The role of gendered emotions in ratifying the Treaty of Cambrai, 1529-1530 Susan Broomhall, The University of Western Australia

English-language version of author-submitted manuscript to the collection La Paix des Dames,
1529 (eds) Jonathan Dumont, Laure Fagnart, Pierre-Gilles Girault & Nicolas Le Roux (Presses
Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2021) Please cite from the published version of the text.

The role of gendered emotions in ratifying the Treaty of Cambrai, 1529-1530
Susan Broomhall, The University of Western Australia

The Treaty of Cambrai has long been celebrated as the work of powerful women, encapsulated
in its popular appellation, the Ladies’ Peace. This narrative, which foregrounds the central role
in its negotiation by Marguerite d’Autriche and Louise de Savoie, on behalf of the Habsburg
Emperor, Charles V, and French monarch, François Ier respectively, was equally advanced in
contemporary chronicles, poems, prints, and commemorative medals as well as in the
epistolary records of both male and female political protagonists. Historian Jane de Iongh
reflects the common scholarly view in proclaiming the treaty “the triumph of feminine
diplomacy over masculine force”.1 In this essay, I want to explore the ways in which emotions,
as textual expressions and bodily performances, were central to the treaty’s development and
ratification, particularly as these were framed in gendered terms. I argue that the gendered
construction of emotions of that was pivotal to the Treaty of Cambrai contained significant
messages concerning perceptions of men and women’s respective capacity for political
engagement.

This analysis encompasses textual sources that documented not only the delicate diplomatic
development of the treaty published in the cathedral at Cambrai on 5 August 1529, but also the
subsequent negotiations over the following year. These included the consummation of the
marriage between Éléonore d’Autriche and François Ier, the return of the Valois heirs, the
restitution of towns such as Hesdin, the recognition of the heritage of Charles, connétable and
duc de Bourbon (through his sister and heir, Louise de Bourbon, princesse de Roche-Sur-Yon)
and the transfer of a significant sum of gold and treasures. At the same time, pressing issues in
1530 imposed new challenges on the key protagonists as well as their agents, not least attacks
by Netherlandish pirates against the French and the ongoing marital drama of Henry VIII and
Katherine of Aragon, Charles’ aunt. The diplomatic work of this treaty by no means ended
with the swearing of oaths of commitment at the cathedral in Cambrai but had to be carefully
worked through to bring to fruition. The eighteenth-month period from 1529 to 1530 that is the
focus here was thus critical to whether the treaty’s ideas and agreements would be delivered,
not only by the leading female protagonist who sought to secure the legacy of their labours,
but also by the male diplomatic personnel who were charged with achieving it.

Research for this essay was supported by a Discovery Grant (DP180102412), held at The
University of Western Australia, funded by the Australia Research Council. I am grateful for
the insights and feedback of the editors on this work.
1
  de Iongh Jane, Margaret of Austria, Regent of the Netherlands, New York, Norton, 1942, p.
247.

The role of gender in diplomatic negotiations has recently become the focus of close attention
by early modern scholars, including in the Ladies’ Peace itself.2 There can be no question that
elite women were expertly placed, by their to and fro between natal and marital dynasties for
example, to manage delicate diplomatic negotiations, and often did so. This essay explores an
area of gendered diplomatic relations that has been less considered to date, that of the role of
emotions in contemporaries’ understanding of the nature of diplomatic work. Here, I examine
how emotions, specifically feelings that were accredited to men and women differently, were
expressed in text and performed through the bodies of a range of personnel associated with
these exchanges. These concerned only the treaty’s authors, Marguerite d’Autriche and Louise
de Savoie, and the male leaders on whose behalf they acted, Charles and François, but also
women attached to the French court such as Charles’ sister and François’ new bride, Éléonore
d’Autriche, and François’ sister, Marguerite de Navarre. These individuals were joined in their
labours by a suite of diplomatic personnel including the grand master, Anne de Montmorency,
and the Emperor’s envoys to the ratification, Guillaume des Barres, Charles de Poupet de la
Chaulx, Louis de Flandre, seigneur de Praet and Jehan de la Sauch. Additionally, both
Marguerite and Louise had sent to each other’s courts their own men to act as personal avatars
for their own positions and feelings, Gilles de la Pommeraye for Louise and François de
Bonvalot and Philippe de Lalaing for Marguerite respectively, as Marguerite explains to
Charles, “pour tant mieux effectuer l’amyité dernièrement dressée”.3

There is now a large literature recognising that the nature of emotional ideas, practices and
expressions must be interpreted in precise historical contexts that include their social, cultural,
political and linguistic dimensions.4 Feelings were central to diplomatic conversations at any
time, as they were gestured in person, enacted through bodies and expressed through
documents. 5 Their emotional formulations were inflected by many factors, such as their

2
  Sluga Glenda and James Carolyn (ed.), Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since
1500, London, Routledge, 2016; Fletcher Catherine, “The Ladies’ Peace Revisited: Gender,
Counsel and Diplomacy”, in Queenship and Counsel in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Helen
Matheson-Pollock, Joanne Paul and Catherine Fletcher, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan,
2018.
3
  31 August 1529: Archives générales du Royaume, Papers d’État et d’Audience, no 38, p. 100
cited in de Boom Ghislaine, Correspondance de Marguerite d’Autriche et de ses ambassadeurs
à la cour de France, Bruxelles, Maurice Lamertin, 1935, p. 2, note 1.
4
  For the medieval and early modern context relevant here, see Broomhall Susan, (ed.), Early
Modern Emotions. An Introduction, London, Routledge, 2015.
5
  On the gendered nature of diplomatic emotional exchange, see Adams Tracy, “Married
Noblewomen as Diplomats: Affective Diplomacy” and Broomhall Susan, “Ordering Distant
Affections: Fostering Love and Loyalty in the Correspondence of Catherine de Medici to the
Spanish Court, 1568–1572”, in Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe:
Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder, ed. by Susan Broomhall, Farnham, Ashgate, 2015;
Broomhall Susan, “Diplomatic Emotions: International relations as gendered acts of power”,
in The Routledge History to Emotions in Europe, 1100-1700, ed. by Andrew Lynch and Susan
Broomhall, London, Routledge, 2019; Broomhall Susan, “Catherine’s tears: diplomatic
corporeality and gender at the sixteenth-century French court”, in Fluid Bodies: Rethinking

composition by women and men in different political positions in these negotiations and agents
with varied levels of experience, delegated authority, and leadership within the diplomatic
corps that they represented. These performed emotional states and messages may have
reflected lived experiences of these individuals, but what they certainly did was convey
carefully constructed political positions of their protagonists. In doing so, as the following
sections will explore, they invoked shared understanding of particular emotional states as more
commonly felt by women or men, making gendered emotions, as both practices and as ideas,
central to diplomatic work.

Sisters and mothers

Structuring the peace as motivated by noble sentiments, feelings that women were claimed to
feel most keenly, assisted the embattled French who sought out the negotiations in early 1529.
Of course, as Catherine Fletcher has recently pointed out, both the women accredited with ‘The
Ladies’ Peace’ were equally engaged with military campaigns as well, as were other
contemporary female leaders. 6 Nonetheless, in the context of these negotiations, it was
perceptions of the shame and dishonour that would be attached to François, which was essential
to understanding the leading role his mother, Louise, took on in brokering discussions.

To tell it from the Habsburg side, it was Louise who first approached Marguerite and who
provided the rationale for these negotiations.7 In a detailed letter of 31 December 1529, Pierre
de Rosimbos, premier maître d’hôtel et chef de finances of Marguerite and Guillaume des
Barres, her secretaire en ordonnance, explained to the Emperor how the possibility of such
talks had been broached. Des Barres had been in Paris where Louise had revealed to him her
apparent fears that the ongoing conflict would “engendrer une perpetuelle hayne entre ces deux
princes” and that “nul n‘estoit plus tenu d’y sercher remede que elle et madame, consideré la
proximité du sang que leur estoient iceulx princes”. 8 Louise explained that she wished to
encourage the king to “delaissat toutes rancunes et se rengeast à la paix” and asked Des Barres
to ascertain if his mistress, Marguerite, could do the same for her nephew, Charles; “esperant
que, si elle se vouloit employer en cest endroit d’aussi bonne affection que elle, il en sortiroit
bon effect”.9

Soon after Des Barres’ return to Marguerite’s court had arrived Gilbert Bayard, sieur de Font,
presenting letters from Louise that indicated his authority to speak secretly on her behalf. These
again expressed her “regretz” about the war and the “reproches et injures entrevenues entre

Expressions of Bodies and Their Fluids in Pre-Modern Literature, Theology, and Art, ed. by
Anne M. Scott and Michael Barbezat, Amsterdam: ARC Humanities Press, 2019.
6
  Fletcher C, “The Ladies’ Peace…”, op. cit., p. 122.
7
  On earlier overtures from Louise to Marguerite in the early 1520s, see Fletcher C, “The Ladies’
Peace…”, op. cit., p. 122.
8
  Le Glay, (ed.), Négociations diplomatiques entre la France et l’Autriche durant les trente
premières années du XVIe siècle. Tome 2, Paris, Imprimerie Royale, 1845, p. 677, 677–78.
9
  Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 678.

eulx, et de defension du pis et des maulx et inconvenians” for all Christendom as a result of the
conflict.10 Marguerite had, however, rejected this overture, insisting that any negotiations for
peace needed clear evidence in whose name such dealings were being undertaken.11 Some five
weeks later, Bayard returned with a letter in which Louise argued instead that “les deux dames
pourroient entre elles et d’elles-mesmes, sans povoir par lettres patentes des deux princes, ….
pourroient traicter en prenans fondement et faisans le preambule d’icelluy” and that, moreover,
they should do so

       considerant les grans erreurs et troubles seismatiques qui croissant et pululent chacun jour … les
       invahissements que le Turc a fait … les mors de tant de noble hommes et autres bons et loyaulx serviteurs
       de leurs princes et seigneurs, les ruynes et desolacions et autres maulx infiniz .. à cause desdites guerres.12

France had far more to lose by continued warfare and Louise thus far more to gain from
situating the overture to talks not as a shameful act of submission by François but rather as the
honourable duty of women to work for peace. Over time, these were ideas that Marguerite
came likewise to embrace and that enabled her to enjoy a significant diplomatic role.

In addition to these imperatives as women to work for peace in Christendom, personal goodwill
between the women was regularly foregrounded as a foundation that could overcome any
obstacles that the negotiations might face. A strong sisterly bond was central to the narrative
that brought together Marguerite and Louise, both of whom had been raised at the court of
France under the watchful eye of Anne de France. It was their excellent rapport that would,
Marguerite argued to her nephew, overcome the challenges of the negotiations before them:
“semble que je pourray beaucop mieulx praticquer leffect de vostre intencion, et de degree en
degree avec ladicte dame Dangoumois, que par autre main tierce et par envoyer et renvoyer.”13
The affective experience of the rapport that they had engendered in Cambrai would be recalled
time and again over the following year. Philippe de Lalaing, Marguerite’s personal agent at the
French court, was tasked by his mistress to encourage Louise not to “mectre en oubly la bonne
compaignie qu’elle a veu à Cambray et l’honnesteté et bonne amytié qu’elle y a trouvé”.14 The
assumptions about their shared motivations could overcome all difficulties, as Marguerite to
Louise: “vtre bon vouloir leql est sans doubte reciproque en vers vous.”15 Each finished her
letters as the other’s “bonne seur”, foregrounding the personal affective connection from their
childhood that bound them to a shared goal.

However, the diplomatic power of Marguerite and Louise’s negotiations also had its roots in
wider perceptions of maternal feelings and their influence. Bayard assured Marguerite that
François would follow the diplomatic lead developed by his mother, as

10
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 678.
11
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 678.
12
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 681.
13
   26 May 1529: Lanz Karl (ed.), Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V, vol 1, Leipzig, FA
Brockhaus, 1844, p. 301. The part in italics was in cypher in the original text.
14
   8 September 1529: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 3.
15
   Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), Ms Fr. 3016, fol 45.

il n’y a nulle autre tierce personne sur laquelle il puist avoir ne prendre meilleur cause ne fondement de
       agreer ce que il faindroit avoir esté traicté par sadite mere à son ignorance, sans son sceu, et soubz son
       bon plaisir, pour l’amour et reverence filiale.16

Similarly, Charles’ authority for Marguerite to advance negotiations on his behalf, represented
her “comme de tante & mère, elle avoit singulière affection de s’employer à dresser & conduire
la dicte paix”. 17

Equally significant for advancing negotiations was the perceived desire of a good wife and
mother to reunite with her children. In these exchanges, the woman who positioned herself as
the mother of François’ heirs, François and Henri, was not their biological mother, Claude de
France, who had passed away, but instead their step-mother, François’ second wife, Éléonore
d’Autriche. Éléonore, the sister of Charles V, was actively involved in a campaign of
correspondence with her Habsburg relatives and agents, as well as those of her Valois spouse,
to secure the release of the children as rapidly as possible.18 Elite women continually juggled
multiple obligations to male relatives as did Éléonore, from her brother Charles to her husband
François. Indeed, Éléonore was just as much an object and agent in diplomatic exchange as
were the Valois children. In these missives, she invoked her feelings as a mother as the impetus
for her impassioned pleas, who “ne leur désire moins de bien et salut que leur propre mère,
qu’en l’amour que leur porte pour telle me tiens”. 19 Éléonore’s perceived commitment,
alongside her aunt and mother-in-law, to improving relations between the Habsburg and Valois
as the treaty intended was widely praised by contemporaries. Lalaing and his colleague,
François de Bonvalot, wrote eagerly to Marguerite of their interview with Éléonore in July
1530 in which she told them that she would “faire tous extremes à ce que ladite paix et amytié
doibve perpétuer, desmonstrant quant à ce merveilleuse affection”.20

Elite women were recognised as negotiating multiple dynastic alliances and sentimental ties
both to male family and to other women, as mothers and sisters in particular. The intense
emotional states that these different relationships were imagined to engender in women gave
them authority to intervene in such a crises. Indeed, counter-balancing the potentially
competitive nature of women’s multiple bonds was a challenge that elite women regularly
faced and a form of expertise that could justify their leadership in the delicate diplomatic
environment of this peace.

16
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 683.
17
   de Quinsonas E (ed.), Matériaux pour server à l’histoire de Marguerite d’Autriche, vol 3,
Paris, Delaroque Frères, 1809, p. 342.
18
   See Pardanaud Chloé, “Plaider, convaincre, entrer en scène. Éléonore d’Autriche et la
liberation des Enfants de France, d’après sa correspondance inédite”, Seizième Siècle, 4, 2008,
p 195-216.
19
   To François Ier, BnF Ms Fr. 2980, fol 86 à 90 cited in Pardanaud C, “Plaider, convaincre…”,
op. cit., p. 202.
20
   15 July 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 123.

Pride and honour

If women’s emotional imperatives as sisters and mothers were foregrounded in negotiations of
the treaty, so too was elite women’s attention to their own honour.21 That the success of this
peace was a very personal matter to Marguerite and Louise was clear to all concerned. Éléonore,
for example, wrote of her desire for the alliance to succeed to Louise; that is, “à celle que je
sais qui a toute puissance, et que par votre moyen se doit le tout conclure”.22 But these claims
to the treaty as the work of women, was also a presentation that Marguerite and Louise took
ownership of themselves. Marguerite thus described to Anne de Montmorency, the arrival of
Éléonore and the Valois children as “comme de la perfection de chose dont madame dame et
moy nous sommes entremises” and named herself the “autrice de la paix”.23 Likewise, Louise
wrote to Marguerite that she looked forward to the day when she could “s’esjouir avec vous
des labeurs commungs”.24 These women’s attention to the ratification of the treaty was thus a
matter of personal pride in their political achievements.

The call to elite female honour could be diplomatically powerful. At challenging moments,
both women were called upon not to risk dishonour through action or inaction. In March 1530,
for example, when Marguerite was seeking stronger French support in the plight of Katherine
of Aragon, she insisted to her agents, Bonvalot and Lalaing, that they ought to “parler ung mot
à Madame ma seur, de bonne sorte, luy remonstrant qu’elle doibt garder l’honneur des dames
et princesses, en chose tant honneste et favourable”.25 Similarly, François implicitly invoked
Marguerite’s honour in describing the illicit actions of Netherlandish ships that had attacked
French vessels off the English coast. “C’est choze qui est de très mauvaise exemple,” he wrote,
“qui, à mon avis, a esté faite sans vostre sceu en consentement, attendu la bonne paix et amytié
d’entre l’Empereur, mon bon frère, et moy, de laquelle vous avez esté en partie médiatrisse.”26
Marguerite replied just as François had hoped, that these wrongdoers should be punished and
that she trusted the king believed her strong desire to maintain peace.

Yet, while the honour of Marguerite and Louise was central to their ongoing commitment to
the achievement of the treaty, they had also constructed male emotions in precise ways that
had implications for understandings about women’s political engagements. Women created
narratives not simply as protagonists for peace, but also as proponents of ideas about male
emotions. These interpretations, on the one hand, enabled the involvement of Marguerite and
Louise specifically in the affairs of Habsburgs and Valois in Europe, but, on the other, they
would prove detrimental to perceptions of female political participation more broadly.

21
   On the nature of contemporary discussions about women’s honour, see Broomhall Susan,
“Gendering the culture of honour at the fifteenth-century Burgundian court”, in Women,
Identities and Communities in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Stephanie Tarbin and Susan
Broomhall, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008.
22
   BnF Ms Fr. 2980, fol 92 à 94, cited in Pardanaud C, “Plaider, convaincre…”, op. cit., p. 202.
23
   8 July 1530 and 11 October 1529: BNF Ms Fr. 2997, fols 17, 25.
24
   13 October 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 193.
25
   24 March 1529: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 42.
26
   10 August 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 145–6.

Firstly, Marguerite and Louise argued for their ability to negotiate the treaty because of
women’s particular talents at assuaging men’s feelings. Marguerite, for example, told her
nephew, should “quelque chose de malentendu entre voz deux Majestez”, he should leave
matters to her and Louise to resolve: “Madame la Régente et moy userions de noz ars et
adoulcirons leurs affaires.”27 But she did not make clear whether these ‘arts’ were borne of
long years of experience and education specific to these two women, or were innate skills of
the female sex.

Moreover, Marguerite constructed elite male pride as intractable, while elite women’s honour
could be subordinated and compromised for dynastic goals:

       il ne convienne que toutes injures et rancunes soyent abolyes, et que estans les reproches et injures entre
       iceulx princes venues si avant …. seroit difficil que ce qu’en est fait, se puisse par eulx-mesmes abolir à
       leur honneur.28

While this created a rationale for Louise and Marguerite’s respective involvement in the
negotiations, it came at a cost to the perceived value of women’s personal honour.

In fact, this was important for, Marguerite and Louise claimed, elite men’s honour would not
allow Charles and François to turn aside the allies and friends to whom they had made prior
commitments, in order to forge an agreement between Habsburg and Valois. These alliances
were personal to these male leaders and invested in their sense of self. As Bayard proposed, if
Louise and Marguerite negotiated to the disadvantage of allies, the emperor “pourra prendre
excuse des tous griefz, et lui en gecter le chat aux jambes, comme ayant traicté sans son sceu”.29
Marguerite herself claimed that she and Louise were ideal to undertake negotiations because
they could make no such personal commitments. They were, she wrote, responsible only to the
nephew and son for whom they spoke. These claims reinforced that neither woman could speak
her own right politically but only as the representative of men.

However, in practice, it was not only the emotions of male rulers that were at stake in these
negotiations. Missives bear witness to efforts by both women and men to articulate
Montmorency’s particular value. Marguerite, for example, was careful to cultivate the
sympathies of Montmorency for the peace, consistently using the language of cousin and
cousine. She wrote of her delight in his “bon et singulier vouloir que sa majeste a de demourer
en perfaicte amitye avec le Roy”. It was support, she told him, that she would not forget: “pouez
croire que si loccasion et opportunite loffre, ne men treuverez mescongnoissante.”30Éléonore

27
   8 February 1530: Papiers d’Etat et d’Audience, no 38, p. 248v-249 cited in de Boom G,
Correspondance…, op. cit., p. XIX.
28
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 682.
29
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 683.
30
   BNF Ms Fr. 3010, fol 5. On the language of friendship in diplomatic endeavours, see Rey
Michel, “Communauté et individu: Amitié comme lien social à la Renaissance”, Revue
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 38, 1991; Lasaffer Randall, “‘Amicitia’ in Renaissance

similarly nursed Montmorency’s pride, recognising his importance to “la délivrance de
Messieurs mes fils sont accomplies, que n’a été sans votre peine et grande diligence”.31 And so
too did these women’s diplomatic agents such as Marguerite’s envoy, Lalaing, who addressed
Montmorency as “cellui qui soubz la main des deux princesses et a lassistence de voz amiz
avez este principal directeur de ce bien de paix”.32 These agents shared their own sociabilities
that ran alongside the duties to which they were delegated by their leaders. Lalaing’s father,
Antoine, recommended his second son to Montmorency’s care when he sent him to study in
Paris and later the two families became connected by marriage.33

While Marguerite and Louise were explicitly formulating a role for women in these
negotiations as a consequence of male feelings, elite women were not the only interlocutors
who could claim expertise in fostering peace. This was also one of the most significant claimed
roles of diplomatic staff, as courtiers, special envoys and official ambassadors.34 Moreover, the
men who were their agents frequently operationalised what they articulated as their own
emotional states in order to manoeuvre in the difficult circumstances of the treaty’s ratification.
Letters to Marguerite, for instance, rendered explicit her agents’ sentiments of frustrations that
they could not carry out her requests. In June 1530, Bonvalot and Lalaing explained how they
were “merveilleusement marriz, Madame, que ne pouvons en nul endroit satisfaire à vos dites
lettres et affaires y déppendans”. But they deftly recast their failures (past and potential) into
desires, assuring her that “Bien tenons nous pour certain que les poursuytes seront cy après
longhes et les effectz très difficiles, pour l’ascquitz desquieulx ce néantmoings ferons tousjours
nostre myeulx”.35

Only amongst themselves could Marguerite’s agents vent other frustrations about how best to
represent their mistress in these delicate negotiations. To his father, Philippe de Lalaing
lamented the vagueness of Marguerite’s instructions:

       Quant Madame nous escript, les lettres sont aulcunefois si très cruees que nous n’y scavons souvent riens
       mordre et ne scavons à la fois comment parler des matères que on nous escript, car on nous eslargist bien

Peace and Alliance Treaties (1450-1530)”, Journal of the History of International Law, 4, 2002;
Oschema Klaus, Freundschaft und Nähe im spätmittelalterischen Burgund, Studien zum
Spannungsfeld von Emotion und Institution, Cologne, Böhlau Verlag Köln, 2006; Oschema
Klaus, (ed.), Freundschaft oder ‘amitié’? ein politisch-soziales Konzept der Vormoderne in
zwischen-sprachlichlen Vergleich (15–17 Jahrundert), Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2007;
Smagghe Laurent, Les Émotions du Prince: Émotion et discours politique dans l’espace
bourguignon, Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2012.
31
   25 July 1530: BNF Ms Fr. 3011, fol 32 and BnF Ms Fr. 3011, fol 14, cited in “Plaider,
convaincre…”, op. cit., p. 203, 213.
32
   21 May 1530: BNF Ms Fr. 2997, fol 60.
33
   Decrue Francis, Anne de Montmorency, grand maître à la cour, aux armée et au conseil du
roy François Ier, vol. 1, Paris, E. Plon, 1885, p. 138. Antoine II, 3rd count of Hoogstraten,
married Éléanore de Montmorency in 1560.
34
   Fletcher C, “The Ladies’ Peace…”, op. cit., p. 122–24.
35
   9 June 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 97.

peu ce de quoy l’on vault que nous parlons.36

Montmorency, for his part, voiced his annoyance to Jean II d’Humières, governor of Peronne,
in charge of negotiations about the restitution of Hesdin. A certain “Madame de Reu”
demanded compensation for the loss of a silver basin during the French occupation of the town.
Montmorency wrote with some expression of impatience to supply her with another and other
pieces of plateware “dont alors elle se tenoit contante”, but warned him to not waste time on
such “si petit de choses […] qui ne touchent en rien le fait entre lempereur ne le Roy”.37 Such
letters were circulated in a restricted circle (that could be familial as well as professional) of
male sociability in which such opinions and sufferance could be expressed.

For their part, Imperial agents could be equally blunt among themselves about their
expectations of the French, whose acceptance of the treaty’s seemingly disadvantageous
conditions appeared nothing short of remarkable. To the Emperor, Praet considered the
successful outcomes Marguerite had achieved: “je croy, que ce sont menterises.”38 It was an
opinion he repeated to senior statesman, Nicolas de Perrenot de Granvelle; the treaty was “sy
avantageuses que aucuns doutent qu’il y ait tromperie”.39 Praet’s colleague, Chaulx, could also
report that many thought the treaty a French trick, but felt that the surest explanation was in
the personal sentiments of the kingdom’s leaders:

       la chose que le roy de France et sa mere desirent, c’estoit de ravoir leurs enffans; et aussi est à croire que
       laditte dame, qui s’est meslé de fere ceste paix, tiendra main, pour son honneur et auctorité, à
       l’entretenir.40

Nonetheless, he suggested Charles “ne pourroit mieulx faire que dissimuler, et, en actendant
que la rompture vienne encoires ceste fois dudit roy de France” since if

       le lendemain après la restitucion desdites daulphins et accomplissement des choses dessus dites, ledit roy
       de France feist de nouveau la guerre à l’empereur […] S.M. le puist prendre despourveul d’argent et gens,
       tant de cheval que de pied.41

Praet’s letters combined a kind of disbelief about Marguerite’s abilities with bravado about the
Imperial position over the French.

Pride could infuse letters and negotiations, whether those of men or women as leaders or as
their agents. At the same time, elite women and male diplomatic staff shared constraints as
subordinates to princes and their particular forms of emotional expressions, which shaped their
own emotional styles in conducting diplomacy, displayed through actions and epistolary
expressions.

36
   13 March 1530: Ms Lalaing, p. 415 cited in de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. xvi.
37
   BNF Ms Fr. 3008, fol 2.
38
   5 August 1529: Lang K, Correspondenz…, op. cit., p. 329.
39
   31 August 1529: Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 693.
40
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 707.
41
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 696 and 695.

Brotherly love

Establishing François and Charles as brothers of equal status, and as family members with
shared interests, was critical to the success of the treaty. This required not only words but also
the investment of elite bodies in marriage. Central to the Peace of Cambrai was thus the
consummation of the marriage of François and Éléonore. Bonvalot and Lalaing were alert to
courtly responses to the new queen upon her arrival at the border, reporting to Marguerite their
perception of François’ feelings to his bride. Being attentive to precise emotional displays and
gestures was part of diplomatic labour. They were pleased to detail an early interview between
the couple on 15 July at which François had “de bien fort bon visaige et prétendant grand
contentement, … se assirent sur ung lict de camp et devisèrent l’espace d’une bonne heure ou
plus”.42 They assured Marguerite that given Éléonore’s conduct “sy vertueusement et avec tant
grande honnesteté deportée en son endroit et de ses enffans […] il la doibt aymer”.43 François’
emotional response to his new bride mattered because they spoke to Éléonore’s perceived
capacity to influence her new husband.

By this marriage, François was of course now Charles’ brother and Marguerite’s nephew, an
identity that could be operationalised by both sides. Marguerite hoped that

       à la venue de la Royne en France, le Roy se trouvra plus enclin à l’assistance de ladite Royne d’Engletrere,
       pour l’amour que nous espérons il aura à ladite Royne de France et aux siens pour les favoriser, sachant
       que c’est sa tante.44

However, Éléonore’s influence upon her husband had to be exercised carefully and subtly,

       captivant la benyvolence et grâce d’eulx, le plus qu’elle pourra, sans les arguer en manière quelconque,
       car je les cuyde bien congnoistre et elle aura plus par la doulceur que par les trop presser.45

Likewise, it was to his “bonne mere et tante” that François addressed his complaint about
Netherlandish ships attacking French vessels.

Louise and Marguerite did not limit their ambitions for creating family feeling between Valois
and Habsburg to François and Charles alone. They also planned a series of marital alliances
among the next generation of the dynasties. As Marguerite advocated to Charles, “moyennant
lesdites alliances, ce sera ung mesme vouloir desdites Srs, une âme en deux corps et qui
picquera l’ung, l’autre s’en ressentira, comme si c’estoit une mesme maison”.46 She encouraged
her courtly agents to provide opportunities for Louise to advance their proposal further. While
“la perpetuation de l’amytié d’entre l’Empereur et le Roy s’en pourroit ensuyvre, qu’est ce

42
   15 July 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 123, 124.
43
   4 July 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 115.
44
   6 June 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 91.
45
   21 July 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 131.
46
   12 August 1539: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. xxii.

qu’en ce monde je plus desire, j’ay eu singulier plaisir”, at the same time, Marguerite reminded
her agents to be careful not to look too eager, “sans vous y démonstrer trop affectés”, in ways
that would put the Habsburg at a disadvantage in any marital negotiations.47

Fatherly love

Another critical matter negotiated as part of the Treaty of Cambrai was the return of the Valois
children to France. The exigencies of fatherly love therefore became a vital motivation for
action and explanation in these discussions. That François’ concern to have his children
returned was foremost for the French, a point of which Habsburg negotiators were well aware.
They were worried that, once returned, François would have little interest in fulfilling his other
obligations under the treaty.48 Thus, the children’s return would be dependent on guarantees
and delivery of other aspects, including an enormous ransom payment of gold and other
valuable assets. Bonvalot and Lalaing related an uncomfortable discussion with François in
Bordeaux in early July, after the children had returned, in which the French king appeared to
make clear his discontent with ongoing Habsburg demands and “repris les rudesses”, “se
démonstrant en ce merveilleusement mal content”, threatening that “doires en avant, il ne seroit
besoingt ny ne vouldroit que semblables paroles et commendemens s’adressassent à luy”.49
Lalaing’s letter to his father was rather more explicit about François’ position: “il nous dict
qu’il ne vouloit plus qu’on usast de telz termes et langaiges vers luy, comme on avoit fait par
cy-devant, et qu’il n’estoit plus subject et que ses enffans estoient en France.”50 Both sides
realised that Habsburg bargaining power was severely diminished once the children had
returned.

Before the return of the children, French negotiators had positioned the Habsburg
preoccupations with financial aspects as demeaning to their status. Lalaing had reported to his
father in December 1529 that Montmorency had complained about the precise demands for
financial payments to be exacted before the children would be returned, “comment il semble
que vous nous voullez constraindre à force d’une choze que nous donnons de grace, pour ravoir
noz enffans”. 51 Louise too had taken Guillaume des Barres aside, telling him that she was
“toutte perplex. Elle nous pria fort de tenir la main que la bonne amytié que ces deux prinses
ont ensamble se piust entretenir, et que on regardast de mitiguer ces petittes demandes là”.52
French ambassadors queried the logistics of the exchange of gold coins “si très-grosse que bien
difficilement et malaisement les coffres dedans lesquelz elle sera” and “choze si mal aisée que
de remuer ung si lourd poix et fardeau que la somme qu’il fault fournir” was to be managed
against the risks to the children and queen in boats in the river: “n’y aura ordre de faire passer
ledit argent ne aussy mesdits seigneurs les enffans avecques la royne, sans les mectre en très-

47
   March 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 34, 35.
48
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 695.
49
   4 July 1530: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 116.
50
   de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 116, note 1.
51
   19 December 1529: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 200.
52
   23 January 1529: de Boom G, Correspondance…, op. cit., p. 207.

grant et evident peril et dangier de leurs personnes”.53 Such statements rendered the Habsburg
exigencies for the exchange faintly ridiculous, while suggesting that French concerns were
strictly for the safety of those involved.

Moreover, Charles found himself rather more personally under fire as a result of a devastating
report from the French envoy, huissier Jean Bodin, about the treatment of the Valois children
in Habsburg care. Bodin had attended the young boys, François and Henri,

       en une chambre d’icelluy chasteau assez obscure, sans tapisserie ne parement aucun … la fenestre de
       ladite chambre, qui est garnie par dehors et par dedans de gros barreaux de fer, et la muraille de huict ou
       dix pieds d'espaisseur, ladite fenestre si haulte que à toute payne peuvent mes dits seigneurs avoir layr et
       le plesir du jour, qui est bien suffisant à détenir personne attaint de gros crime … ledit lieu tant ennuyeulx
       et mal sain, que pour le josne et tendre eaige de mes dits seigneurs ainsi menez et détenus et en si pauvre
       ordre de vestemens.54

The whole effect “ne me fut lors possible contenir sans gecter larmes”. 55 His shocking news
prompted immediate action. François wrote to Marguerite to mediate with her nephew to secure
the children’s better protection. He pushed her to respond to “une requeste de pere sy
resonnable qu’elle ne doyt estre refuse”. 56 Antoine Lalaing told his son, Philippe, that
Marguerite had been “esbahie et perplexe” by the news that the children had not been treated
well; “il luy en desplaist bien fort”. She had responded immediately to François’ request by
writing to Charles and his wife Isabella of Portugal, and made copies of these letters for
Pommeraye to provide to François and Louise so that they could see her due diligence in the
matter.57 She reminded Charles in a postscript in her own hand, that “dieu vous at fet ceste
grace de vous avoir donne des biaus enffans; parquoy povez mieulx santir, que vault amour de
pere, et le regret dudt sr roy”.58 The duties and love of a father were powerful motives to action
for both men at the centre of this negotiation.

Conclusion

By the end of 1531, both Marguerite and Louise had died. The claims of these women and their
agents who had made female involvement so centrally about emotional engagements as
mothers and sisters, their personal honour and their capacity as women to understand and
assuage the feelings of male relatives were not transferable; they were individual. In the service
of peace, Marguerite and Louise and their diplomatic agents had foregrounded emotional
concepts not only about women’s expertise in counter-balancing multiple relationships in
which they sustained potentially competing loyalties, but also about the emotional states and
stakes of princely masculinity. They were actively constructing elite male emotions as not only

53
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 731.
54
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. cciii.
55
   Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. ccii.
56
   6 October 1529: Le Glay, Négociations…, op. cit., p. 710.
57
   10 October 1529: Ms Lalaing, 2e partie, p. 263 cited in de Boom G, Correspondance…, op.
cit., p. 24 and 25, note 1.
58
   Lang K, Correspondenz…, op. cit., p. 348.

central to these negotiations, but as critical knowledge that particular elite women had the
ability to manage. Ultimately, this helped to define the Ladies’ Peace as a continuation of a
conventional political system that was focused on men, not as an advancement of women’s
capacity more broadly for political action. Marguerite and Louise defined men’s emotions as
at the heart of power.

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