STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
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Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC
TRENDS 2021
Key Developments in Global Affairs
Editors: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert
Series Editor: Andreas Wenger
Authors: Brian G. Carlson, Julian Kamasa, Linda Maduz,
Niklas Masuhr, Lisa Watanabe
CSS
ETH Zurich
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 1 April 2021. © 2021, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-76-9
CHAPTER 5
Japan and South Korea: Adapting to
Asia’s Changing Regional Order
Linda Maduz
Small and middle powers in Asia find themselves in a key arena of acceler-
ating great-power competition. Nowhere are the economic dominance and
politico-military ambitions of a rising China more evident and nowhere is the
potential for military escalation between China and the US greater than here.
Much sooner than in other regions of the world, countries in Asia have had to
position themselves in the growing US-China rivalry. The experience of Japan
and South Korea shows that middle powers have a role to play in shaping the
rivalry, and thereby in shaping their own regional strategic environment.
Trade ministers pose for a photo during the 3rd Inter-sessional Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam May 22, 2017. Kham / Reuters
99
ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
The US has led the post-war region- political ambitions and security prior-
al order in East Asia for over half a ities. A particular focus for Beijing lies
century. Its dominance in East Asian in its immediate neighborhood in East
political, economic, and security af- and Southeast Asia. These trends have
fairs has remained unchallenged until become especially pronounced under
recently. To establish and maintain Xi Jinping, who became general secre-
the order, the US has relied on strong tary of the Chinese Communist Party
partnerships with East Asian coun- in November 2012 and president in
tries, Japan and South Korea (official- March 2013. Under Xi’s leadership,
ly the Republic of Korea) foremost China has adopted a more activist for-
among them. A security architecture eign policy and is increasingly mod-
built on a US-centered, bilateral alli- ernizing its military. It has stepped
ance system has constituted the hard up its diplomatic efforts and inten-
backbone of the regional order. This sified cooperation with its neighbors
architecture has been part of a larger while at the same time engaging in
political bargain, though, which has new (territorial) disputes with them.
closely tied the US and its East Asian Particularly in the economic sphere,
partners to one another both econom- China today is a powerful leader that
ically and politically. Today, voices has successfully leveraged its influence
critical of US engagement in Asia exist to establish new China-centered infra-
on both sides of the Pacific. Under US structures and hierarchies in East Asia.
President Donald Trump’s administra-
tion, the US even openly called into As a consequence, the regional order
question the value of bilateral alliances in East Asia is currently undergoing
and free trade to the US – central pil- a transition. This is evidenced by the
lars of the US-led East Asian order. fact that existing arrangements, pro-
cesses, and rules are called into ques-
In addition to internal sources of ero- tion and are being (re-)negotiated.
sion, the rise of China constitutes an- While the emerging and established
other critical challenge to the existing hierarchies can complement each oth-
regional order. Trade and investment er, they are, in certain respects, also of
flows in the East Asian region increas- a competitive and mutually exclusive
ingly center on China, which since nature. China, which was absent from
2010 has been the world’s second-larg- the establishment of the US-led order
est economy (see chart on trade flows). in Asia, is contesting some of the es-
Along with its rapid economic develop- tablished rules of the order: For exam-
ment, the country has developed new ple, its claims in the South China Sea,
100JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
101ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
which the Permanent Court of Arbi- provider. Consequently, waning US
tration in The Hague rejected, have leadership and a related weakening of
raised concerns about the preservation the rules-based, multilateral regional
of freedom of navigation. In addition, order limit their strategic options. At
relations among Asian countries are the same time, the ongoing geopoliti-
changing and have become more con- cal shifts call into question US security
flictual, indicating that the mediating guarantees and stimulate discussions
effect of US leadership in the region is in both countries about taking in-
waning. An important feature of the creased responsibility for their security
US-led regional order was that the US while still keeping the US engaged.
prevented conflicts among regional
partners. That the old order is weaken- With an ever more powerful and as-
ing is clearly in evidence as long-held sertive China in their neighborhood
conflicts flare across the region, partic- and uncertainties surrounding their
ularly in reference to old unsettled ter- strategic ties with the US, Japan and
ritorial disagreements and unresolved South Korea find themselves in a pre-
claims regarding Japanese reparations dicament. In this uncertain, pressing
for wartime atrocities. situation, Japan is opting for a pro-
active approach, seeking a new lead-
What form the future regional order ing role in the region as well as in its
will take will depend in part on how alliance with the US. With initiatives
East Asian countries, particularly the such as the Free and Open Indo-Pa-
more influential ones, position them- cific and the Quadrilateral Security
selves in the great-power rivalry. Two Dialogue, Japan wants to set the re-
key actors in the regional architecture gional agenda and shape the order in
are Japan and South Korea. As middle its interest. Japan is the country in
powers, they lack great-power capabil- East Asia that most openly opposes
ities. However, given their economic China’s rise. South Korea, by con-
and military strength, as well as their trast, is more accommodating and
geostrategic positions, they are in a po- holds a position that is similar to that
sition to project influence and shape of other countries in the region. It is
politics at the regional and interna- hedging against China by increasing
tional levels.1 The great-power rivalry its military spending and reinforcing
affects them in complex ways. It reveals its security ties with the US. In par-
their existential security dilemma, leav- allel, it is deepening its ties with Chi-
ing them with no real alternative to re- na in economic and other domains.
lying on the US as their main security It actively avoids making choices
102JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
between the two great powers, whose sphere, while the US continues to
co-presence is considered beneficial. dominate the security sphere. China
is the main trading partner of Japan
This chapter analyzes the changing and South Korea and most Southeast
power configuration in East Asia, Asian countries; this continues to be
highlighting the implications of Chi- true in the face of efforts by some
na’s rise and the erosion of the old regional governments, including Ja-
logic behind US engagement in the re- pan, to divert supply chains away
gion. A primary focus of the chapter is from China. Formerly the region’s
on how key actors in the region, such main trading partner, the US is still
as Japan and South Korea, conceptu- a key economic player, and it remains
alize the changes in their new strategic many countries’ first choice for secu-
environment and formulate policies rity provision. Yet, in light of China’s
in response. The chapter reflects more rise, new uncertainties exist regarding
generally on the role of middle powers US security guarantees towards the
in the US-China rivalry and on how region. While investing in their ties
much agency they have in shaping the with the US, countries in East and
regional order. Lastly, the chapter ex- Southeast Asia continue deepening
amines the position of the US, which their relations with China as well. The
has recently proved the least consistent emerging order seems more complex
in its approach towards the region as and less predictable. The jury in the
compared to other major actors in East battle for “Asia’s soul” – seeing wheth-
Asia. The chapter argues that wheth- er the region will prioritize security or
er the US will be able to strike a new economics – is still out.2
grand political bargain with countries
of the region and reinforce its position The complex circumstances shap-
as an Asian power is an open question ing and dictating the regional or-
and will depend on whether the inter- der in Asia have roots that extend
ests of the US and its East Asian part- as far back as the early 1950s. The
ners continue to align. The coming communist victory in China (1949)
years under the Biden administration and the course of the Korean War
will be crucial in this regard. (1950 – 1953) had fueled fears in the
United States that countries in Asia
China Rising: Shaking up the Post- would fall to communism (in line
War Regional Order in East Asia with the “domino theory”). Accord-
Today, two orders coexist in East ingly, the US sought to establish a
Asia. China dominates the economic system of bilateral security ties with
103ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
a range of countries, including mutu- and Development (OECD) and G20
al defense treaties with Japan, South memberships by the late 1990s. In
Korea, and Taiwan, among others (see recent years, East Asian partners ran
map). The United States undertook trade surpluses with the US, and cap-
several tasks that it perceived to be ital flows from East Asia financed
in its own national security interest, the growing US trade deficit. Thus,
including building a bulwark against even after the economic assump-
communism in the region, managing tions underpinning their cooperation
the reintegration of war-defeated Ja- had changed, elites on both sides of
pan, and preventing other allies such the Pacific continued to support the
as South Korea and Taiwan from en- arrangement.
gaging in further conflicts.3 Thus, the
alliances served the US as effective One of the key features of this US-
tools to manage trans-Pacific relations led “hub-and-spokes” system, which
as well as regional relations.4 defined East Asian policymaking for
decades, is its focus on Japan. The
The US-led alliance system was the system is also known as the San Fran-
basis for a dense US-centered net- cisco system, for it is in San Francisco
work of bilateral ties that included where the World War II peace treaty
not only a security dimension, but with Japan was concluded in 1951.
an equally important politico-eco- Considering Japan’s crucial strategic
nomic dimension. In exchange for US position in East Asia, the US invested
security guarantees, which required in rebuilding the country’s economy
substantial financial contributions and integrating it into the emerging
towards stationing US forces on their Western-led global order. Against the
soil, Japan and South Korea received backdrop of the communist security
privileged access to the US market and threat, the US wanted Japan to be
direct political channels to Washing- economically successful and polit-
ton.5 This helped facilitate extremely ically stable. At the same time, the
rapid economic development. Japan US restrained the country’s military
became the second-largest economy capabilities by making Japan adopt
in the world from 1968 – 2010, and a pacifist constitution and non-nu-
South Korea developed from one of clear principles during the post-war
the poorest countries in the world into US occupation. Washington thereby
a fully developed nation in the span also offered reassurance to countries
of just a few decades, holding Organ- in the region with lingering concerns
isation for Economic Co-operation about Japan’s regional ambitions and
104JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
105ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
potential for renewed aggression, in- a new, China-centered regional order.
cluding South Korea. The arrange- Projected to overtake the US in the
ment successfully transformed Japan coming decades as the world’s larg-
from a former enemy of the US into a est economy, China recently replaced
reliable junior partner, both regionally the US as the most important trading
and globally.6 partner in East Asia. It became the
primary trading partner of South Ko-
China’s rise occurred while the coun- rea and Japan in 2004 and 2007 re-
try remained outside of the estab- spectively. China has also turned into
lished US-led regional order. Since the an important source of foreign direct
beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era, investment (FDI) and loans in Asia
China has made the quest for security and a willing partner for infrastruc-
and the reduction of vulnerabilities a ture and technology development.
priority. Seeking to stay under the in- Some of the smaller Southeast Asian
ternational radar, China successfully countries, such as Cambodia and
promoted its economic growth, facili- Laos, are heavily indebted to China.
tated by the 1978 market reforms, and Beijing has sought integration into
modernized its military. For decades, existing institutional formats such as
China’s economy enjoyed fast, often the Association of Southeast Asian
double-digit, growth. Consequently, Nations (ASEAN), joining the ASE-
the mismatch between its increasing AN+3 grouping in 1997, as well as the
economic weight and its low profile World Trade Organization (WTO),
in regional and world politics was which it joined in 2001. China has
growing. This changed with the acces- also started creating its own interna-
sion to power of Xi Jinping in 2012: tional and regional institutions, in-
In contrast to his predecessors, Xi is cluding the Asian Infrastructure In-
pursuing a far more assertive agenda, vestment Bank (AIIB, 2015) and the
openly communicating China’s global Regional Comprehensive Economic
political ambitions, seeking confron- Partnership (RCEP, 2020).
tation when considered necessary, and
creating facts on the ground, imposing For many countries in the region,
them on weaker neighbors.7 China looms large not just as a lead-
ing economic power, but also as a
China’s challenge to the regional order potential security threat. While US
is a consequence of its growing eco- military and technical superiority
nomic power, but it is also due to Chi- remains unmatched for the time be-
na’s dedicated efforts to institutionalize ing, China is catching up – notably
106JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
focusing on improving its maritime Japan to quadruple its annual pay-
power capabilities. China has invested ments to 8 billion USD. In the dis-
in the expansion of its coast guard into pute over bilateral cost sharing, the
Asia’s largest, and has also focused on US threatened to withdraw its troops
improving its navy. Beijing now con- from the countries were Washington’s
trols the world’s largest fleet, though demands not met. The disputes re-
the US navy remains the world’s pre- flected Trump’s long-held misgivings
mier fighting force. China’s increasing about maintaining a US military pres-
military strength and ambitions are ence overseas. He had repeatedly crit-
reflected in a more assertive approach icized allies, such as Japan and South
towards its neighborhood, particularly Korea, as “free riders” that would ex-
evident since 2010. In breach of estab- ploit the US security umbrella and fail
lished international conventions, Chi- to pull their weight in regional securi-
na backs its controversial claims in the ty. This assessment did not appear to
South China Sea with naval maneu- take into account that Washington’s
vers, the creation of artificial islands, Asian allies consistently increase their
and administrative arrangements. defense spending, finance US military
This results in territorial conflicts with facilities on their territories, conclude
neighboring states and increased ten- major arms deals, and contribute to
sions with the US. In reaction to the US-led military and peacekeeping op-
perceived “containment” and “encir- erations across the world.8
clement” by the US and its allies, Chi-
na is likely to further strengthen its Trump’s approach towards US allies
efforts to drive a wedge between them in East Asia, and his election more
– a particularly direct challenge to the generally, reflect a broader politi-
existing order. co-societal trend in the US, namely
disappearing domestic support for
Waning US Dominance: Weakening the old grand political bargain with
Hub, Weakening Spokes East Asia. In the Cold War context,
Under the Trump presidency there was political consensus among
(2017 – 2021), open rifts in US al- both the elites and the broader public
liances with its East Asian partners that it was beneficial to give trade and
became visible. In an unprecedented investment privileges to East Asian
push, the Trump administration asked partners and have them pay for the US
South Korea to quintuple its annu- security umbrella in exchange. This
al payments for stationing US troops was to the detriment of US workers
on its territory to 5 billion USD and in sectors competing with East Asian
107ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
economies, namely the automobile, distinctively protectionist and unilat-
consumer electronics, and steel sec- eral approach, the Trump administra-
tors. With the changing international tion disrespected previous modes of
context (particularly the collapse of US engagement with East Asia, low-
the communist threat) and changing ering East Asian countries’ confidence
economic power relations between the in US leadership. At the same time,
US and its East Asian partners, the val- the Trump administration’s embrace
ue of the larger political bargain with of open competition with “long-term
the region, including the value of US strategic rival” China meant increased
military presence and partners in Asia, strategic attention to the region.
has been called into question in the
United States.9 The weakening of US influence in
East Asia affects not only US ties with
Well before Trump’s arrival in office in its East Asian partners, but also rela-
January 2017, US leadership in East tions among them. The fraught re-
Asia had shown signs of inconsisten- lationship between Japan and South
cy and at least temporary disengage- Korea is a particularly illustrative
ment. In the post-Cold War period, example. Japan’s 2020 defense white
US foreign and security policymakers paper makes no mention of plans to
had increasingly shifted their atten- continue defense cooperation with
tion to other world regions and new South Korea. According to the annu-
security threats. After the terrorist at- al report, such cooperation and ex-
tacks of 11 September 2001, President change would be difficult to sustain
George W. Bush focused on the “War in light of recent events, including a
on Terror.” Growing political aware- 2018 radar incident in which a South
ness of the increasing economic, de- Korean warship allegedly directed its
mographic, and geopolitical weight of fire-control radar on a Japanese sur-
Asia, and China in particular, led the veillance plane. Similarly, South Ko-
US under President Barack Obama rea had recently threatened to end
to pursue a policy of reengagement a military intelligence-sharing pact
with Asia starting in 2011, which was known as the General Security of
known as the “Pivot to Asia.” At the Military Information Agreement. In
heart of this shift in strategy was the turn, South Korea’s 2020 Defense
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement White Paper dropped a reference to
(TPP). Trump, however, withdrew Japan as “partner” and described it
the US from this free trade agreement instead as close neighbor. The bien-
on his first day in office. With its nial report listed a number of issues
108JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
hindering “forward-looking defense and infrastructure financing, as well
relations,” including Japanese lead- as at the level of regional organiza-
ers’ “distorted perceptions” about the tions. Japan, holding a leading posi-
country’s colonial past, Japan’s terri- tion in the Asian Development Bank,
torial claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima decided, for example, not to join the
islands, the 2018 radar incident, and China-led AIIB.
Japan’s 2019 decision to tighten ex-
port controls on high-tech products In light of China’s rise and grow-
to South Korea in reaction to court ing doubts about US commitment
rulings over compensation for South to regional allies, Japanese concerns
Korean wartime forced laborers.10 about its weakening regional position
prompted Tokyo to take an increas-
Japan: Seeking a New ingly proactive approach in its efforts
Leadership Role in Asia to set a regional agenda. In contrast
In the face of a changing security envi- to smaller countries in the region, in-
ronment and unsteady US leadership cluding South Korea, Japan acknowl-
in East Asia, Japan has stepped up its edged China as an economic com-
role in the region.11 It has taken pro- petitor and security threat early on.
active steps to promote a liberal eco- Japan’s economy suffered from chron-
nomic order and to protect and sta- ic deflation that began in the late
bilize the security framework in East 1990s and lasted until 2013. In 2010,
Asia. In 2007, Japan became the first China’s economy overtook Japan’s to
country to propose a strategic frame- become the world’s second-largest,
work for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacif- though Japan remains in third place.
ic” (FOIP), designed to counter Chi- The technological advantage that
na’s expansive and illiberal behavior in Japanese companies hold over their
the East China Sea and the South Chi- Chinese competitors is also shrink-
na Sea.12 When the US under Trump ing. Other areas of concern include
withdrew from the TPP in early 2017, China’s growing military capabilities
Japan took the lead and led it to com- and their potential application. China
pletion. Ultimately, 11 Pacific states has made maritime and sovereignty
signed the Comprehensive Progressive claims in the East China Sea, includ-
Trans-Pacific Partnership in March ing over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands,
2018 (see graph on Asia-Pacific trade which directly conflict with Japan’s
agreements). Japan competes with own claims. Furthermore, Chinese ac-
China over regional influence, for ex- tivities in the South China Sea poten-
ample in the area of development aid tially threaten freedom of navigation.
109ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
These newer challenges combined Japan depends on stable access to the
with older, unabated threats emanat- sea. Against the backdrop of China’s
ing from a nuclear-armed North Ko- sweeping sovereignty and territorial
rea highlight the worsening of Japan’s claims in the East and South China
security environment. With its mil- seas, Japan is proactively promoting a
itary activities restricted by its post- maritime order in which the rule of
war constitution, Japan continues to law at sea is respected. To this end, Ja-
depend on US security arrangements, pan sees the preservation of the status
including the nuclear umbrella. quo, in which the US holds naval pri-
macy in the region, as in its interest.
Recent policy documents reveal how Japan also emphasizes the importance
Japan defines its strategic interests and of “values” and increasingly positions
foreign policy position in the changing itself as a contributor to the liberal
geopolitical environment. The country and rules-based international order.
identifies itself as a “maritime state.”13 Seeing a strong US leadership role in
As a trade-dependent island nation, East Asia as in its interest, Japan takes
110JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
an active role in encouraging Asian by its longevity (2006 – 2007 and
countries to support the US in the 2012 – 2020), unique in Japan’s post-
strategic US-China rivalry.14 war history, and an unprecedented
concentration of executive power. Abe
Part of Japan’s efforts to strengthen as- pursued domestic policies reflecting
pects of the existing order and pursue the nationalist and revisionist political
its own interests has been to emphasize thought of the conservative establish-
multilateralism and cooperation with ment, of which his long-ruling Liberal
out-of-the-area states. To advance re- Democratic Party is a part. Since the
gional security cooperation, Japan has end of the Cold War, conservative
reached out not only to the US, but calls have existed to re-prioritize Ja-
also to Australia and India. Japan seeks pan’s military strength over econom-
such cooperation not only in security ic development.17 Abe successfully
affairs, as in the Quadrilateral Securi- pushed security reforms despite op-
ty Dialogue (Quad), but also as part position from parliament and the
of an effort to work with partners to public, which holds relatively liberal
strengthen the liberal order in the re- positions (as seen in popular protest
gion through initiatives such as “Asia’s against US military installations). This
Democratic Security Diamond,” as led to a reinterpretation of Article 9 of
well as on the broader international Japan’s pacifist post-war constitution
level.15 With the EU, Japan concluded in 2015.18 According to the new doc-
a trade agreement as well as a strategic trine, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces may
partnership agreement, which makes now participate in collective security
reference to common values such as operations and defend the military of
democracy, the rule of law, and hu- an ally, including the United States,
man rights. Through these initiatives when it is under attack. Some analysts
and others, Japan has taken the lead see this change in Japan’s security pol-
in responding to the rise of an illiberal icy as an evolutionary step,19 pointing
China. Japan’s conceptual work on is- to Japan’s previous support for the US
sues such as FOIP is an essential part wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, whereas
of its leadership on strategic issues in others consider it to be revolutionary
East Asia.16 and marking the end of Japan’s post-
war pacifism.20
Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Ja-
pan started to adopt a more activist for- In summary, Japan’s strategy in the
eign policy and a more assertive security face of China’s rise and the relative
policy. Abe’s tenure was characterized decline of the US is multi-faceted. It
111ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
has launched new initiatives in which 2017 as a response to China’s expan-
it partners with other countries both sionism. Under Moon, South Korea
inside and outside of the region. This even agreed to increase defense ex-
also includes closer security coopera- changes and establish military hot
tion with ASEAN states, for example lines with China.
within the ASEAN Defense Ministers’
Meeting Plus. Japan has also increased The reluctance to join US initiatives
its defense spending and adjusted its against China is noteworthy since
security policy, broadening the profile modern South Korea would not exist
of its Self-Defense Forces. However, if not for its close strategic ties with
and importantly, Japan has also in- the US, forged during the post-war
vested in improving its relations with period. Historically, South Korea had
China. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands only limited strategic options; the
dispute in 2012/2013, when Abe re- “geographic location at the vortex
took office (and previously in 2008), of great-power rivalry in Northeast
significantly strained the relationship Asia” made the country “a victim of
between the two nations. Abe’s sub- the tragedy of great-power politics.”
sequent stabilization of Japanese rela- Great-power conflicts resulted in the
tions with China is one of his foreign Korean Peninsula’s loss of sovereignty
policy achievements. in the early 20th century, its division
after World War II, and the Korean
South Korea: Navigating War. The US security umbrella has
Great-Power Rivalry guaranteed South Korea’s existence
In his first press conference in 2021, from the Korean War to the pres-
South Korean President Moon Jae-in ent against security threats from the
made it clear: South Korea would not North. The regime in Pyongyang
take sides in the US-China rivalry. Re- continues to expand its nuclear and
lations with China and the US would missile programs and could devas-
be “equally important.”21 South Korea tate the densely populated Seoul re-
has resisted recent calls by the Trump gion with its conventional and pos-
administration to join its Clean Net- sibly chemically equipped artillery
work initiative, which would require deployed along the border.22
countries not to use Huawei equip-
ment for their 5G networks. South In the past, South Korea relied on
Korea has also refrained from officially the US not only for security, but
supporting the US-led Indo-Pacif- also for its economic prosperity and
ic Strategy, which was introduced in positioning in the international
112JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
system. With US help, South Korea alliance with the US will also want
experienced spectacular (export-led) to pursue good relations with China,
economic growth and successfully given the expected negative effects of
integrated into the Western-led lib- a deteriorating relationship with Chi-
eral international order. It currently na on the South Korean economy and
holds the position as the 11th-largest prospects for reunification.24
economy and sixth-largest exporter
in the world. Since the 1990s, South President Moon is a representative
Korea has been an active member of of the progressive political camp,
the UN, WTO, and the OECD. De- which in the past was more critical
spite these achievements, South Korea of the country’s alliance with the US
faces a rather hostile regional security and more likely to place equal value
environment with some of the world’s on the country’s relations with Chi-
largest economic and military powers na than was the conservative camp.
in its neighborhood.23 However, South Korean politicians
and the broader public see China less
An economic rationale, shared by favorably than they did a few years
other Asian countries, and a strategic ago. In reaction to South Korea’s de-
dilemma specific to South Korea ex- cision to deploy a US missile defense
plain why South Korea will not easi- system (THAAD), China in 2016
ly commit to fully aligning with the launched an 18-month boycott cam-
US against China. Like its neighbors, paign with severely damaging effects
South Korea sees its economic future for the South Korean economy. This
with China, its main trading partner. sowed public distrust on the Kore-
Politically influential business circles an side. Recent public opinion polls
hold, in general, a China-friendly reveal that the South Korean public
view. The key to understanding South holds a decreasingly favorable view of
Korea’s strategic engagement with both great powers. However, if they
China, however, is North Korea. Co- had to choose between them, a clear
operation with China, the only ally majority of South Koreans would still
and largest trading partner of North choose the US over China.25
Korea, is seen as critical to achieving
the reunification of Korea. Reunifica- In the unfolding US-China compe-
tion is a key priority of South Korean tition, South Korea has so far opted
foreign policy, along with economic for a “strategic nondecision.”26 His-
prosperity and security/sovereignty. torically, South Korea has always tried
Even staunch supporters of a strong to accommodate the most powerful
113ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
country. Currently, South Korea seeks promote their competing visions for
to avoid making choices by accommo- the region through regional organi-
dating both great powers. To accom- zations and other initiatives. China’s
modate China and settle the THAAD Belt and Road Initiative is a clear ex-
dispute, South Korea agreed to re- ample of the country building influ-
strain itself militarily (including no ence in its neighborhood. Yet, partici-
additional THAAD deployment, no pation in these undertakings also risks
participation in any US-led regional alienating the other power. China-led
missile defense network, and no tri- initiatives may be seen as purpose-
lateral military alliance with the US fully excluding the US, but Wash-
and Japan). It has also been open to ington-supported proposals, such as
joining China-led regional groupings, the 5G Clean Network initiative, are
such as the AIIB (2015) and the RCEP quickly interpreted as attempts to lim-
(2020), the latter of which is the it or contain China. Such competing
world’s largest free trade zone encom- proposals leave countries in the region
passing China, Japan, and the ASEAN with zero-sum choices.27
states, as well as Australia and New
Zealand. At the same time, South In East Asia, no region-wide politi-
Korea keeps investing in its alliance cal or security mechanism exists that
with the US. Even under arguably the could mediate the effects of the un-
most progressive Korean government folding great-power competition and
(2003 – 2008), South Korea partic- its associated uncertainties on indi-
ipated in the US “War on Terror” in vidual countries. While both great
Iraq as the third-largest contributor. powers invest in establishing and re-
inforcing partnerships in the region,
The Role of Middle Powers doubts exist as to how reliable these
in the US-China Rivalry partnerships are and how well they
The implications of the great-pow- align with partner countries’ political,
er rivalry for East Asian countries are security, and economic interests. In
twofold. First, countries in the region reaction to the uncertain geopolitical
face increasing pressure to make choic- environment, the small and middle
es and align with either China or the powers of East Asia are increasing
US. Second, the rivalry reflects and their defense spending and reinforc-
reinforces ongoing power shifts, giving ing security cooperation – not only
rise to strategic uncertainties. East Asia with the US, but also with other
is of core interest to both great powers, global partners such as Australia and
and both China and the US actively India. More generally, intraregional
114JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
interaction and cooperation, with a administration (2013 – 2017), is one
focus on economic activities (for ex- among a number of initiatives that
ample in the ASEAN context), are on did not prove successful – arguably,
the rise. While they reflect the general because South Korea was not in a
trend of intensifying economic ties, strong enough position to push it.
such joint activities can also be seen It was also Park who pointed to the
as countries’ individual hedging strat- “Asian Paradox” of decades-long in-
egies in an increasingly harsh geopolit- tensifying economic cooperation in
ical environment. East Asia in the near absence of polit-
ical and security cooperation.
Cooperation between small and me-
dium powers will be essential in en- Another legacy of the US-led order
abling them to voice their interests that makes in-depth regional coop-
in an environment increasingly dom- eration or even integration difficult
inated by great-power competition. is Japan’s position in the region: It is
However, the US-led order is heavily strong and contested at the same time.
focused on bilateralism, with particu- Wanting Japan to be the economic en-
larly strong links in Northeast as com- gine and stable anchor of the region,
pared to Southeast Asia. In the past, the US shielded the country from
South Korea has shown openness to claims to reparations for the colonial
multilateral solutions for the region, and war atrocities inflicted on neigh-
including in Northeast Asia. Seoul has boring countries. In contrast to Ger-
also demonstrated an interest in deep- many, Japan has never engaged in a
ening regional integration, for exam- process of critically coming to terms
ple through the ASEAN+3 forum. In with its war crimes. The Philippines,
fact, South Korea has proved far more for example, openly protested against
open to such efforts than Japan. Most the 1951 peace treaty as it did not
South Korean presidents in the post- commit Japan to pay reparations. In a
Cold War period pursued a strategic related development, Japan’s increased
vision of a regional security mecha- economic engagement in Southeast
nism that could help overcome (mil- Asia starting in the 1970s led to back-
itary) insecurities and competition in lash; anti-Japanese protests took place
the region. A main motivation was to in Indonesia and Thailand. The ongo-
ease tensions in both US-China and ing conflict between Japan and South
Sino-Japanese rivalries. The Northeast Korea is also rooted in unresolved
Asian Peace and Cooperation Initia- historical conflicts, aggravated by new
tive, launched by the Park Geun-hye nationalism in both countries.
115ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
Due to the visible nationalism and re- order. The current power shifts indi-
visionism in contemporary Japanese cate that US influence will wane in
politics, combined with memories of the future order and that some power
imperial Japan, East Asian neighbor will be shared with an ever more am-
states remain suspicious of the coun- bitious and powerful China. Japan’s
try’s ambitions to raise its regional strategy towards China can be de-
leadership profile. But Japan’s rela- scribed as balancing or “heavy hedg-
tions with smaller Southeast Asian ing.” The country undertakes broad
states have, on the whole, improved efforts to keep the US engaged in
over time. Japan’s position in the re- the region. By contrast, the approach
gion is today well established. Neigh- taken by most other countries qual-
boring countries appreciate Japan as ifies as some sort of “light hedging”
a business partner, leading source of or “dual hedging,” meaning efforts to
FDI, or major donor of development hedge against both China and the US
aid. More problematic are the coun- by increasing cooperation with both
try’s relations with South Korea. In great powers simultaneously.28 Like
recent years, the two countries found many other countries in the region,
themselves in a downward spiral, con- South Korea refrains from competi-
stantly hitting new lows in their rela- tion over regional influence but seeks
tionship. Japan will have to overcome a stable regional order. South Korea
such fundamental conflicts within the has made it clear that it does not want
region and convince East Asian part- to align with one of the great powers
ners of their shared interests in order amid their rivalry. Timely, proactive,
to have an impact on the emerging re- and consistent action and communi-
gional order. Its focus so far has been cation by middle powers can help en-
on political coalition-building outside sure their continued position of influ-
the region. In a similar logic, South ence and prove decisive in solidifying
Korea could strengthen its position in a new regional order.
the great-power rivalry by improving
its relations with Japan. In the absence of a regional architec-
ture, middle powers have a key role
In situations when power is rapid- to play in formulating indigenous
ly shifting, as is the case in East Asia solutions to new political and security
amid the US-China rivalry, a clear challenges in East Asia and promot-
positioning of regional actors, espe- ing their joint interests even if they
cially the more influential ones, can be conflict with those of great powers.
consequential for the forming regional Japan stands out as the actor that has
116JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
arguably most actively positioned itself respond jointly to the challenges relat-
in the new and changing geopolitical ed to China’s rise. Will strengthening
landscape of the region. During this old engagement patterns be enough,
formative period for East Asia, Tokyo however, to hinder China’s increasing
demonstrated political innovation and geopolitical influence in the region?
leadership. It has been at the forefront The US is still in a position to exert
of anticipating and reacting to power strong influence on East Asian part-
shifts in East Asia, including China’s ners, through either coercive means
rise and the relative decline of the US. (such as the threat to exclude them
Under Abe’s premiership, Japan man- from intelligence sharing) or positive
aged to develop a long-term strategic incentives. The US, however, also in-
vision of the region and Japan’s role in creasingly needs to compete with Chi-
it. Both conceptual work and political na, an influential economic partner
action have been important to bring and provider of public goods to coun-
political visions, such as the Quad tries in the region. Unlike China, the
and FOIP, to life. This included in- US has until recently “shunned the re-
ternational networking efforts. Other gion’s various indigenous architectural
countries, like the US, have embraced efforts,” for example by being “decid-
concepts like FOIP that have been pro- edly ambivalent” about past proposals
moted by Japan. Analysts argue that Ja- such as Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
pan has, over the past decades, become operation (APEC).30 The US under
a more equal ally with the US and, to- Trump placed priority on domestic
day takes on a leading, forward-think- needs and interests (“America first”)
ing role in the East Asian region.29 over the interests of other countries,
including those of East Asian allies.
Towards a New Grand Political Defining common interests and de-
Bargain in East Asia veloping joint perspectives will be a
The East Asian order is at a critical necessary part of the US attempt to
juncture. The future of the region re-establish itself as a reliable, consis-
continues to depend critically on US tent partner and leader in Asia.
engagement. Early indications from
the Biden administration show that Whether the US and its East Asian
it seeks to abandon the unilateral ap- partners will arrive at a consensus over
proach taken under Trump and will the rules and principles they want to
strengthen cooperation with old and promote jointly in the region is de-
new partners and allies, such as Japan, pendent on how closely the interests
South Korea, and India, in order to of the partners align. In this regard,
117ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
the US approach towards China and partners. Threat perceptions and se-
North Korea will be crucial. An ap- curity interests of the US, Japan, and
proach that isolates China econom- South Korea largely coincide. For
ically and politically is in the interest all three countries, China’s rise rep-
of neither Japan nor South Korea. At resents a primary security threat and
the same time, concerns over China’s one that will dominate discourse for
military ambitions are growing across the foreseeable future. As China con-
the region and beyond. Signs exist tinues to gain influence and power,
that China will consolidate its military mutual security ties among Japan,
cooperation with North Korea and South Korea, and the US will become
further strengthen ties with Russia.31 increasingly relevant. Similarly, a hos-
For example, China and Russia’s first tile North Korea that keeps increasing
joint air patrol in July 2019 proved its nuclear and missile capabilities is
aggravating to both Japan and South another shared security priority. Fur-
Korea. Both Tokyo and Seoul accused thermore, the impact of the long his-
the joint air patrol of violating their tory of cooperation between the US
national airspace. By making the in- and its Northeast Asian allies should
cursion near the disputed Dokdo/ not be underestimated. Past military
Takeshima islands, which South Ko- cooperation has proven very success-
rea administers but Japan also claims, ful, particularly in reference to close
China may have intended to drive a US-Japan collaboration on missile
wedge between the two US allies, with defense. Against the backdrop of the
Russia’s help. Furthermore, changes in changing security environment, Ja-
the US approach towards North Korea pan even signaled its intention to step
have also sown confusion and worry. up its security cooperation with the
Trump’s summit diplomacy direct- US and expressed interest in joining
ly engaged with North Korean leader the US Five Eyes intelligence part-
Kim Jong-un, raising fears that the US nership with Australia, Canada, New
could strike a deal with North Korea to Zealand, and the UK.
the detriment of Japan and South Ko-
rea. The US will have to assure its part- The growing military capabilities of
ners and address such concerns and East Asian partners and their con-
fears in a credible and sustainable way. tinued commitment to their alliance
with the US facilitate a strong US mil-
A good basis exists for continued and itary engagement in the region. Both
even strengthened military coopera- Japan and South Korea are interested
tion between the US and its East Asian in playing an active role in regional
118JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
security, though South Korea is far organizations. Typical of middle pow-
more reluctant than Japan to take sides ers, Japan and South Korea are also
in the US-China rivalry. Contrary to supportive of multilateralism. Both
President Trump’s claims, Japan and have stable democratic political sys-
South Korea have been investing in tems and promote the rule of law,
both their own military power and both domestically and international-
their alliance with the US. Japan in- ly. Japan and South Korea are valu-
creased its defense spending by 13 per able partners from a regional geostra-
cent since 2013, after a decade of cuts. tegic aspect, but also as international
Tokyo also covered almost all of the technological and infrastructure gov-
costs for new US military facilities at ernance leaders – key areas in the ef-
Futenma and Iwakuni. It also relies fort to manage China’s rise.
heavily on US arms exports, as 90 per
cent of Japanese defense systems and To strengthen its leadership going for-
weapons are American. South Korea ward, the US will have to be sensitive
is among the world’s top spenders on to new, complex geopolitical realities
defense (currently 2.6 per cent of its in East Asia. Countries like Japan and
GDP and rising) and paid 90 per cent South Korea are today in a far better
of the 11 billion USD construction position to shape regional politics
cost for Camp Humphreys, the US’ than they were 70 years ago. In the
largest overseas military base. It also early 1950s, the US established a sys-
purchased 13 billion USD worth of tem of strongly asymmetric relations
US arms in a recent four-year period.32 with its East Asian partners, which
reflected countries’ relative power at
Aside from the military aspects of the time. The US had established its
their partnership, the US also enjoys military superiority through its role
many other significant benefits from in World War II and the Korean War,
its Northeast Asian allies. Tokyo and and had by this time also proved it-
Seoul are natural partners of the US self as an economic powerhouse. The
with regard to both regional and glob- US accounted for half of global GDP
al governance. Japan and South Korea and held 80 per cent of the world’s
are among the most economically and hard currency reserves. In partner-
technologically advanced countries ing with Japan and South Korea, the
worldwide. They are active members US was partnering with war-ravaged,
of the Western-led international or- economically weak nations. Today,
der, holding memberships in all im- they are among the leading econo-
portant Western-led international mies in the world, running large trade
119ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
surpluses with the US. Both coun- the order in their interest will also
tries have modernized their militaries, depend on their ability to cooperate.
which are among the best equipped Yet simply sharing common interests,
in the region. China’s rise makes Ja- such as the pursuit of stability, peace,
pan and South Korea indispensable and economic prosperity, will not
partners of the US in the region. At suffice. They also need to overcome
the same time, China’s growing pow- impediments to multilateral cooper-
er and influence creates new security ation at the regional level, some of
challenges for Japan and South Korea, which are legacies of the established
showcasing the benefits of a strong US US-led order. This includes East Asia’s
position and partnerships in East Asia. strong preference for bilateralism and
unaddressed historical anti-Japanese
The Future of the Regional sentiments.
Order in East Asia
East Asia is transitioning to a more What could a new grand political bar-
complex regional order where power gain look like from a US perspective?
will be more diffuse and both the US To continue playing a leading role in
and China want to lead. Given East East Asia over the long term, the US
Asia’s growing economic and geopolit- will have to redefine the nature of its
ical weight, success in this effort will role as an Asian power and gain clarity
influence their respective abilities to in its strategic priorities. The political
maintain and develop their great-pow- support at home for the old bargain is
er status. The positioning of middle gone. President Biden faces domestic
powers will be decisive in how the constraints regarding US participa-
great-power rivalry will play out in the tion in free-trade agreements. Yet it
region. Japan, for example, demon- is just those tools that are of growing
strates how middle powers can have geopolitical relevance in East Asia. At
an impact on regional politics in ways the same time, assessments of the geo-
that serve their interests by taking a political role of both China and Japan
proactive approach. Japan has proved enjoy a strong bipartisan consensus.
successful in actively seeking coopera- China is seen as a long-term strategic
tion with other extra-regional powers, competitor whose rise the US needs
such as Australia and India and po- to manage. Japan is considered a key
tentially European countries, in a way partner in this endeavor. In addition,
that helps solidify Tokyo’s position North Korea continues to represent a
on the world stage. Whether middle significant security threat in East Asia
and small powers in Asia can shape of international relevance, an issue
120JA PA N A N D S O UT H KO R E A
on which the US will want to coop- 9 See Calder, Securing Security through Prosperity.
erate with East Asian partners includ- 10 Chang-kyong Park, “Seoul Affirms Cool Japan
ing South Korea. Sufficient common Relations, Warm China Ties in Defence White
Paper,” South China Morning Post, 03.02.2021.
ground seems to exist for continued
US engagement in East Asia – an en- 11 Richard L. Armitage / Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The
U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2020: An Equal Alliance
gagement that will be backed by its with a Global Agenda,” CSIS Japan Chair
old East Asian partners. (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2020).
12 Yoichi Funabashi / G. John Ikenberry, “Intro-
duction: Japan and the Liberal International
1 Şuhnaz Yilmaz, “Middle Powers and Regional Order,” The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism:
Powers,” Oxford Bibliographies in International Japan and the World Order (Washington, DC:
Relations (2017). Brookings Institution Press, 2020), pp. 1 – 36.
2 Evan A. Feigenbaum / Robert A. Manning, “A 13 Takuya Matsuda, “Explaining Japan’s Post-Cold
Tale of Two Asias,” Foreign Policy, 31.10.2012. War Security Policy Trajectory: Maritime Real-
ism,” Australian Journal of International Affairs
3 This included preventing Chiang Kai-shek 74:6 (2020), pp. 687 – 703.
from returning to mainland China and trying
to defeat the communists and keeping South 14 Yoichiro Sato, “Trump Wrong to Accuse
Korea’s Syngman Rhee from trying to militarily Japan of Free Riding on Security,” Nikkei Asia,
overthrow the regime in the North. See Victor 17.07.2019.
D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American
Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 15 See Matsuda, Explaining Japan’s Post-Cold War
University Press, 2016), pp. 65 – 121. Security Policy Trajectory.
4 G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and 16 Richard L. Armitage / Joseph S. Nye Jr.,
East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of Interna- The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2020.
tional Affairs 58:3 (2004), pp. 353 – 67; Victor
D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American 17 Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: The
Alliance System in Asia. Current Discourse,” Journal of Japanese Studies
33:1 (2007), pp. 125 – 152.
5 Compared to security arrangements that the US
struck with European partners, Asian partners 18 Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the
contributed significantly more to the financing Evolutionary,” The Washington Quarterly 38:2
of US military presence, received less direct (2015), pp. 79 – 99.
financial aid from the US, and imposed less
restrictive controls on US military personnel 19 Michael J. Green, “Japan Is Back: Unbundling
on their territory. See Kent Calder, “Securing Abe’s Grand Strategy,” Analyses (Sydney: Lowy
Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco Institute, 2013).
System in Comparative Perspective,” The Pacific
Review 17:1 (2004), p. 145. 20 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Grand Stra-
tegic Shift: From the Yoshida Doctrine to an
6 Ibid, pp. 135 – 57. Abe Doctrine?” Strategic Asia 2017 – 18: Power,
Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific
7 Mathieu Duchâtel, Géopolitique de la Chine, (Seattle / Washington, DC: The National
2nd ed., (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
2019).
21 Chang-kyong Park, “Moon Jae-in says South
8 Richard L. Armitage / Victor Cha, “The 66-Year Korea will not take sides in US-China rivalry,”
Alliance between the U.S. and South Korea Is in South China Morning Post, 18.01.2021.
Deep Trouble,” Washington Post, 02.11.2019.
121ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 22 Scott A. Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 1. 23 Ibid. 24 Ellen Kim / Victor Cha, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States,” Asia Policy 21:1 (2016), pp. 101 – 21. 25 J. James Kim / Chungku Kang, “The U.S.-Chi- na Competition in South Korean Public Eyes,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2020. 26 See Ji-Young Lee, “South Korea’s Strategic Nondecision and Sino-U.S. Competition,” Strategic Asia 2020: U.S.-China Competition for Global Influence (Seattle/Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020). 27 Victor D. Cha, “The Security Dilemma in Asian Architecture: United States, Japan, and China,” in: Takashi Inoguchi / G. John Ikenberry / Yoichiro Sato (eds.), The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011), pp. 157 – 176. 28 See on South Korea: Scott A. Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads, pp. 221 – 222. 29 See Richard L. Armitage / Joseph S. Nye Jr, The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2020. 30 Ibid, p. 158. 31 Kang Choi et al., “The Shifting Environment in Northeast Asia and Our Responses,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2019. 32 Bruce Klingner et al., “Trump Shakedowns Are Threatening Two Key US Alliances in Asia,” Brookings, 2019. 122
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