Achievements and Limitations of the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 3/2021
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3/2021
Achievements and Limitations of the
OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine
—
Andreas Umland
UI Reports on Human Rights and Security in Eastern Europ e No. 3
PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE
This report is published by the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at The Swedish Institute of International Affairs The Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs is an independent Centre, funded by the Swedish Government, established in 2021. The Centre conducts policy relevant analysis on Russia and Eastern Europe and serves as a platform and meeting place for national and international discussions and exchanges on Russia and Eastern Europe. Andreas Umland Research Fellow at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at UI. This is the third publication in a series of UI Reports focusing on human rights and security in Eastern Europe. © 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Photo: AP/TT Nyhetsbyrån
Executive Summary Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations have struggled to fulfil the high hopes placed in them as backbones of a new rules-based world order, in particular the vision of an inclusive and peaceful European security order based on the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine has become a critical instrument of multilateral attempts to observe, manage and eventually resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the eastern Donbas since 2014. This report briefly illustrates how this conflict has posed an especially complicated challenge to consensus-based intergovernmental institutions such as the OSCE, which have become increasingly characterized by internal normative divergences. Russian obstruction and the inability of the OSCE to properly define and label the confrontation an armed interstate conflict between two of its participating states have resulted in serious limitations on what a mission such as the SMM can achieve. Despite the limits placed on it by Moscow’s constraints and the lack of sufficient resources, the SMM has contributed significantly to de-escalation in the Donbas. Among other things, the SMM has preserved a notable presence on the spot, improved its reporting on the situation in the conflict zone and employed increasingly sophisticated monitoring methodologies and technologies. Nonetheless, the report recommends a number of further improvements to increase the SMM’s effectiveness, and thereby facilitate an eventual solution to the conflict. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Introduction The Mandate and Role of the
SMM in the Minsk Negotiations
Since 2014, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been
Established even before the outbreak of the
playing a central role in attempts to resolve
first armed confrontations in the Donbas in
of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the
mid-April 2014, the OSCE SMM is the only
Donets’ Basin (Donbas), above all by virtue
international monitoring group permanently
of its especially large and sophisticated
deployed not only to the conflict area, but
Special Monitoring Mission (SMM). The
throughout Ukraine. The Mission has had
OSCE is also the crucial mediator at the
only limited ground access to critical areas
negotiation table of the Trilateral Contact
of the de facto occupied, non-government-
Group (TCG), which until recently had been
controlled territories (see below) and has
meeting in Minsk. The OSCE Chairperson-in-
occasionally also been constrained in its
Office sends, and provides the mandate for,
access to certain installations in the
a Special Representative to the TCG, which
government-controlled areas.2 Nonetheless,
comprises Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE.
it is by far the most important international
actor on the ground, and acquired this
In collaboration with the Normandy Four
position early on. The first monitors were
Format (which is not dealt with in detail
deployed less than 24 hours after a
here), the OSCE sets the dominant
consensual decision by all the OSCE
institutional context, among other things
participating states to establish the SMM on
through its Permanent Council, for
21 March 2014.3
multilateral attempts to resolve the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine. Certain
According to the Mission’s original and, as of
relatively new technologies in the context of
May 2021, still valid mandate, its aim is “to
such a mission, such as unmanned aerial
contribute ... to reducing tensions and
vehicles (UAVs), satellites and long-range
fostering peace, stability and security; and
cameras, have been used on an unusually
to monitoring and supporting the
large scale in Ukraine, making the SMM the
implementation of all OSCE principles and
world’s leading operation of its type. Against
commitments”.4 The SMM has an annual
this backdrop, inferences drawn from the
budget of over €100 million, which in OSCE
Ukrainian case have wider implications for
terms is a significant amount. The entire
civilian missions by international
OSCE Unified Budget, which excludes the
organizations elsewhere.1
SMM, in 2019, for instance, was
€138,204,100. Nonetheless, the SMM is still
1 Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov and Ewa Mahr, “Learning https://dt.ua/SOCIUM/osin-pikuzi-inshiy-svit-
to Deploy Civilian Capabilities: How the United 259076_.html (accessed 1 October 2019).
Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in 3 Johan Engvall, “OSCE and Military-Confidence
Europe and European Union Have Changed Their Crisis Building in Conflicts: Lessons from Georgia and
Management Institutions,” Cooperation and Conflict, Ukraine,” FOI Report, no. 4750 (2019), p. 40.
vol. 54, no. 4 (2019), pp. 524-543. 4 “Permanent Council Decision No. 1117,” OSCE, 21
2 Alexander Hug, "Pikuzy: koly zblyzhennia tilky March 2014, https://www.osce.org/pc/116747
viddaliaie," Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 3 November 2017, (accessed 4 April 2020).
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 4a comparatively cheap operation in patrolling along the contact line to
comparison with many United Nations asphalted streets. Since the start of armed
peacekeeping operations. The SMM has in hostilities, the dilemma for the SMM’s
recent years had approximately 1,300 staff management team has been to try to strike
members, among whom more than 700 are a balance between maximum access and
monitors who not only observe forward-leaning operations, on the one
developments on the spot, but also work to hand, and full security for its monitors on
reduce tensions within the ongoing conflict.5 the ground, on the other. Russia obviously
wants a constrained and tame Mission that
The nature and shape of the SMM differs operates and reports in a way that fits – or
from previous and other currently operating at least does not undermine – its “civil war”
OSCE missions. A former member of the narrative on the Donbas conflict.8
SMM, Hilde Haug has, among other things,
highlighted that “it was the first time that The SMM is thus only partly comparable to
the OSCE deployed a civilian field mission of some former operations in the Western
this scope that would come to work in a Balkans, such as the OSCE Kosovo
high-risk environment in an active conflict Verification Mission or the OSCE Task Force
stage”.6 By early 2020, for instance, more for Kosovo. Together with the OSCE Project
than 260 civilians had been killed by Coordinator in Ukraine and the OSCE
landmines along the so-called contact line. Observer Mission at the Russian Federation
In 2017, the SMM medic Joseph Stone was checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk,9 the SMM
killed while on patrol “when an SMM in Ukraine constitutes an especially heavy
armored vehicle was struck by an explosion, presence of the OSCE in an active conflict
most likely caused by an anti-tank mine in a location. It is, moreover, monitoring a
non-government-controlled area near currently low-intensity and delegated, but
Pryshyb in the Luhansk region”.7 still frightening, interstate war between
Europe’s territorially two largest states.10
After this incident, the SMM began to
further limit its already constrained
5 “Factsheet: What is the OSCE?” OSCE, 19 September 7 “OSCE SMM Chief Monitor Çevik pays tribute to
2019, https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet SMM medic who died in the cause of peace,” OSCE, 23
(accessed 4 April 2020). April 2020, https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-
6 Hilde Katrine Haug, “The Minsk Agreements and the mission-to-ukraine/450589 (accessed 2 May 2021).
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission: Providing Effective 8 Jakob Hauter, ed., Civil War? Interstate War? Hybrid
Monitoring for the Ceasefire Regime,” Security and War? Dimensions and Interpretations of the Donbas
Human Rights, vol. 27, nos. 3-4 (2016), pp. 342-357, Conflict in 2014-2020 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2021).
here p. 343. Also quoted in: André Härtel, Anton 9 Donetsk is a Russian town on the border with
Pisarenko and Andreas Umland, “The OSCE’s Special Ukraine and should not be confused with the
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: The SMM’s Work in Ukrainian Donbas city of the same name, which is the
the Donbas and Its Ukrainian Critique in 2014–2019,” capital of Donets’ka oblast’. The OSCE monitors are, in
Security and Human Rights, vol. 32 (2021), Russia’s Donetsk, observing Russian-Ukrainian border
forthcoming. This article is partly reproduced here and traffic at one checkpoint (and in Gukovo at another
lists most of the previously published analytical as well one).
as some first academic papers on the SMM, in its 10
Jakob Hauter, “Delegated Interstate War:
footnotes. Introducing an Addition to Armed Conflict
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 5Russia, moreover, has the world’s largest moderator/coordinator of the TCG Working
arsenal of nuclear warheads while Ukraine Group on Security Issues.
no longer has any nuclear weapons. Ukraine
had for a short period in the early 1990s The TCG meetings are conducted in the
been the world’s third largest nuclear- semi-official presence of representatives of
weapon state. Under pressure from both what are termed “certain areas of the
Washington and Moscow, Kyiv gave up its Donets’k Oblast’” (CADO) and “certain areas
entire atomic arsenal in exchange for of the Luhans’k Oblast” (CALO), or, as the
explicit security assurances provided at a Moscow-controlled pseudo-states label
Conference on Security and Cooperation in themselves and are known in Russia, the
Europe summit in Budapest in December “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the
1994 (when the CSCE was renamed into “Lugansk People’s Republic” (DNR/LNR).
OSCE). These assurances were provided by
the three depositary states of the 1968 The negotiations are based on Minsk-1 (the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Minsk Protocol) and Minsk-2 (the “Package
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) – of Measures”), two agreements signed by
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom Ukraine’s representative, former President
and United States – as well as, in separate Leonid Kuchma; Russia’s representative,
statements, by the two other official then Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail
nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, China Zurabov; and Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini of
and France.11 Finally, it is sometimes Switzerland on 5 September 2014 and 12
forgotten that Ukraine is home to Europe’s February 2015, respectively. However, the
largest nuclear power plant, in the south- Minsk-2 Package of Measures was de facto
eastern Zaporishshs’ka oblast’, negotiated by the presidents of Ukraine,
approximately 250 km from the current Russia and France, as well as by Germany’s
combat zone. Federal Chancellor within what became
known as the Normandy Format.
The Mission is part and parcel of the OSCE’s
role as an intermediary between Kyiv and Although the Normandy Four meetings were
Moscow in what in Ukraine is often called independent and had no formal mandate to
the Minsk process—a phrase that is actually task the OSCE, the documents emanating
reserved in internal OSCE parlance for from them – somewhat paradoxically –
another negotiation format concerning mention the OSCE prominently. The second
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Donbas-related and fourth points of the Minsk Protocol
Minsk format began in the early autumn of assign the OSCE the task of monitoring the
2014 and brings together Ukraine, Russia ceasefire and the Russian-Ukrainian
and the OSCE in the above-mentioned TCG. border.12 Minsk-2 mentions the OSCE in its
The SMM Chief Monitor is also the second, third and tenth points, in
Typologies,” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 12, no. 4 Schmies, ed., NATO’s Enlargement and Russia: A
(2019), pp. 90-103. Strategic Challenge in the Past and Future (Stuttgart:
11 Mariana Budjeryn and Andreas Umland, “Damage ibidem-Verlag, 2021), pp. 177-189.
Control: The Breach of the Budapest Memorandum 12 “Protokol po itogam Trekhstoronnei kontaktnoi
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” in: Oxana gruppy otnositel’no sovmestnykh shagov,
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 6connection with the issues of monitoring the SMM was accompanied by an
withdrawal of heavy weapons from, a “Interpretative Statement” by Moscow that
ceasefire in and the demilitarization of the violated some of the basic principles of the
conflict zone.13 The arcane terminology that Organization—the territorial integrity and
has evolved for diplomatic communications the political sovereignty of participating
on the conflict, as well as the legally states:
ambivalent status of the Minsk accords and In joining the consensus regarding the
Normandy Four in relation to the OSCE, can draft decision of the Permanent Council
be seen as illustrations that for the Kremlin, on the deployment of an OSCE Special
these negotiations, their peculiar format Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the
and documents – including their definitions Russian Federation proceeds from the
of the parties to the Donbas conflict – are assumption that the geographical area
part and parcel of Russia’s hybrid aggression of deployment and activities of the
against Ukraine.14 mission in question is strictly limited by
the parameters of the mandate as
adopted today, which reflects the
political and legal realities existing since
Challenges to and Discussions of 21 March 2014 as a result of the fact
that the Republic of Crimea and
the SMM’s Mandate
Sevastopol have become an integral
part of the Russian Federation.15
The nature, competencies and reach of the
In response, Ukraine, the United States and
OSCE SMM to Ukraine have been at the
Canada published their own official
centre of a seven-year long contestation.
Interpretive Statements, remarking that
The monitoring mandate – unchanged since
Crimea is Ukrainian territory and that the
2014 – formally covers the entire territory of
SMM should therefore have access to the
Ukraine. However, since Russia no longer
peninsula.16 The European Union (EU) issued
considers the Crimea peninsula to be
no such additional note, a notable European
Ukrainian territory, Moscow made it clear
failure that was apparently due to a lack of
from the start of the Mission that the SMM
agreement on the issue among the EU
will not be given access to Crimea. The
member states.
OSCE’s original decision to establish the
napravlennykh na implementatsiiu Mirnogo plana _Agreements (accessed 21 May 2021); Mark Galeotti,
Prezidenta Ukrainy P. Poroshenko i initsiativ “The Minsk Accords: Should Britain Declare Them
Prezidenta Rossii V. Putina,” OSCE, 5 September 2014, Dead?” Britain’s World, 24 May 2021,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/a/123258. www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/the-minsk-
pdf (accessed 5 October 2020). accords-should-britain-declare-them-dead/ (accessed
13 “Kompleks mer po vypolneniiu Minskikh 21 May 2021).
soglashenii,” OSCE, 12 February 2015, 15 Organization for Security and Co-operation in
https://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221 (accessed 5 Europe Permanent Council, “Decision No. 1117:
October 2019). Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
14 Andreas Umland, “Why the EU Should Decouple Ukraine,” OSCE, 21 March 2014,
Sanctions Against Russia from the Minsk Agreements,” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/6/116747.
Harvard International Review, 15 July 2016, pdf (accessed 15 May 2021).
www.academia.edu/27014352/Why_the_EU_Should_ 16
Ibid.
Decouple_Sanctions_Against_Russia_from_the_Minsk
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 7The Mission therefore has a significant restrictions were recorded at
presence, with hubs and forward patrol checkpoints of the armed formations
bases, only on Ukraine’s mainland (in the along official crossing routes on the
contact line, preventing the SMM from
Donbas there were 578 monitors in the
crossing it during patrolling. The
spring of 2021) and to a lesser extent in Kyiv,
Mission was also prevented from
where it has a head office, and the cities of
moving between non-government-
Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivs’k, Kharkiv, controlled areas of Donets’k and
Kherson, L’viv, and Odesa (187 monitors as Luhans’k regions almost entirely. The
of the spring of 2021). In this connection, SMM's monitoring of border areas
the SMM has been occasionally also asked beyond government control continued
to observe situations unrelated to the to be systematically limited due to
Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In late 2020, for restrictions to the Mission's access both
instance, Hungary publicly demanded the in the areas and on the routes leading
towards them. As a consequence, the
involvement of the SMM in the monitoring
Mission's observations in such border
of a tense situation in some settlements of
areas could again not be fully
the Hungarian minority in western Ukraine’s
categorized as comprehensive and
Transcarpathian region.17 With its strident independent monitoring. […] SMM
rhetoric and largely unfounded accusations unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
against Kyiv, Budapest has been implicitly continued to be subjected to GPS signal
supporting the official Russian narrative that interference and gunfire, which limited
ethnic tensions within Ukraine and the the SMM's monitoring and put Mission
nationalist policies of Kyiv have led to an members and technological assets at
allegedly “civil” war in the Donbas. risk. Despite repeated requests by the
Mission and the raising of the issue by
the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and the
The major problem of the SMM, however, is
SMM Chief Monitor at the OSCE
that, in spite of its mandate and clear task to
Permanent Council (PC), these
monitor the entire Donbas conflict zone, the restrictions were not eased and
SMM still has incomplete access to large problems remained throughout the
parts of the CADO/CALO. In an April 2021 entire reporting period. Failure to
report, the OSCE complained about the remove mines, unexploded ordnance
limitations on the movement of the SMM: (UXO) and other explosive objects, and
the laying of new ones, also continued
Almost all restrictions (93 per cent)
to restrict the Mission's freedom of
occurred in non-government-controlled
movement. Furthermore, the SMM also
areas [i.e. the occupied and de facto
continued to face impediments in
Moscow-ruled territories of Ukraine’s
establishing and reporting facts
eastern Donets’ Basin]. Half of the
following specific incidents and reports
17 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “‘Outrageous and meeting/ (accessed 27 May 2021); “Statement by the
Unacceptable’: Hungarian Foreign Minister on the Delegation of Ukraine in Response to the Current
Situation in the Transcarpathian Region,” Security and Issue Raised by the Delegation of Hungary,” OSCE, 29
Human Rights Monitor, 4 December 2020, December 2020,
www.shrmonitor.org/outrageous-and-unacceptable- www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/f/476461.pdf
hungarian-foreign-minister-complains-about- (accessed 27 May 2021).
situation-in-ukrainian-region-at-osce-ministerial-
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 8of incidents in non-government- armed missions to a participating state, let
controlled areas.18 alone one still facing an active conflict.21 A
The SMM remains a purely civilian mission 2016 suggestion by then President of
that monitors the conflict but cannot Ukraine Petro Poroshenko that the SMM
intervene, at least, not on the spot, as this should be armed was resolutely rejected by
would require a peacekeeping or -enforcing all the other relevant actors, among other
mandate. The SMM plays a dialogue things because that would expose the, thus
facilitation role on the ground, while far, unarmed civilian monitors to new
initiating and supporting, for instance, threats.22
localized ceasefires to allow the repair of
critical civilian infrastructure, humanitarian In addition, further continuing limitations on
operations and demining.19 This modus the Mission’s current and future mandate
operandi has been preserved even though are linked to funding issues. The SMM’s
Western analysts were already arguing in budget is not part of the OSCE Unified
2016 that – particularly during periods of Budget,23 but linked to and defined by its
conflict escalation – the SMM’s purely “civil specific mandate in the Donbas.24
mandate is not adequate for such a tense
and violent situation”.20 At various stages of the conflict, alongside
discussions of a fundamental transformation
Such ideas, however, not only encounter of the SMM’s mandate, peace operations by
resistance from Russia and its allies among other organizations – notably the UN – have
the OSCE states, but also come up against also been discussed (see below).25 An EU
the fundamental challenge that the OSCE police force for Ukraine was also suggested,
has no experience of the deployment of even though neither of the parties to the
Donbas conflict is a member of the EU.26 The
18 Thematic Report: Restrictions to the SMM’s 23 “Permanent Council Decision No. 1326,” OSCE, 11
Freedom of Movement and Other Impediments to the April 2019, https://www.osce.org/permanent-
Fulfilment of Its Mandate, July-December 2020 (Kyiv: council/417164 (accessed 5 October 2019).
OSCE SMM, 2021), pp. i-ii. 24 “Permanent Council Decision No. 1323,” OSCE, 29
19 Serhiy Tolstov, “Diial’nist’ mizhnarodnyh March 2019, https://www.osce.org/permanent-
organizatsiy v Ukraini: zahal’ni tendentsii ta orientyry,” council/415988 (accessed 5 October 2019).
Viche, no. 4 (2015), pp. 11-15. 25 The earliest such suggestions were: Andrej Novak,
20 Kostanyan Hrant and Stefan Meister, “Ukraine, “What’s Peace in the Donbas Worth to Us? Why the
Russia and the EU: Breaking the Deadlock in the Minsk International Community Should Propose a UN
Process”, CEPS Working Document, no. 423 (2016), p. Protectorate,” Osteuropa-Plattform der Grünen, 4
3, https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8514008 December 2014,
(accessed 1 October 2019). grueneosteuropaplattform.wordpress.com/2014/12/0
21 The only case where the OSCE has mandated an 4/whats-peace-in-the-donbas-worth-to-us-by-andrej-
armed mission regards Nagorno-Karabakh in a future novak/ (accessed 1 October 2019); Volodymyr
situation to oversee a peace deal. Yet, this operation Kravchenko, “‘Blakytni kasky’ u donets’komu stepu,”
has never happened and may never happen as the Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 February 2015,
OSCE Minsk Group was sidelined by Russia and Turkey https://dt.ua/internal/blakitni-kaski-u-doneckomu-
in autumn 2020. stepu-_.html (accessed 1 October 2019).
22 Kateryna Bosko, “Die Debatte um eine bewaffnete 26 On the first such proposal: Steven Blockmans and
OSZE-Mission in der Ostukraine,” Ukraine-Analysen, Daniel Gros, “The Case for EU Police Mission Ukraine,”
no. 171 (2016), pp. 19-20. CEPS, 14 May 2014, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-
publications/case-eu-police-mission-ukraine/
(accessed 1 October 2019). See also later: Oleksiy
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 9supposition behind most of these proposals the SMM in place. The SMM functions as a
was, and still is, that a supplementary kind of thermometer of the conflict. If it
mission (or several combined missions) were forced out of the CADO/CALO or
would complement the current purely became more restricted in its operation, this
civilian efforts of the SMM through would constitute early warning of coming
additional – above all military – means. violence.
However, these debates, so far, remain
hypothetical. Western countries have not The SMM daily reports provide a
yet been ready to send troops to Ukraine considerable amount of data that, with each
while Russia opposes this within the UN passing year, becomes more conclusive. The
Security Council. At one point a proposal constantly growing number of observations
was circulated, by Russia, for a very small allows for synchronic and diachronic
UN operation in Ukraine, but this was not a comparison, statistical analysis and historic
sufficiently robust armed mission that could interpretation. For example, the SMM
have changed the status quo in the occupied recorded 312,554 ceasefire violations in
territories, and was thus rejected by Ukraine 2018, a number that was almost 25% lower
as well as the West.27 than it was in 2017 but largely similar to the
number of such violations recorded in
2016.28
Successes and Hindrances of the
Despite the relatively impressive scale of the
SMM’s Activities SMM, it is too small and, as indicated above,
too restricted in its mobility to adequately
Perhaps the most important cover the more than 17,000 square
accomplishment of the SMM so far is its kilometres of the conflict zone.29 The SMM
longevity on the spot. The mere physical monitoring and reporting methodology also
presence – “to see and be seen” – of has limitations. For instance, the
international observers since the very early observations follow certain patrolling
days of the conflict has raised the threshold algorithms that are perhaps partly known to
for further armed conflict. It has most the combatants rather than the dynamics of
probably prevented escalations and the ceasefire violations. One shot – even if
atrocities that might have happened without fired during an exercise rather than a
Melnyk and Andreas Umland, “Beyond the Minsk 28 “Trends and observations from the Special
Agreements: Why and How a Combined UN/EU Monitoring Mission to Ukraine,” OSCE,
Peacekeeping Mission Could Disentangle the Donbas https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-
Conundrum,” European Council on Foreign Relations, ukraine/417620 (accessed 2 October 2019) as quoted
30 March 2016, in: Härtel, Pisarenko and Umland, “The OSCE’s Special
www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_beyond_the_minsk Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.”
_agreements (accessed 5 October 2019). 29 Azad Safarov, "Novyi plan shchodo Donbasu: OON
27 Andreas Umland, “UN Peacekeeping in Donbas? The ta OBSE vidpovidaiut' za bezpeku, ES – za vidbudovu,"
Stakes of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” European Deutsche Welle, 29 January 2019,
Council on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2018. https://www.dw.com/uk/новий-план-щодо-
ecfr.eu/article/commentary_un_peacekeeping_in_do донбасу-оон-та-обсє-відповідають-за-безпеку-єс-
nbas_the_stakes_of_the_russia_ukraine_confl/ за-відбудову/a-47276080 (accessed 1 October 2019).
(accessed 5 October 2019).
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 10skirmish – may be counted as a violation in to be affected by the ongoing failure of
the same way as far more serious hostile those in control in non-government-
artillery fire would be. If several monitors controlled areas to offer the necessary
security assurances to open forward
and/or sensors hear or see the same bullet
patrol bases (FPBs) in settlements in the
or warhead, each observation could be
vicinity of border areas outside of
counted as a separate incident and thus
government control.30
reported as allegedly constituting several
ceasefire violations. In short, to rely solely Another fundamental oddity of the Mission
on the SMM’s reporting for a depiction of is that Russian citizens, as citizens of an
reality can be misleading. OSCE participating state, are part of the staff
on a permanent basis, in spite of the fact
That said, the effectiveness of the SMM’s that the Kremlin was the original instigator
observation activity over the years has of and continues to drive the conflict.31
greatly improved as a result of increasingly Some of the Russian monitors are suspected
sophisticated monitoring methodology and of espionage.32
technology. A 2021 report by the SMM on
developments in the second half of 2020 The OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian
notes that: Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (but not
Donets’k) is separate from the main OSCE
The SMM continued to operate 27
mission and represents yet another peculiar
cameras – deployed to 23 locations – 19
in government-controlled areas, four in facet of the overall monitoring efforts by the
non-government-controlled areas and OSCE in the Donbas.33 In contrast to these
four between government- and non- two small border locations, the Russia-led
government-controlled areas. The lower separatists deny permanent direct access to
number of SMM cameras in non- other parts of the Russian-Ukrainian border,
government-controlled areas is a where their irregular forces control the
consequence of the refusal of those in Ukrainian side. The area of the OSCE Mission
control of these areas to offer the
at the two Russian checkpoints covers just
necessary support and assistance for
40 metres, of a 409-km border that is
the installation of cameras. […] The
currently not under the control of Ukraine
SMM’s ability to monitor the areas near
the international border continued also (i.e. the section between the separatist so-
called people’s republics and Russia).34 The
30 Thematic Report, pp. 12 & 9. 33 Olena Snihyr, “Rosiys’kyy ekspansionizm u Moldovi,
31 “More Russians among OSCE observers in Donbas. Hruzii ta Ukraini: paraleli ta vidminnosti,” Dzerkalo
Manipulations detected in reports,” InformNapalm, 9 Tyzhnia, 19 May 2018,
January 2020, informnapalm.org/en/more-russians- https://dt.ua/international/rosiyskiy-ekspansionizm-u-
among-osce-observers-in-donbas/ (accessed 9 January moldovi-gruziyi-ta-ukrayini-paraleli-y-vidminnosti-
2020). 278236_.html (accessed 1 October 2019).
32 Allison Quinn, “Russian OSCE monitor in Ukraine 34 Yevheniia Filipenko, “Statement in response to
fired after drunkenly saying he was a Moscow spy,” Ambassador Gyorgy Varga, Chief Observer of the OSCE
The Telegraph, 30 October 2015, Observer Mission at two Russian checkpoints on the
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europ Russian-Ukrainian border,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
e/russia/11965191/Russian-OSCE-monitor-in-Ukraine- of Ukraine, 15 February 2018,
fired-after-drunkenly-saying-he-was-a-Moscow- mfa.gov.ua/en/news/62982-statement-in-response-
spy.html (accessed 1 October 2019). to-ambassador-gyorgy-vargachief-observer-of-the-
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 11SMM ’s official mandate “task[s] observers, increase in SMM staff and resources to
operating under the principles of enable the SMM to provide continuous on-
impartiality and transparency, with the-ground monitoring of this 409-km
monitoring and reporting on the situation at section of border.36
the checkpoints of Donetsk and Gukovo, as
well as on the movements across the One recurring problem of the SMM’s
border”.35 The monitors on the spot, movements in the non-government-
however, are not even allowed to move controlled area in earlier periods was that
around freely on the territory of the very the monitors were threatened or attacked
checkpoints they are supposed to observe. while conducting their patrols.37 In some
The partly irrelevant reports from this cases, OSCE monitors were arrested and
separate and circumscribed second OSCE held by pro-Russian warlords. Sometimes,
mission in the war zone are used by the their cars were fired at.38 Parked vehicles
Kremlin to support Russia’s claims of non- and monitoring equipment were
involvement in the conflict. deliberately destroyed.39 In recent years,
OSCE SMM long-range cameras have
The main function of this separate border frequently been destroyed, turned off or
mission is to provide Moscow with a fig leaf prevented from being installed by Russia-led
argument that the Russian-Ukrainian state separatists.40 UAVs have been jammed and
border is being monitored. The OSCE shot at.
Mission at Gukovo and Donetsk is designed
to distract rather than to inform the public, All this in spite of the fact all the signatories
and to conceal rather than to document to the Minsk Protocol agreed to “ensure
what is going on between the CADO/CALO, permanent monitoring on the Ukrainian-
on one side, and Russia, on the other. What Russian state border and verification by the
is really needed is comprehensive OSCE, together with the creation of a safety
monitoring of the entire perimeter currently zone in the border regions of Ukraine and
not controlled by Ukraine’s government.
This would, however, demand a significant
osce-observer-missionat-two-russian-checkpoints-on- _monitoring_mission_patrol_comes_under_fire_in_d
the-russian-ukrainian-border (accessed 25 May 2021). onbas (accessed 1 October 2019).
35 “Permanent Council Decision No. 1130,” OSCE, 25 39 Viktor Kotyhorenko, “Chy mozhlyve zhyttia poza
July 2014, www.osce.org/pc/121826 (accessed 1 Mins’kom?” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 24 June 2016,
October 2019). https://dt.ua/internal/chi-mozhlive-zhittya-poza-
36 Tetiana Sylina, “Mins’ka khalabuda,” Dzerkalo minskom-_.html (accessed 1 October 2019).
tyzhnia, 28 August 2015, 40 “Neshchodavno vstanovlenu na skhodi Ukrainy
https://dt.ua/internal/minska-halabuda-_.html kameru SMM OBSE znyshcheno vohnem zi strilets’koi
(accessed 1 October 2019). zbroi,” OSCE, 10 August 2017,
37 Ihor Ievtushenko, “The role and place of https://www.osce.org/uk/special-monitoring-mission-
international organizations in the settlement of armed to-ukraine/335281 (accessed 5 October 2019);
conflicts in the southeast of Ukraine (legal aspects),” “Boiovyky ‘DNR’ vidkliuchyly kamery OBSE v raiyoni
Problems of Legality, no. 131 (2015), pp. 124-132. Donets’koho aeroportu,” Ukrinform, 23 May 2016,
38 “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission patrol comes https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/2021679-
under fire in Donbas,” Censor.net, 10 June 2019, bojoviki-dnr-vidklucili-kameri-obse-v-rajoni-
https://censor.net.ua/en/news/3131451/osce_special doneckogo-aeroportu.html (accessed 1 October
2019).
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 12the Russian Federation”.41 In April 2021, As the Ukraine expert, Olena Snyhir, among
OSCE Secretary General Helga Schmid others, has pointed out: “[t]he OSCE has the
declared: “I am deeply concerned by recent legal instrument to remove the aggressor
incidents affecting the SMM, notably heavy state from its conflict resolution activities –
interference with its technical assets and a ‘consensus minus one’ principle that was
persistent freedom of movement adopted at the Prague OSCE Council of
restrictions. The SMM’s safe and secure Ministers in 1992 and employed only once
access throughout Ukraine is more in relation to former Yugoslavia”.44 Thus far,
important than ever in the current however, the OSCE has not been willing or
circumstances of heightened tensions in the able to use this mechanism with regard to
region”.42 Russia’s deliberate circumscription of the
SMM’s overall role, concrete mandate, size
The OSCE is an intergovernmental and operation.
organization that makes its decisions by
consensus, which means that the Sword of
Damocles of a veto by Russia and its allies Policy Recommendations on the
always looms large. This constrains and even
shapes the political agenda, daily behaviour
SMM and Conflict Management
and external communications of the
Organization and its sub-units. Such defects In spite of Russian resistance, Western
become especially dysfunctional when it is policymakers and diplomats should attempt
necessary, as in the case of Russia’s role in to improve the scope and efficiency of the
Transnistria, South Ossetia or the Donbas, to SMM’s framework and operation in the
clearly and officially identify a party to a following ways:
“hybrid” conflict that is a member of the
OSCE.43 Not only Moscow-controlled and 1. Organizational set-up: The SMM
equipped paramilitary units, but also should be given as much autonomy,
Russia’s regular army have been active in freedom and leeway as possible
the CADO/CALO and large amounts of within the OSCE with regard to its
weapons have crossed the Russian- internal conduct, operation on the
Ukrainian border, but none of this has ever spot, public performance and official
been explicitly pointed out in the SMM’s reporting. At the same time, the
reporting. SMM’s separate budget should be
integrated into the OSCE’s general
budget to secure its connection to
41 “Protokol,” point 4. Donbass-Konflikts,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol.
42 As quoted in: “OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Linde and 57, no. 4 (2016), pp. 586-613.
Secretary General Schmid discussed recent 44 Olena Snihyr, “OBSE v Ukraini: rol’ Rosii, SMM ta
developments in and around Ukraine,” OSCE, 18 April pytannia myrotvorchoho kontyngentu,” Ukrains’ka
2021, www.osce.org/chairmanship/483818 (accessed pryzma, 4 October 2016, http://prismua.org/osce-
on 5 May 2021). ukraine-role-russia-smm-peacekeepers/ (accessed 1
43 Ulrich Schneckener, “Hybrider Krieg in Zeiten der October 2019), as quoted in: Härtel, Pisarenko and
Geopolitik? Zur Deutung und Charakterisierung des Umland, “The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine.”
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 13the Organization and continued inventory (i.e. Russian-supplied
operation for as long as necessary. weapons). In view of the recent
The SMM should cooperate more build-up of the Russian military
closely and ideally be unified with presence in the Black Sea, the SMM
the OSCE’s separate mission at may want to increase its presence in
Gukovo and Donetsk. Because of the mainland southern Ukraine,
especially high demands of the especially by the Azov Sea and
SMM, staff recruited to it should be Isthmus of Perekop. At the same
required to have previous time, the SMM should be shielded
operational experience in other from engaging in non-core activities,
missions. Some SMM staff should such as monitoring the situation of
have relevant civilian and not only the Hungarian minority in western
military or police experience in Ukraine. The OSCE member states
order to improve social patrolling and the EU should continue to
and comprehensive reporting by the provide sufficient funding for the
entire Mission. Inept staff members SMM to operate. The Mission’s
should be swiftly replaced without budget should be further increased
politicization by the sending in order to: (a) enlarge the number
participating state. The gender of monitors and other staff; (b)
balance could be improved among improve the SMM’s current
senior managers and in certain technical equipment, including UAVs
other personnel categories. This and cameras; and (c) obtain new
would, among other things, enhance equipment such as artillery sensors
diversity and facilitate more and radar systems. The SMM’s
effective social patrolling. monitors should, to the extent
possible, investigate and report
2. Modalities of observation: Western military fatalities in addition to
politicians and diplomats should put civilian casualties. At the same time,
pressure on Russia to allow the the Mission’s monitors should more
SMM full, permanent, unhindered fully engage in observation and
and round-the-clock freedom of description of important
movement and access to all parts of humanitarian issues, especially in
the conflict zone, especially on the the non-government controlled
Russian-Ukrainian border and ideally areas, linked not least to the grave
to Crimea. More emphasis should human rights violations in the two
be put on reporting and highlighting pseudo-republics’ notorious
the presence of military equipment detention systems and torture
on Ukraine’s territory that is not in prisons.45
the Ukrainian armed forces’
45Stanislav Aseyev and Andreas Umland, “‘Isolation’: isolation-torture-prison/ (accessed 2 May 2021); Halya
Donetsk’s Torture Prison,” Harvard International Coynash, “Human Rights Violations in the Occupied
Review, 4 December 2020, hir.harvard.edu/donetsks- Parts of Ukraine’s Donbas since 2014,” UI Reports on
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 143. Content and style of reporting: internal weekly reports should be
Reporting from the SMM should be: made public immediately while a
(a) more reflective of the monitors’ biweekly or monthly working paper
recorded observations on the spot series could publish scholarly and
(for example, the absence of narrowly focused analyses of certain
unequivocal evidence for certain SMM-recorded events and
violations is often not evidence of developments by qualified internal
an absence of such violations); (b) or external experts. A future special
clearer and more transparent in reporting system for mainland
terms of the political meaning of southern Ukraine, in case of an
reported facts; and (c) more escalation there, should perhaps
analytical and interpretative in its already be being contemplated. The
presentation. The filtering, redacting Mission’s direct interaction with
and coding of the information that governmental institutions,
flows from the monitors into the interested media outlets, specialized
published reports should be think tanks, relevant NGOs and
reduced to a technical minimum. other international bodies, and
The political censorship and self- individual academic researchers
censorship linked to the consensus- should be intensified in order to
based nature of organizations such improve the verification, circulation
as the OSCE need as far as possible and interpretation of the vast
to be avoided. As much as possible amount of information collected by
(in the light of various security and the SMM.
privacy considerations) of the large
amount of raw oral, verbal, 4. Accompanying measures:
numerical, visual and audial data Discussion of a fundamental
collected by the SMM – especially reformatting of the current Mission,
the imagery from UAVs and such as an arming or a substantive
satellites – should be made openly extension, should be conducted
accessible to the public sooner cautiously so as not to endanger the
rather than later. The current daily continuing existence of the SMM as
reporting format may not be an OSCE operation for as long as the
necessary during times of low- conflict exists. A qualitative
intensity conflict, when upgrading of the current
approximately three – analytical international engagement in the
rather than merely factual – reports Donbas could be sought through
per week from the SMM may be other organizations and
sufficient. The SMM’s current
Human Rights and Security in Eastern Europe, no. 1 Areas of the Donbas,” UI Reports on Human Rights
(2021), https://www.ui.se/globalassets/butiken/ui- and Security in Eastern Europe, no. 2 (2021),
report/ui-report-no.-1-2021.pdf (accessed 2 May www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-
2021); Stanislav Aseyev and Andreas Umland, publications/2021/ui-report-no-2-2021.pdf (accessed
“Prisoners as Political Commodities in the Occupied 2 May 2021).
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 15institutions.46 This would concern, publication projects based on SMM
above all, additional autonomous reports.
OSCE institutions explicitly
mandated to cooperate with the 5. Towards a conflict solution: Ukraine
SMM, such as the Office for and its Western partners should
Democratic Institutions and Human continue to raise the issue of a large
Rights (ODIHR) Representative on classical UN-mandated, combined
Freedom of the Media (RFoM) and armed and civilian peacekeeping
High Commissioner on National mission to the Donbas. The task of
Minorities (HCNM). These structures such an operation, in close
could become more involved in the cooperation with the Ukrainian
monitoring and reporting of state, the SMM, the ODIHR, ReoM,
violations of OSCE commitments in the HCNM and the CoE, would be to
the non-government-controlled ensure Russian troop withdrawal
areas while also cooperating more and Ukraine’s full control over its
closely with the SMM, the United international border, as well as the
Nations, the Council of Europe (CoE) necessary conditions for the
and other actors in the international eventual holding of legitimate
community. The EU could, within its parliamentary elections (within
now fully functioning Association single-mandate districts), and
Agreement with Ukraine, return to regional as well as local elections in
the spring of 2014 idea of an EU the currently non-government-
police mission to eastern Ukraine, controlled areas.47 Western
although such an operation would governments should already today
probably only get access to be developing contingency plans for
government-controlled areas. the deployment and funding of a
Within the EU’s Eastern Partnership full-scale and sufficiently armed UN
programme, or other Ukraine- mission as well as a temporary
related multilateral initiatives, a international civilian administration
range of conflict-related initiatives in eastern Ukraine, in the highly
might be possible to support the unlikely event that Russia agrees in
activities of the OSCE in Ukraine the Security Council to such a
through, for instance, research and solution to the Donbas conflict.48
46 Whether an attempt to fully re-establish the Joint 47 Michael Georg Link, “Die Wahlbeobachter müssen
Control and Coordination Commission, which auf die Krim,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 May 2015,
consisted of Russian and Ukrainian military officers www.nzz.ch/meinung/debatte/standards-nicht-zum-
and existed between 2015 and 2017, would make halben-preis-1.18544519?reduced=true (accessed 20
sense is, in view of of its ambiguous record as a May 2021).
bilateral organ and defunct initiative, contested. 48 Carl Bildt, “Is Peace in Donbass Possible?” European
Walter Kemp, “Moving from War to Peace in Ukraine: Council on Foreign Relations, 12 October 2017,
The Role of a Joint Military Commission,” Security and www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_is_peace_in_donba
Human Rights Monitor, 29 April 2020, s_possible (accessed 1 October 2019); Andreas
www.shrmonitor.org/moving-from-war-to-peace-the- Umland, “Re-Imagining and Solving the Donbas
role-of-a-joint-military-commission/ (accessed 2 May Conflict: A Four-Stage Plan for Western and Ukrainian
2021). Actors,” Foreign Policy Association, 29 August 2018,
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 16foreignpolicyblogs.com/2018/08/29/re-imagining- western-and-ukrainian-actors/ (accessed 1 October and-solving-the-donbas-conflict-a-four-stage-plan-for- 2019). © 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 17
Acknowledgements This report relies on, among other things, a number of informal conversations with previous or current SMM and other OSCE officers whose kind but anonymous assistance is gratefully acknowledged. It also heavily draws on a 2020 research paper focused on the Ukrainian critique of the SMM, co-written by Umland with Dr. André Härtel (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg) as well as Anton Pisarenko (Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv). That longer article “The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine” is forthcoming in the journal Security and Human Rights (Brill/Nijhoff) in 2021, and was produced, in 2019-2021, within the project “Collective Action of Non-State Armed Groups in the Ukrainian Conflict: A Comparison of Pro-Russian and Ukrainian Non-state Armed Groups”49 funded by the Volkswagen Foundation in Germany. 49 Dimensions: Collective Action of Non-state Armed groups in the Ukrainian Conflict (a Comparison of Pro- Russian and Ukrainian Non-state Armed Groups). Available at: app.dimensions.ai/details/grant/grant.4974241 (accessed 8 June 2021). © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
About UI Established in 1938, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) is an independent research institute on foreign affairs and international relations. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. All manuscripts are reviewed. Copyright of this publication is held by UI. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of UI. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Visiting Address: Drottning Kristinas väg 37, Stockholm Postal Address: Box 27 035, 102 51 Stockholm Phone: +46 8 511 768 00 www.ui.se info@ui.se Twitter: @UISweden @ResearchUI
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