SOUTH KOREA BETWEEN EAGLE AND DRAGON
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SOUTH KOREA BETWEEN
EAGLE AND DRAGON
Perceptual Ambivalence and
Strategic Dilemma
Jae Ho Chung
The decade of the 1990s began with the demise of the
Soviet empire and the subsequent retreat of Russia from the center stage of
Northeast Asia, leaving the United States in a search to adjust its policies in
the region. The “rise of China,” escalating cross-strait tension since 1995,
North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship and missile challenges, latent irreden-
tism, and the pivotal economic importance of Northeast Asia have all led the
United States to re-emphasize its role and involvement in the region.1 This
redefinition of the American mission has in turn led to the consolidation of
the U.S.-Japan alliance, exemplified by the 1997 Defense Guideline revision,
as well as to the establishment of trilateral consultative organizations such as
the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) among the U.S.,
Japan, and South Korea.
The increasingly proactive posture by the U.S. has, however, generated
grave strategic concerns on the part of China and Russia, which have sought
to circumscribe America’s hegemonic parameters in Asia both bilaterally and
multilaterally (i.e., the formation of the “Shanghai Six” and the Boao Asia
Forum, as well as China’s call for an Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Jae Ho Chung is Associate Professor of International Relations, Seoul
National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. The author wishes to thank Bruce J. Dickson and
Wu Xinbo for their helpful comments on an earlier version.
Asian Survey, 41:5, pp. 777–796. ISSN: 0004–4687
Ó 2001 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California
Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223.
1. A series of documents– East Asia Strategic Report, Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint
Vision 2020, and Asia 2025–well demonstrate the expanding commitment and interests of the
U.S. in the Asian region.
777778 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 (ASEAN)-China free-trade area).2 The U.S. bombing of the Chinese em- bassy in Belgrade in 1999, the missile-defense controversies (both Theater Missile Defense [TMD] and National Missile Defense [NMD]), and the re- connaissance plane incident in 2001 have further added to concerns over America’s unilateral actions and their strategic implications. Other political events have also raised concerns in the region: the election of Chen Shui-bian as president in Taiwan, Japan’s increasingly rightist drift, and, most impor- tant, the new administration of George W. Bush, who described China as America’s strategic competitor, in sharp contrast with Bill Clinton’s efforts to build a strategic partnership with China. All of these developments have combined to paint a rather grim picture of this crucial part of the world at the dawn of the new millennium. Most alarmed by all of these confrontational signals and the changed at- mosphere in the area is perhaps the South Korean government. Just as Ger- man unification was made possible by the tacit acceptance of the Soviet Union and active persuasion by the U.S., as well as the sincere efforts of the two German states, so too may Korean reunification require consensus-build- ing among the four major powers in Northeast Asia.3 Consensus is best reached when all parties concerned maintain good relationships among them- selves. Unfortunately, ménage à six is a remote possibility in Northeast Asia, thus posing a dilemma for Seoul, which has to elicit support from the four major powers, and the U.S. and China in particular. Given that South Korea is structurally tied to the U.S. through the alliance framework, equating the “rise of China” with a China threat will undoubtedly constrain the strategic options available to Seoul. The main thrust of this article is that China is increasingly important in South Korea’s strategic calculations. At the same time, Seoul has to maintain a friendly and mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S., not only for economic interests but also to serve strategic and reunification goals. Sus- taining amicable relationships with both powers, however, will become in- creasingly difficult if the overall capability gap between the two, in real or perceptual terms, gets smaller and smaller and eventually produces a typical case of power transition, a clash of civilizations, or both. Four factors con- 2. The “Shanghai Six” is a multilateral summit mechanism initiated in 1996. Originally, it consisted of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2001. The Boao Asia Forum was established in Hainan, China, in 2001, with 25 Asian countries and Australia as its member states. 3. For such a process in the German case, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Ger- many Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Despite the willingness of Russia and Japan to play active roles in the Korean process, the U.S. and China assumed much more important functions as the signatories of the 1953 Armistice Agreement as well as participants in the four-party talks.
JAE HO CHUNG 779
tribute to Seoul’s dilemma. First, Korea is more tightly tied to the U.S. than
it wishes to be. Second, Korea’s perceptions of China are highly favorable
even though the genuine intentions of the latter remain unclear. Third, much
of the Washington-Beijing relationship evolves independently of Seoul. Fi-
nally, regardless of the above issues, Seoul somehow has to find a suitable
middle ground between Washington and Beijing.
This study relies largely on three different sources of data and information
for its empirical analysis. First, both primary materials and secondary analy-
ses in English, Chinese, and Korean have been used to offer a balanced view
of Korea’s perceptual ambivalence and strategic dilemmas in dealing with the
U.S. and China. Second, a dozen nationwide opinion surveys conducted in
South Korea during 1988-2000 have been utilized in depicting the public’s
perceptions of the U.S. and China. Third, the article uses both structured and
unstructured interviews that the author conducted with 20 foreign-policy ex-
perts in Seoul in the late 1990s. These interviews help delineate the policy
elite’s perceptions and prescriptions.
The “Rise of China”: Beyond a
Simple Dichotomy
A few years ago, many foreign observers were alarmed by the prospect of
China’s disintegration. Now, China is being portrayed as a rapidly emerging
great power with the potential to challenge regional and, to a certain extent,
global stability.4 However, all discussions concerning what China will be-
come in the future are inconclusive at best, irrespective of their lists of statis-
tical data and trend projections. Statistics of the past, while useful, can never
suffice to offer accurate predictions of the future. Given that “telescoped
growth” may accelerate, or, alternatively, economic crises may interpose
themselves at any time, any future projection is invariably a conjecture.
Undoubtedly, China’s track record has been impressive, showing average
real gross domestic product growth per annum since 1979 of nearly 10%,
three times the world average. Furthermore, various Western and Chinese
forecasts have suggested that the size of China’s economy will either super-
sede or, at a minimum, approach that of the U.S. by 2020 at the earliest and
by 2050 at the latest.5 What, then, will China do with its abundant economic
4. While China denies any intention of becoming a hegemon, it is nevertheless willing to
assign itself great-power (daguo) status. See Tao Wenzhao (ed.), Jujue baquan–yu 2049nian
zhongguo duihua [Rejecting hegemony –communicating with China in 2049] (Beijing: Zhong-
guo jingji chubanshe, 1998); and Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shi zai
bixing” [It is inevitable that China conduct great-power diplomacy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi
[World economy and politics], no. 1 (2000), p. 10.
5. See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994); Development Research Center of the State Council, Diaocha780 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 resources? Obviously, its strategic intentions are likely to matter more than its economic or military capabilities alone. More important, how China will be viewed by its regional neighbors will also be a very crucial policy determi- nant.6 In this sense, much of the debate on what China will become through its ongoing reform, and how its success should be treated by others, has been overly dichotomized. The “us” (West) versus “them” (China) discourses predominate, and “they” have always been the object for engagement, con- tainment, “congagement,” “constrainment,” and so on from the “we” per- spective, without considering China’s perceptions and preferences. 7 It seems that, perhaps, the issue is not how to predict China’s future but whose point of view to take. Certainly, there is more to the world than a simple juxtaposition of the West and China (or the “rest”). In the context of East Asia, while China is generally regarded as the subject for engagement, significant variations have also been found in specific responses by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia.8 It is in this vein that exploring how the “rise of China” is viewed and assessed by an impor- tant regional actor–South Korea–is deemed a timely and worthwhile en- deavor. While Seoul has been highly successful in engaging China, its success has not yet been closely scrutinized as the core source of the strategic dilemma that it has begun to face.9 The dilemma centers around the blend- ing–if not the choice–between the self-complacent status quo within the U.S.-aligned system and the hopeful but risky journey to a Sinocentric stance, yanjiu baogao [Research and study report: Internal material], no. 991 (February 3, 1999), p. 22; and Hong Kong Standard, January 30, 2000. 6. See Stuart Harris, “The People’s Republic of China’s Quest for Great Power Status: A Long and Winding Road,” in Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu (eds.), China under Jiang Zemin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 165–82. One important dimension that warrants much scholarly attention concerns the factors of domestic instability–rural unrest, labor issues, “float- ing population, ” local defiance, underground economy, religious movements including Falungong, and so on–in the context of imposing severe constraints on the “rise of China.” See, for instance, Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (eds.), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict, and Resistance (London: Routledge, 2000). 7. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the `Constrainment’ of China,” International Secur- ity 20:4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107–35; idem., “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs (September- October 1999), pp. 24–36; Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic of China Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000); and Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). 8. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999). 9. The most up-to-date and comprehensive discussion of South Korea’s efforts to engage China–and its moderate success–is provided in Victor D. Cha, “Engaging China: Seoul-Bei- jing Détente and Korean Security,” Survival 41:1 (Spring 1999), pp. 73–98.
JAE HO CHUNG 781
with uncertain expectations as to China’s intentions. Certainly, South Korea
is not alone in having to ponder how the “rise of China” will affect its future.
China’s Rising over Korea
Does China matter economically? Since South Korean-Chinese economic
exchanges were initiated in the late 1970s, the size of the bilateral trade in-
creased by 1,647 times in just 20 years, from $19 million in 1979 to $31.3
billion in 2000. The pace at which South Korean-Chinese trade grew seems
extraordinary, as it took 30-some years for Korean-U.S. trade to accomplish a
comparable level of expansion. Much of the trade expansion occurred prior
to the 1992 normalization of relations, which further highlights the very spe-
cial nature of the bilateral relationship. In 1998, when bilateral trade declined
for the first time since 1982 to $17.4 billion because of the financial crisis
that engulfed South Korea, China and South Korea still remained the third
largest trading partners for each other, after only the U.S. and Japan. Bilat-
eral trade almost recovered to the pre-crisis level in 1999, with $22.5 billion,
and the volume for 2000 reached $31.3 billion, accounting for 9.4% of South
Korea’s total foreign trade. It should also be noted that South Korea has
reaped significant trade surpluses with China–in successive years since
1992, including $5.4 billion in 1998, $4.8 billion in 1999, and $5.7 billion in
2000. 10
South Korea’s total materialized investment in the U.S. of $6.5 billion (as
of 2000) far exceeds that in China of $4.6 billion (on 4,910 projects). Given
that Seoul was officially permitted to make direct investments in China only
since 1988, the gap may soon be reduced. China already is the second-largest
recipient of South Korea’s overseas investment, while South Korea marks the
seventh-largest destination for China’s outbound investment. During
1991–2000, South Korea offered China a total of $197 million from its Eco-
nomic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), as well as $71 million in
overseas development assistance (ODA), making China the largest recipient
of South Korea’s ODA. South Korea, too, has depended heavily on China’s
provision of large-scale construction projects worth $4.4 billion. In sum,
China matters very much to South Korea economically.
Does China matter militarily? This remains opaque. Very few South Ko-
rean experts talk publicly and negatively about the military implications of
the “rise of China.” Considering that China was South Korea’s military ad-
versary 50 years ago, it is all the more interesting to hear a wide range of
calls for the expansion of bilateral military cooperation, resulting recently in
10. Various figures (excluding those of Hong Kong and Macau) cited are from the Bureau of
Asia-Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, 1979–2000.782 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 the institutionalization of reciprocal annual visits by their defense ministers.11 To date, Seoul has maintained a sort of strategic ambiguity as to whether and under what circumstances China is likely to pose a grave threat, and how to cope with such contingencies.12 Most specialists in Seoul echo what their American counterparts have long argued: that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is big but outdated. Such clichéd discussions that China’s conven- tional forces are weak, outdated, and powerless, even against Taiwan, may be irrelevant for South Korea. China may not need Dongfeng-41 long-range missiles, Su-27 fighter aircraft, SSBN, or aircraft carriers for military action against Korea. With its J-8s, brown-water navy, and rapid-reaction forces stationed in the Beijing, Shenyang, and Jinan military regions, China could pose a formidable threat to South Korea. In sum, China matters militarily, even though such concerns have not yet been officially expressed by Seoul.13 Does China matter diplomatically? Without doubt. Korea is one of the few places over which the Chinese shadow has traditionally been cast heavily, irrespective of the ebbs and flows of Beijing’s influence. The Sino-Japanese War in 1894–95 over the suzerainty of Korea, Mao’s decision in 1950 to intervene in the Korean War despite China’s continuing civil war and grave domestic problems, and Beijing’s agreement in 1997 to participate in the four-party talks testify to China’s persistent and unequivocal interest in the Korean Peninsula. Now, with more power, wealth, prestige, and influence than ever before, China has certainly become an indispensable diplomatic presence to be reckoned with in resolving the Korean question.14 Needless to 11. Liu Ming (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) argues that Korea has wished to expand military ties with China mainly because to highlight constraining China as the principal function of the South Korea-U.S. alliance relationship would be the last thing Seoul would want. See “Hanguo de diyuan weizhi yu qi waijiao he anquan zhengce” [Korea’s geographical location and its diplomatic and security policy], Yatai luntan [Asia-Pacific forum], no. 3/4 (1999), p. 37. 12. The best available reference in this regard is Eric A. McVadon, “Chinese Military Strat- egy for the Korean Peninsula,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.), China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 271–94. 13. The Defense White Paper, published annually by the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, generally devotes two to three pages to briefly outlining China’s military modernization, and another two to three pages to summarizing inter-military exchanges . No trace of security concern is evident. In stark contrast, the Japanese counterpart publication spends a total of 66 pages on China’s nuclear weapons, China’s inadequate non-proliferation policy, China’s reactions to ABM and TMD systems, maritime jurisdictional disputes with China, and so on. See East Asian Strategic Review (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2000), pp. 67–69, 77–79, 83–88, 104–07, 139–41, 191–237. 14. For a rare disclosure of China’s intention–to enhance China’s influence over the re- gion–behind its participation in the four-party talks, see Li Qiang (PLA School of International Relations), “Chaoxian bandao wenti sifang huitan de xianzhuang yu qianjing” [The current situa- tion of and prospects for the four-party talks over the Korean problem], Dangdai yatai [Contem- porary Asia and the Pacific], no. 3 (1999), pp. 33–37.
JAE HO CHUNG 783 say, Beijing’s real and potential influence over Pyongyang further adds to China’s pool of resources to be employed in dealing with the Korean prob- lem.15 Does China matter in cultural and perceptual terms? Absolutely. Before the Asian financial crisis, about 600,000 South Koreans visited China in 1997 alone. The figure rose to over 1,000,000 in 2000. By last year, 1,789 Korean corporate offices had been established, and more than 60,000 South Koreans were long-term residents in China, including over 13,000 students nation- wide. Bilateral educational exchanges were officially permitted only in 1993, and the number of South Korean students in China has risen dramatically. The 2000 figure is roughly comparable to the total number of Korean stu- dents who studied in the U.S. between 1953 and 1975. Furthermore, of the Korean-Chinese–one of the two major national minority groups that have independent sovereign states neighboring China (the other being Mongolians)–2,000,000 provide another source of strong emotional attach- ment.16 Most important, the South Korean perceptions of China merit our atten- tion. On the basis of a dozen public-opinion surveys conducted between 1988 and 2000, the following characteristics are highlighted. First, South Korean public perceptions of China have become increasingly favorable dur- ing the period concerned, in stark contrast with those toward the United States.17 Particularly worth noting, as Tables 1 through 4 indicate, is that the South Koreans’ favorable perceptions of China were inversely correlated with age, while those of the U.S. were positively correlated. That is, older generations with more immediate memories of the Korean War and the Cold War expressed less affinity for China, while younger generations were much more positive toward it. A comparison between Table 1 and Tables 3 and 4 also suggests that the positive perceptions of China became increasingly in- dependent of age after the 1992 normalization. 15. China’s provision of food and energy as grants or at “friendly prices” has been central to the survival of the North Korean regime. To what extent such aid can be directly translated into Beijing’s explicit influence over Pyongyang is hard to gauge, however. There is no doubt that, so far, China has been potentially more influential than any other major country involved. Kim Jong Il’s surprise visits to China in May 2000 and January 2001 should also be interpreted in the context of Pyongyang soliciting Beijing’s support for its new policy framework in formation. 16. For the Chinese concern in this vein, see Sun Yunlai and Sha Yunzhong (eds.), Jilinsheng bianjiang minzudiqu wending he fazhan de zhuyao wenti yu duice [Major problems and solutions for stability and development in the minority regions in Jilin] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1994), esp., pp. 223–52. The much-delayed establishment of the Shenyang Consular Office in 1999 is also attributed to such concerns on the Chinese part. See Dong-A ilbo [Dong-A daily], January 29, 1999. 17. For a detailed report on the downward turn of South Korean public perceptions of the U.S. since the 1980s, see Joong-ang ilbo [Joong-ang daily], August 24, 1998.
TABLE 1 Perceptions Toward China by Age Groups, 1989–90 (%)
20s 30s 40s 50s and older
Positive 43.9/46.3 31.6/36.6 28.9/33.8 22.3/26.8
Neutral 36.1/35.7 45.2/37.8 41.6/44.8 51.4/46.6
Negative 20.0/17.7 23.3/25.1 29.5/21.0 26.3/26.4
SOURCES: Chonhwangi ui han’guk sahoe: 1989 kungmin uisik chosa [The Korean society in
transition: 1989 national perception survey] (Seoul: Institute of Population and Developmen t
[IPD], 1990), p. 153; and 1990 IPD Survey, p. 184.
NOTES: The figures on the left of slash refer to those of 1989 and those on the right to those of
1990. The balance stands for no responses.
TABLE 2 Perceptions Toward the U.S. by Age Groups, 1989–90 (%)
20s 30s 40s 50s and older
Positive 28.2/29.5 30.0/34.1 44.3/47.8 54.2/48.6
Neutral 26.8/27.3 33.5/33.1 32.1/30.8 26.2/35.9
Negative 44.9/43.2 36.5/32.6 23.6/21.4 19.7/15.3
SOURCES: 1989 IPD Survey, p. 153; and 1990 IPD Survey, p. 181.
NOTES: The figures on the left of slash refer to those of 1989 and those on the right to those of
1990. The balance stands for no responses.
TABLE 3 Cooperative Partner for the 21st Century by Age Groups (1993)
Chose U.S. (%) Chose China (%)
20s 22.8 34.8
30s 36.4 34.4
40s 39.0 36.4
50s and older 54.8 27.7
SOURCE: 1993 IPD Survey, p. 158.
TABLE 4 Closest Partner for the Year 2006 by Age Groups (1996)
Chose U.S. (%) Chose China (%)
20s 19.3 46.6
30s 21.3 50.4
40s 26.5 50.2
50s and older 32.1 41.0
SOURCE: Hangukin ui uisik kach’igwan chosa [Survey of national consciousness in Korea]
(Seoul: Ministry of Information [MOI], 1996), p. 354.JAE HO CHUNG 785
TABLE 5 Public Perceptions of China and the U.S., 1996–2000
Chose China (%) Chose U.S. (%)
1996* 47 24
1997** 56 31
1999*** 33 22
2000**** 45 43
* MOI survey, p. 354. The question: “Which country will become closest to Korea in 10 years?”
** 97 Seyon chosa bokoso [1997 survey report for the Sejong Institute] (Seoul: Dongseo
Research Co., October 1997), pp. 11–13. The question: “With which country should Korea
strengthen its relations?”
*** Dong-A Daily, January 1, 1999. The question: “Which country will Korea be closest to in
the 21st century?”
**** Hangook Daily, June 9, 2000. The question: “With which country should Korea cooperate
most for the success of the inter-Korean summit?”
Table 5, formulated on the basis of four different (i.e., non-time-series)
nationwide surveys conducted during 1996–2000, further demonstrates that
China has indeed been rising in the minds of the South Koreans. It may also
be postulated that, on the basis of the younger generations’ more favorable
and hopeful views of China, Beijing’s influence over the Korean Peninsula is
likely to continue to expand. In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests that,
for Korea, the “rise of China” has been both real and concrete in economic,
military, diplomatic, cultural, and perceptual terms.18
Perceptual Divide and Sources of
Ambivalence toward China
Given the crucial importance attached to the burgeoning Sino-South Korean
bilateralism described above, what constitutes the dilemma? First, there is a
sharp split between the South Korean public and the policy elite in their re-
spective perceptions of China. In contrast with Japan and the U.S., where the
general public appears to be more concerned with the “rise of China,” in
18. For an interesting Chinese observation that mutually amicable perceptions between South
Korea and China are rooted in common historical and cultural backgrounds, see Han Zhenshe,
“Fazhan ZhongHan huoban guanxi yingjie 21shiji de tiaozhan” [Challenges for the developmen t
of China-Korea relations in the 21st century], Dangdai yatai, no. 1 (2000), p. 39. For an Ameri-
can view that Beijing, too, chose Seoul as its more preferred Korean associate and that, therefore,
South Korea is now “sandwiched” between the United States and China, see Eric A. McVadon,
“China’s Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula,” in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Planning
for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), pp. 149, 169.786 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 Korea the elite seem more uneasy than the public.19 While the origin of such perceptual variations is unclear, the South Korean policy elite appear to be much more status-quo oriented, preferring to remain within the U.S.-aligned structure, and thus more likely to fear that the “rise of China” will be largely destabilizing. 20 Second, closely related to the South Korean elite’s strategic ambivalence is their concern with the uncertainty of China’s intentions. For good geopoliti- cal reasons, South Korea cannot help but ponder whether the “rise of China” is likely to engender a malignant neighbor with parabellum dispositions. On the basis of semi-structured interviews with 20 people deemed influential in the Korean foreign-policy community, the following findings are reported.21 All 20 interviewees regarded the U.S. role in maintaining regional security in Northeast Asia as absolutely necessary. Eighteen of them predicted that this dynamic would change within 10 to 30 years, and 12 thought this shift would stem from the “rise of China.” Ten interviewees chose China as potentially the most threatening country, while six selected Japan (the others chose Russia or gave no response). This contrasts sharply with the Korean public’s perceptions of China and Japan. 22 The South Korean elite’s strategic ambivalence is further manifested in Seoul’s options, if containing China should become the principal function of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Five interviewees favored actively cooperating with the U.S. and Japan against China, another five opted for considerable detach- ment from the U.S.-Japan axis, and the rest proposed alternatives including issue-variant support and maximum neutrality.23 19. For such a perceptual divide in Japan and the U.S. regarding China, see Hideo Sato, Japan’s China Perceptions and Its Policies in the Alliance with the United States , Discussion Paper Series, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, September 1998, p. 10; and William Watts, Americans Look at Asia (Washington, D.C.: Asia Society Washington Center, October 1999), p. 36. 20. For generally conservative foreign policy orientations of the South Korean elite, see Sam Sung Lee, “The Korean Society and Foreign Policy,” in Yong Soon Yim and Ki-Jung Kim (eds.), Korea in the Age of Globalization and Information (Seoul: KAIS, 1997), pp. 110–22. 21. Depicting elite perceptions is a daunting task. While the interviews with 20 people may not provide a solid base for generalization, they may nevertheless suffice to produce a rough sketch. The interviewees included seven government officials and military officers, five re- searchers at government-affiliated think tanks, four journalists, and another four university professors. 22. According to two nationwide surveys conducted in 1995 and 1997, Japan was viewed as most-threatening by 53% and 23% of the respondents, while China was ranked second by 24% and third by 8%, respectively (1995 Sejong Survey, p. 78; and 1997 Sejong Survey, p. 11). 23. This may also be compared to the highly contrasting public perceptions toward the con- solidation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. According to a survey, jointly conducted by Asahi shimbun and Dong-A Daily, the respective negative response rate was 15% in Japan, 20% in the U.S., 44% in South Korea, and 55% in China. See ibid., December 5, 2000.
JAE HO CHUNG 787 Third, the ambivalence of the South Korean elite also derives from Seoul’s evolving perceptions of Beijing’s role in the resolution of the Korean prob- lem. Since the June 23 Pronouncement in 1973, one pivotal belief shared by successive administrations in Seoul has been that Beijing might construc- tively influence Pyongyang.24 The nordpolitik fervently pursued under Presi- dent Roh Tae Woo was also based on the same tenet, eventually leading to the normalization of relations with China in 1992. Presidential visits to China have usually been preceded by the wishful signal that Seoul would like Beijing to exert some constructive influence over Pyongyang. Over the years, however, an increasing number of policy experts have questioned Bei- jing’s willingness and sincerity in pressing Pyongyang on behalf of Seoul. Some dub it the tactic of zhengjing fenli (“separating politics [with Pyong- yang] from economics [with Seoul]”) in Chinese.25 Others go so far as to label it as a China myth unlikely to materialize. It is often pointed out that the 1994 Geneva accord between Washington and Pyongyang was accom- plished with little input from Beijing. Similarly, despite Beijing’s unex- pected decision in 1997 to join in the four-party talks, which was initially interpreted by Pyongyang as a three-against-one posture, China has managed not to tilt toward Seoul at Pyongyang’s expense. 26 Fourth, the so-called “uncivil” faces of China have significant bearing on South Korea’s ambivalence toward its neighbor. Many South Koreans– elites in particular–tend to view China as too uncivil to get close to. One prominent Korean foreign policy expert privately commented that, “[t]hose who call for the further strengthening of ties with China have no idea of what they are suggesting, given what China really is.” Observers often cite mari- time piracy and territorial intrusion by Chinese fishing vessels as examples of uncivil behavior.27 China is also held responsible for much environmental degradation, particularly airborne pollutants affecting Korea. According to a 1998 study, about 66% of South Korea’s airborne intake of sulfur dioxide originated from China. About a quarter of nitrogen oxide and up to a third of acid-rain levels affecting South Korea were also attributed to Chinese pollu- tion.28 While a bilateral ministerial coordination group on environmental 24. The June 23 Pronouncement significantly altered Seoul’s foreign policy by dropping the long-held Hallstein Principles and opening South Korea’s door to most countries, including China and the Soviet Union. 25. A Chinese official offered an interesting rebuttal to this characterization as follows: “As far as the separation of politics from economics is concerned, Seoul has done quite the same– following the U.S. very closely in military-security issues, while engaging actively with China in economic realms.” 26. For Pyongyang’s initial perception of China’s participation in this vein, see McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” p. 289. 27. See “Special Report,” Weekly Hankook, December 16, 1999, pp. 48–58. 28. Chosun Daily, October 23, 1997; and Chosun Monthly, June 2000, pp. 583–89.
788 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001
protection is currently in operation, few remain hopeful about China’s role in
this increasingly crucial realm.
Most important, human-rights concerns loom large in shaping Korean per-
ceptions of China. In September 1999, Wu Dawei, China’s ambassador to
Seoul, commented that people who had fled from North Korea were escapees
and not refugees; that the escapee problem was strictly a bilateral issue be-
tween Beijing and Pyongyang; and that Seoul’s characterization of it as a
human-rights problem was in effect an act of interference with Chinese sov-
ereignty. A few weeks later, however, the United Nations High Commission
on Refugees (UNHCR) officially acknowledged that there were a small num-
ber of refugees among those escapees. Furthermore, in January 2000, Beijing
returned seven North Korean refugees extradited from Russia without any
assurance of their safety and without first consulting Seoul.29 As South
Koreans’ human-rights awareness has expanded in recent years, their percep-
tions of China as uncivil may also grow.30
Fifth, the audacity of Chinese diplomats has further compounded South
Korean elite ambivalence toward China. Two episodes may suffice to pro-
vide a rough picture. Before the Dalai Lama’s first visit to South Korea,
originally scheduled for 2000, Chinese Ambassador Wu warned that “permis-
sion for his entry would jeopardize the bilateral relationship, though not to
the extent of severed ties.” These comments were rejected, particularly since
the Dalai Lama had visited more than 40 countries with which China main-
tains diplomatic relations.31 Separately, Wu’s suggestion that Korea first con-
sult with China on the issue of reopening direct air links with Taiwan also
drew strong resistance.32
The Menu for Choices and Constraints
Perceptual divide is not the only source of strategic ambivalence. Equally if
not more important are structural factors that, often intertwined with history
and memories, limit the range of choices available to Seoul. Theoretically,
there are at least nine options from which South Korea may choose. They
include: (1) preventive war; (2) jumping on a bandwagon; (3) distancing (i.e.,
downgrading a relationship); (4) neutrality/self-help; (5) binding; (6) engage-
29. See Dong-A Daily, October 13 and 18, 1999; Chosun Daily, January 27, 2000; Chosun
Monthly, June 2000, pp. 458–72; and New York Times, May 31, 2000.
30. Seoul had remained silent on most human rights controversies related to China including
the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989, because of its own dark past of Kwangju. Seoul’s modus oper-
andi on these issues was sarcastically dubbed “quiet diplomacy. ” How strongly South Korea
will turn up its voice on the refugee problem as a humanitarian issue remains uncertain.
31. Dong-A Daily, May 30 and June 29, 2000.
32. See ibid., November 17, 2000.JAE HO CHUNG 789 ment; (7) balancing/containment; (8) hedging; and (9) issue-based support.33 Given the premise that Seoul wishes to maximize economic gains while safe- guarding its security interests and accomplishing reunification, the following feasibility assessments may be offered for each option. First of all, in light of ever-expanding economic, diplomatic, cultural, perceptual, and even military bilateralism, waging (or joining in) a preventive war against China is totally unrealistic. Second, jumping on China’s band- wagon by leaving the current U.S. alliance system also seems unrealistic. For the foreseeable future, the “rise of China” appears more probable than the “collapse of China.”34 Yet, this ascent will be a strenuous process, estimated to take at least 20 to 50 years. If the relatively dominant status of the United States remains unchanged until 2020 at the earliest, and particularly given the indispensable contribution that American forces make in deterring North Ko- rea, it is deemed premature by Seoul to opt now for a leap onto China’s bandwagon. Third, neither distancing nor severing ties is a desirable option from Seoul’s viewpoint, not only for obvious geopolitical reasons but also because of South Korea’s high economic stake in the China market. 35 Fourth, being a buffer state rather than a rim state, South Korea does not appear to have a viable option to declare neutrality.36 Replacing the U.S. alliance system with neutrality without concrete security supplements would 33. Many of these options are adapted from Randall L. Schwaller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory” and Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, “Conclu- sion,” in Johnston and Ross (eds.), Engaging China, pp. 7–17, 273–78. 34. China differs very much from the former Soviet Union in terms of the ethnic minority population, the history of national integration, the respective reform strategy, and so on. Thus, a simple analogy of collapse would not hold for China. Historically, China’s “dynastic cycles” were repeated when peasant revolts, local militarism, and external threat coincided. Sporadic small-scale rural instabilities may continue, but not to the extent of posing a serious nationwide threat. See Thomas Bernstein, “Instability in Rural China,” in David Shambaugh (ed.), Is China Unstable? Assessing the Factors (Washington, D.C.: The Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 93–110. Local militarism is also quite unlikely. For Beijing’s mechanisms against the rise of local military forces, see David Shambaugh, “China’s Military in Transition: Politics, Profes- sionalism, Procurement and Power Projection,” China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996), p. 283. Finally, despite the controversies about NMD and TMD, direct external threats against China are minimal. For a Chinese critique of the “China threat” and “China collapse” theses, see Li Xiaohua, “Jiexi `Zhongguo weixielun’ yu `Zhongguo bengkuilun’ de shenhua” [Demystifying the “China threat” and “China collapse” theses], Dangdai yatai, no. 11 (1999), pp. 19–24. 35. For a Chinese view well aware of this geopolitical “inseparability,” see Liu Ming, “Hanguo de diyuan weizhi yu qi waijiao he anquan zhengce” [Korea’s geographical location and its diplomatic and security policies], p. 37. For the disastrous impact of China’s import ban on Korean-made mobile phones and polyethylene in June 2000 in retaliation for South Korea’s application of safeguard tariffs to Chinese garlic imports, see Dong-A Daily, June 8 and 19, 2000; and Chosun Daily, July 4, 2000. 36. For the infeasibility of neutrality for buffer states, see Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 82–83. A similar conclusion is drawn by Robert A. Man-
790 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 be difficult for Seoul to accept. Nor does self-help–opting for self-arma- ment–seem very realistic, as it is too costly and lacks comparative advan- tage vis-à-vis greater powers. Fifth, the most widely discussed idea is binding, in which Korea and others would ally with China, or establish a multilateral framework of collective security that includes China as a member state. In the light of Beijing-Pyongyang relations, still characterized as “brotherhood sealed in blood,” Seoul’s ability to ally with Beijing is a remote possibility. Inducing China into a multilateral security arrangement in the context of Northeast Asia is perhaps equally daunting. China seems to regard the area as a ciquyu (semi-region), where mechanisms of collective security would not quite fit.37 Incremental institutionalization–the so-called “ASEAN Way”–is a possibility, but China will present strong reservations if such schemes are pushed by the U.S.38 The remaining four are more realistic options that Seoul has been using or is trying to implement. The sixth option, engagement, needs no further elab- oration. It has a long history, second only to balancing/containment, and evi- dence abounds that it has worked for both South Korea and China.39 Two points of caution should be noted, however. One is the gradual transforma- tion of South Korea-China economic bilateralism from complementarity to competition, which may complicate further engagement in the future. The other is the structural and perceptual limits imposed on Beijing-Seoul en- gagement by the Korean-U.S. alliance, which is often viewed as an instru- ment to contain China.40 Balancing/containment has the longest history in South Korea’s approach to China. Korea has used this option jointly with the U.S. and Japan since the Korean War. Still, significant changes have arisen from debates about U.S. establishment of a benign unipolarity in East Asia, the rise-of-China conun- drum, and South Korea’s successful engagement with China during the 1990s. The “comprehensive cooperative partnership” (quanmian hezuo ning and James J. Przystup, “Asia’s Transition Diplomacy: Hedging Against Futureshock,” Sur- vival 41:3 (Autumn 1999), p. 54. 37. See Yin Guiyun, “Hezuo anquan: Yatai diqu kexing de anquan moshi xuanze” [Coopera- tive security: Security arrangement options for Asia and the Pacific], Dangdai yatai, no. 10 (1999), p. 33. 38. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wal- lander (eds.), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1999), pp. 287–324. 39. See Victor D. Cha, “Engaging China: The View from Korea,” in Johnston and Ross (eds.), Engaging China, pp. 43–46. 40. Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, Against Us or With Us: The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea , Discussion Papers, the Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, May 1998, pp. 34–35.
JAE HO CHUNG 791 huoban guanxi) agreed upon by Seoul and Beijing in autumn 2000 makes the explicit use of containment much more difficult.41 What adds to the complexity is the Japan question. Generally, the alliance- induced risks of abandonment and entrapment tend to vary inversely.42 The strategic weight of America’s Asian alliances is shifting increasingly toward enhancing Japan’s security role in East Asia, presumably as a counter to China. Seoul faces two possible risks here, which may become positively correlated: a U.S. desire to lessen its regional security burden by promoting Japan’s regional role and thus possibly abandoning South Korea’s strategic interests; or the entrapment scenario, in which South Korea would be sucked into a U.S.-Japan alignment against China.43 It may be a truism that South Korea and China share similar perceptions of Japan. To Seoul, therefore, the “rise of China” could be more acceptable than a resurgent Japan.44 As for whether containment could be Seoul’s optimal choice if a U.S.- China conflict erupted, we return to the expert interviews. Of 20 interview- ees, seven felt Korea should maintain the status quo by aligning with the U.S. against China; four opted for replacing the Korean-American alliance with a multilateral security framework; another seven urged selective support for either the U.S. or China, depending on the issues involved; and two withheld their views. Two conclusions emerged from these discussions: (1) a consen- sus on changing the status quo is premature; and (2) China is considered neither a strategic supplement for South Korea’s national security equation nor an object for containment. 41. According to the Chinese interpretation, partnership involves two dimensions of “not an- tagonizing each other and of sharing risks” (hu bu weidi tongdang fenxian). See Zhang Jianhua, Jiejue Zhongguo zaidu mianlin de jinyao wenti [On the resolution of some crucial problems China faces again] (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 2000), pp. 503, 517, 523. 42. See Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36:4 (July 1984), pp. 466–74. 43. While 46% of the American general public and 62% of the elite (represented by the Luce Foundation Fellows) were in favor of Japan’s rearmament, 91% of the South Korean general public held that preventing Japan’s militarism should be Seoul’s priority goal. See Watts, Ameri- cans Look at Asia, p. 42; 1997 Sejong Survey, p. 12; and Dong-A Daily, December 5, 2000. 44. According to a survey, only 10% of Koreans and 23% of Chinese believed that Japan had been sincerely repentant of past military atrocities. Seventy-eight percent of the Korean respon- dents and 63% of the Chinese respondents replied that Korean-Chinese strategic relations would improve in the future, while the comparable figure for the Japanese respondents was only 37%. See Hanguk, chungguk, ilbon kungmin uisik chosa baekso [White Paper on the national con- sciousness survey in Korea, China, and Japan] (Seoul: KBS and Yonsei University, December 1996), pp. 431, 436. For the U.S. insensitivity to such perceptual undercurrents, see Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” Foreign Affairs 77:6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37–49. Alternatively, however, Washington may be encouraging Tokyo’s more active security role in the region in order to make Seoul more receptive to the U.S. presence in South Korea as a mechanism of checking on Japan.
792 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 Seoul’s bifurcated concerns for Washington and Beijing lead us to the next option, hedging, or spreading the risk by betting on both powers, a strategy that the government has occasionally experimented with.45 During President Kim Young Sam’s visit to China in early 1994 at the height of North Korea’s nuclear crisis, Hwang Byung-Tae, Seoul’s ambassador to Beijing, com- mented that, “Korea’s cooperation with China on this grave issue [of nuclearization] must go beyond the current level . . . to match that of mutual consultation between Seoul and Washington.” Within two hours, the ambas- sador had retracted his remark, saying that it reflected only his personal view. The whole episode was dubbed a diplomatic gaffe.46 In 1994, President Kim Dae Jung remarked in Hong Kong that Seoul was considering a trilateral military dialogue with Beijing and Pyongyang. A year later, this led to the first meeting between the defense ministers of South Korea and China.47 Seoul’s dilemma has resurfaced on more symbolic occasions as well. In preparations prior to the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, President Kim Dae Jung dispatched his foreign minister to Beijing and his deputy minister to Washington, allegedly displeasing Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Recent ambassadorial appointments are yet another indicator of Seoul’s rela- tive stance on its relations with Washington and Beijing. For the first time, a former foreign minister was assigned to China, while a professor-turned-con - gressman was appointed to head the U.S. mission.48 Hedging is often indistinguishable from the last option, issue-based sup- port. If hedging requires prudent actions with a certain amount of secrecy, issue-based support presupposes relatively transparent rules known to all in- volved parties. In a sense, issue-based support works from a proactive posi- tion, while hedging is more reactive. A couple of examples are offered here to illustrate Seoul’s occasional exercise of issue-based support. In negotia- tions toward the Uruguay Round, South Korea often sided with China in its efforts to protect its agricultural produce market. In coping with Japan’s “distortion of history,” too, Seoul cooperated with Beijing in denouncing Ja- pan at international forums, while the position of Washington remained un- specified. On the other hand, with regard to non-proliferation issues, South Korea generally supported the U.S. stance rather than that of China, which 45. For a view that characterizes Seoul as shying away from hedging, see Johnston and Ross, “Conclusion,” p. 288. 46. See Chosun Daily, March 31, 1994. For a strong endorsement of Ambassador Hwang’s view, see Sisa Journal, April 14, 1994, p. 112. Recently, Dong-A Daily also positively charac- terized it as a “meaningful incident.” See the issue of September 8, 1998. 47. See Chosun Daily, November 20, 1998. Since 2000, the defense ministers’ meeting has been designated as an annual event. 48. For such reports and observations, see ibid., May 26, 2000; and Asiaweek, June 2, 2000, p. 10.
JAE HO CHUNG 793
viewed some issues–most notably, regulating missile development–as in-
fringing on its sovereign rights. In this vein, South Korea’s decision not to
join the TMD plan in 1999 was not merely the result of its concerns over
China, but also a consistent issue-based decision as well.49 Regarding the
U.S.-led U.N. resolution on human rights conditions in China, on the other
hand, Seoul has always abstained.
Walking the Tightrope: Dilemmas
of Not Making Choices
On the surface, history appears to repeat itself for Korea as an unfortunate
geopolitical pawn of its stronger neighbors. Many of the players are indeed
familiar from a century ago, notably China and Japan, as well as Russia and
the United States. Much of the similarity stops there, however. While Seoul
once again faces the dilemma of choosing between China and the West, spe-
cifically, the U.S., this time a reversed order of preference is given. By the
1890s, the Korean state had largely missed its chances for self-strengthening
and realignment, primarily by remaining the most loyal subsystem of the
Sinic world order. Now, to abandon the U.S.-led regional security structure
seems premature, if not dangerous. How to build peace on the Korean Penin-
sula and how to readjust the role of the American forces are both fundamental
variables in the equation. With these two questions unresolved, jumping onto
another bandwagon would be highly destabilizing for South Korea.
More frustrating is the fact that U.S.-China relations are beyond any inde-
pendent efforts at control by South Korea, despite the fact that the bilateral
dynamics can have a fundamental impact on the Korean question.50 Wash-
ington’s perceptions of Pyongyang can differ greatly from Seoul’s: this at
times produces serious policy discord between the two.51 Furthermore, po-
tentially the most explosive issue centers around the U.S. forces in Korea.
Washington has time and again expressed the wish to station its forces in
49. According to a survey done in 10 Asian countries in early 1999, South Korea ranked sixth
in perceiving a missile threat from North Korea and ninth in approving TMD plans. See Far
Eastern Economic Review, March 18, 1999, p. 36.
50. A high-level South Korean official, in an interview with the author, revealed that the
South Korean government had had much to worry about regarding the potentially adverse impact
of the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on the four-party talks scheduled
to be held a month later. Lacking control over such a key variable must be both perplexing and
frustrating for Seoul.
51. While Seoul has been more interested in the inter-Korean summit, family reunions, confi-
dence-building, economic cooperation, and overall tension reduction with Pyongyang, Washing-
ton has paid specific attention to such issues as nuclear non-proliferation, missile control,
weapons of mass destruction, and so on. These different policy horizons are noted in Catharin
Dalpino and Bates Gill (eds.), Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2000–01 (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, March 2001), p. 31.794 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 Korea even after reunification, and this has been tacitly accepted by Seoul, though without specifying the details. China has consistently objected to the stationing of any foreign forces in a third country, including Korea.52 How to define the nature and role of a U.S. military presence in a unified Korea is a delicate problem. Most studies suggest that any post-unification Korean- American alliance should be transformed from a robust peninsular alliance against North Korea into a regional security alliance.53 An intricate question is the target of such an alliance. If it is China, what should the Korean stand be? Can the Seoul government avoid consequences, both the bad (possible entrapment in conflict due to tight security commitments) and the ugly (pos- sible escalation of conflict due to the failure of reining in the alliance part- ner)? 54 The whole question comes down to whether the costs of Seoul’s departure from the U.S.-aligned structure outweigh the benefits of opting for something else. Unless concrete arrangements to assure peace are institutionalized on the Korean Peninsula–to put it another way, as long as the North Korean threat is present and plausible–it will be cheaper and, therefore, more rea- sonable for Seoul to side with Washington. Self-armament would be too costly, and China has no intention or incentive to support Seoul at the ex- pense of Pyongyang. U.S. support for reunification, as well as for post- reunification reconstruction, will be indispensable. Last, but not least, South Korea’s economic relationship with, if not dependency on, the U.S. is too intimately intertwined with bilateral strategic considerations to justify a switch.55 52. What you hear from the Chinese side personally–personal views ( siren yijian)–often differs from their official position (gongshi lichang) in that China often does appreciate the positive dimension of the U.S.-Japan alliance in restraining Japan, and that the departure of American forces from Korea will produce undesirable pressure for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan as well. 53. See, for instance, Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), p. xvii; and Morton I. Abramowitz, James T. Laney, and Michael J. Green, Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 40–41. 54. See Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, “Networks of Intrigue? Realpoli- tik, Alliances, and International Security,” in Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), Recon- structing Realpolitik (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 190–94. 55. The U.S., in significant part because of security considerations, played a crucial role in helping South Korea to recover from the recent financial crisis. See Lawrence B. Krause, The Economics and Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 224–25, 228–30. More realistically, according to the 2000 data, out of Seoul’s $40 billion in exports to the U.S., $23 billion were concentrated in semiconduc - tors, automobiles, computers, telecommunications, and textiles, namely, South Korea’s core in- dustries. See Dong-A Daily, March 15, 2001.
JAE HO CHUNG 795 China, nevertheless, cannot be dispensed with. Assessing China’s power solely in per capita terms misses the point.56 The former Soviet Union’s global power was not founded on its per capita indicators, nor was China’s accession to the United Nations Security Council 30 years ago rooted in its economic power. China’s growing influence over the Korean Peninsula is real. The bottom line for Seoul, therefore, is not to antagonize China; in this regard, South Korea’s being sucked into a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere must be avoided.57 At this juncture, Seoul must avoid making premature choices. Not making choices involves enhancing transparency on the known factors and maintain- ing strategic ambiguity on the unknowns. That is, Seoul must maximize what it has, the security alliance with the U.S. and economic bilateralism with China, while minimizing any commitments on issues beyond its control. Not making choices also presupposes a comprehensive independent assessment of Korea’s security environment and future contingencies. 58 Strategic soul- searching of this sort means exploring the boundaries of Korean discretion while exercizing much-needed prudence. Such explorations often prove risky but may nevertheless offer valuable lessons and guidelines for the fu- ture.59 Although the U.S. and China have adopted the same tenet toward the Ko- rean question–maintaining peace ( heping) and stability (wending)–it re- mains unclear whether they mean the same thing by stability. In communications from knowledgeable Chinese diplomats to the author in summer 2000, Beijing’s notion of stability seems to mean gradually growing Chinese influence over Korean issues, at the expense of the U.S. The Chi- nese seem confident that Seoul will look more and more to Beijing for sup- port and advice. 56. Segal, “Does China Matter?” pp. 24–25. 57. A former Pentagon official assured this author that in hundreds of simulations involving U.S.-China conflicts over Taiwan, the option of the U.S. asking South Korean forces to join in against China had never been contemplated. Personal communication in January 2001. 58. For the calls for Seoul’s own strategic “soul-searching,” see Ralph Cossa, Korea: The Achilles’ Heel of the U.S.-Japan Alliance , Discussion Paper, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stan- ford University, May 1997, p. 9; and Larry M. Wortzel, “Planning for the Future: The Role of U.S. Forces in Northeast Asian Security,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounde r, July 26, 2000 (http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder /bg1388html) . 59. Very recently, Seoul’s ambivalent position on NMD–more specifically, its insertion of a phrase, “preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty,” in the South Korean-Russian summit communiqué–came under severe fire. While treated as a diplomatic mistake, there are valuable lessons to be drawn from that incident. That is, successful hedging requires prudence, which can minimize the danger of confused signals. Yet, prudence is at a premium, and thus hard to come by.
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