THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert

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THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
THE REORGANIZATION
     OF KMART

           By:
       Jon Fisher
     Justin Wolbert
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
Goals of Presentation
•Tell the story of Kmart
•Lessons for Debtor’s
 counsel
•Lessons for Creditor’s
 counsel
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
Sebastian S. Kresge
Date                         Event

1897   Worked with J. G. McCrory’s in Memphis, Tennessee

1899        Founded his own five-and-ten-cent store

1912       Incorporated the S. S. Kresge Corporation

1924        Kresge is worth $5 billion in 2009 dollars

1962         Kmart, Wal-Mart, and Target founded

1966                     Dies at age 99
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
The Rise and Fall of Kmart

• In 1988, Kmart was larger than Wal-Mart
  • Kmart had sales of 26 billion, with 692 million of
    profit
  • Wal-Mart had sales of 16 billion, with 627 million
    in profit

• By 2002, Wal-Mart was larger than Kmart
  • Kmart had sales of 32 billion, with 95 million in
    losses
  • Wal-Mart had sales of 220 billion, with 7 billion in
    profit
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
1988 Company Profile

 Sales              Profits

                              Wal-Mart
         Wal-Mart
         Kmart
                              Kmart
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
2002 Company Profile

 Sales
                             Profits
                     7,000
                     6,000
                     5,000
                     4,000
         Wal-Mart    3,000
                     2,000
         Kmart       1,000
                         0
                    -1,000
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
What Happened?

• Inability to successfully compete against
  Wal-Mart

• Lack of a coherent corporate philosophy

• Corporate Compensation
  • Ex. Chairman and CEO at the time of
    bankruptcy, Charles Conaway, received $23
    million in compensation for 11 months of work
    ($2,900 per hour, 24/7)
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
THE REORGANIZATION OF KMART - By: Jon Fisher Justin Wolbert
Continued
• Conaway negotiated a $6.5-million lump-
  sum payout if he was "terminated" within
  18 months. The following day, Kmart filed
  for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
• Mark Schwartz, president and COO,
  walked away with his $3-million retention
  “loan.”
Continued

Charles Conaway         Mark Schwartz
Beginning of the end

• ESL, a “vulture” hedge fund, buys large
  amounts of Kmart debt.

• Kmart secures promises for $2 billion in
  post-petition financing.
ESL Investments

 Is a hedge fund that buys distress assets

 Bought approximately $1.2 Billion in
  debt

 Headed by Eddie Lambert, Called the
  “next Warren Buffet”

 Promised to invest at least $700 million
Eddie Lambert
Beginning of Bankruptcy

On January 21, 2002, Fleming Companies halts all
   shipments of groceries.
-   Fleming is Kmart’s sole grocery provider
-   Fleming accounts for 11% of all Kmart’s sales

On January 22, 2002, Kmart files bankruptcy.
-   Kmart files 23 first day motions
-   One month in, docket = 900+ documents
-   One year in, docket = 8,000+ documents
Issues

 Critical Vendor

 JDA
Paying Critical Vendors
• Kmart received authorization to pay pre-
   petition claims of $183.8 million to “critical”
   vendors.
• Section 105(a): “The court may issue any
   order, process or judgment that is necessary
   or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
   this title.”
• Days before confirmation, Critical Vendor
   Order is overturned by the District Court
  • Section 105 should be used to enforce the
      code, not change it.
Seventh Circuit Affirms
• Dicta: Section 363(b)(1) might provide
  authorization.
• “The trustee…may use, sell, or lease,
  other than in the ordinary course of
  business, property of the estate…
• Must show
 • The “critical” vendors would cease
    providing goods to the debtor without
    payment
 • Best interests of the estate
JDA Software
• JDA provided computer support for the
  Caribbean.

• The International CFO of Kmart said that
  Kmart would pay for all post-bankruptcy
  services even if he had to write the check
  himself.

• Kmart did not pay and deleted the software.
Outcome

• Section 503(b) provides that the “the
  actual, necessary costs and expenses of
  preserving the estate” are to be treated as
  an administrative expense.
• The Court did not require payment
  because there was no benefit to the
  estate.
Kmart Proposes a Plan

 Negotiations for payment

 Splitting the money

 Effects on the parties
Issues to be Resolved

 Who is Kmart?

 Did Kmart know that it was
 approaching bankruptcy?
Substantive Consolidation

  Kmart’s Story   Creditor’s Story
Fraud

Kmart’s Story           Creditors' Story
Coming to a Resolution

 Treated as Consolidated

 Establish a trust

 Pre-petition lenders get 40% of claims

 Claims will be paid in Cash
Distributing the Wealth

Class                         Claims           % of     Amount Paid
                                               Recovery

Class 1: Secured claims          $61,000,000        100        $61,000,000

                                                                        0
Class 2: priority claims                  0           0

Class 3:Pre-petition claims   $1,076,156,647         40       $430,462,659

Class 4: Note claims          $2,277,384,986       14.4       $327,943,438
Continued

Class                            Claims                % of Recovery    Amount Paid

Class 5: Trade Vendor Lease         $4,300,000,000                9.7     $417,100,000

rejection claims

Class 6: Other unsecured              $200,000,000                9.7      $19,400,000

claims

Class 7: General unsecured                $5,000,000             6.25        $312,500

convenience claims
                                                                                      0
Class 8: Preferred obligations        $648,043,500                N/A
Sharing the Wealth

              Class 1 : Secured claims

              Class 3: Prepetition claims

              Class 4: Prepetion note
              claims

              Class 5: Trade Vendor/
              Lease rejection claims

              Class 6: Other unsecured
              claims

              Class 7: General
              unsecured convenience
              claims
Effects

 Kmart Company

 DIP Financers

 Employees

 Senior Management

 Plan Investors
Kmart Company
DIP Financers
Employees
Senior Management
Plan Investors
Continued

 Bought Kmart for slightly under a Billion

 In 2003, sold less than 5% of leases for $850
  million

 Bought Sears and merged the companies in
  2004 for $10 billion

 Kmart has yet to show a profitable year, aside
  for selling of real estate
Sears Holdings
Takeaways from Presentation

        Debtor’s Counsel

        Creditor’s Counsel
Debtor’s Counsel
• Imitate
   • Hit the ground running with DIP
     financing lined up
   • Positive perception to court and vendors
• Learn
   • Critical Vendor Order – don’t reach too
     far
   • JDA – strategic assurances
Creditor’s Counsel
• Imitate
   • ESL spotted a great opportunity and
     transformed it into a way to get money
   • Know when to strike a deal
• Learn
   • Fleming – be careful what you ask for
   • JDA – assurances are not enough
      • Request payment in advance?
         • Avoidable preference
      • Force assumption of pre-petition
        contract?
Questions or Comments?
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