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SPECIAL
207
no.
The Ukraine Conflict: Pathways to Peace
Ajay Bisaria and Ankita Dutta
JANUARY 2023
© 2023 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through
print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF.Abstract
N
ow in its twelfth month, the Ukraine
crisis is caught in a protracted winter
of war rather than one of frozen
hostility or attempted peace. Most for ‘strategic accommodation’ through creative
prognoses point towards continuing peace diplomacy? Do the theory and history of
military action instead of dialogue in the near term. conflict resolution offer any pointers? This report
This is primarily because Russia and Ukraine have examines the available options should the path of
made their maximalist positions clear. But is the diplomacy open up.
door to dialogue completely shut, or is there room
2Introduction
T
he Ukraine crisis, now in its twelfth
month, is caught in a prolonged
winter of war rather than one of The second was Russian President Vladimir
frozen hostility or attempted peace. Putin’s address at the meeting of Russia’s Defence
Two developments in December Ministry Board, where he doubled down on the
2022 underscored this reality. First, Ukrainian commitment to provide the country’s armed
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the US, forces with the latest weapon systems while
where he set a high bar for an end to the conflict “maintaining and improving the combat readiness
in an impassioned address to the US Congress: of the nuclear triad” and continuing “the special
“just peace is no compromises as to the sovereignty, military operation” as the key priority of 2023
freedom, and territorial integrity of my country, “until its goals are achieved in full.”3 Battlefield
the payback for all the damages inflicted by Russian developments since then and the continuing
aggression.”1 The visit signalled an attempt to Ukrainian demands for western weaponry suggest
escalate the conflict with added weaponry and that the conflicting parties are placing greater
firmer western support. To many Americans, faith in a military rather than a diplomatic phase,
Zelenskyy’s assertion that “Ukraine holds its lines even though Russia has periodically signalled its
and will never surrender”2 evoked an inflection willingness to negotiate after freezing the current
point from the Second World War, when UK Prime territorial status quo.
Minister Winston Churchill visited Washington in
1941 to draw the US into a European war.
3Since September 2022, Ukraine has been
able to reclaim some territory in its northeast
and challenge Russian forces in the south. From Both Russia and Ukraine have made their
October 2022, Russia targeted civilian and energy maximalist positions clear—Ukraine would
infrastructure across Ukraine. Most prognoses are like Russia to vacate all its occupied territory,
of continuing military action rather than dialogue including Crimea, while Russia would like to
in the near term: Ukraine’s leadership informed hold on to its military gains and secure Ukraine’s
The Economist in December 2022 that it is bracing ‘guaranteed neutrality.’ However, is the door to
for winter attacks and a Russian spring offensive.4 dialogue completely shut? Or is there room for
The accidental missile strike in Poland in November ‘strategic accommodation’ through creative peace
2022 and the repeated nuclear rhetoric, especially diplomacy? Do the theory and history of conflict
talk of a ‘dirty bomb,’ only underline the possibility resolution offer any pointers?
of further escalation through miscalculation.
A scenario that cannot be ruled out is of heavy
Russian losses sending the conflict spiralling out of
control into a nuclear endgame. Yet, while global
voices periodically call for dialogue, serious peace
proposals are conspicuously missing in action.
4Pathways to Peace:
In Theory and History
I
n their influential work, which is frequently
used as a template for peace talks, academics
William Ury and Roger Fisher presented Applying this understanding to the Ukraine
four principles for effective negotiations: conflict, the BATNA for Ukraine remains military
separating people from the problem, gains on the battlefield, whereas, for Russia, it is
focusing on interests rather than positions, defending the accrued territorial gains of the year.
generating a variety of options before settling on This is primarily because both countries believe
an agreement, and insisting that the agreement be in their respective capacities to push forward on
based on objective criteria.5 Central to their model the battlefield towards ‘complete victory’, which
is the concept of ‘the best alternative to a negotiated for Kyiv would mean pushing Russia out of its
agreement’ (BATNA). BATNA asks conflicting territories, and for Moscow, retaining territories
parties what concessions they are willing to make to in eastern Ukraine. However, pursuing complete
arrive at the negotiated agreement or what course victory would lead to a long and destructive war
of action they would adopt in the absence of such or a grinding stalemate—both scenarios creating
an agreement. negative ripples in Europe and worldwide.
5Several reasons have been used to justify why
countries go to war, from gaining territory, to
defending it, from righting historical wrongs to The Cold War never officially began and, thus,
pre-emptive or punitive actions. However, the could not reach an official conclusion through
trajectory and consequences of war are often hard a peace settlement in the 1990s or the 2000s,
to define or control.6 The First World War, the first even though the Budapest Memorandum of
major conflict of the 20th century, presents two key 1994 attempted to draw up some of its security
lessons that are relevant to the current conflict: contours. The present crisis has reignited the
First, refusal to seize the moment for negotiations undeclared and unfinished Cold War, with a
leads to greater suffering and destruction; and 21st-century update of the historical contestation
second, the eventual results of negotiations may not featuring an aggressive US-led NATO, a
turn out well for either the victor or the vanquished. resurgent Russia, a proxy battleground in
This is primarily because the consequences of the Europe, and nuclear brinkmanship. However,
First World War—including the Treaty of Versailles, the revival of the Cold War has not seen a
the Communist Revolution in Russia, and the comprehensive strategic response from the
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire— West, like the ‘containment’8 of the Soviet Union
paved the way for the Second World War.7 Similarly, designed in the 1940s. As former US Secretary
the Second World War led to decolonisation, the of State Henry Kissinger9 wrote in 2014, “the
creation of the United Nations, relative peace in demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy;
Europe framed by a bipolar world, and a Cold War it is an alibi for the absence of one.” Similarly,
that lasted 45 years. it could be said that the current vilification of
Putin and the lionisation of Zelenskyy indicate
the absence of a coherent grand Western strategy
towards Russia and, hence, the wavering on
conflict resolution.
6History tells us that resolutions for even the most
vexed conflicts can be arrived at through dialogue.
Negotiations, in theory, are meant to “balance the Diplomacy is critical to highlight grievances
competing interests of states and to find common as well as viewpoints. It is not necessary that
denominators which could form basis for an conflicting parties have direct connections;
agreement.”10 This was exemplified by negotiations instead, key stakeholders could facilitate the
aimed at preventing the Cold War military dialogue process. In fact, multilateral processes
confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union seem to be the preferred pathway in post-Cold
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even 60 years on, War conflict resolution. Less than three decades
the crisis shines the light on some enduring lessons ago, when borders within Europe were redrawn
in conflict resolution. Conflict experts argue that in the former Yugoslavia, the crisis ended with the
the negotiations to end the Cuban missile crisis Dayton Peace Accords, which offer an instructive
were also designed to develop confidence-building template for the current crisis. The crisis in Bosnia
measures for avoiding accidental nuclear war. and Herzegovina highlighted the complexities
These negotiations were ‘based on the common interest and limits of European diplomacy, while the
in reducing the risk of confrontations that might escalate US and NATO intervened to set the stage for
to nuclear warfare’ and ‘could proceed because it de-escalation and ceasefire. The lead-up to the
was possible to identify shared interests that cut final accords included several failed plans and
across or partially overrode the conflicting ones” agreements to bring the conflict to a close. Bosnia
(emphasis added).11 represents a case where mediators determined
when the situation was critical enough to require
resolution. Early mediators responded primarily
to pressure exerted by media images of atrocities
in Bosnia, perceiving that the conflict had
escalated enough for resolution—not because the
parties themselves had grown weary, but because
the situation had gone too far. The question that
the Bosnia situation raised, which is still relevant
today, is when is it the right time and when is it
‘just’ for the international community to intervene
and mediate in a crisis?
7According to scholar Ira William Zartman, there
are two approaches to the practice of negotiation—
“first, lies in the substance of the proposals for a Nevertheless, when one of the conflicting
solution - when parties resolve their conflict by parties is a nuclear power, escalation scenarios
finding an acceptable agreement—more or less a need to be considered seriously. Russian nuclear
midpoint; and second, lies in the timing of efforts for signalling has arguably been confusing and mostly
resolution—when parties resolve their conflict only dismissed as sabre-rattling, oscillating between
when they are ready to do so—when alternative Moscow placing nuclear forces on “special alert”13
means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and Putin dismissing the threat of tactical nuclear
and the parties find themselves in an uncomfortable weapons: “We see no need for that...There is no
and costly predicament. At that point they grab on point in that, neither political, nor military.”14
to proposals that usually have been in the air for Still, it would be unwise to rule out scenarios of
a long time and that only now appear attractive.”12 Russia choosing to “use a smaller tactical weapon
While applying this understanding to the current in Ukraine as a “game changer”, to break a
conflict in Ukraine, one can assume that neither stalemate or avoid defeat.”15 Overall, while the
party to the conflict has reached the stage of current risk of a nuclear endgame is low, it cannot
negotiation, primarily because their interests do be discounted and needs to be managed carefully.
not overlap. Ukraine is reiterating its demands for
the restoration of its eastern territories, reparations A major challenge to early peace is the fact that
for the damage, and accountability for Russian war the only existing platform of negotiation between
crimes. In contrast, Russia has made it clear that Ukraine and Russia has been rendered ineffective.
it intends to integrate the conquered territories The Normandy Format, put in place in 2014, led
into its boundaries. Arguably, Ukraine’s western to mediation between the two parties and the
partners do not see their interests served by a subsequent Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 agreements.
ceasefire deal when the objective of ‘weakening
Russia’ is being realised and nuclear risk is yet to
breach the threshold of tolerance.
8The belligerents had differing interpretations of
the provisions of the format, which led to it being
sidelined; Ukraine saw the 2015 agreement as Clearly, what is required for peace is an ‘off-
an instrument to re-establish control over the ramp,’ however difficult, towards de-escalation.
rebel eastern territories, while Russia viewed One way forward could be a platform provided
the deal as obliging Ukraine to grant rebel by a third country or countries, which would
authorities in Donbass comprehensive autonomy encourage the conflicting parties to step up and
and representation in the central government, negotiate unconditionally. The success of this
effectively giving Moscow the power to veto Kiev’s kind of negotiation was evident in the processes
foreign policy choices. Moreover, former German of the Tashkent Agreement in 1966 and the Oslo
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s December 2022 Accords in the 1990s. These agreements provided
remarks16 confirmed Russia’s deepest geopolitical a platform for the negotiations while charting
suspicion that the Minsk accords were never meant the future course, with major powers stepping in
to be implemented but were designed to buy whenever necessary. The Oslo Accords provide
time for Ukraine to be strengthened as a western the most promising template for the present
bulwark against it. Voices in Russia even suggest conflict. They also framed the basic interim
that it made a tactical error by not completing the agreement between Israel and the Palestine
job in 2014–15, when it had the chance to move Liberation Organisation (PLO) to establish peace
deeper west into Ukraine with little challenge. and push forward in capacity building while
While these agreements do provide a baseline for maintaining a futuristic timeline on conversations
the current conflicting parties to work towards de- around critical issues. In both cases, major powers
escalation, initialising the format is a challenge. were involved in pushing the conflicting countries
This is primarily because the Normandy Format, towards negotiations in a neutral third country.
which initiated these agreements, was neglected by
the guarantor nations, Germany and France, and
was completely ignored during the current conflict.
More importantly, no credible alternative platform
for conflict resolution has come into play after
January 2022.
9Table 1:
Takeaways from Major Conflicts of the 20th and 21st
Centuries
Year of
Signing of Actors Involved/
S. Time Taken for
Conflict Agreement/ Great Power Key Takeaways
No. Negotiations
Armistice/ Presence
Accord
1 First World Armistice Allied Powers 161 days (18 Key features of the Treaty of Versailles included:
War signed (US, UK, Italy, January–28 • Formation of the League of Nations.
on 11 France) June 1919)
November • New German government to surrender
1918 approximately 10 percent of its pre-war territory in
Europe, as well as all its overseas possessions.
Treaty of
• Limiting the size of the German army and navy, and
Versailles
allowing for the trial of Kaiser Wilhelm II and several
signed on
other high-ranking German officials as war criminals.
28 June
1919 • The Germans accepted responsibility for the war and
the liability to pay financial reparations to the Allies.
2 Second 1945 US, UK, France, Yalta Yalta Conference:
World War Soviet Union Conference • Unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany
(8 days: 4–11 and the division of Germany and Berlin into
February 1945) four occupational zones controlled by the US, Great
Potsdam Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.
Conference (17 • Germans, civilians, and prisoners of war would be
days: 17 July–2 punished for the war (reparations), partially through
August 1945) forced labour to repair the damage they caused to
their country and to others.
• Poland was reorganised under the communist
Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland,
and Joseph Stalin promised to allow free elections
(but failed to follow through).
• The Soviet Union agreed to participate in the UN
with a guaranteed position as a permanent member
of the Security Council.
• Stalin agreed to enter the Pacific War against Japan
three months after the defeat of Germany.
Potsdam Conference:
• The decentralisation, demilitarisation, denazification,
and democratisation of Germany.
• The division of Germany and Berlin, and Austria and
Vienna into the four occupations zones outlined at
Yalta.
• Prosecution of Nazi war criminals.
• Return of all Nazi annexations to their pre-war
borders.
• Shifting Germany’s eastern border west to reduce
its size, and expulsion of German populations living
outside this new border in Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Hungary.
• Transformation of Germany’s pre-war heavy-industry
economy (which had been vital for Nazi military
build-up) into a combination of agriculture and light
domestic industries.
• Recognition of the Soviet-controlled Polish
government.
• Announcement of the Potsdam Declaration outlining
terms of surrender for Japan.
103 Cold War No formal US, Soviet There is no • Geopolitical tension between the US and the Soviet
agreement Union consensus on Union and their respective allies, the Western
the beginning Bloc and the Eastern Bloc.
or end of the
• Establishment of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact
Cold War, but
in 1955.
it is generally
considered to • George Kennan’s policy of containment of the Soviet
be 1947–91 Union.
(approximately
45 years) • Nuclear brinkmanship between the US and the
Soviet Union.
• Competition for influence in Latin America,
the Middle East, and the decolonised states of
Africa, Asia, and Oceania.
4 Korean 27 July China, North 2 years 17 days • Suspension of open hostilities.
Crisis 1953 Korea, South (1951–53)
• Withdrawal of all military forces and equipment
Korea, US, UN
from a 4,000-metre-wide zone, establishing the
Demilitarised Zone as a buffer between the forces.
• Prevention of both sides from entering the air,
ground, or sea areas under control of the other.
• Arranged release and repatriation of prisoners of war
and displaced persons.
• Establishment of the Military Armistice Commission
and other agencies to discuss any violations and
ensure adherence to truce terms.
5 Cuban October US, Soviet 2 weeks • To prevent possible nuclear war and to communicate,
Missile 1962 Union a direct telephone link was established between the
Crisis White House and the Kremlin, which came to be
known as the ‘Hotline.’
• Having approached nuclear conflict, both
superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms
race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear
Test Ban Treaty.
6 Tashkent 10 January India, Pakistan, 4–10 January • Officially ended the war between Pakistan and India,
Agreement 1966 Soviet Union 1966 which occurred from August–September 1965.
• “Settled…disputes through peaceful means” and by
not having “recourse to force.”
• Withdrawal of “all armed personnel” no later than
25 February 1966 and moving those personnel “to
the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965,” with
both countries to “observe the cease-fire terms on the
cease-fire line.”
• Maintaining cross-border relations “based on the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
each other.”
• Repatriation of prisoners of war.
117 Oslo Peace First: 1993 Israel, PLO, Negotiations • Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the
Accords Norway, US began Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and
Second:
discreetly in recognised Israel’s right to exist in peace.
1995
1993.
• Both sides agreed that a Palestinian Authority
would be established and would assume governing
responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over
a five-year period.
8 Dayton 21 Croatia, Bosnia, 21 days (1–21 • Preserved Bosnia as a single state consisting of
Agreement November Serbia, US, November two parts—the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the
1995 UK, France, 1995) Bosnian Serb Republic, with Sarajevo remaining the
Germany, Italy, undivided capital city.
Russia,
• The parties agreed to fully respect human rights and
European Union
the rights of refugees and displaced persons.
• The parties agreed to cooperate fully with all entities,
including those authorised by the UN Security
Council, in implementing the peace settlement and
investigating and prosecuting war crimes and other
violations of international humanitarian law.
9 Minsk 5 The Trilateral 37 days • Comprised 12 points:
Protocol September Contact Group (31 July–5
• Ensuring immediate bilateral ceasefire.
2014 on Ukraine September
(Ukraine, Russia, 2014) • Ensuring monitoring and verification of the ceasefire
Organisation by OSCE.
for Security and
Co-operation • Decentralisation of power, including through
in Europe adoption of the Ukrainian law ‘On temporary Order
(OSCE)), France, of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of
Germany, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.’
Representatives • Ensuring permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian–
from Donetsk Russian border and verification by OSCE, with the
People’s creation of security zones in the border regions of
Republic Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
and Luhansk • Immediate release of all hostages and illegally
People’s detained persons.
Republic
• A law preventing the prosecution and punishment of
people in connection with the events in some areas
of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
• Continuing inclusive national dialogue.
• Taking measures to improve the humanitarian
situation in Donbas.
• Ensuring early local elections in accordance with the
Ukrainian law ‘On temporary Order of Local Self-
Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts.’
• To withdraw illegal armed groups and military
equipment as well as fighters and mercenaries from
the territory of Ukraine.
• To adopt a programme of economic recovery and
reconstruction for the Donbas region.
• To provide personal security for participants in the
consultations.
1210 Minsk II 12 February Ukraine, 16 hours (11– • The agreement included:
2015 Russia, France, 12 February
• Immediate and full ceasefire in particular districts
Germany, 2015)
of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and
Representatives its strict fulfilment as of 00:00 midnight EET on 15
from Donetsk February 2015.
People’s
• Pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal
Republic
distance towards the creation of a security zone.
and Luhansk
People’s • Effective monitoring and verification of ceasefire
Republic regime and pull-out of heavy weapons by OSCE.
• Initiating a dialogue on modalities of conducting
local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian
legislation and Ukrainian law ‘On temporary Order
of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts
of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts’ as well as about
the future of these districts based on the above-
mentioned law.
• Providing pardon and amnesty by way of enacting
a law that forbids the persecution and punishment
of persons in relation to events that took place in
particular districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts of Ukraine.
• Providing release and exchange of all hostages and
illegally held persons based on the principle of ‘all for
all.’
• Restoring control of the state border across the
conflict zone to the Ukrainian government.
• Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with a new
constitution to come into effect by the end of 2015,
the key element of which was decentralisation (taking
into account the peculiarities of the districts of the
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, agreed to with the
representatives of these districts) and approval of
permanent legislation on the special status of Donetsk
and Luhansk oblasts.
Source: Compiled by the authors from various sources.
13Lessons for the Ukraine Conflict
E
very major conflict in the last 100
years, as outlined in Table 1, provides
lessons for the present crisis. The First negotiations may not lead to concrete outcomes,
World War indicated that inordinate and the models followed may differ in detail, but
delay in starting negotiation processes open channels of communication remain critical.
could cause grievous harm. The Second World
War showed the dangers of a conflict spiralling As with any conflict, the present crisis comes
into a nuclear dimension. The Cuban Missile with the opportunity for peace, the dissolution
Crisis highlighted the importance of backchannel of which could lead to disastrous outcomes.
diplomacy as critical to put forward grievances and The sooner both parties realise this, the more
provide a platform for further discussions. The attractive the pathways to peace will become. In
Tashkent Agreement and Oslo Accords emphasised the Ukraine crisis, the first step towards peace
the role of a neutral platform for negotiations. The will need to be the cessation of hostilities. It is
Dayton Agreement process indicated the right dangerous for the world to complacently wait for
time for international actors to push for mediation. a solution in the summer of 2023, after Russia
As the Ukraine crisis nears a year and with its has been confronted with the latest weaponry or
economic repercussions being felt across the globe, after Europe has shivered through a weaponised
the case for dialogue remains strong, despite the winter.
reluctance of the belligerents and their backers. The
14The second step towards sustained peace is
negotiation. For a peace process to take shape, it
is critical to balance the maximalist demands on appetite for negotiation, but Ukraine’s Western
both sides and push for negotiations, including backers may need to funnel in more diplomacy
an unconditional ceasefire. At the moment, both than armaments.
conflicting parties seem to assume that they control
the momentum of the conflict and, thus, are not Contours of a Negotiated Peace
inclined towards talks. For external facilitation to
be successful, timing is crucial; while the conflicting If and when both parties come to the negotiating
parties need to be inclined, external stakeholders table, what shape could the negotiated peace
need to reach “the stage of receptivity - having the take? At the G20 summit in Bali in November
trust of the parties, confidentiality, and willingness 2022, Zelenskyy proposed a 10-point peace plan.
to expend political capital and time, and a strong The maximalist plan asked Russia to “reaffirm
team to back up the effort.”17 the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the
framework of the relevant resolutions of the UN
What will be crucial is for international General Assembly and the applicable international
stakeholders to bring pressure on both countries to legally binding documents; along with cessation
cease hostilities unconditionally and work towards of hostilities and withdrawal of troops by Moscow;
a peace process. The UN Security Council is special tribunals for Russian war crimes; security
limited in its ability to provide a peace platform, guarantees and confirmation of end of war.”18
given that a veto-wielding permanent member is Zelenskyy had also signed a decree in September,
party to the conflict. Russia, for its part, believes wherein he ruled out peace negotiations by
that the West is “backing” Ukraine, just as the West stating: “We are ready for a dialogue with Russia,
believes that China is siding with Russia. Third but with another president.”19 On its part,
parties that enjoy the trust of both conflicting Moscow has said that the country was “ready for
sides could step in when asked to outline a basic the negotiations, but not on the West’s demand
agreement for de-escalation, as was witnessed to pull out of Ukraine,” adding that “the West’s
during negotiations for the Tashkent Agreement. refusal to recognise new territories seized from
Although both sides have regularly stated their Ukraine makes peace talks harder.”20 Both
maximalist demands, the components of a potential countries have thus applied stiff conditions, even
negotiated peace may vary due to shifts in their of regime change, but not shut the door entirely
perceived negotiation power. A critical question is to a peace process.
who will take the first step; Russia has signalled an
15A possible way forward was proposed by
Kissinger during a talk at the Davos Summit in
May 2022,21 then in an article in December,22 calling While reverting to the February 2022 status
for a compromise between Russia and Ukraine to quo could be viewed as a victory by Ukraine
the status quo ante: the positions of the two forces and the West, will Russia agree to surrender its
before Russia’s invasion began on 24 February 2022 military gains? Similarly, will the declaration of
to push for a negotiated peace in Ukraine to reduce neutrality, as offered by Ukraine at the beginning
the risk of another devastating world war. He of the conflict, be the starting point for a
stated that “the outcome of any war and the peace negotiated peace? Given that the ground situation
settlement, and the nature of that peace settlement has since changed, neutrality might be acceptable
— it will determine whether the combatants remain to Moscow, but will it be acceptable to Kyiv? Or
permanent adversaries, or whether it is possible to will Ukraine ask for concrete security guarantees
fit them into an international framework.” from the West and NATO as part of peace
negotiations? This may also be unacceptable for
Russia; it may accept Ukraine joining European
economic, but not security, structures, the EU
but not any version of NATO. Another critical
aspect is who will be the facilitator, since it must
be a country (or countries) that both conflicting
parties trust to provide a neutral space.
16Where are the Peaceniks?
T
here have been several tentative
attempts to broker peace during the
Ukraine crisis, including by Turkey diplomacy and dialogue as the only way forward.
and Israel, which began contributing Throughout the conflict, India has refused to
when France and Germany ceased endorse Russian actions and has underlined its
to play that role. With the current focus on the respect for territorial integrity, spoken against
G20, can the organisation or its chair, India, play a the use of nuclear weapons, and highlighted the
similar role? impact of the crisis on food and energy security,
particularly in the Global South. India has also
India is not new to the role of a facilitator; it reiterated that it is ready to contribute to any
played a similar role in the Korean War, where it peace effort. This was evident in Prime Minister
proposed a resolution to end the conflict, resulting Narendra Modi’s conversations in December
in the signing of the Armistice Agreement. Notably, 2022 with Putin and Zelenskyy, where Zelenskyy
India refused to support or blame any party in the pointedly called for New Delhi’s help “with
conflict on the one hand and worked to restore the implementing the peace formula”23 that he had
status quo on the other. This resonates in India’s put forward during the G20 Bali Summit.
stand on the present conflict in Ukraine—New
Delhi has expressed concerns over increasing
violence, but refused to take sides, while calling for
17Various strategic factors drive India’s balanced
approach to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. If invited,
peace process, which India could achieve by
India is well-positioned to facilitate bilateralism
working with partners to address the interests
and bilateral peace talks between the two
of all stakeholders. India could then collaborate
conflicting parties, given that it is trusted by both
with its partners to work on a peace plan as part
sides and by a range of stakeholders. New Delhi
of its presidency’s larger agenda. Thus, the G20
could comfortably work with partners to build
provides India with the opportunity to set the
a consensus towards a peace process that meets
blueprint for that discussion.
the interests of all stakeholders, particularly by
leveraging its G20 leadership. Modi is perhaps
The G20 Troika has the potential to be the
one of the few global leaders who can reach out to
vehicle for this purpose. The G20 Troika presently
many of his contemporaries (whether Putin and
comprises of three developing countries—
Zelenskyy, or US President Joe Biden and French
Indonesia (the past president), India (the current
President Emmanuel Macron) in a single day.24
president), and Brazil (the incoming president)—
Moreover, India could harness bilateral synergies
representing the true Global South. The troika
with Ukraine, Russia, US, and the European Union
would offer G20 the opportunity to look at the
to bring these vectors together and push an agenda
crisis from a developing-world perspective. Since
for peace.
the beginning of the conflict, India has been
highlighting the ripple effects of the crisis on
The Troika Diplomacy
countries in the Global South, including increased
prices of energy and fertilisers and heightened
India’s G20 presidency provides New Delhi
food insecurity. During its G20 presidency,
with a platform, as well as the responsibility to
Indonesia25 also advocated for a resolution, with
initiate discussions among stakeholders to de-
President Joko Widodo visiting both Russia and
escalate the Ukraine crisis. Since G20 remains
Ukraine to push for peace. With Brazil in the mix,
the world’s premier economic forum, it will need
the troika could prove to be a credible vehicle for
to grapple with the most serious political crisis of
a negotiated peace process.
current times, particularly since Russia and all
G7 members are part of this grouping. The first
critical step is to arrive at a consensus towards a
18An alternative pathway is for India to join a
trilateral group with Israel and Turkey to initiate a
consensus mechanism towards a peace process. The Any multilateral group chosen to attempt
choice of Turkey and Israel would acknowledge peace can take cues from historical peace
their early efforts towards resolution of the crisis. processes and provide a platform for talks. For
Israeli and Turkish leaders have expended example, learning from the Oslo Peace Process
considerable effort to get the conflicting parties and the Tashkent Agreement, the group can
to come to the negotiating table. While Turkey provide a neutral ground for both parties to
played a critical role in finalising the much-needed discuss a ceasefire agreement which, once
grain deal, it has been unsuccessful in getting both implemented, could give way to further discussion
countries to discuss a ceasefire. What would work on substantive issues. The peacebuilders could
in favour of this grouping is that it might be more propose an incremental approach to address the
acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia, given their concerns of both Ukraine and Russia, starting
respective ties with the countries and the exclusion from the least problematic issues, to promoting
of the European countries and the US. confidence-building measures, to addressing
difficult territorial matters.
19Conclusion
H
istorically, conflicts have ended
either with comprehensive victories
or prolonged stalemates. While military pause and build towards the next phase
the 20th century saw devastating of conflict? Or is Russia open to talks, since these
endgames, many 21st-century will allow it to preserve its military gains, even if
conflicts (such as Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and now by abandoning the dream of ‘total victory’? Many
Ukraine) seem to be more prolonged. As winter in Ukraine and the West see these remarks as
proceeds, the violence in Ukraine may intensify. “posturing” owing to continued Russian attacks
and an attempt to justify Russia’s “imperial-style
In a December interview, Putin said that he war of occupation.”27
was “ready to negotiate with everyone involved
about acceptable solutions, but that is up to What is clear is that the global community
them,”26 placing the onus of dialogue on Ukraine needs to encourage both sides towards peace
and the West. While these comments may seem talks; neither party will come to the negotiating
directed towards war-fatigued domestic audiences table as long as the BATNA of a military
and war-sceptical Europeans, Russia’s apparent solution appears more valuable. Irrespective
openness towards negotiated peace raises two of the pathway taken by Ukraine, the global
critical questions: Is it tactical to make room for a conversation needs to shift from war strategies to
templates for peace; the alternative is much too
dangerous for the world.
20Endnotes
1 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Zelenskyy,” December 21, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/12/21/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-in-joint-
press-conference/.
2 President of Ukraine, “Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a Joint Meeting of the US Congress,” December 22, 2022,
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-stoyimo-boremos-i-vigrayemo-bo-mi-razom-ukrayina-amerika-80017.
3 President of Russia, “Meeting of Defence Ministry Board,” December 21, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/70159.
4 “Volodymyr Zelensky and his Generals Explain Why the War Hangs in the Balance,” The Economist, December 15, 2022,
https://www.economist.com/ukraines-fateful-winter.
5 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (UK: Random House, 1981), p. 50.
6 Guillermo Altares, “History’s Lessons for the Ukraine-Russia Conflict: How Do Wars Get Started?,” El Pais, January 28,
2022, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2022-01-28/historys-lessons-for-the-ukraine-russia-conflict-how-do-wars-get-started.
html.
7 Anatol Lieven, “Ukraine’s War is Like World War I, Not World War II,” Foreign Policy, October 27, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2022/10/27/ukraines-war-is-like-world-war-i-not-world-war-ii/.
8 Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, “Kennan and Containment, 1947,”
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan.
9 Henry Kissinger, “To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-
11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html.
10 Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington DC: National
Academy Press, 2000), p. 4.
11 Stern and Druckman, International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, p. 4.
12 Stern and Druckman, International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, p. 225.
13 “Ukraine Invasion: Putin Puts Russia’s Nuclear Forces on Special Alert,” BBC, February 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-60547473.
2114 “Putin Says ‘No Need’ for Using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” PBS, October 27, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
world/vladimir-putin-rules-out-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine.
15 “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?,” BBC, September 25, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-60664169.
16 Tina Hildebrandt and Giovanni di Lorenzo, “Hatten Sie Gedacht, Ich Komme Mit Pferdeschwanz?,” Zeit Online, December
7, 2022, https://www.zeit.de/2022/51/angela-merkel-russland-fluechtlingskrise-bundeskanzler.
17 Pankaj Saran, “The Role India Can Play in Halting Ukraine War,” The Times of India, November 9, 2022, https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/ukraine-peacemaker-india/articleshow/95410117.cms.
18 President of Ukraine, “Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit,” November 15, 2022, https://www.president.
gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yaksho-rosi-79141.
19 President of Ukraine, “Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” September 30, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/
news/mi-robimo-svij-viznachalnij-krok-pidpisuyuchi-zayavku-ukrayi-78173.
20 Paul Kirby, “Ukraine War: Russia Demands Annexations Recognised Before Talks,” BBC, December 2, 2022, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-63832151.
21 World Economic Forum, “Kissinger: These Are the Main Geopolitical Challenges Facing the World Right Now,” May 23,
2022, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/kissinger-these-are-the-main-geopolitical-challenges-facing-the-world-
right-now/.
22 Henry Kissinger, “How to Avoid Another World War,” The Spectator, December 17, 2022, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/
the-push-for-peace/.
23 Suhasini Haider, “Ukrainian President Zelenskyy Speaks to PM Modi About G20, Thanks India for Aid and UN Support,”
The Hindu, December 26, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ukraines-zelenskyy-seeks-indias-participation-in-
implementation-of-peace-plan-over-call-with-pm-modi/article66307716.ece.
24 Ajay Bisaria and Ankita Dutta, “Where is the Clamour for Getting Russia and Ukraine Off the Ramp?,” Observer Research
Foundation, November 5, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/where-is-the-clamour-for-getting-russia-and-
ukraine-off-the-ramp/.
25 Stanley Widianto, “G20 President Indonesia Seeks to Ease Crisis with Ukraine, Russia Visits,” Reuters, June 22, 2022, https://
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-president-push-peace-with-ukraine-russia-visits-minister-2022-06-22/.
26 “Ukraine War: Russia ‘Ready to Negotiate’ Claims Vladimir Putin,” Euronews, December 25, 2022, https://www.
euronews.com/2022/12/25/ukraine-war-russia-ready-to-negotiate-claims-vladimir-putin?utm_source=newsletter&utm_
medium=EN_TESTMay&utm_content=ukraine-war-russia-ready-to-negotiate-claims-vladimir-putin&_
ope=eyJndWlkIjoiYmY1NTMxOWUxMjQxZjhjZWFkZmFmM2IxNTg3MjJkNjQifQ%3D%3D.
27 “Russian Missiles Rain Down on Ukraine Towns on Christmas Day,” Euractiv, December 26, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/
section/global-europe/news/russian-missiles-rain-down-on-ukraine-towns-on-christmas-day/.
22About the Authors
Ajay Bisaria is a former civil servant who served as the High Commissioner of India to Canada from March 2020 to June 2022.
Ankita Dutta is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme.
Attribution: Ajay Bisaria and Ankita Dutta, “The Ukraine Conflict: Pathways to Peace,” ORF Special Report No. 207,
January 2023, Observer Research Foundation.
Cover image: Getty Images/ Kutay Tanir
Back cover image: Getty Images/Andriy Onufriyenko
23Ideas . Forums . Leadership . Impact 20, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area, New Delhi - 110 002, INDIA Ph. : +91-11-35332000. Fax : +91-11-35332005 E-mail: contactus@orfonline.org Website: www.orfonline.org
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