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Princeton Diplomatic
Invitational 2020
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)NATO PDI 2020
Contents
Contents.......................................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction to NATO ................................................................................................................ 3
Topic A: Russia Today ................................................................................................................. 5
Questions to Consider ................................................................................................................ 14
Bibliography A ............................................................................................................................. 15
Topic B: Counter-terrorism ....................................................................................................... 15
Questions to Consider ................................................................................................................ 27
Bibliography B ............................................................................................................................. 28
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Introduction to NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance
made up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established on
April 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s creation at the beginning of the
Cold War was an attempt at balancing power between the East and West. More specifically,
the rise of Soviet Union following WWII – and the widespread fear of the communism that
came without it, especially in Europe – necessitated some form of intergovernmental action
that would provide for the mutual protection of several allied nations in the North Atlantic.
As such, NATO’s primary purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members
through its most unique, enduring principle – the principle of collective defense.
In the North Atlantic Treaty, collective defense is established in Article 5, wherein it is
stated that “an armed attack against one or more [members]… shall be considered an attack
against them all.”1 However, Article 5 had never been formally invoked until the 9/11
terrorist attacks against the United States. In so doing, the North Atlantic Council – the
governing body of the organization – exhibited solidarity toward the US, as well as its power
to engage in collective action against counterterrorism. Among other things, this action
involved radar aircraft patrol, naval standing forces and efforts to “enhance intelligence-
sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies.”
The cooperation and sharing of NATO’s military assets follows both a civilian and a
military structure. Of the former, each member state has at its disposal a delegation of
permanent representatives, all of which are overseen by the NATO headquarters in Brussels.
1
"The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
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Of the latter, NATO military operations oversee forces placed under the organization’s
jurisdiction by individual member states, along with associated command and control
structures. These forces are available for NATO operations once they meet a specific set of
readiness criteria, as well as rules of deployment that vary from country to country.
In civilian and military matters alike, however, a consensus is taken by common consent.
Since 1949, this principle of consensus has existed at every committee level, meaning that
any “NATO decision” passed is an expression of the collective will of the 28 sovereign
states participating in the Alliance.2 This system is interesting politically – and rather
idiosyncratic on the international stage – seeing as consensus decision-making means there is
no voting within NATO. Consultations instead take place until a course of action that is
acceptable to all is agreed upon. Surprisingly, this negotiation process happens rapidly since
members consult each other on a regular basis. They often can anticipate each other's
positions as a result.
2
Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed
September 29, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.
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Topic A: Russia and NATO
NATO was originally established to balance power between the Soviet Union and North
Atlantic nations. This meant the mission of NATO was clear and simple, reflected in the
brevity of the original document.
The Founding Articles
NATO allies would come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack on a member state
under Article 53. The assumption was, from 1949 through 1991 that NATO would most
likely face off against the Warsaw Pact in an all-out combined arms land war in continental
Europe and the North Atlantic. During this period, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were
directly comparable. The United States and the Soviet Union provided the brunt of the
nuclear and conventional forces to their respective sides. Both possessed similar force sizes,
though the exact strategic doctrine, quality of troops and preferred tactics varied. The Soviet
Union was expected to use large armored formations to cross the famous Fulda Gap in
Germany and Western Europe. The assumption for NATO and the reality for the Warsaw
Pact was simple. NATO’s ally troops and forward deployed American forces would attempt
to hold off the Warsaw Pact for as long as possible before US reinforcements could arrive
over the Atlantic route.
In Limbo: the 1990s
In 1991, this situation changed. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated, leaving NATO without
its original mission. Since then, the threat has shifted to insurgencies in distant deserts. These
threats have been largely intangible, decentralized and highly variable. NATO has also
3
NATO, “Countering Terrorism.”
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expanded, adding many former Warsaw Pact states and even the former Baltic Soviet
Republics: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia4.
Russia Resurgent
This last point has not gone unnoticed by NATO’s eastern neighbor. Russia has since
2000 greatly modernized and expanded its military capability5. Russia in 2000 was suffering
from a top heavy command structure with too many senior officers, while vital high end
equipment atrophied and conscripts were unpaid. The situation has improved drastically.
Military reforms have increased the number of professional troops, new weapons projects,
started in the 1990s have been brought to fruition and tactics developed6. Russia now
possesses one of the most robust and competitive arms manufacturing industries, behind only
the United States in arms exports. The Russian military is capable of carrying out highly
coordinated operations close to home: as demonstrated in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in
2014. Capabilities for deployments abroad have also been greatly increased, as the Russian
intervention in the Syrian Civil War has proven decisive7. For all intents and purposes, Russia
is a world power, with a formidable military capability.
Force imbalance
Russia, for all its military capability is still a single nation, operating without a major
defensive alliance like NATO. Combined, NATO members possess a larger population,
economy and military force. The United States alone outguns Russia in every military metric,
at least on paper.
4
Joel R Hillison, “New NATO Members: Security Producers or Consumers.”
5
The Rand Corporatin, “What Will Russian Military Capabilities Look Like in the Future?”
6
The Rand Corporatin.
7
“Putin Announces Russian Troop Withdrawal from Syria during Visit.”
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This strategic situation is unique. An alliance of 29 members against a single large nation
creates special risks and opportunities for both sides. NATO is an alliance with varying
degrees of integration. Eastern members, closest to Russia possess limited military
capabilities, some still are heavily reliant on Soviet era equipment, while spending insufficient
sums on defense. Much of NATO’s present mission has been shifted to working on counter-
terrorism, with counter-Russian capabilities deteriorating. NATO has stepped in to fill gaps,
notably providing an international rotation of jet fighters to the three Baltic States (which do
not possess any combat aircraft of their own)8.
Russia meanwhile has largely worked to modernize its military for the position it finds
itself in. Russia is not the Soviet Union, neither in size, population or economy. It cannot
fight NATO directly in a prolonged conflict. In response, Russia’s economy and scientific
expertise has been leveraged to counter this NATO advantage.
On the military side: overlapping grids of anti-air and anti-ship missile coverage can
prevent NATO mobilizations and movements of troops and aircraft to the front lines.
Russian missile technology has recently produced highly accurate, effective cruise missiles like
the Kalibr family. Also in the news has been the S-400 air defense complex. This system is
regarded as among the best in the world for air defense, effective against stealth fighters,
enemy cruise missiles and even ballistic missiles9.
In the event of a war, NATO would need time to mobilize and bring its forces to bear
from the US and Western Europe. During this time, Russian troops could dig in to forward
positions and deploy their area denial systems. These would be more than a match for NATO
troops if fully deployed and could give Russia negotiating room.
8
Joel R Hillison, “New NATO Members: Security Producers or Consumers.”
9
Majumdar, “The S-400 for Formidable Air Defense.”
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On the economic side, Russian gas pipelines provide much of Europe’s natural gas, with
nations such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria 100% reliant on Russian gas imports.
Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Czechia and Austria are also highly dependent on Russia for their
energy needs. Outside of NATO, Ukraine has been hard hit by Russian gas supply cuts10.
In conclusion, while Russia is outmatched in military force, its advantages in mineral
resources can be leveraged in the event of a conflict as a force multiplier.
NATO overstep?
So far, this briefing has been from the NATO perspective. For many senior-level NATO
policy makers, particularly American military planners, the Russian Federation is a default
continuation of the Soviet Union. In other words, Russia picked up where the USSR left off.
The information above should be enough to provide credence that this is not entirely true. So
what’ are the criticisms of NATO?
NATO is by nature a defensive alliance. Russian grand strategy has, for centuries, been
about putting distance and buffer states between Moscow, Saint-Petersburg and the rest of
the Russian heartland and any potential invader. Invasions of Russia tend to be bloody affairs
and the suffering is borne by civilians, as was the case during the Mongol conquests,
Napoleonic Wars and Second World War. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the
enlargement of NATO, the Soviet Union’s former buffer was eroded11. Russian strategists
could quite reasonably could conclude that NATO is encircling Russia for an invasion. Even
if unlikely, the possibility of NATO directly bordering Russia means that strategies to stop
10
Polyakova, “Russia Is a Great Power Once Again.”
11
“Russian Mentality.”
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NATO expansion must be decisive. For Russian war planners, a lapse in judgement about
potential invasion is unacceptable.
This has been brought up as a likely explanation of the 2008 invasion of Georgia, when
the nation was in talks with NATO to join. The reasoning for invasion is simple. To join
NATO, a nation must possess full territorial integrity. During the 2008 war with Russia, the
Georgian breakaway regions of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia were officially recognized by
Russia and have received significant support since. The same can be said for the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions in Ukraine in the ongoing Ukrainian Civil War. Because of this, neither
Georgia nor Ukraine could join NATO at present.
However, given that Russia has only acted in response to NATO, is it possible that the
Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts have been reactive and not assertions of Russian power?
Showing the Imperial Flag
The Soviet Union was known for frequently deploying military forces around the
world, conducting visits in friendly socialist states with its navy and air force. The Soviet
submarine force even completed a global circumnavigation with a pair of nuclear submarines
in 196812. Also frequent, were incursion flights: where Soviet aircraft would fly close to
national borders. Most famous were the flights of Soviet nuclear capable Tupelov Tu-95
bombers close to the US border. Modern Russia has seemingly brought back the ports of call,
incursion flights and deployments of military hardware abroad for demonstrative purposes.
Russian bombers have visited Cape Town, Caracas and other locations, while the new
Admiral Gorshkov class frigate recently completed a long voyage across the world to various
ports of call.
12
Military History Journal, “USSR Report.”
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An American F-22 intercepts a Russian Tu-95 nuclear capable bomber off the Alaskan coast
A Russian Su-27 fighter intercepts an American B-52 nuclear capable bomber over the Baltic Sea
It is absolutely critical to know that the United States and NATO perform these exact
same actions. Conduct is almost always safe and professional, a test of capabilities for both
sides. No fatal incidents have occurred despite hundreds of intercepts over the past decade.
American bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft regularly fly close to Russian airspace.
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American carrier groups and air squadrons are permanently deployed abroad. This has not
gone unnoticed by Russian military officials, who point it out every time NATO accuses
Russia of aggressive behavior.
Cooperation
Despite their differences, NATO and Russia regularly cooperate. Both may send
representatives to view the other’s military exercises, a major sign of trust. Both have
denounced terrorism and are actively engaged in combatting it abroad. Russian and American
troops have a direct hotline for resolving crises in Syria and coordinate to avoid interfering or
hitting each other. The NATO-Russia Council exists to address mutual concerns like nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation.
NATO points of contention:
NATO has several major points of contention with Russian conduct. Chief among
them is the 2014 Crimea crisis, in which a largely unrecognized referendum voted that the
Crimean peninsula be reincorporated into Russia. Unmarked Russian soldiers, known as little
green men guaranteed that Crimea was held, easily expelling Ukrainian security forces.
The NATO response was fairly quick. France cancelled Russia’s contract for a pair of
Mistral class landing helicopter docks (warships sorely needed by the Russian Navy). The
European Union and United States enacted heavy economic sanctions13.
Also contentious has been the Russian military deployment to Syria, which has largely
reversed the course of the war since 2015. This is particularly critical as NATO formerly
operated with impunity in conflict zones during the collapse of Yugoslavia and in Iraq,
without needing to consider other Great Powers being involved.
13
BBC, “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline - BBC News.”
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The other major issue for NATO is Russian influence on member policies. As
mentioned, Russian gas supply directly affects NATO members and their stance on further
sanctions. Germany in particular has been noted as being less willing to place sanctions on
Russia due to its high reliance on imported gas. Meanwhile the Russian government has been
accused of conducting informational warfare and influencing the media narrative through
doctored news articles and other methods.
Russian points of contention:
While Russia is not represented in this committee, the Russian point of view must be
understood if relations are to improve.
The major issue for Russia has been the same since 1991. Russia has warned against
NATO expansion into the former Warsaw Pact and other Eastern European states. In 1990,
the last Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev was given the reassurance that after
Germany was unified, there would be “not one step east”. The Eastern bloc states would
remain as the buffer Russian strategists considered essential to national security.
Even with this overstep, Putin himself is quoted as considering the NATO campaign
against Yugoslavia as the starting point for souring relations. NATO stepping into the
Russian sphere of influence and ignoring Russian interests is a critical point of contention.
Also contentious is the Ukrainian security situation. Ukraine has historically been seen
as the “little brother” of Russia, with their two destinies tied by politics. Ukraine in recent
years has been less than favorable towards this view, moving towards EU integration and
cooperation with NATO. The United States considers Ukraine to be an official ally.
Central to the Ukraine crisis is the Crimean peninsula, considered essential to Russian
national security. Crimea is home to both a Russian ethnic majority and the Sevastopol naval
base, home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This is a critical base for Russian interests in the
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Middle East and Mediterranean regions14. The Black Sea Fleet is considered as a critical
vanguard covering Russia’s southern flank.
In summary, Russia wishes to be viewed as a Great Power and have its security
interests respected rather than denounced. It is up to this committee what steps to take next.
Going forward:
Russia is not opposed to strategic cooperation. Above the Arctic Circle, in space and
in the realm of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation, Russia is fully willing, able and has
cooperated with the United States and other NATO members.
Any discussion will need to take into account the interests of Russia, NATO’s Eastern
European partners and the United States. Russia is part of the European community and
despite sanctions still engages in trade, sends students and workers abroad. Whether or not
rapprochement will be reached, NATO partners must consider opening discussion on key
issues and engaging Russia where discussion can be productive. Rather than denouncing
Russia as a revisionist state, NATO members could consider discussion on nuclear and
conventional arms deployment limitations as well as better linking the two entities’ counter-
terrorism efforts. Both sides stand to gain from cooperation and effective de-escalation of
tensions. Neither Russia nor any NATO member wishes to return to the Cold War state of
constant fear.
14
“2018 Russia Military Strength.”
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Key Terms
Area Denial
Force Multipliers
Article V/Collective Defence
Cyber Warfare/Propaganda
Great Powers
The Status quo
Russian gas exports
Nuclear disarmnament
Crimea
The Black Sea Fleet
Questions to Consider
How should propaganda and cyber warfare be thwarted on an international scale?
What should be done with Crimea if it is unrealistic that Russia will ever give it up
peacefully?
Should Ukraine ever be considered for NATO membership?
Should the United States be involved in European affairs with Russia at all?
What readiness action plans can be put into effect during ‘peacetime’ or proxy wars, if
at all?
How should NATO utilize its standing forces/other military means in relation to the
Baltics and the Eastern flank in response to new Russian weapons systems?
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Consider revisiting the North Atlantic Treaty once more. What changes could be made
to the existing institutional framework of the Alliance to better adapt it to the present
relationship with Russia?
Bibliography A
“2018 Russia Military Strength.” Accessed January 23, 2019.
https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
detail.asp?country_id=russia.
BBC. “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline - BBC News,” November 13, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
Joel R Hillison. “New NATO Members: Security Producers or Consumers.” Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, January 4, 2009.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11539?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&sear
chText=nato&searchText=free&searchText=riders&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBas
icSearch%3FQuery%3Dnato%2Bfree%2Briders&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-
4929%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A5ecfb83253dee5354a8a23be07751d18&seq
=9#metadata_info_tab_contents.
Majumdar, Sayan. “The S-400 for Formidable Air Defense.” Vay Aerospace and Defence
Review, no. 4 (August 2018): 41–43.
Military History Journal. “USSR Report.” Springfield VA: US Department of Commerce, August
15, 1986. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a359706.pdf.
NATO. “Countering Terrorism.” Multinational Organization. North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, October 12, 2019.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.
Polyakova, Alina. “Russia Is a Great Power Once Again.” The Atlantic, February 26, 2018.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/russia-syria-putin-
assad-trump-isis-ghouta/554270/.
BBC. “Putin Announces Russian Troop Withdrawal from Syria during Visit,” December 11,
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42307365.
PravdaReport. “Russian Mentality: Uncertainty and Fatalism,” March 26, 2002.
http://www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/26-03-2002/36195-0/.
The Rand Corporatin. “What Will Russian Military Capabilities Look Like in the Future?” The
Rand Corporation, June 18, 2019.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10038.html.
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Topic B: Counter-terrorism
Introduction
Countering terrorism is, and always has been, an enduring security priority for NATO
and its constituent nations. From the 1972 hostage situation at the Olympic Games in
Munich, to the infamous Lockerbie attack that killed over 200, terrorism has remained
embedded in the psyche of the western world.15 However, although the intimidating specter
of terrorism has always remained a constant, such cannot be said for the the structure, tactics,
and goals of the organizations that perpetrate terrorism. In the past two decades, the nature
of terrorism has evolved dramatically. Modern terrorist organizations are decentralized,
diffuse, and play by a different set a rules than those of the 20th and early 21st centuries. In
order to combat these emergent threats, NATO will need to entirely rethink the way it
approaches terrorism. The organization will need to develop a different set of principles and
strategies to ensure that NATO remains a relevant and effective security coalition for years to
come.
History of Terrorism
The word terrorism dates back to the mid-18th century, when Maxmilien Robespierre
instigated a “Reign of Terror” immediately following the French revolution. Robespierre
believed in the use of terrorism as a way to carry out dramatic societal reforms.16 This idea of
using violence as a form of ideological control was novel at the time, and laid the basis for the
modern conception of terrorism.
15Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Pan Am flight 103 disaster", accessed October 01, 2016,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Pan-Am-flight-103-disaster.
16
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However, terrorism under Robespierre’s formulation is carried out by a state actor,
whereas modern perpetrators of terrorism are overwhelmingly non-state actors. This
transition from state to non-state actors did not occur until the mid 20th century, when ethnic
nationalism, combined with the rejection of European colonialism and the rise of differing
ideologies such as communism led to the increasing use of guerilla tactics and other forms of
rebellious violence. For example, the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) employed
terrorist tactics in Turkey in an attempt form an independent Kurdish State. The Irish
Republican Army (IRA) carried out bombing and assassinations in Ireland with the purpose
of separating from Great Britain, and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers used suicide bombings
to wage an ethnic war against the incumbent Sri Lankan government.17 It was clear that
terrorism had evolved beyond its roots in the 18th century. It had become an instrument for
political usurpation; no longer a tool to be used by the state, but rather a tool to be used
against it.
Terrorism took on another new dimension with the advent of mass-air travel in the
mid-19th century. The 1960’s saw the rise of new forms of terrorism such as hijackings,
airplane bombings, and attacks on foreign territory. Terrorist organizations were no longer
relegated to the domestic affairs of any individual country: their attacks were often carried out
overseas, and with motivations that transcended national boundaries. The infamous Munich
Massacre encapsulated this transformation perfectly. In the midst of the 1972 Munich
Olympic Games the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September infiltrated the
Olympic village, taking nine Israeli hostages.18 The terrorists demanded the release of a
17Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Irish Republican Army (IRA)", accessed October 01, 2016,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army.
18 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016,
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291
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number of Palestinian political prisoners, and when their demands were not met, proceeded
to massacre all of the Israeli hostages. Many contend that the German police, unprepared and
ill-equipped to properly handle a terrorist situation, committed a number of tactical blunders
that directly led to the tragic ending of the standoff.19
The tragedy of the 1972 Munich Olympics was a watershed moment for the
international community. First, the massacre served as a reminder that terrorism had become
a truly global phenomenon. Terrorists now had the capabilities to make dramatic and
symbolic statements on the most prominent of global stages. It wasn’t until the Munich
Massacre that the world regarded terrorist attacks as theatrical or dramatic in nature, and this
shift in perspective would set the precedent for future high-profile attacks such as the 1988
Lockerbie bombing and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. But the
19 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September
30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm
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Munich Olympics didn’t just highlight the rapidly evolving capabilities of terrorist
organizations, it also revealed how ill-prepared the international community was to check
these new capabilities. The words “counter-terrorism” and “international terrorism” were
never in the political lexicon of the United States until the Munich Massacre.20 Germany
lacked an official counterterrorism unit at the time of the Munich Massacre, and its local
police forces were woefully underprepared to face a terrorist threat. The massacre directly led
to the creation of an official German counterterrorism agency: GSG-9, and other countries
quickly followed suit.21 The late 20th century was when countries started taking the terrorist
threat seriously- as not just isolated domestic guerillas, but as ideologically motivated and
dangerously capable transnational organizations.
Throughout this dramatic evolution of terrorism, NATO had remained relatively
stagnant. Even as the terrorism threat further evolved at the turn of the century to include
religiously motivated groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, the organization was sluggish
to respond. In 1999, NATO adopted a strategic concept that identified terrorism as a risk
affecting its member nations. However, no formal measures to combat terrorism were agreed
upon at the summit.
Counter-terrorism momentum picked up in the organization after the September 11
attacks on the United States. In the days following the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 –its
mutual defense clause- for the first time in its history. Under Article 5, any attack on a NATO
member is an attack on the entire alliance, compelling the entire coalition to come to the
assistance of the United States through security operations such as Operation Eagle Assist and
20 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September
30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm
21 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016,
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291
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Operation Active Endeavor.22 In 2002, NATO adopted the “Prague Package”, aimed at “adapting
NATO to the challenge of international terrorism”. The package adopted four pillars that
constituted NATO’s comprehensive response to the emerging threat of terrorism: anti-
terrorism (reducing the vulnerability of civil and military elements to terrorist attacks),
offensive counter-terrorism, consequence management, and military cooperation. Subsequent
summits have served to reinforce these themes. For example, in 2004 NATO launched the
Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) initiative, which utilized technology in helping NATO
develop countermeasures for asymmetric terrorist threats.
The evolution of terrorism did not stop at the conclusion of the 20th century. The
terrorist threat continues to evolve today, and has taken on a number of unique
characteristics that did not exist in the 9/11 era.
First and foremost, the balance of power between the major Islamist terrorist
organizations has changed dramatically. Fourteen years ago, al Qaeda was the “undisputed
heavyweight among jihadist groups”. Now however, the organization faces increasing
competition from groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Hezbollah. In
2014, al Qaeda released a video lecture that railed against ISIS, claiming that they do not
acknowledge ISIS’ Caliphate as the true Caliphate of Islam.23 This very fact that this video
was made demonstrates the dynamic between the jihadist organizations has shifted: al Qaeda
is being put on the defensive, while ISIS is becoming recognized as the primary jihadist
organization.
22 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and
Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016,
http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-
The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf
23 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10,
2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/
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Map of ISIS’ Territorial Holdings in 2016
Tangentially related to ISIS’ rise to prominence is the fact that in its heyday
(2014/2015), it organized itself into a de-facto state entity. Though the Taliban, Al-Shabaab,
and al Qaeda have historically controlled limited swaths of territory in the Middle East, none
have controlled as much land, and administered it in the organized and institutionalized way
that ISIS did at its peak. Within its territory, ISIS provided utilities, basic social services,
courts, and enforces the rule of law.24 Though the international community largely refused to
recognize ISIS as a state, for all intents and purposes, the group was indeed running one.
This behavior marked a substantial departure from the terrorist organizations of the 20th
century, which were predominantly non-state actors, and provided ISIS several key
24 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed
September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism
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advantages. Nick Rasmussen of the United States National Counterterrorism Center
contended that ISIS’ creation of a de-facto state provided it the necessary ingredients to
develop substantial “external operations capability”. The creation of a state provided a “save-
haven” for terrorists and provides them with valuable manpower and financial resources.
Fortunately for NATO, ISIS was beaten back from 2015 onwards, and it lost its capital of
Raqqa in 2017. In November 2017, ISIS’s last Syrian and Iraqi landholdings were captured by
other forces. Still, the existence of de-facto terrorist states (albeit at a much smaller scale) in
other unstable parts of the world (especially parts of Afghanistan and Yemen) means that
terrorists continue to have deeply-entrenched bases for planning overseas attacks. Developing
proper countermeasures to meet the enhanced capabilities of a state-based terrorist
organization will be of crucial importance for NATO.
The basic structure of the terrorist organization has changed as well. Once highly
centralized and hierarchical, the chain of command has become highly diffuse and
decentralized.25 For example, from an operational standpoint, ISIS operates not as one
coordinated body, but as a series of independent nodes. These nodes are self-financing, self-
directed, and granted a large degree of autonomy by ISIS’ governing body.26 This allows
individual operations to be conducted across the broad swath of ISIS territory at an
alarmingly fast pace. It also makes ISIS particularly difficult to destabilize, as eliminating a
high-level official in a “decapitation strike,” or degrading the capabilities of one node leaves
the rest of the organization completely unaffected. This decentralized system of authority
allows ISIS to be flexible, adaptable, and resilient to the sustained counterterrorism efforts of
25McChrystal, Stanley. “Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World”, Print. May 12,
2015. Accessed September 29, 2016.
26 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed
September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism
22NATO PDI 2020
the international community. Other terrorist organizations, like Al-Qaeda, have also begun
adopting these tactics as their leaders have become increasingly vulnerable to US drone
strikes. Indeed, despite the 2011 assassination of Osama bin Laden and the 2019 killing of
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in addition to countless other strikes against top terrorists, groups like
ISIS and al-Qaeda remain stubbornly dangerous. NATO will need to evolve new strategies to
help address the challenges of combatting these decentralized leadership structures.
Also worthy of note is the evolving nature of terrorist attacks against NATO member
nations. The previously discussed attacks of the late 20th and early 21st centuries all involved a
substantial amount of planning and coordination. Bombings and strikes against major targets
like the Olympics required substantial funding, leadership, and advance preparation.
However, in response to the comprehensive counterterrorism security measures mandated by
NATO agreements, such as the “Prague Package,” terrorist organizations have been forced to
evolve. In recent years, they have become less reliant on highly-coordinated attacks such as
Lockerbie and 9/11, and more dependent on so-called “inspired” or “lone-wolf attacks”.27
ISIS in particular makes extensive use of social media to encourage overseas converts to
conduct their own homegrown attacks. The transition towards using these attacks has
significant implications for the nature of terrorism: attacks are now far more frequent and less
spectacular. ISIS is now able to leverage media channels to inspire self-radicalized people
from all over the western world.28
Weapons have shifted from complex bombs and military weaponry towards simple
everyday tools like rental trucks, knives, and commercially-available firearms. The targets of
these attacks have changed as well. Instead of going after highly-guarded places like airplanes
27Ibid
28Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10,
2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/
23NATO PDI 2020
and skyscrapers, these “inspired” radicals often target street fairs or even just crowded
sidewalks. Admittedly, these new attacks do not net anywhere near the death toll of a
bombing or hijacking, but they are frequent and extremely difficult for national intelligence
services to anticipate. Nick Rasmussen believes that these evolving tactics provide law
enforcement “far less time to disrupt or mitigate potential plots”, and this presents a great
challenge for NATO’s future anti-terrorism efforts.29
NATO has also identified a number of emerging threats posed by terrorist
organizations. In a report prepared by the Assistant Secretary-General, NATO identified
several areas of global infrastructure and development that it believes will become key
terrorist objectives in the future. For example, NATO believes that the rising demand of
strategic resources such as energy will compel terrorist organizations to disrupt or seize
control of such infrastructure.30 NATO also believes that shipping lanes, particularly narrow
bottleneck straits such as The Strait of Malacca will also become high-value targets for
terrorists.31
Beyond the social media capabilities of organizations such as ISIS, NATO also
believes that terrorist organizations are looking into more advanced forms of technological
warfare. Namely, NATO believes that cyber-terrorism and cyber-attacks could fit in
extremely well with the “strategic-level objectives of terrorists”.32 Though it is currently
estimated that terrorists do not have the capabilities to conduct large-scale cyberattacks as of
29 Gordon, Phillip H, “NATO’s Growing Role in the Middle East.” The Brookings Institution, March 1, 2006,
accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-growing-role-in-the-greater-middle-
east/
30 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and
Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016,
http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-
The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf
31 Ibid
32 Ibid
24NATO PDI 2020
yet, this situation may quickly change in the future as terrorist organizations develop more
advanced technological capabilities.
Though a comprehensive NATO framework for meeting these evolving threats has
yet to be developed, nearly all agree that any course of action must involve the organization
evolving beyond its original mission as a reactive security coalition. The NATO Assistant
Secretary-General noted that in order to afford its member states credible and effective
protection, the organization must become “more of a team player”.33 This means that NATO
must transform from a defense alliance into a “multi-faceted security organization”.34 It
cannot sit idly waiting for one of its member nation to be attacked, it must take proactive
steps to ensure that such an attack is never allowed to happen in the first place. This may
include initiatives such as intelligence sharing, multilateral consultations, preventative social
programs, and coordinating with other international partners or coalitions.
Country Policy
Economically Advanced Western Democracies (e.g. France, United States, U.K.)
With substantial economic and political clout, these countries are at the forefront of NATO,
and as such are prime targets for potential terrorist attacks. From the Pulse shooting in
Orlando, to the truck massacre in Nice, France, the most high-profile attacks are often
perpetrated against these countries. Hence, this bloc of highly developed countries would be
more willing to commit significant financial resources in evolving NATO’s capabilities and
developing it into a proactive security-based organization.
33 Ibid
34 Ibid
25NATO PDI 2020
Eastern European and Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, etc.)
Most of these countries were former members of the Warsaw Pact, and many suffer from
chronic economic and political instability. It is important to consider that though
transitioning NATO into a more proactive organization would likely have security-related
benefits, it would also be expensive, dramatically expand the organization, and mandate
certain actions that might be seen as compromising national sovereignty, such as intelligence
sharing. Because high-profile terrorist attacks seldom occur in these Eastern European
countries, they may be less willing to transition the organization into an enhanced security
partnership.
Key Terms
Terrorism
Decentralization
“Lone-wolf” attacks
Al-Qaeda
Hezbollah
ISIS
Taliban
Article 5
Prague Package
Defense Against Terrorism (DAT)
Assymetric warfare
26NATO PDI 2020
Questions to Consider
In what ways has terrorism evolved since the 20th century?
The United States has set a precedent for invoking Article 5 in the event of a terrorist
attack, even if it is perpetrated by a non-state actor. Should this precedent continue?
What are some of the specific terrorism-related policy proposals that NATO adopted
after the September 11 attacks? How effective have they been?
Can you anticipate other valuable strategic targets that terrorists may be inclined to
attack in the future?
How will terrorism capabilities evolve in the future? Where will they be at five years
from now? Ten years? How can NATO best anticipate and meet these enhanced
capabilities?
Should every country maintain a specialized counterterrorism police force?
How can NATO best degrade the capabilities of decentralized and diffuse
organizations such as ISIS?
Should NATO evolve into a proactive security-based coalition? What competing
factors are at play, and how do these factors align with the priorities of your country?
Which non-NATO countries would be strategically valuable for NATO to work with?
27NATO PDI 2020
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