                    and 6 , 1 2 , 1 8 mo;
                                                                                                        Doxycycline              if unvaccinated                 annual booster
                                                                                                        200 mg IV,               begin initial
                                                                                                        then 100 mg IV           doses of vaccine
                                                                                                        every 8 - 1 2 h*
        Smallpox         Pharyngeal swab             ELISA                     Precautions              Cidofovir is              Vaccinia immune                Licensed vaccine
                         Scab material               PCR                       for airborne             effective in              globulin 0.6 rnL/kg            is Wyeth calf
                         (handled at                 Virus isolation           pathogens                vitro                     IM within 3 days               lymph vaccinia
                         biosafety level                                                                                          of exposure
                         2-3)                                                                                                     (best within 24 h)             Investigational
                                                                                                                                                                 cell-culture vaccinia
                                                                                                                                  Vaccination if                 has been developed
                                                                                                                                  > 3 years since                by Department of
                                                                                                                                  last vaccination               Defense

        "Other alternatives include penicillin, gentamicin, erythromycin, and chloramphenicol
        ELISA=enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; PCR = polymerase chain reaction; PO=by mouth, IV=intravenously; SC=subcutaneously
          SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM FRANZ DR, JÄHRLING PB, FRIEDLAND A M , ET AL. CLINICAL RECOGNITION A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF PATIENTS E>POSED TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS.
                                                                                                                                                       J A M A 1 9 9 7 ; 2 7 8 : 3 9 9 - 4 1 1.

                                      Inhalational anthrax, a rapidly fatal ill-                                      A n t h r a x as a w e a p o n
                                 ness commonly known as woolsorters' disease,                                         Aerosolized anthrax could be a potent
                                 accounts for most of the remaining natural                                           weapon that could be released from aircraft or
                                 cases. Inhaled spores are ingested by pul-                                           into a building, with a mortality rate of up to
                                 monary macrophages and carried to hilar and                                          80%. Fortunately, there are limitations to the
                                 mediastinal lymph nodes, where they germi-                                           danger posed by anthrax. The spores are not
                                 nate and multiply. The incubation period may                                         volatile, so they will not aerosolize sponta-
                                 range from 2 to 60 days. Nonspecific flulike                                         neously. Spores can infect cutaneously only
                                 symptoms develop first, followed after 2 to 4                                        through breaks in the skin, posing little risk to
                                 days by abrupt respiratory failure, hemody'                                          intact skin. In addition, person-to-person
                                 namic collapse, pronounced pulmonary                                                 spread has never been documented, meaning
                                 edema, and death. Meningitis occurs in half of                                       that an infected person would not trigger an
                                 cases. Chest radiographs may show a widened                                          epidemic.4
                                 mediastinum and pleural effusions. Gram-pos-
                                 itive bacilli may be noted in blood cultures.                                        A n t h r a x vaccine
                                 Transmission from person to person has never                                         A n anthrax vaccine was developed in the
                                 been documented.                                                                     1950s using an avirulent strain that elaborates
                                      Gastrointestinal anthrax is a rare conse-                                       only protective antigen and produces a protec-
                                 quence of eating contaminated meat.                                                  tive antibody response in 7 days. The current
                                 Symptoms are pain, nausea, vomiting, and                                             vaccine requires an onerous schedule, with
                                 fever, with bloody diarrhea and hematemesis,                                         doses at 0, 2, and 4 weeks, and 6, 12, and 18
                                 with progression to toxemia and sepsis. This                                         months, followed by annual boosters (TABLE 1 ) . 5
                                 form is difficult to diagnose and almost uni-                                        This vaccine has not been the subject of any
                                 versally fatal. Incubation is 1 to 7 days.3                                          controlled studies; the only study has shown a

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The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox
protective effect against cutaneous anthrax,                          The Planned Parenthood case described
hut numbers were too small to determine                          earlier in this article would have posed little
whether the vaccine also protects against the                    serious threat of disease, even if the powder in
inhalational form. The US military first vacci-                  the envelope had been anthrax. As anthrax
nated troops during the Gulf War and now                         spores are not volatile, it was unlikely that the
routinely vaccinates all personnel, a practice                   administrative assistant inhaled the spores
that has sparked a political controversy about                   and very unlikely that anybody else did. The
the vaccine's safety.                                            self-contained respirators used by emergency
                                                                 personnel responding to the scene were prob-
Therapies for anthrax                                            ably not necessary. The spores would be likely
Antibiotic prophylaxis for inhalational                          to cause cutaneous infection only if the assis-
anthrax appears to be most effective before                      tant had preexisting breaks in her skin.
respiratory symptoms develop, but it is diffi-                   Decontamination showers and prophylaxis
cult in naturally occurring cases to begin ther-                 were probably indicated for the assistant, but
apy early because the nonspecific prodrome is                    not for the others in the building.
virtually impossible to distinguish from flu or
other less serious diseases.                                     •        SMALLPOX
     The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) recommends postexpo-                            It is important to reeducate physicians about
sure prophylaxis with ciprofloxacin or anoth-                    smallpox because it has not been seen in the
er fluoroquinolone twice daily, with doxycy-                     United States since the 1940s. The last nat-
cline the second agent of choice. Although                       urally occurring case in the world occurred
natural anthrax is very susceptible to peni-                     in 1977 in Somalia, and in 1980, the World
cillin, military experts decided in 1991 that                    Health Organization declared smallpox
Iraq and Russia both had the technology to                       eradicated. Routine childhood vaccination
develop penicillin-resistant strains. The                        was discontinued in the United States in
quinolones would also be effective against                       1972. The strength of any remaining immu-
plague and tularemia, which may be difficult                     nity among those who were vaccinated as                              Smallpox rash
to distinguish from anthrax in the field.                        children is not known, but only about 15%
Antibiotics would have to be taken for at                        of the population is thought to have any
                                                                                                                                      often develops
least 8 weeks after exposure, because the                        immunity.                                                            on the soles
spores can lie dormant in the hilar lymph                             Smallpox, caused by the variola virus,
nodes for up to 6 weeks before germinating.                      used to be a universal disease of childhood,
                                                                                                                                      and palms
Alternately, antibiotics could be given for 4                    killing many victims but leaving the sur-
weeks while the first 3 doses of vaccine are                     vivors with prolonged immunity. The disease
administered.1-3 In either case, these proce-                    begins with high fever and myalgia, with the
dures would clearly strain local supplies of                     characteristic rash forming on about the
antibiotics as well as vaccine in the event of                   fourth day, starting as macules and progress-
a large-scale exposure.                                          ing to papules and vesicles, scabbing over at
                                                                 1 to 2 weeks. It typically begins on the face,
CDC r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for anthrax t h r e a t s      oropharynx, and arms, spreading later to the
Standards published by the CDC 1 after sever-                    trunk and legs, and the vesicles often devel-
al recent anthrax hoaxes recommend decont-                       op on the palms and soles. Smallpox is con-
amination showers with soap and water only,                      tagious from the formation of the rash until
with no bleach. They also state that exposed                     scabs separate at about 3 weeks. The lesions
surfaces should be decontaminated with dilute                    have a synchronous onset. Death, which
bleach solution, not full-strength bleach.                       generally occurs in the second week of ill-
Chemoprophylaxis is recommended for 8                            ness, apparently results from toxemia.
weeks in the absence of a vaccine, for 4 weeks                   Smallpox is transmitted most often through
in combination with the first 3 doses of the                     airborne droplets but can also be passed by
vaccine, or until the threat of anthrax has                      contact. Its incubation period ranges from 7
been excluded.                                                   to 17 days, averaging 12 days.6

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The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox
Forms of smallpox                                          one of the last European outbreaks. A German
     Variola major, the most severe form of                returning from a trip to Pakistan in 1970 devel-
smallpox, has a case-fatality rate of about 30%            oped a fever and was quarantined with suspect-
in unvaccinated populations. When the rash                 ed typhoid. He developed the characteristic
and mucous membranes become hemorrhag-                     smallpox rash 4 or 5 days later and was immedi-
ic, a phenomenon occurring mostly in preg-                 ately taken to a special smallpox isolation hos-
nant women, the course of the disease is more              pital that had been maintained for just such
severe and mortality even higher. A confluent              emergencies. Mass vaccinations were conduct-
rash indicates a severe form of smallpox, and a            ed in the region, and a number of sick patients
discrete rash a less serious one. Variola minor            were also given vaccinia immune globulin
or alastrim is a much less virulent form of                (V1G). Even though the index patient had
smallpox with a case-fatality rate of about 1%.            been quarantined at the first hospital and the
                                                           German population was already well vaccinat-
D i f f e r e n t i a l diagnoses                          ed, 19 additional cases developed among the
During the onset of smallpox, nonspecific                  patients and staff at the first hospital. It is
fever and myalgia may simulate flu. Measles                thought that the patient's cough, unusual in
may be ruled out if the mouth and throat have              smallpox, helped disperse more virus than usual
no Koplik's spots. Chickenpox rash is cen-                 in aerosolized form. Most alarming, one of the
tripetal, denser on the trunk than on the                  cases developed in a visitor who opened a hall-
extremities, and virtually never develops on               way door about 30 feet from the patient's room
the palms and soles. Also, in chickenpox,                  to ask directions, spending no more than about
eruptions of different stages of maturation are            15 minutes in the hospital.7
found next to each other, whereas smallpox is
generally at the same stage of development                 Vaccines and therapies
everywhere on the body. Monkeypox is a rare                There are no known treatments for smallpox.
disease very similar to smallpox that may be               Cidofovir is effective in vitro (TABLE 1 ) .
ruled out by the absence of history of travel to                    The vaccine may prevent or ameliorate ill-
western Africa. Generalized vaccinia infec-                ness if given within 3 or 4 days of exposure.                          Smallpox
tion, an occasional consequence of the vac-                Passive immunization in the form of vaccinia
cinia vaccine still given to a few high-risk               immune globulin is most effective when admin-                          vaccine is
workers, may also resemble smallpox.3                      istered in the first 24 hours after exposure. '3                       effective but
        Diagnosis can be confirmed by electron                      Although the vaccinia vaccine is very
microscopy of vesicular scrapings or gel diffu-            effective, it would be difficult to reinstitute a                      has serious
sion testing of vesicular fluid antigen against            L i n i v e r s a l vaccine program. First, we have only               risks, including
vaccinia antiserum. Light microscopy can                   a small stockpile of vaccine (5 to 10 million
reveal intracytoplasmic variola particles, the             doses in the United States and perhaps 70                              death
Guarnieri bodies.                                          million worldwide) and no technology for
                                                           rapidly manufacturing more.
S m a l l p o x as a w e a p o n                                    The vaccine is not benign. At least one
Smallpox weapons could be developed in                     death per 1 million can be expected, as well as
small laboratories with only a few thousand                serious complications including secondary
dollars' worth of equipment. Like anthrax,                 autoinoculations, generalized vaccinia infec-
smallpox can be aerosolized for maximum                    tion, eczema vaccinatum, and post-vaccine
effect. Although surviving smallpox cultures               encephalitis.
are kept in only two labs, a C D C lab in
Atlanta, and a Russian one, the security of the            •        TO LEARN MORE
Russian lab has been in question ever since
the fall of the Soviet Union.                              Physicians who wish to learn more about bio-
     Smallpox could be an even more devastat-              logical weapons should begin with the C D C
ing weapon than anthrax because it is easily               Web site (www.cdc.gov), which contains a
spread from person to person. The extreme con-             wealth of resources accessible with the search-
tagiousness of smallpox was demonstrated by                term "bioterrorism."

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The threat of bioterrorism: A reason to learn more about anthrax and smallpox
1999 REVIEWERS                                                                                         MEDICAL GRAND R O U N D S
                                                                                                                                                                            •
                                                                                                      One important document available on the
W       e thank those who reviewed manuscripts submitted to
        the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine for the year end-
ing September 30, 1999. Reviewing papers for scientific jour-
                                                                                                 site is the "Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: A
                                                                                                 Template for Healthcare Facilities," a set of
nals is an arduous task and involves considerable time and                                       guidelines for managing patients with diseases
effort. We are grateful to these reviewers for contributing their                                that may be related to bioweapons.8
expertise this past year.—John D. Clough, MD, Editor-in-Chief.                                        Guidelines for responding to both genuine
                                                                                                 anthrax attacks and anthrax hoaxes have been
Achkar, Edgar                     Gifford, Ray W Jr          Murphy, Daniel J                    published by the C D C in Morbidity and
Anderson, Charles                 Gordon, Steven M           Nahman, N Stanley Jr                Mortality Weekly Report.1
Antman, Elliot                    Gorensek, Margaret         Nally, Joseph V                          The August 6, 1997 issue of JAMA was
Baker, David                      Grant, R Peery             Nickerson, Paul E                   dedicated to bioterrorism and contains a valu-
Ballas, Samir                     Groene, Linda              Olin, Jeffrey W                     able review by Franz et aP of the signs and
Barnett, Gene H                   Grossman, Joshua           Overmoyer, Beth A                   symptoms of diseases with possible bioweapons
Bartholomew, John R               Hall, Phillip M            Palmer, Robert M                    significance. The July-August 1999 issue of
Belinson, Jerome L                Handel, Daniel             Ploro, Mathilde                     Emerging Infectious Diseases was also dedicated
Berner, Lynn                      Hayden, Stephen P          Radwany, Steven                     to coverage of bioterrorism, focusing on the
Blumenthal, David E               Hebert, Lee                Raisz, Lawrence                     National Symposium on Bioterrorism held at
Borzak, Steven                    Hedrick, Sterling          Reddy, Sethu K
                                                                                                 Johns Hopkins University in February 1999.9
Braun, William E                  Henry, Catherine A         Rein, Michael                       A recent review article in the New England
Brenner, Robert                   Hoffman, Gary S            Richard, Thomas C
                                                                                                 Journal of Medicine contains additional in-
Branson, David L                  Howard, Robert             Richter, Joel E
                                                                                                 depth information about anthrax.10
Bukowski, Ronald M                Hutzier, Jeffery C         Rollins, Michael B                       In an emergency, physicians are urged to
Burke, Carol A                    Isaacson, J Harry          Rooney, Theodore W                  contact their local health departments. Further
Cain, Robert A                    Jaeger, Fredrick J         Rosenbaum, Harvey                    information on diagnostics, medical manage-
Calabrese, Leonard H              James, Karen B             Roth, Mark                          ment, and vaccines can be obtained from the
Cannon, Chris                     Juhasz, Robert S           Sahgal, Vinod                       Commander, US Army Military Research
Caravella, Philip                 Keys, Thomas F             Sandhu, Satinderpal                 Institute for Infectious Diseases, at (phone)
Carey, William D                  Kratche, Richard P         Schubert, A r m i n                 301-619-2833 or (fax) 301-619-4625.            •
Carter, Lynne                     Kunkel, Robert             Segal, Allen M
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