THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
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Goals of Presentation •Tell the story of Kmart •Lessons for Debtor’s counsel •Lessons for Creditor’s counsel
Sebastian S. Kresge Date Event 1897 Worked with J. G. McCrory’s in Memphis, Tennessee 1899 Founded his own five-and-ten-cent store 1912 Incorporated the S. S. Kresge Corporation 1924 Kresge is worth $5 billion in 2009 dollars 1962 Kmart, Wal-Mart, and Target founded 1966 Dies at age 99
The Rise and Fall of Kmart • In 1988, Kmart was larger than Wal-Mart • Kmart had sales of 26 billion, with 692 million of profit • Wal-Mart had sales of 16 billion, with 627 million in profit • By 2002, Wal-Mart was larger than Kmart • Kmart had sales of 32 billion, with 95 million in losses • Wal-Mart had sales of 220 billion, with 7 billion in profit
2002 Company Profile Sales Profits 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 Wal-Mart 3,000 2,000 Kmart 1,000 0 -1,000
What Happened? • Inability to successfully compete against Wal-Mart • Lack of a coherent corporate philosophy • Corporate Compensation • Ex. Chairman and CEO at the time of bankruptcy, Charles Conaway, received $23 million in compensation for 11 months of work ($2,900 per hour, 24/7)
Continued • Conaway negotiated a $6.5-million lump- sum payout if he was "terminated" within 18 months. The following day, Kmart filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. • Mark Schwartz, president and COO, walked away with his $3-million retention “loan.”
Continued Charles Conaway Mark Schwartz
Beginning of the end • ESL, a “vulture” hedge fund, buys large amounts of Kmart debt. • Kmart secures promises for $2 billion in post-petition financing.
ESL Investments Is a hedge fund that buys distress assets Bought approximately $1.2 Billion in debt Headed by Eddie Lambert, Called the “next Warren Buffet” Promised to invest at least $700 million
Eddie Lambert
Beginning of Bankruptcy On January 21, 2002, Fleming Companies halts all shipments of groceries. - Fleming is Kmart’s sole grocery provider - Fleming accounts for 11% of all Kmart’s sales On January 22, 2002, Kmart files bankruptcy. - Kmart files 23 first day motions - One month in, docket = 900+ documents - One year in, docket = 8,000+ documents
Issues Critical Vendor JDA
Paying Critical Vendors • Kmart received authorization to pay pre- petition claims of $183.8 million to “critical” vendors. • Section 105(a): “The court may issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” • Days before confirmation, Critical Vendor Order is overturned by the District Court • Section 105 should be used to enforce the code, not change it.
Seventh Circuit Affirms • Dicta: Section 363(b)(1) might provide authorization. • “The trustee…may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate… • Must show • The “critical” vendors would cease providing goods to the debtor without payment • Best interests of the estate
JDA Software • JDA provided computer support for the Caribbean. • The International CFO of Kmart said that Kmart would pay for all post-bankruptcy services even if he had to write the check himself. • Kmart did not pay and deleted the software.
Outcome • Section 503(b) provides that the “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate” are to be treated as an administrative expense. • The Court did not require payment because there was no benefit to the estate.
Kmart Proposes a Plan Negotiations for payment Splitting the money Effects on the parties
Issues to be Resolved Who is Kmart? Did Kmart know that it was approaching bankruptcy?
Substantive Consolidation Kmart’s Story Creditor’s Story
Fraud Kmart’s Story Creditors' Story
Coming to a Resolution Treated as Consolidated Establish a trust Pre-petition lenders get 40% of claims Claims will be paid in Cash
Distributing the Wealth Class Claims % of Amount Paid Recovery Class 1: Secured claims $61,000,000 100 $61,000,000 0 Class 2: priority claims 0 0 Class 3:Pre-petition claims $1,076,156,647 40 $430,462,659 Class 4: Note claims $2,277,384,986 14.4 $327,943,438
Continued Class Claims % of Recovery Amount Paid Class 5: Trade Vendor Lease $4,300,000,000 9.7 $417,100,000 rejection claims Class 6: Other unsecured $200,000,000 9.7 $19,400,000 claims Class 7: General unsecured $5,000,000 6.25 $312,500 convenience claims 0 Class 8: Preferred obligations $648,043,500 N/A
Sharing the Wealth Class 1 : Secured claims Class 3: Prepetition claims Class 4: Prepetion note claims Class 5: Trade Vendor/ Lease rejection claims Class 6: Other unsecured claims Class 7: General unsecured convenience claims
Effects Kmart Company DIP Financers Employees Senior Management Plan Investors
Kmart Company
DIP Financers
Employees
Senior Management
Plan Investors
Continued Bought Kmart for slightly under a Billion In 2003, sold less than 5% of leases for $850 million Bought Sears and merged the companies in 2004 for $10 billion Kmart has yet to show a profitable year, aside for selling of real estate
Sears Holdings
Takeaways from Presentation Debtor’s Counsel Creditor’s Counsel
Debtor’s Counsel • Imitate • Hit the ground running with DIP financing lined up • Positive perception to court and vendors • Learn • Critical Vendor Order – don’t reach too far • JDA – strategic assurances
Creditor’s Counsel • Imitate • ESL spotted a great opportunity and transformed it into a way to get money • Know when to strike a deal • Learn • Fleming – be careful what you ask for • JDA – assurances are not enough • Request payment in advance? • Avoidable preference • Force assumption of pre-petition contract?
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