STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
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Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC
TRENDS 2021
Key Developments in Global Affairs
Editors: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert
Series Editor: Andreas Wenger
Authors: Brian G. Carlson, Julian Kamasa, Linda Maduz,
Niklas Masuhr, Lisa Watanabe
CSS
ETH Zurich
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 1 April 2021. © 2021, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-76-9
CHAPTER 1
China-Russia Relations
and Transatlantic Security
Brian G. Carlson
The China-Russia relationship is an increasingly important factor in
transatlantic security. Russia and China pose security challenges to the
Euro-Atlantic region in distinct and mostly uncoordinated ways, but
their partnership allows both countries to pursue spheres of influence close
to home. The United States and its allies will therefore face growing
security challenges in both the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions. The
rise of China will force the United States to devote increased attention
and military assets to Asia, underscoring the need for a strengthened
European pillar in NATO.
Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS
Summit in Brasilia, Brazil, November 13, 2019. Sputnik / Ramil Sitdikov / Kremlin via REUTERS
11ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
Relations between China and Russia complicates US grand strategy, with
have grown increasingly close in recent important consequences for Europe
years, a trend that will have import- and the transatlantic partnership.
ant implications for transatlantic se- Comity between China and Russia
curity. The China-Russia relationship ensures that both countries enjoy a
features growing cooperation in both secure strategic rear, freeing each of
diplomatic and security affairs. The them from the fear that the other
two countries often align their diplo- would abandon it and join its adver-
macy, jointly rejecting international saries, especially in a crisis.
criticism of their domestic governance,
standing in opposition to conceptions The reassurance that both countries
of an international order based on lib- gain from this understanding affords
eral political values, and forging com- both of them some additional room
mon positions on a variety of inter- for maneuver in their own regions,
national issues, including in the UN where they are establishing spheres
Security Council. The strengthening of influence.1 They pursue this goal
of political and diplomatic relations, through the tactic of “probing,” which
in turn, has enabled China and Russia entails limited, calculated provoca-
to increase their bilateral defense co- tions designed to test the commit-
operation. This includes Russian sales ment of the United States to its al-
of advanced weapons to China and lies and partners.2 China and Russia
joint military and naval exercises of in- frequently disavow any intention to
creasing frequency, intensity, and geo- form a political-military alliance. In
graphical scope, including joint naval many cases, parallel rather than co-
exercises within the past few years in ordinated actions by the two coun-
the Mediterranean and Baltic seas. tries impinge on Western interests.
Coordinated China-Russia efforts in
As China and Russia draw closer to- Europe remain limited, but the two
gether, the impact on transatlantic countries act individually in ways that
security stems not primarily from the pose challenges to regional security.
two countries’ direct military cooper-
ation or contemplation of joint mili- Both China and Russia are strength-
tary operations in the Euro-Atlantic ening their military capabilities, ap-
region, but rather from the broader plying pressure on the United States
effects of their rapprochement. The and its allies in the Asia-Pacific and
China-Russia “strategic partnership” Euro-Atlantic regions, respectively.
creates a geopolitical environment that This places increased strain on the
12C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
United States, stretching its resources partnership. Europe could make a
and complicating the task of fulfilling valuable contribution to this effort
its security commitments. According by increasing defense spending and
to several recent studies, the United assuming a greater share of the bur-
States would face severe challenges in den for European security within the
winning a war against either country framework of NATO.
under certain scenarios, including a
war against Russia over the Baltics or China-Russia Relations
a war against China over Taiwan. The and the West
ultimate risk would be simultaneous The West has been an important
or sequential moves by the two coun- factor in the strengthening of Chi-
tries in their respective regions that na-Russia relations since the end of
could thrust the United States into the Cold War. The convergence of
great-power war on two fronts. Chi- national identities between China and
na’s growing power will force the Unit- Russia, based largely on opposition
ed States to devote increased attention, to US power and to conceptions of a
resources, and military assets to the liberal international order, which both
Asia-Pacific or broader Indo-Pacific countries viewed as Western-centric,
region. Meanwhile, in the absence of was an important driver of the re-
a rapprochement between Russia and lationship.3 Both China and Russia
the West, which appears unlikely in resented the preponderance of power
the near term, security challenges in that the United States enjoyed, criti-
Europe will also remain pressing. cized US “hegemonism,” and actively
encouraged the formation of a mul-
Under these geopolitical circumstanc- tipolar world to replace the unipolar
es, the United States is likely to face order that emerged after the end of the
a period of sustained great-power Cold War. They denounced criticism
competition. US President Joe Biden’s of their human rights records by West-
administration appears to favor a du- ern leaders, whom they accused of in-
al-track approach of seeking coopera- terfering in their domestic affairs with
tion with both China and Russia on the goal of promoting political change.
issues of common interest while also As tensions grew in their respective
attempting to counter threats and re- relations with the West, China and
sist aggression. In order to pursue this Russia drew closer to each other. They
strategy successfully, the United States viewed their bilateral relationship as a
must rely heavily on its network of means of gaining increased leverage in
alliances, including the transatlantic disputes with the West.
13ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 These trends became especially pro- Relations with the West are not the nounced in the past decade. At a time only driver of the China-Russia re- when several of China’s neighbors lationship, however. Some aspects, were becoming increasingly wary of including energy ties, are largely a its growing power and seeking in- function of the bilateral relationship creased support from the United itself.4 More broadly, Russia has im- States, Russia defied the expectations portant reasons to maintain strong of many analysts by drawing ever relations with China regardless of the closer to China, despite the growing state of its relations with the West. power imbalance in China’s favor and Historical memory of the Sino-Soviet the potential vulnerability of Russia’s split during the Cold War serves as a eastern regions. Russia set aside long- reminder for Russia of the price that term concerns about China’s rise, cal- it could pay for estrangement from culating that its main challenges for China. At that time, the Soviet Union the foreseeable future lay in its trou- was the stronger of the two countries. bled relations with the West, especial- Now, with the balance of power in ly following the onset of the Ukraine the bilateral relationship tilting rapid- crisis. In particular, President Vladi- ly in China’s favor, the risks for Russia mir Putin viewed the West as a poten- would be even greater. Given the vul- tial threat to his domestic governance. nerability of Russia’s underpopulated, For Russia, China’s rise had the pos- underdeveloped regions of Siberia sible benefit of diverting US attention and the Russian Far East, Russia can to Asia. For China, which embarked ill afford a rupture of its relationship on an increasingly assertive course with China. For its part, China views in foreign policy under President Xi Russia as not only a partner in resist- Jinping’s leadership, Russia’s disputes ing the West, but also as a provider of with the West also served as poten- energy and advanced weapons as well tial distractions for the United States. as a friendly neighbor, an important Both China and Russia recognized consideration at a time when Chi- that the network of US alliances, in- na faces tensions with several other cluding the transatlantic partnership, countries along its periphery. gave the United States a crucial advan- tage. They accordingly sought to dis- Despite the increasingly close relation- rupt these alliances. In Europe, Russia ship between China and Russia, their began these efforts at an early stage, partnership has exerted only a limited but China has become increasingly direct impact on the West. To date, active on this front in recent years. their cooperative efforts have failed to 14
C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
yield significant leverage over the West Nord Stream 2, a pipeline that is set
in terms of halting or reversing par- to deliver natural gas from Russia to
ticular foreign policy decisions by the Germany through the Baltic Sea. The
United States or Europe.5 The setbacks German government resisted these
that the United States and Europe have calls, however, and by early 2021 the
suffered in recent years are largely the project was nearing completion de-
result of domestic political, social, and spite the threat of US sanctions against
economic factors in Western societies participating German companies.
themselves.6 China and Russia largely
failed to take advantage of transatlan- As for China, the outbreak of the
tic tensions during Donald Trump’s coronavirus pandemic led to a deteri-
presidency, instead alienating many oration of relations with the West. In
European countries through their hu- both the United States and Europe,
man rights abuses at home and their the pandemic caused high death tolls
increasingly assertive behavior abroad, and extensive economic damage. The
including their efforts to gain influence US-China relationship, which already
in European countries.7 exhibited signs of an impending su-
perpower rivalry, grew worse amid
In Russia’s case, the poisoning of op- the pandemic, as US officials and the
position leader Alexei Navalny in Au- public blamed China for covering up
gust 2020 exacerbated tensions with and failing to contain the outbreak.
the West. After falling ill on a domes- When the pandemic first reached Eu-
tic flight in Russia, Navalny was flown rope, China saw an opportunity to
to Germany for treatment, where his increase its influence in several Euro-
diagnosis showed poisoning with pean countries by providing medical
Novichok, a nerve agent originally de- supplies and other assistance. Some
veloped by the Soviet Union. Follow- of the Chinese equipment turned out
ing his recovery, Navalny returned to to be defective, however. This failure,
Russia in January to resume his chal- combined with China’s heavy-hand-
lenge to the government. The Russian ed efforts to shift blame for the out-
authorities immediately imprisoned break and to claim credit for its re-
him, but his supporters held large an- sponse, turned public opinion in
ti-government protests in several Rus- many European countries against
sian cities. Both the United States and China and raised concerns about the
the EU imposed sanctions on Russia in consequences of growing dependence
response. The attack on Navalny also on an increasingly powerful author-
prompted calls for Germany to cancel itarian country. This tendency had
15ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
its limits, however, as the European allegedly passing classified informa-
Union concluded negotiations with tion to China. The standoff between
China on the Comprehensive Agree- Chinese and Indian forces in the two
ment on Investment (CAI) in Decem- countries’ Himalayan border region,
ber 2020, despite the incoming Biden which resulted in a skirmish that
administration’s expressed desire to killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unde-
consult with the EU first. clared number of Chinese troops, cre-
ated an awkward situation for Russia,
The pandemic also created challeng- which attempts to maintain friendly
es for the China-Russia relationship. relations with both countries.8
Russia closed its border with China
in the early days of the pandemic, but Despite these tensions, the Chi-
China later turned the tables by clos- na-Russia relationship appeared to
ing the border itself following a sharp remain strong. In October, Putin re-
rise in cases in Russia, a decision that sponded to a question about the pos-
left many Chinese citizens temporar- sibility of an alliance with China by
ily stranded on the other side. The saying, “It is possible to imagine any-
two countries handled these and other thing. … We have not set that goal
pandemic-related challenges relative- for ourselves. But, in principle, we
ly smoothly, but other issues caused are not going to rule it out, either.”9
tension in 2020. When the Russian This appeared to suggest greater
Embassy in China commemorated openness to the possibility than Pu-
the 160th anniversary of the founding tin had expressed previously. Russian
of Vladivostok, the city in the Rus- leaders also rebuffed India’s efforts to
sian Far East, Chinese Internet users encourage Russia’s participation in
responded angrily, noting that the the Indo-Pacific regional concept. In
city, formerly called Haishenwai, was December, Russian Foreign Minister
part of the Qing dynasty’s Manchu- Sergei Lavrov criticized India’s par-
rian territory prior to Russia’s impe- ticipation in the US-led Indo-Pacific
rial conquest of the region. The Chi- Strategy, accusing the United States
na-Russia border is settled as a matter and its allies of attempting to draw
of law, but indications that segments India into “anti-Chinese games.”
of Chinese public opinion reject the That same month, for the second
status quo could become a concern time since July 2019, Chinese and
for Russia over the long term. Russian Russian strategic bombers conducted
prosecutors charged a Russian scien- a joint air patrol in Northeast Asia,
tist specializing in Arctic research with prompting Japan and South Korea to
16C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
scramble fighter jets in response. The transatlantic partnership. The secu-
joint air patrols were part of a pattern rity relationship between Russia and
of increasingly close China-Russia de- the West has been increasingly tense
fense cooperation in recent years. since Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and the rise of a Russian-supported
Cooperation between China and Rus- insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Since
sia is a growing concern for both the then, Western countries have pursued
United States and Europe. On both a dual-track approach to Russia, seek-
sides of the Atlantic, however, relations ing dialogue and a political solution
with China and Russia are primarily in Ukraine through the Minsk pro-
determined by interactions with the cess while at the same time impos-
two countries individually. China and ing sanctions and seeking to bolster
Russia act in parallel in ways that have NATO’s deterrent, especially along
an impact on Western societies and its eastern flank. Russia has pursued
on transatlantic security. The United military modernization, introduced
States is increasingly preoccupied with new weapons systems, and conduct-
potential security threats from both ed large-scale military exercises in its
China and Russia, but geography dic- western regions. The Conventional
tates that Europe has its own distinct Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which
perspective. Viewed individually, both was negotiated at the conclusion of
Russia and China pose security chal- the Cold War, remains moribund.
lenges to Europe, but the nature of Russia suspended its participation
these challenges differs significantly. in the treaty in 2007 and withdrew
Recent strategy documents by the EU altogether in March 2015, one year
and national governments in Europe after the annexation of Crimea. Rus-
tend to distinguish between Russia, sia also frequently conducts provo-
which they present as a revisionist cations such as bomber and fighter
power with aggressive aims, and Chi- patrols that make incursions into the
na, which they portray as increasingly airspace of NATO member states and
influential on the world stage and as- other Western countries. In 2020,
sertive in Asia, but not a direct mili- the United States withdrew from the
tary threat to Europe.10 Open Skies Treaty, alleging Russian
violations.11
Russia’s Challenge to
Transatlantic Security The nuclear dimension of securi-
Russia remains the primary security ty relations between Russia and the
concern for NATO and the broader West remains crucial, with growing
17ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
China-Russia Relations and Defense Cooperation
Since 1989
1989 • Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China normalize relations
1990 • Soviet arms sales to China resume after hiatus since the 1950s
1991 • Soviet Union collapses. China establishes diplomatic relations
with Russian Federation
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996 • Establishment of “strategic partnership”
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001 • Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation
2002
2003
2004
• First joint military exercises (Peace Mission 2005)
2005
• Russian arms sales reach post-Cold War peak, then decline for several years
2006
2007
2008 • Russia’s Vostok-2010 military exercises appear to simulate tactical nuclear
2009
strike against Chinese invasion
• Putin returns to Russian presidency after four years as prime minister
2010
• Xi Jinping becomes general secretary of Chinese Communist Party
2011 • Russia annexes Crimea and supports insurgency in eastern Ukraine,
2012
prompting Western sanctions
• Russia agrees to sell S-400 air defense system to China
2013
• Joint naval exercises in Mediterranean Sea
2014 • Russia agrees to sell Su-35 fighter jets to China
2015 • Joint naval exercises in South China Sea
2016 • First computer-simulated missile defense exercise
• Joint naval exercises in Baltic Sea
2017
• Second computer-simulated missile defense exercise
2018
• China participates in Russia’s Vostok-2018 domestic military exercises
2019 • First joint air patrol in Asia-Pacific
2020 • Russia offers to help China build missile attack early warning system
• Joint naval exercises with Iran
2021
• Second joint air patrol in Asia-Pacific
18C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
implications for China. The United measures, and include China. Russia
States and Russia agreed to a five-year raised its own demands, insisting that
extension of the New Strategic Arms a new treaty should address missile
Reduction Treaty (New START) in the defense and other issues.
early days of Biden’s presidency, just
days before the treaty was set to expire, Russia also countered US demands
but many questions remain about the that a new treaty include China, ar-
future of arms control. In the view guing that China should make its
of many analysts, Russia adheres to a own sovereign decision on this mat-
“theory of victory” according to which ter. China has consistently refused to
it could use the threat of nuclear es- participate in international arms con-
calation or the actual first use of nu- trol for as long as its arsenal remains
clear weapons in order to “de-escalate” significantly smaller than those of the
a conflict on favorable terms.12 Russia two nuclear superpowers. Although
has taken several steps in the apparent Russian officials would welcome Chi-
pursuit of this capability. In addition na’s eventual participation, they are
to modernizing all three legs of its reluctant to apply pressure on China
nuclear triad, it has developed new for fear that this would merely alienate
intercontinental-range systems such an important partner while failing to
as a hypersonic glide vehicle, a nu- bring it to the negotiating table. They
clear-armed, nuclear-powered cruise also argue that any arms control ne-
missile, and a nuclear-armed, nucle- gotiations that include China should
ar-powered, undersea autonomous also include Britain and France.
torpedo. Russia has also established
superiority in non-strategic, dual-ca- Russia’s position has shifted as its
pable systems that can be armed with relationship with China has grown
either nuclear or conventional weap- closer. Only a few years ago, Russian
ons, including the SSC-8/9M729, a officials suggested that China should
ground-launched cruise missile that join future arms control agreements
violated the Intermediate-Range Nu- and complained that only Russia and
clear Forces (INF) Treaty.13 The Trump the United States were bound by the
administration refrained from extend- restrictions of the INF Treaty. Russian
ing New START, insisting that the two defense planners harbor largely un-
sides first reach a political framework spoken concerns about China’s grow-
agreement calling for a new treaty that ing conventional military capabilities,
would verifiably cover all nuclear war- including conventionally equipped
heads, establish updated verification missiles of intermediate or shorter
19ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
range.14 The ability to defend Rus- Beyond traditional security issues,
sia’s eastern regions against a potential Russia also poses security concerns for
Chinese attack depends on nuclear Europe and the transatlantic partners
deterrence or, failing this, on the early in newer, non-traditional ways. Rus-
use of tactical nuclear weapons against sia’s use of “little green men” during
an invading Chinese army. Concerns its seizure and annexation of Crimea,
about China appear to have been an as well as its unofficial support for
initial reason for Russia’s violation of insurgents in eastern Ukraine, raised
the INF Treaty, though the recent im- concerns about possible future in-
provement in bilateral relations has stances of such hybrid or gray-zone
eased Russia’s immediate concerns interventions that fall below the level
about a potential security threat from of open, direct military engagement.
China. Russia has poisoned critics of the Pu-
tin regime on the territory of Western
The United States withdrew from the countries, as in the fatal polonium
INF Treaty in August 2019 on the attack on Alexander Litvinenko in
grounds that Russia was unwilling London in 2006 and the Novichok
to return to full compliance with its attack on Sergei Skrypal in Salisbury,
provisions, which would have meant England, in 2018, which Skrypal
accepting that the SSC-8/9M729 was and his daughter survived but which
in violation of the treaty. The United killed a bystander. The poisoning of
States could now choose to deploy Navalny occurred on Russian soil, but
missiles of the previously forbidden it generated outrage in the West. The
range in Europe. These would most Novichok attacks call into question
likely be conventional systems, con- Russia’s compliance with the Chem-
sidering that NATO’s member coun- ical Weapons Convention and are
tries would have difficulty agreeing on also examples of Russian information
the deployment of nuclear missiles in warfare, as the Russian government
Europe. The demise of the INF Trea- denied that the Novichok was of Rus-
ty could also allow the United States sian origin and suggested that West-
to deploy intermediate-range missiles ern governments might have been the
in Asia, most likely equipped with perpetrators. Germany also accused
conventional warheads, as a means of the Russian government of ordering
countering the growing military pow- the killing of a former Chechen reb-
er of China, which was not a signatory el commander who was shot dead in
to the treaty and possesses a large arse- Berlin in 2019. Russian cyber threats
nal of missiles in this category.15 are a growing concern, as shown by
20C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
the 2020 SolarWinds attack and other to develop a coordinated policy ap-
cases. Russia also seeks to sow division proach toward China.17 Like Russia,
in Western societies and to undermine China engages in efforts to under-
EU and NATO cohesion through in- mine Western liberal democracies. It
terference in domestic politics. seeks to coopt elites and to influence
public opinion in European coun-
China’s Challenge to tries, including Switzerland.18 These
Transatlantic Security efforts pose a threat to the political
For Europe, China is not a direct mil- sovereignty of individual European
itary threat. China has upgraded its countries and the European Union as
military capabilities in recent years, but a whole. Growing economic depen-
these efforts are focused on its imme- dence on China, especially in supply
diate neighborhood in the Asia-Pacif- chains that are crucial for defense and
ic region. China has also pursued an intelligence, could create vulnera-
increasingly assertive foreign policy, bilities for Europe. China’s inroads
but this is a more immediate concern in parts of Europe, especially in the
for US allies in Asia than for Europe. Western Balkans, and along its pe-
Many European countries are wary of riphery, including in the Arctic and
becoming embroiled in the US-China in the Middle East and North Africa
rivalry and especially in any potential region, pose geopolitical challenges
military conflicts in Asia. Moreover, to Europe.19 China’s efforts to engage
many Central and Eastern Europe- with European countries bilaterally
an countries want NATO to remain or in sub-regional forums, includ-
focused on Russia. China has gained ing the 17+1 format that promotes
increased prominence in European China’s business and investment re-
policy debates, but mostly on issues of lations with 17 countries in Central
trade, investment, technology, and hu- and Eastern Europe, threaten to di-
man rights. vide Europe and prevent it from ne-
gotiating with China from a position
Nevertheless, China poses a variety of of strength based on European unity
challenges to European security. As a and transatlantic cohesion.
result, China has risen on the transat-
lantic agenda. A report by the Europe- China also poses a cybersecurity
an Commission in 2019 called China threat to Europe and the transatlantic
a “systemic rival.”16 In late 2020, a partners, particularly through cyber-
report by the independent NATO Re- espionage. China has gained an ad-
flection Group called for the alliance vantage in crucial high-tech sectors,
21ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
including Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy of the United States, issued in
and fifth-generation wireless technol- December 2017, named China and
ogy (5G), with important econom- Russia as “revisionist powers” that
ic and security ramifications for the “challenge American power, influence,
West.20 The Trump administration had and interests, attempting to erode
some success in persuading European American security and prosperity.”22
countries to limit or block Chinese The summary of the 2018 National
telecommunication giant Huawei’s Defense Strategy, unveiled in January
involvement in 5G networks, arguing 2018, identified the “central challenge
that such steps were necessary in order to US prosperity and security as the
to protect Western intelligence-shar- reemergence of long-term, strategic com-
ing against threats from Chinese sur- petition” by these revisionist powers.23
veillance and espionage.
The new focus on great-power compe-
These challenges require European tition led to a change in defense strat-
countries to strengthen cyber defens- egy. For much of the post-Cold War
es, diversify supply chains, expand era, the United States followed a two-
intelligence-sharing, and take other war strategy. This approach sought to
measures to strengthen the resilience ensure that the United States could
of their societies.21 Although the se- defeat two “rogue states” simulta-
curity challenges that China poses to neously, for example in the Middle
Europe are largely indirect, the growth East and on the Korean Peninsula.
of China’s military capabilities in the With the release of the 2018 Nation-
Asia-Pacific region will have important al Defense Strategy, the United States
secondary effects in Europe. This trend shifted its focus toward securing the
has already caused shifts in US defense ability to defeat one great power in a
policy, with inevitable implications for war at any given time. The strategy
Europe and transatlantic security. does not provide for victory over two
great powers simultaneously. Instead,
US Defense Strategy Shifts it calls for the United States to main-
to Great-Power Competition tain the capability, while defeating a
The combination of China’s rise to single great power in one theater, to
global power and the revival of Russia’s deter another great power in a differ-
great-power ambitions led the United ent theater at the same time.24
States to adjust its foreign and defense
policies during Trump’s presiden- In the period preceding the release of
cy. The most recent National Security the 2018 National Defense Strategy,
22C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
a growing body of evidence suggested contingencies, however, geography
that the United States would have dif- and recent improvements in military
ficulty defeating even one great power capabilities could give China or Rus-
at a time under certain circumstances. sia an advantage.
Studies by RAND for the US Depart-
ment of Defense found that the task China’s improved anti-access/area de-
of defending Taiwan against a Chinese nial capabilities complicate US objec-
assault had grown increasingly difficult tives in the Asia-Pacific, including the
and that the United States and NATO defense of Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands
might lose a war with Russia over the in the East China Sea, or the Spratly
Baltics under present conditions.25 Fol- Islands in the South China Sea. In a
lowing the release of the new defense war over Taiwan, for example, China
strategy, the congressionally mandated could launch missile attacks at several
National Defense Strategy Commis- US targets in the region, including air
sion reached similar conclusions, as bases, aircraft carriers, and airplanes.
did other studies.26 David Ochmanek, China could also target US command
a researcher at RAND, described the and control by conducting cyberat-
situation vividly in March 2019, when tacks and by attacking satellites and
he said that in many recent war games other space-based communications
pitting the United States and its allies infrastructure. The risk is that China
against China or Russia, the US-led co- could quickly seize control of Taiwan
alition “gets its ass handed to it.”27 while inflicting grave losses of per-
sonnel and equipment on the United
In such assessments, the main chal- States. Similar concerns apply to Eu-
lenges for the United States lie in rope, focusing on the possibility that
potential regional military contingen- Russian forces could rapidly overrun
cies. Although both China and Russia the Baltics and prove difficult to dis-
have increased their defense spending lodge.29 To be sure, such pessimistic
significantly during this century, the assessments remain controversial.30
United States maintains an advan- However, a broad recognition exists
tage over both countries in overall that the task for the United States and
military power. US levels of defense its allies in such contingencies has
spending are still significantly higher grown more difficult than it would
than those of either China or Russia, have been only a few years ago.
though the gap narrows when spend-
ing is measured in terms of purchas- The United States thus faces daunting
ing power parity (PPP).28 In regional security challenges in dealing with
23ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 24
C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
both China and Russia individually. In December 2019, China and Russia
The challenge would only grow if the held joint naval exercises with Iran.
two countries were to increase their The joint air patrols in 2019 and 2020
bilateral defense cooperation signifi- added a new dimension to bilateral
cantly. Although China and Russia defense cooperation.
have refrained from taking the ulti-
mate step of forming an alliance, their China-Russia defense cooperation fo-
defense cooperation has nevertheless cuses on the sphere of conventional
grown steadily in recent years, with weapons, but the two countries have
important consequences for transat- also cooperated on issues of broader
lantic security and US grand strategy. strategic significance. They have con-
sistently opposed the development of
China-Russia Defense Cooperation US missile defense systems. In recent
Bilateral defense cooperation has been years, however, they have also held
a crucial element of the China-Rus- their own joint missile defense exer-
sia relationship during the post-Cold cises in the form of computer simu-
War era, and further advances have oc- lations. Russia offered to assist China
curred in the past few years. Since the with the development of a missile at-
end of the Cold War, Russia has been tack early warning system. China and
China’s largest foreign arms supplier, Russia have also coordinated their po-
making important contributions to sitions on outer space and cyberspace.
China’s military modernization. Rus- They have sought to restrict military
sian arms sales to China fell sharply in activities in outer space, even while
the mid-2000s but rebounded by the continuing to develop and test their
early 2010s, culminating in the sales of own anti-satellite weapons, and they
advanced Russian weapons of a techno- have promoted a view of Internet
logical level that previously would have governance that emphasizes national
been off limits, most notably the S-400 sovereignty.
air defense system and Su-35 fighter
jets. The two countries have engaged In the course of defense cooperation
in an impressive series of joint mili- with China, however, Russia remains
tary and naval exercises. In September mindful of the need to maintain its
2018, a Chinese contingent partici- capability to deter or defeat a poten-
pated in Russia’s large Vostok-2018 tial Chinese invasion, unlikely as this
domestic exercise in the Russian Far prospect seems now. As mentioned
East, the first time that Chinese forces above, Russia has an interest in en-
had joined a domestic Russian exercise. suring nuclear deterrence in such a
25ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
contingency and in securing China’s In 2015, China and Russia conduct-
eventual participation in internation- ed joint naval exercises in the Medi-
al arms control. Russia’s concerns in terranean Sea. During these exercises,
this area also dictate that its sales of Chinese ships also entered the Black
advanced weapons enhance China’s Sea, though they stayed away from
air, naval, and air defense capabilities Crimea. The following year, the two
for maritime contingencies against the countries held joint naval exercises in
United States and its allies and partners the South China Sea just weeks after
in the Asia-Pacific region, rather than the Permanent Court of Arbitration
strengthening China’s ground forces. in The Hague ruled against China’s
sweeping claims to sovereignty over
Despite their increasingly close diplo- the sea. China appeared to use these
matic relationship and defense cooper- exercises to signal its defiance of the
ation, China and Russia have declined court ruling, as well as Russia’s sup-
to form a political-military alliance port for such defiance. China repaid
involving mutual security guarantees. the favor in 2017, when the two coun-
The 2001 Treaty on Good-Neighbor- tries conducted joint naval exercises in
liness, Friendship, and Cooperation the Baltic Sea. China’s participation in
commits both countries to refrain these exercises may have been intend-
from joining alliances directed against ed not only as a signal of political sup-
the other and calls for bilateral consul- port to Russia, but also as a response
tations in the event that either country to British and French participation in
faces a threat to its security. However, freedom of navigation operations in
the treaty includes no obligation for the South China Sea.32
either country to provide security as-
sistance to the other, the crucial fea- The transatlantic partners also face the
ture of any alliance. Both countries challenge of potential China-Russia
prefer to maintain diplomatic flexibil- cooperation in hybrid warfare or gray-
ity and avoid being drawn into each zone conflicts.33 China’s investments
other’s regional disputes.31 and attempts to build influence in
Europe could allow it to assist Russia
The Euro-Atlantic region is an unlike- in the event of military conflict in the
ly theater for any sort of China-Russia region. For example, China could at-
joint military action. However, the two tempt to use its newfound influence in
countries’ navies have exercised togeth- some European countries to dissuade
er in the region, largely for purposes them from supporting NATO in a
of signaling mutual political support. conflict with Russia. China could also
26C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
27ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
use its investments in European ports prospect of war against China in Asia
to help Russia by complicating NATO and against Russia in Europe. The
logistics.34 China’s expressed interest in 2018 National Defense Strategy’s fo-
dredging a deep-water port at Klaipeda, cus on the ability to defeat a single
Lithuania, could have special signifi- great-power adversary while simulta-
cance in this respect, though Lithuania neously deterring, but not necessarily
ruled out such a Chinese investment defeating, another raises the question
between 2020 and 2023 on national of how the United States would re-
security grounds.35 In general, however, spond in such a situation.37 Retired
China is unlikely to provide significant Gen. Ben Hodges, who served as US
levels of direct security assistance to Army Commander in Europe from
Russia in a military conflict in Europe. 2014 to 2017, starkly expressed this
concern, as well as its implications for
Nevertheless, China-Russia defense Europe, during the Warsaw Security
cooperation has important implica- Forum in October 2018. “The Unit-
tions for transatlantic security. Rus- ed States needs a very strong Euro-
sian arms sales to China raise revenues pean pillar. I think in 15 years – it’s
that Russia uses for military research not inevitable – but it is a very strong
and development, contributing to the likelihood that we will be at war with
recent enhancement of Russia’s own China,” he said. “The United States
military might. Moreover, by divert- does not have the capacity to do ev-
ing US attention and military resourc- erything it has to do in Europe and
es to the Asia-Pacific region, China’s in the Pacific to deal with the Chinese
growing military capabilities, includ- threat.”38 In a subsequent interview,
ing the contributions from advanced Hodges made clear that his message
Russian weapons, complicate US ef- was directed at US allies in Europe. “I
forts to provide security in Europe was trying to tell them, ‘Hey look, we
and potentially afford Russia some do not have the capacity in the United
additional room for maneuver in the States to be able to deter Russia, to be
region.36 Together, these factors place the bulwark against possible Russian
increasing strain on US grand strategy, aggression, and deal with China.’”39
with direct implications for Europe.
In a two-war scenario, the actions of
The Ultimate Fear: China and Russia could be coordinat-
A War on Two Fronts ed or merely opportunistic. If the two
In a nightmare scenario, the United countries were to act in coordinated
States would simultaneously face the fashion, then this would represent a
28C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
de facto alliance. Such an arrangement strategy of “offshore balancing.” Un-
seems unlikely because it would be der this strategy, recognizing that Chi-
susceptible to the familiar pitfalls of na represents the main challenge to US
entrapment or abandonment. That is, security and international leadership,
both countries would be wary of being the United States would withdraw its
drawn into such a plan on the other’s onshore military presence from Eu-
timetable or of receiving insufficient rope and the Middle East in order to
support from the other. Even if one concentrate its forces in the Asia-Pacif-
side were merely to act opportunisti- ic region. Europe would then assume
cally, seizing an opportunity arising responsibility for its own security.41
from aggression by the other, the ef- A rapprochement with Russia would
fect would be to detract from the abil- complement this effort by easing the
ity of the United States to wage war path for a US withdrawal from Euro-
effectively against either. This would pean security affairs. In the long run,
deliver both sides some of the benefits some analysts argue, the United States
of an alliance without entailing formal could even draw Russia into a balanc-
commitments. The mere prospect of ing coalition against China.42
such a scenario could give China or
Russia increased leverage in a dispute Transatlantic policymakers should
with the United States and its allies. look for ways to limit the extent of
The possibility of a two-front war, the China-Russia partnership by
even if unlikely, poses severe challeng- emphasizing areas in which the two
es for US grand strategy, for European countries’ interests potentially di-
strategic thinking, and for the future verge, including nuclear arms control
of the transatlantic partnership. and China’s growing influence in Eur-
asia. In the near term, however, at-
Implications for tempts at rapprochement with Russia
Transatlantic Security are unlikely to succeed, and efforts to
The United States and its European draw Russia into a balancing coalition
allies could address such challenging against China are even less plausible.
geopolitical circumstances in various Both Russia and China place a high
ways. Some analysts call for the Unit- value on their partnership and would
ed States to attempt a rapprochement be unwilling to sacrifice it.43 Russia
with Russia in order to prevent it from could drift away from China over
becoming excessively close to China.40 time, but this would most likely be a
Among those who support such an naturally occurring process resulting
approach are advocates of a US grand from an eventual Russian calculation
29ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
that China’s growing power and ambi- Trump also entertained the possibility
tions had made it a greater threat than of playing the “Russia card” in rela-
the West. China has a strong incentive tions with China, though his admin-
to avoid such an outcome by continu- istration’s approach was uneven. On
ing to cultivate its relationship with the one hand, the administration’s na-
Russia. In the absence of a Western tional security and defense strategies
rapprochement with Russia, which highlighted the emergence of strate-
might have been possible at the end gic competition with both China and
of the Cold War but would be consid- Russia, and in practice Trump main-
erably more difficult now, the United tained a firm line with Russia while
States remains committed to resisting engaging in increasingly open con-
aggression by both China and Russia. frontation with China. On the other
This approach could require a form hand, Trump refrained from criticiz-
of containment of both countries, a ing Putin and frequently expressed
course that would depend heavily on his desire to improve relations with
US cooperation with allies.44 Russia, partly in an effort to increase
US leverage over China. Indeed, he
Trump took a distinctive approach accused past US presidents of pushing
to these issues. With regard to trans- Russia into China’s arms. Trump made
atlantic relations, his views unsettled little progress in these efforts, partly
many US allies in Europe. His repeat- because of US domestic opposition,
ed criticism of NATO member states including concerns about Russian
for their low levels of defense spend- interference in the 2016 presidential
ing caused some European countries election, and partly because of inter-
to question US commitment to the national factors, including the depth
alliance. “The times in which we could of the chasm between Russia and the
completely depend on others are, to a West and the growing strength of the
certain extent, over,” German Chan- China-Russia relationship.
cellor Angela Merkel said following
the 2017 NATO and G7 summits, The Biden administration’s foreign
adding: “We Europeans truly have to policy is likely to differ significant-
take our fate into our own hands.” In ly. Biden has vowed to work closely
2020, Trump ordered the withdrawal with allies and appears prepared to
of 12,000 US soldiers from Germany, confront both China and Russia on a
some of whom were to be redeployed range of issues while remaining open
elsewhere in Europe. Biden reversed to engagement in areas of common
this decision early in his presidency. interest. As a presidential candidate,
30C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
Biden called Russia an “opponent” and to NATO while seeking increased Eu-
China a “serious competitor.” During a ropean support for US policy toward
speech at the State Department shortly China.46 Biden appealed to European
after his inauguration, he called China allies for support during his speech
“our most serious competitor” and de- to the Munich Security Conference
clared that “American leadership must in February 2021. “We must prepare
meet this new moment of advancing together for long-term strategic com-
authoritarianism, including the grow- petition with China,” he declared,
ing ambitions of China to rival the adding that the transatlantic partners
United States and the determination of should also resist Russia’s cyberattacks
Russia to damage and disrupt our de- and other “recklessness.”
mocracy.” Biden later said that he an-
ticipated “extreme competition” with US allies in Europe welcome Biden’s
China. He has argued that the Unit- emphasis on the transatlantic partner-
ed States should work with its allies in ship, but forging a common transat-
Europe and around the world in order lantic approach to China and Russia is
to negotiate with China from a posi- unlikely to be easy. Merkel said during
tion of strength on such issues as trade, this year’s World Economic Forum
technology, and human rights, while that she opposed the formation of
also seeking cooperation with China blocs, and she cautioned during the
on climate change and global public Munich Security Conference that
health.45 Biden has been consistently “our interests will not always con-
critical of Russia and appears likely to verge.” This appeared to signal Ger-
take a tough line, as in his recent deci- many’s reluctance to embrace Biden’s
sion to deploy B1 bombers to Norway conception of a struggle pitting West-
in order to strengthen the presence of ern democracies against authoritarian
US airpower in the Arctic region. In a China and Russia.47 Merkel, who will
signal of US commitment to defend leave office this year, was a driving
the Baltics, the B1s later conducted force behind the conclusion of nego-
joint air patrols with NATO’s Baltic tiations with China on the investment
Air Policing mission. At the same time, agreement during Germany’s six-
Biden’s decision to extend New START month rotation in the EU presiden-
showed his willingness to engage prag- cy. This agreement demonstrates that
matically with Russia. the growing dependence of German
manufacturing industries, especially
The Biden administration appears set the auto sector, on the Chinese mar-
to pursue a strategy of recommitting ket will complicate efforts to build a
31ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
united transatlantic approach toward with Britain and Germany particu-
China. Germany’s decision to proceed larly dismissive of the idea. Despite
with Nord Stream 2 also reflects its de- Merkel’s earlier statement that Eu-
sire to separate economic and strategic ropean countries would have to take
goals, an effort that increasingly places their fate into their own hands, Ger-
it at odds with the United States. man Defense Minister Annegret
Kramp-Karrenbauer rejected what she
Recent debates on European strategic called “illusions” of European strategic
autonomy also complicate transat- autonomy, arguing that Europe will
lantic discussions.48 French President remain dependent on the US securi-
Emmanuel Macron, the most outspo- ty guarantee, especially the nuclear
ken European leader calling for Eu- umbrella, for the foreseeable future.
ropean strategic autonomy, reiterated European critics of Macron’s proposal
his case during the Munich Security also noted its high financial cost, con-
Conference. Macron, who has warned tinued European dependence on co-
of NATO’s “brain death,” argues that operation with US forces in military
Europe can no longer count on the operations abroad, and the fear that
United States to defend its NATO al- European strategic autonomy could
lies, partly because US focus will in- strengthen the arguments of those
evitably turn to China. In his view, in the United States calling for dis-
therefore, European countries should engagement from NATO. Nor have
build independent military forces in Macron’s diplomatic overtures toward
order to provide for their own defense Russia made significant gains. They
and attain strategic autonomy. Only face opposition from Germany and
in this way, Macron argues, can Eu- from Central and Eastern European
rope remain in control of its own des- countries that trust only the United
tiny. In parallel with these efforts, Ma- States to guarantee their security.
cron attempted diplomatic outreach
to Russia, arguing that Europe would European concerns about US com-
never enjoy security and stability until mitment to transatlantic security are
relations with Russia had improved. understandable. The Biden adminis-
Lingering tensions could lead Russia tration is far more favorably disposed
into isolation or a stronger relation- toward NATO than was Trump, but
ship with China, he argued.49 urgent domestic issues, including ef-
forts to promote recovery from the
Macron’s efforts to promote strategic pandemic and to address deep do-
autonomy have made little progress, mestic political polarization, threaten
32C H I N A - R U S S I A R E L AT I O N S
to keep US attention focused inward. the Euro-Atlantic region. The new
Under these circumstances, prudence operational concept that the US Army
calls for Europe to strengthen its mili- developed in response to the 2018
tary capabilities within NATO, as dif- National Defense Strategy, known as
ficult as this may be at a time when Multi-Domain Operations, recogniz-
its energies and resources are focused es the difficulty of reinforcing troops in
on recovery from the pandemic, while a theater of war against a great-power
leaving open the long-term possibility competitor. Addressing this problem
of attaining strategic autonomy. would require either a major increase
in US troops stationed in Europe or
The best approach, however, would an increased role for European coun-
be for the transatlantic partners to re- tries themselves.50 The first option is
vitalize their cooperation. In view of unlikely because the rise of China will
the increasingly close China-Russia re- force the United States to shift focus
lationship, and in the absence to date to a considerable degree toward Asia
of successful efforts to pry Russia away in the coming years, leaving fewer re-
from China, the transatlantic partners sources available for European securi-
will face a situation in which great-pow- ty. This leaves the second option. The
er adversaries pose security challenges United States should remain commit-
in both the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pa- ted to NATO and the provision of se-
cific regions. Under these circumstanc- curity in Europe, but European coun-
es, close transatlantic cooperation will tries could make a vital contribution
be essential. Europe should address the to the transatlantic partnership by in-
specific challenges that it faces from creasing defense spending, assuming
China by bolstering its resilience and an increased share of the burden for
reducing vulnerabilities that could arise European security within NATO, and
from excessive dependence on Chinese thereby allowing the United States to
supply chains, markets, and invest- devote the necessary attention and re-
ments. Britain and France both have sources to Asia.
security presences in the Asia-Pacific
region, participate regularly in freedom
of navigation operations in the South 1 Graham Allison, “The New Spheres of Influ-
China Sea, and could play some role in ence,” Foreign Affairs 99:2 (March/April 2020),
pp. 30– 40.
US efforts to contain China militarily.
2 Jakub J. Grygiel / A. Wess Mitchell, The Unqui-
et Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and
For the most part, however, NATO the Crisis of American Power (Princeton, NJ:
should remain focused on security in Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 42 – 76.
33ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
3 Gilbert Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to 14 Steve Pifer, “Russia’s Shifting Views of Mul-
the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral tilateral Nuclear Arms Control with China,”
Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s Brookings, 19.2.2020; Ulrich Kühn / Anna
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Péczeli, “Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty,”
Press, 2014). Strategic Studies Quarterly 11:1 (Spring 2017),
pp. 70 – 71.
4 Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia-China Relations
and the West,” in: Stefan Meister / Daniel 15 Jacob Cohn / Timothy A. Walton / Adam
Hamilton (eds.), The Russia File: Russia and the Lemon et al. Leveling the Playing Field:
West in an Unordered World (Washington, DC / Reintroducing U.S. Theater-Range Missiles in a
Berlin: Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Post-INF World (Washington, DC: Center for
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019);
Studies, Johns Hopkins University and German Toshi Yoshihara / Jacob Cohn, “The Case for
Council on Foreign Relations / Deutsche Deploying U.S. Land-Based Missiles in Asia,”
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 2017), National Interest, 31.5.2019.
pp. 152 – 154.
16 European Commission and HR/VP Contribu-
5 Richard Weitz, “Sino-Russian Relations and tion to the European Council, EU-China – A
Transatlantic Ties,” in: Meister / Hamilton Strategic Outlook, 3.12.2019, p. 1.
(eds.), The Russia File, p. 145.
17 NATO Reflection Group, NATO 2030: United
6 Marcin Kaczmarski, “The Sino-Russian Rela- for a New Era. Analysis and Recommenda-
tionship and the West,” Survival, 62:6 (Decem- tions of the Reflection Group Appointed by
ber 2020 – January 2021), p. 199. the NATO Secretary General, 25.12.2020,
pp. 27 – 28.
7 Walter Russell Mead, “Russia and China Wield
Dull Wedges,” Wall Street Journal, 8.9.2020, 18 Ralph Weber, Unified Message, Rhizomatic
p. A15. Delivery: A Preliminary Analysis of PRC/CCP
Influence and the United Front in Switzerland.
8 Brian G. Carlson, “Russia and the China-In- Sinopsis: China in Context and Perspective,
dia Rivalry,” Russian Analytical Digest 265 18.12.2020.
(19.3.2021), pp. 8 – 11.
19 Mikko Huotari / Jan Weidenfeld / Claudia
9 Alexander Gabuev, “Is Putin Really Considering Wessling, Towards a ‘Principles First Approach’
a Military Alliance With China?” Moscow Times, in Europe’s China Policy. Drawing Lessons from
2.12.2020. the Covid-19 Crisis (Berlin: MERICS, Septem-
ber 2020), p. 17.
10 Robin Allers, “Whom to Call? In Search of a
European Policy on Russia and China,” in: Jo 20 Julianne Smith / Andrea Kendall-Taylor /
Inge Bekkevold / Bobo Lo (eds.), Sino-Russian Carisa Nietsche et al., Charting a Transatlantic
Relations in the 21st Century (Cham, Switzer- Course to Address China (Washington, DC:
land: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 273. Center for a New American Security / German
Marshall Fund of the United States, October
11 Névine Schepers, “Keeping the Skies Open over 2020), pp. 2, 10.
Europe,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy 8:8 (July
2020). 21 Franklin D. Kramer, Priorities for a Transat-
lantic China Strategy (Washington, DC: The
12 See for example Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Atlantic Council, November 2020).
Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). 22 The White House, National Security Strategy of
the United States of America, December 2017,
13 Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States pp. 2, 25.
of America, Nuclear Posture Review, February
2018, pp. 8 – 9.
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